{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "AI-enabled frameworks allow attackers to scale identity compromises across thousands of tenants at machine speeds; a negative result over the estate confirms that automated persistence tradecraft is not active."
      },
      "name": "AI-Driven Identity and Cloud Exploitation",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1110.003",
        "attack.t1098",
        "attack.t1550.001",
        "attack.t1078.004",
        "command and control",
        "credential access",
        "discovery",
        "initial access",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "artex-and-beyond-ai-enabled-penetration-testing-platforms",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on identity and cloud persistence; external vulnerability exploitation requires hb_http_activity and is handled separately.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "category": "identity",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A standard rule detects individual password sprays; this hunt correlates the spray with Graph API manipulation and rare role assignments across three surfaces, providing the context to identify an orchestrated AI intrusion.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
          "steps": [
            "lead-spraying-ips"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "cloud-privilege-manipulation",
          "steps": [
            "app-credential-changes",
            "role-assignment-changes"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "internal-discovery-automation",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "automated-credential-harvesting",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Automated Vulnerability Probing",
            "slug": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Acunetix web scanner",
              "Nessus vulnerability scanner",
              "Interactsh out-of-band detection",
              "Inbound scanning traffic from ARTEX-associated C2 IPs"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "High-Velocity Credential Spraying",
            "slug": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1110.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Accelerated sign-in attempts against downstream Microsoft 365 tenants",
              "Compromised ConnectWise application credentials used for multi-tenant access"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Orchestrated C2 and Tunneling",
            "slug": "orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "VShell C2 framework",
              "AdaptixC2 framework",
              "Chisel TCP/UDP tunneling",
              "Net Proxy Server (NPS) tunneling",
              "multios.trojan.adaptixc2 signature"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Internal Discovery Automation",
            "slug": "internal-discovery-automation",
            "tactic": "discovery",
            "techniques": [
              "T1046"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "fscan internal network scanner",
              "multios.tool.fscan signature"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Automated Credential Harvesting",
            "slug": "automated-credential-harvesting",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1003.001",
              "T1555"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Mimikatz execution",
              "LSASS memory access",
              "Credential leak management services integration"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Cloud Privilege Manipulation",
            "slug": "cloud-privilege-manipulation",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1098"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Microsoft Graph API activity",
              "Entra ID application credential changes",
              "Role assignment and privilege modifications"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Threat actors are leveraging AI-driven penetration testing frameworks like ARTEX and PentAGI to automate reconnaissance, credential spraying, and post-exploitation at machine speed. These frameworks orchestrate a variety of offensive tools including C2 frameworks (VShell, AdaptixC2), tunneling utilities (Chisel, NPS), and internal scanners (fscan) to rapidly compromise targets across both endpoint and cloud environments."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Focus on Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365 tenants. High-velocity spraying is best identified on the sign-in surface, while persistence moves appear in cloud API and entity management logs.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An adversary is using an AI-orchestration framework to conduct high-velocity credential spraying against Entra ID and subsequently manipulate application credentials or directory roles for persistence at machine speed.",
      "parameters": {
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "standard-retention",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine for identity activity."
        },
        "spray_threshold": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "talos-artex-report",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "10",
          "description": "Minimum number of unique accounts targeted by a single IP to qualify as a spray lead."
        },
        "privileged_roles": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "talos-artex-report",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "Global Administrator",
            "Application Administrator",
            "Cloud Application Administrator",
            "Privileged Role Administrator"
          ],
          "description": "High-privilege Entra ID roles to monitor for unauthorized assignments."
        },
        "sensitive_api_ops": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "talos-artex-report",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "Add application password",
            "Add key credential",
            "Update application",
            "Add service principal"
          ],
          "description": "API operations indicating application credential manipulation in Entra ID."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/",
          "name": "ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "m365-audit-latency",
          "risk": "A machine-speed framework may complete its objective before the logs are available for the hunt, leading to a delayed response.",
          "owner": "Cloud Infrastructure Team",
          "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
          "question": "whether the spraying happened in the last 60 minutes",
          "requires": "low-latency telemetry for M365 Unified Audit Log",
          "remediation": "Enable high-priority log streaming for Entra ID audit events."
