---
analysis: A standard rule detects individual password sprays; this hunt correlates
  the spray with Graph API manipulation and rare role assignments across three surfaces,
  providing the context to identify an orchestrated AI intrusion.
blind_spots:
- id: m365-audit-latency
  owner: Cloud Infrastructure Team
  question: whether the spraying happened in the last 60 minutes
  remediation: Enable high-priority log streaming for Entra ID audit events.
  requires: low-latency telemetry for M365 Unified Audit Log
  risk: A machine-speed framework may complete its objective before the logs are available
    for the hunt, leading to a delayed response.
  stage: high-velocity-credential-spraying
- id: residential-proxy-evasion
  owner: Security Operations
  question: which IPs are residential proxies used to bypass per-IP thresholds
  remediation: Review accounts with failures from multiple 'New Geo-Location' behaviors
    in Okta/Entra data.
  requires: hb_auth_signin with is_proxy data
  risk: If the attacker uses residential proxies as reported for Hephaestus, a single
    IP threshold might miss a distributed spray.
  stage: high-velocity-credential-spraying
coverage:
- stage: high-velocity-credential-spraying
  status: covered
  steps:
  - lead-spraying-ips
- stage: cloud-privilege-manipulation
  status: covered
  steps:
  - app-credential-changes
  - role-assignment-changes
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration
    testing platforms'' series.'
  stage: automated-vulnerability-probing
  status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration
    testing platforms'' series.'
  stage: orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling
  status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration
    testing platforms'' series.'
  stage: internal-discovery-automation
  status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration
    testing platforms'' series.'
  stage: automated-credential-harvesting
  status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
  claims: no_unsupported
  evidence: citation_required
  missing_data: not_benign
  telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
  applicability: campaign-specific
  handoff: promote-to-detection
  justification: AI-enabled frameworks allow attackers to scale identity compromises
    across thousands of tenants at machine speeds; a negative result over the estate
    confirms that automated persistence tradecraft is not active.
  methodology: model-assisted
  trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An adversary is using an AI-orchestration framework to conduct high-velocity
  credential spraying against Entra ID and subsequently manipulate application credentials
  or directory roles for persistence at machine speed.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1110.003
- attack.t1098
- attack.t1550.001
- attack.t1078.004
- command and control
- credential access
- discovery
- initial access
- persistence
name: AI-Driven Identity and Cloud Exploitation
parameters:
  lookback_days:
    default: '14'
    description: Days of history to examine for identity activity.
    from:
      kind: manual
      observed: '2026-11-13'
      ref: standard-retention
    type: number
  privileged_roles:
    default:
    - Global Administrator
    - Application Administrator
    - Cloud Application Administrator
    - Privileged Role Administrator
    description: High-privilege Entra ID roles to monitor for unauthorized assignments.
    from:
      kind: article
      observed: '2026-11-13'
      ref: talos-artex-report
    type: list[string]
  sensitive_api_ops:
    default:
    - Add application password
    - Add key credential
    - Update application
    - Add service principal
    description: API operations indicating application credential manipulation in
      Entra ID.
    from:
      kind: article
      observed: '2026-11-13'
      ref: talos-artex-report
