{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Agentic frameworks operate at a tempo that defeats manual response and single-behavior logic; a coordinated hunt for the 'unmanaged-access + automated-burst' pattern is required to identify automated persistence in cloud control planes."
      },
      "name": "Agentic Identity and Cloud Control Plane Exploitation",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1078",
        "attack.t1059",
        "attack.t1090.003",
        "attack.t1505.003",
        "command and control",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "inside-the-loop-five-ai-attack-frameworks-that-never-ask-permission",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "high-tempo-command-execution",
          "reason": "This hunt identifies the cloud entry, while the follow-on hunt looks at the host-level command bursts.",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "category": "identity",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single detection rule might flag a suspicious User-Agent, but it cannot correlate the 'Identity + Automation + Endpoint' triad. The hunt context allows an analyst to weigh whether a rare Boto3 agent is a new developer or an ARTEX worker.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
          "steps": [
            "untrusted-cloud-sign-ins",
            "rare-automation-user-agents",
            "endpoint-cloud-tooling"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "high-tempo-command-execution",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "persistence-via-implants-and-webshells",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-and-proxy-infrastructure",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Initial Access via Extensions and Exploits",
            "slug": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1176",
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "ARTEX browser extension recording authenticated sessions",
              "Vulnerability discovery scanning using stock settings",
              "Exploitation of public-facing web applications",
              "User-Agent strings identifying frameworks"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Agentic Cloud and Identity Access",
            "slug": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1078"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Sign-ins to AWS, Entra ID, Slack, and GitHub",
              "Abuse of recorded session tokens from extensions",
              "Automation of cloud CLI tools for account access"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "High-Tempo Command and Tool Execution",
            "slug": "high-tempo-command-execution",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059",
              "T1558.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Command bursts occurring in 2-25 second intervals",
              "Execution of curl, shells, and cloud CLIs",
              "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server function calls (HexStrike)",
              "Reflector agents sending human-like message responses (PentAGI)",
              "Credential access actions including Kerberoasting"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Persistence via Implants and WebShells",
            "slug": "persistence-via-implants-and-webshells",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1505.003",
              "T1547.001",
              "T1053.005"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "CyberStrikeAI WebShell manager connections",
              "Creation of custom implants checking in every 5 seconds",
              "Registry Run keys for implant startup",
              "Windows Scheduled Tasks for recurring execution",
              "Dropping of coding agent workers in containers (Cairn)"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "C2 and Proxy Infrastructure",
            "slug": "c2-and-proxy-infrastructure",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1090.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Connections to Telegram, Slack, Discord, and DingTalk C2 listeners",
              "DNS queries for update.pentagi.com and com.apple.systemupdate",
              "Traffic targeting 224.0.0.0",
              "Routing through multi-hop proxies to bypass IP bans"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Agentic offensive frameworks like ARTEX and CyberStrikeAI automate attack sequences using LLM planners to orchestrate tools like scanners, cloud CLIs, and custom implants in high-tempo bursts. These frameworks frequently bypass human authorization, interacting with cloud control planes and host endpoints via rapid-fire command execution and persistent backdoors."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Focus on AWS, Entra ID, and GitHub logs. Look for successful sign-ins where device compliance is false or missing, then use those source hosts to narrow the endpoint process search.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder is using an agentic framework to automate cloud API interactions and identity access, characterized by successful sign-ins from unmanaged devices followed by high-tempo API bursts and local CLI tool usage.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Workstation or server names identified in the sign-in scoping to focus endpoint process analysis."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "target_providers": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "aws",
            "github",
            "azure_ad",
            "m365",
            "slack"
          ],
          "description": "Cloud and SaaS providers targeted by agentic frameworks."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex",
          "name": "Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "limited-cloud-logging",
          "risk": "A hunt relying only on management events will miss high-tempo data exfiltration bursts.",
          "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
          "question": "whether individual read/write operations inside a storage bucket were performed",
          "requires": "Detailed CloudTrail Data Events or UAL Advanced Audit"
        },
        {
          "id": "ephemeral-infrastructure",
          "risk": "If the endpoint agent is not present on the container host, the process activity will be invisible, leaving only the cloud API logs.",
          "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
          "question": "whether the framework ran inside a short-lived container (e.g. Cairn)",
          "requires": "hb_process_activity with container context"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Agentic Identity and Cloud Control Plane Exploitation",
    "description": "This hunt identifies the footprint of agentic offensive frameworks like ARTEX and CyberStrikeAI in cloud environments. These frameworks automate the 'think-time' of an operator, issuing API commands in bursts of 2 to 25 seconds. We look for successful authentications to cloud and SaaS providers (AWS, GitHub, Entra ID) from unmanaged devices or unknown hosts, then correlate these identities with high-frequency API activity and the use of automated User-Agents or local cloud CLI tools that are rare across the environment. An agent evaluates the temporal proximity of the sign-in to the API bursts to distinguish automated agents from human administrators."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "inside-the-loop-five-ai-attack-frameworks-that-never-ask-permission",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
            "steps": [
              "untrusted-cloud-sign-ins",
              "rare-automation-user-agents",
              "endpoint-cloud-tooling"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "high-tempo-command-execution",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "persistence-via-implants-and-webshells",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-and-proxy-infrastructure",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder is using an agentic framework to automate cloud API interactions and identity access, characterized by successful sign-ins from unmanaged devices followed by high-tempo API bursts and local CLI tool usage.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "limited-cloud-logging",
            "risk": "A hunt relying only on management events will miss high-tempo data exfiltration bursts.",
            "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
            "question": "whether individual read/write operations inside a storage bucket were performed",
            "requires": "Detailed CloudTrail Data Events or UAL Advanced Audit"
          },
          {
            "id": "ephemeral-infrastructure",
            "risk": "If the endpoint agent is not present on the container host, the process activity will be invisible, leaving only the cloud API logs.",
            "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
            "question": "whether the framework ran inside a short-lived container (e.g. Cairn)",