        },
        {
          "id": "residential-proxy-evasion",
          "risk": "If the attacker uses residential proxies as reported for Hephaestus, a single IP threshold might miss a distributed spray.",
          "owner": "Security Operations",
          "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
          "question": "which IPs are residential proxies used to bypass per-IP thresholds",
          "requires": "hb_auth_signin with is_proxy data",
          "remediation": "Review accounts with failures from multiple 'New Geo-Location' behaviors in Okta/Entra data."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "AI-Driven Identity and Cloud Exploitation",
    "description": "This hunt targets the high-speed identity exploitation patterns observed in ARTEX campaigns, specifically the automation of credential spraying and follow-on cloud control-plane manipulation. It begins by identifying source IPs exhibiting automated sign-in failure patterns across many accounts in a short window. The hunt then fans out to search for correlated evidence of persistence, such as an actor adding application passwords via Microsoft Graph or unauthorized directory role assignments. An agent evaluates the temporal and actor-based links between the spraying activity and the administrative changes to confirm an AI-driven intrusion."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "artex-and-beyond-ai-enabled-penetration-testing-platforms",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
            "steps": [
              "lead-spraying-ips"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "cloud-privilege-manipulation",
            "steps": [
              "app-credential-changes",
              "role-assignment-changes"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "internal-discovery-automation",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "automated-credential-harvesting",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An adversary is using an AI-orchestration framework to conduct high-velocity credential spraying against Entra ID and subsequently manipulate application credentials or directory roles for persistence at machine speed.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "m365-audit-latency",
            "risk": "A machine-speed framework may complete its objective before the logs are available for the hunt, leading to a delayed response.",
            "owner": "Cloud Infrastructure Team",
            "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
            "question": "whether the spraying happened in the last 60 minutes",
            "requires": "low-latency telemetry for M365 Unified Audit Log",
            "remediation": "Enable high-priority log streaming for Entra ID audit events."
          },
          {
            "id": "residential-proxy-evasion",
            "risk": "If the attacker uses residential proxies as reported for Hephaestus, a single IP threshold might miss a distributed spray.",
            "owner": "Security Operations",
            "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
            "question": "which IPs are residential proxies used to bypass per-IP thresholds",
            "requires": "hb_auth_signin with is_proxy data",
            "remediation": "Review accounts with failures from multiple 'New Geo-Location' behaviors in Okta/Entra data."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus on Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365 tenants. High-velocity spraying is best identified on the sign-in surface, while persistence moves appear in cloud API and entity management logs.",
        "beyond_detection": "A standard rule detects individual password sprays; this hunt correlates the spray with Graph API manipulation and rare role assignments across three surfaces, providing the context to identify an orchestrated AI intrusion."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "lead-spraying-ips",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "High-velocity credential spraying IPs",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, user_agent, src_location_country, COUNT(DISTINCT actor_user_name) AS unique_accounts_targeted, COUNT(*) AS failure_count, MIN(time) AS first_failure, MAX(time) AS last_failure, (julianday(MAX(time)) - julianday(MIN(time))) * 24 AS duration_hours FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE status_id = 2 AND provider IN ('azure_ad', 'm365') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, user_agent, src_location_country HAVING unique_accounts_targeted >= {{spray_threshold}} AND duration_hours < 1.0 ORDER BY unique_accounts_targeted DESC",
        "surface": "hb_auth_signin",
        "description": "Identify source IPs that target a large number of unique accounts with authentication failures in under one hour, suggesting the use of an automated framework like ARTEX.",
        "expected_signal": "Source IPs targeting multiple accounts in a burst under one hour. The user agent and country help distinguish automated infrastructure from legitimate corporate clusters."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "High-velocity credential spraying IPs",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "provider",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "src_location_country",
          "status_id",
          "time",
          "user_agent"
        ],
        "source": "hb_auth_signin",
        "target": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, user_agent, src_location_country, COUNT(DISTINCT actor_user_name) AS unique_accounts_targeted, COUNT(*) AS failure_count, MIN(time) AS first_failure, MAX(time) AS last_failure, (julianday(MAX(time)) - julianday(MIN(time))) * 24 AS duration_hours FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE status_id = 2 AND provider IN ('azure_ad', 'm365') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, user_agent, src_location_country HAVING unique_accounts_targeted >= {{spray_threshold}} AND duration_hours < 1.0 ORDER BY unique_accounts_targeted DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Source IPs targeting multiple accounts in a burst under one hour. The user agent and country help distinguish automated infrastructure from legitimate corporate clusters.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "app-credential-changes",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Application credential modifications",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT time, actor_user_name, api_operation, resource_name, src_endpoint_ip, status FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE provider = 'azure_ad' AND instr(',' || '{{sensitive_api_ops}}' || ',', ',' || api_operation || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "description": "Find instances where an actor added application credentials to establish persistence after a successful spray.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows indicate where an actor added application credentials such as passwords or keys. Correlating these actors with the spraying IPs provides high-fidelity evidence."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "lead-spraying-ips"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Application credential modifications",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "api_operation",