    type: list[string]
  spray_threshold:
    default: '10'
    description: Minimum number of unique accounts targeted by a single IP to qualify
      as a spray lead.
    from:
      kind: article
      observed: '2026-11-13'
      ref: talos-artex-report
    type: number
provenance:
  authors:
  - name: Huntbase hunt generation
    org: huntbase.io
  generated:
    by: huntbase-hunt-generation
    from: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/
    gates:
    - dry-run
    - lint
    model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Focus on Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365 tenants. High-velocity spraying
  is best identified on the sign-in surface, while persistence moves appear in cloud
  API and entity management logs.
references:
- name: 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms'
  url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/
related:
- hunt: automated-vulnerability-probing
  reason: This hunt focuses on identity and cloud persistence; external vulnerability
    exploitation requires hb_http_activity and is handled separately.
  relation: out-of-scope-alternative
scenario:
  stages:
  - name: Automated Vulnerability Probing
    observables:
    - Acunetix web scanner
    - Nessus vulnerability scanner
    - Interactsh out-of-band detection
    - Inbound scanning traffic from ARTEX-associated C2 IPs
    slug: automated-vulnerability-probing
    tactic: initial-access
    techniques:
    - T1190
  - name: High-Velocity Credential Spraying
    observables:
    - Accelerated sign-in attempts against downstream Microsoft 365 tenants
    - Compromised ConnectWise application credentials used for multi-tenant access
    slug: high-velocity-credential-spraying
    tactic: credential-access
    techniques:
    - T1110.003
  - name: Orchestrated C2 and Tunneling
    observables:
    - VShell C2 framework
    - AdaptixC2 framework
    - Chisel TCP/UDP tunneling
    - Net Proxy Server (NPS) tunneling
    - multios.trojan.adaptixc2 signature
    slug: orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling
    tactic: command-and-control
    techniques:
    - T1572
  - name: Internal Discovery Automation
    observables:
    - fscan internal network scanner
    - multios.tool.fscan signature
    slug: internal-discovery-automation
    tactic: discovery
    techniques:
    - T1046
  - name: Automated Credential Harvesting
    observables:
    - Mimikatz execution
    - LSASS memory access
    - Credential leak management services integration
    slug: automated-credential-harvesting
    tactic: credential-access
    techniques:
    - T1003.001
    - T1555
  - name: Cloud Privilege Manipulation
    observables:
    - Microsoft Graph API activity
    - Entra ID application credential changes
    - Role assignment and privilege modifications
    slug: cloud-privilege-manipulation
    tactic: persistence
    techniques:
    - T1098
  summary: Threat actors are leveraging AI-driven penetration testing frameworks like
    ARTEX and PentAGI to automate reconnaissance, credential spraying, and post-exploitation
    at machine speed. These frameworks orchestrate a variety of offensive tools including
    C2 frameworks (VShell, AdaptixC2), tunneling utilities (Chisel, NPS), and internal
    scanners (fscan) to rapidly compromise targets across both endpoint and cloud
    environments.
series:
  index: 1
  slug: artex-and-beyond-ai-enabled-penetration-testing-platforms
  title: 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms'
  total: 2
severity: high
targets:
  analyst:
    name: Tier-2 analyst
    role: analyst
  endpoint:
    category: endpoint
    name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
    telemetry:
    - endpoint
  hunter:
    agent: true
    name: Hunt agent
  identity:
    category: identity
    name: Identity / sign-in telemetry
    telemetry:
    - identity
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---