            "requires": "hb_process_activity with container context"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus on AWS, Entra ID, and GitHub logs. Look for successful sign-ins where device compliance is false or missing, then use those source hosts to narrow the endpoint process search.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single detection rule might flag a suspicious User-Agent, but it cannot correlate the 'Identity + Automation + Endpoint' triad. The hunt context allows an analyst to weigh whether a rare Boto3 agent is a new developer or an ARTEX worker."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "untrusted-cloud-sign-ins",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Cloud sign-ins from unmanaged devices",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_endpoint_hostname, device_hostname, provider, device_trust_type, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE activity_id = 1 AND status_id = 1 AND (device_is_compliant = 'false' OR device_trust_type IS NULL OR device_trust_type = '') AND instr(',' || '{{target_providers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(provider) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_auth_signin",
        "description": "Identify successful authentications to critical cloud platforms originating from unmanaged devices or unknown workstations, providing the lead for session abuse.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of users and source hosts that signed into cloud services without a managed device context. Silence suggests all sign-ins were from trusted devices."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Cloud sign-ins from unmanaged devices",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "src_endpoint_hostname",
          "device_hostname",
          "provider",
          "device_trust_type",
          "device_is_compliant",
          "status_id",
          "activity_id",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_auth_signin",
        "target": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_endpoint_hostname, device_hostname, provider, device_trust_type, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE activity_id = 1 AND status_id = 1 AND (device_is_compliant = 'false' OR device_trust_type IS NULL OR device_trust_type = '') AND instr(',' || '{{target_providers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(provider) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of users and source hosts that signed into cloud services without a managed device context. Silence suggests all sign-ins were from trusted devices.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-automation-user-agents",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare automated User-Agents in cloud API logs",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT user_agent, actor_user_name, provider, COUNT(DISTINCT cloud_account_uid) AS accounts, COUNT(*) AS calls, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE (LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%python%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%boto%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%aws-cli%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%curl%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY user_agent, actor_user_name, provider HAVING accounts <= 2",
        "surface": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "description": "Detect non-browser tools like Boto3 or Python-requests that are rare across the environment, which often facilitate agentic framework interactions.",
        "expected_signal": "User-Agents corresponding to scripting libraries or CLIs seen on very few cloud accounts. Normal administrative scripts might appear, but framework defaults will be distinct."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "untrusted-cloud-sign-ins"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare automated User-Agents in cloud API logs",
        "reads": [
          "user_agent",
          "actor_user_name",
          "provider",
          "cloud_account_uid",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT user_agent, actor_user_name, provider, COUNT(DISTINCT cloud_account_uid) AS accounts, COUNT(*) AS calls, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE (LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%python%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%boto%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%aws-cli%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%curl%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY user_agent, actor_user_name, provider HAVING accounts <= 2",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "User-Agents corresponding to scripting libraries or CLIs seen on very few cloud accounts. Normal administrative scripts might appear, but framework defaults will be distinct.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "cloud_account_uid",
          "key": [
            "user_agent"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "endpoint-cloud-tooling",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Cloud CLI and scripting on endpoints",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%aws%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%az.exe%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%gcloud%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%python%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%terraform%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Correlate cloud API activity with local process execution of cloud CLI tools or scripting interpreters, scoped to the hosts from the first step.",
        "expected_signal": "Execution of cloud management tools or scripting interpreters on the identified hosts. Silence means no such tools ran on the scoped hosts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "untrusted-cloud-sign-ins"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Cloud CLI and scripting on endpoints",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%aws%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%az.exe%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%gcloud%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%python%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%terraform%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Execution of cloud management tools or scripting interpreters on the identified hosts. Silence means no such tools ran on the scoped hosts.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-agentic-activity",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage Identity and API Evidence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity"
        ],
        "context": [
          "untrusted-cloud-sign-ins",
          "rare-automation-user-agents",
          "endpoint-cloud-tooling"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the combination of unmanaged cloud sign-ins, rare automation user-agents, and local cloud CLI usage indicates an automated offensive framework like ARTEX or CyberStrikeAI. Analyze the timing: do the API calls and local processes start immediately after the unmanaged sign-in?",
        "description": "Synthesize sign-in data, user-agent rarity, and local process activity to determine if an agentic loop is active.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A per-user and per-host verdict on whether the activity represents a malicious agentic framework.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per identity, citing specific rows and timestamps."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "rare-automation-user-agents",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "endpoint-cloud-tooling",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "evaluate-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Evaluate Triage Verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one user identity",
        "condition": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one user identity",
        "blind_spot": "limited-cloud-logging",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route to containment if an agentic framework is confirmed.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-agentic-activity"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "revoke-sessions",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Revoke Cloud Sessions",
      "config": {
        "target": "identity",
        "description": "Neutralize the automated agent by revoking tokens and forcing a re-authentication.",
        "instructions": "Revoke all active sessions and refresh tokens for the identified user across the impacted cloud providers. Reset credentials and rotate access keys if applicable.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-manual-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst review and tuning",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the agent's findings and distinguish malicious automation from legitimate administrative work.",
        "instructions": "Review the identified User-Agents and local process command lines. Correlate with internal engineering schedules to ensure these weren't legitimate automation tasks. If malicious, initiate the full incident response process."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "evaluate-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "revoke-sessions"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document findings and update baseline for known automation.",
        "instructions": "Document the identified automated User-Agents. If benign, add them to a known-automation allow-list for future periodic hunts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-manual-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}