          "provider",
          "resource_name",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "status",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT time, actor_user_name, api_operation, resource_name, src_endpoint_ip, status FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE provider = 'azure_ad' AND instr(',' || '{{sensitive_api_ops}}' || ',', ',' || api_operation || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows indicate where an actor added application credentials such as passwords or keys. Correlating these actors with the spraying IPs provides high-fidelity evidence.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "role-assignment-changes",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Privileged role assignments",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT entity_name AS role_name, actor_user_name, operation_type, time, device_hostname FROM hb_entity_management WHERE provider = 'azure_ad' AND activity_id IN (1, 3, 99) AND instr(',' || '{{privileged_roles}}' || ',', ',' || entity_name || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_entity_management",
        "description": "Identify accounts granted high-privilege directory roles, tracking both standard and non-standard assignment operations.",
        "expected_signal": "Unexpected grants of Global Admin or similar roles. AI frameworks typically move to this stage rapidly after breaching an account."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "lead-spraying-ips"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Privileged role assignments",
        "reads": [
          "activity_id",
          "actor_user_name",
          "device_hostname",
          "entity_name",
          "operation_type",
          "provider",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_entity_management",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT entity_name AS role_name, actor_user_name, operation_type, time, device_hostname FROM hb_entity_management WHERE provider = 'azure_ad' AND activity_id IN (1, 3, 99) AND instr(',' || '{{privileged_roles}}' || ',', ',' || entity_name || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "new_this_window"
        },
        "expected": "Unexpected grants of Global Admin or similar roles. AI frameworks typically move to this stage rapidly after breaching an account.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "actor_user_name",
          "key": [
            "entity_name"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "agent-correlation",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage AI-driven identity threats",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity"
        ],
        "context": [
          "lead-spraying-ips",
          "app-credential-changes",
          "role-assignment-changes"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any IPs or accounts from the spraying leads correlate with the application credential or role modifications. Look for temporal proximity and whether a targeted account was subsequently used for an administrative API call.",
        "description": "Analyze the correlation between high-speed spraying IPs and subsequent privileged operations to confirm a machine-speed intrusion.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A confirmed verdict identifying whether the spray led to successful compromise and persistence.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-IP and per-account verdict of malicious or suspicious, citing the relevant rows from all three surfaces."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "app-credential-changes",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "role-assignment-changes",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-result",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the agent verdict is malicious for at least one IP or account, indicating a successful spray and follow-on administrative change",
        "condition": "the agent verdict is malicious for at least one IP or account, indicating a successful spray and follow-on administrative change",
        "blind_spot": "m365-audit-latency",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Immediately route to containment if an automated identity attack is confirmed.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "agent-correlation"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "revoke-sessions",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Revoke sessions and credentials",
      "config": {
        "target": "identity",
        "description": "Immediately contain the breach by revoking tokens and rotating credentials for involved accounts.",
        "instructions": "Revoke all active sessions and OAuth tokens for compromised accounts. Disable the affected application registrations and force a password reset for any involved users.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-result",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "incident-follow-up",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Incident follow-up and investigation",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Conduct a full investigation into the scope of the intrusion and verify remediation.",
        "instructions": "Review all Graph API logs for the compromised accounts to ensure no other applications were backdoored. Verify that the revoked credentials and roles have not been re-instated."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-result",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-result",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "revoke-sessions"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "hunt-closure",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt closure and reporting",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Record findings and update defensive controls.",
        "instructions": "Document the identified spraying IPs and persistence patterns. If a detection candidate query was effective, recommend it for promotion to a standing alert with a threshold adjusted for normal tenant noise."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-result",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "incident-follow-up"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}