# AI-Driven Identity and Cloud Exploitation

This hunt targets the high-speed identity exploitation patterns observed in ARTEX campaigns, specifically the automation of credential spraying and follow-on cloud control-plane manipulation. It begins by identifying source IPs exhibiting automated sign-in failure patterns across many accounts in a short window. The hunt then fans out to search for correlated evidence of persistence, such as an actor adding application passwords via Microsoft Graph or unauthorized directory role assignments. An agent evaluates the temporal and actor-based links between the spraying activity and the administrative changes to confirm an AI-driven intrusion.

## lead-spraying-ips
<!-- High-velocity credential spraying IPs -->
Identify source IPs that target a large number of unique accounts with authentication failures in under one hour, suggesting the use of an automated framework like ARTEX.

```sqlite target=identity role=detection-candidate params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, spray_threshold=spray_threshold)
~~~yaml
expected: Source IPs targeting multiple accounts in a burst under one hour. The user
  agent and country help distinguish automated infrastructure from legitimate corporate
  clusters.
reads:
- actor_user_name
- provider
- src_endpoint_ip
- src_location_country
- status_id
- time
- user_agent
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_auth_signin
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT src_endpoint_ip, user_agent, src_location_country, COUNT(DISTINCT actor_user_name) AS unique_accounts_targeted, COUNT(*) AS failure_count, MIN(time) AS first_failure, MAX(time) AS last_failure, (julianday(MAX(time)) - julianday(MIN(time))) * 24 AS duration_hours FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE status_id = 2 AND provider IN ('azure_ad', 'm365') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, user_agent, src_location_country HAVING unique_accounts_targeted >= {{spray_threshold}} AND duration_hours < 1.0 ORDER BY unique_accounts_targeted DESC
```

## investigate-fan-out
<!-- Fan out for cloud persistence -->
parallel:
- → app-credential-changes
- → role-assignment-changes
join: → agent-correlation

## app-credential-changes
<!-- Application credential modifications -->
Find instances where an actor added application credentials to establish persistence after a successful spray.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=enrichment params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, sensitive_api_ops=sensitive_api_ops)
~~~yaml
expected: Rows indicate where an actor added application credentials such as passwords
  or keys. Correlating these actors with the spraying IPs provides high-fidelity evidence.
reads:
- actor_user_name
- api_operation
- provider
- resource_name
- src_endpoint_ip
- status
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_cloud_api_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT time, actor_user_name, api_operation, resource_name, src_endpoint_ip, status FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE provider = 'azure_ad' AND instr(',' || '{{sensitive_api_ops}}' || ',', ',' || api_operation || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```

## role-assignment-changes
<!-- Privileged role assignments -->
Identify accounts granted high-privilege directory roles, tracking both standard and non-standard assignment operations.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, privileged_roles=privileged_roles)
~~~yaml
baseline:
  compare: new_this_window
  window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Unexpected grants of Global Admin or similar roles. AI frameworks typically
  move to this stage rapidly after breaching an account.
prevalence:
  by: actor_user_name
  key:
  - entity_name
  rare_below: 3
reads:
- activity_id
- actor_user_name
- device_hostname
- entity_name
- operation_type
- provider
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_entity_management
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT entity_name AS role_name, actor_user_name, operation_type, time, device_hostname FROM hb_entity_management WHERE provider = 'azure_ad' AND activity_id IN (1, 3, 99) AND instr(',' || '{{privileged_roles}}' || ',', ',' || entity_name || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```

## agent-correlation
<!-- Triage AI-driven identity threats -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- lead-spraying-ips
- app-credential-changes
- role-assignment-changes
max_iterations: 5
objective: Determine if any IPs or accounts from the spraying leads correlate with
  the application credential or role modifications. Look for temporal proximity and
  whether a targeted account was subsequently used for an administrative API call.
success_criteria: A per-IP and per-account verdict of malicious or suspicious, citing
  the relevant rows from all three surfaces.
tools:
- endpoint
- identity
```

## route-on-result
<!-- Route on verdict -->
if~: "the agent verdict is malicious for at least one IP or account, indicating a successful spray and follow-on administrative change" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → revoke-sessions
indeterminate: → incident-follow-up
unavailable: → incident-follow-up (blind_spot: m365-audit-latency)
else: → hunt-closure

## revoke-sessions
<!-- Revoke sessions and credentials -->
```action target=identity
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Revoke all active sessions and OAuth tokens for compromised accounts. Disable the affected application registrations and force a password reset for any involved users.
```
→ incident-follow-up

## incident-follow-up
<!-- Incident follow-up and investigation -->
```manual target=analyst
Review all Graph API logs for the compromised accounts to ensure no other applications were backdoored. Verify that the revoked credentials and roles have not been re-instated.
```
→ hunt-closure

## hunt-closure
<!-- Hunt closure and reporting -->
```manual target=analyst
Document the identified spraying IPs and persistence patterns. If a detection candidate query was effective, recommend it for promotion to a standing alert with a threshold adjusted for normal tenant noise.
```
→ end
