{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "AI-enabled frameworks like ARTEX can move from entry to credential theft in minutes; a negative result over the estate confirms no machine-speed maneuvering occurred within the retention window."
      },
      "name": "ARTEX Automated Endpoint and Network Maneuvering",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1572",
        "attack.t1046",
        "attack.t1003.001",
        "attack.t1555",
        "attack.t1105",
        "command and control",
        "credential access",
        "discovery",
        "initial access",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "artex-and-beyond-ai-enabled-penetration-testing-platforms",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
          "reason": "The initial stage of vulnerability probing and web shell deployment is a separate hunt focused on web server logs and public-facing exposures.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "ai-driven-identity-cloud-exploitation",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "While a rule can fire on a specific binary name, this hunt provides the context of machine-speed network scanning and LSASS module interaction, allowing an analyst to identify automated coordination rather than a manual pentest.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling",
          "steps": [
            "offensive-tool-lead",
            "network-discovery-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "internal-discovery-automation",
          "steps": [
            "network-discovery-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "automated-credential-harvesting",
          "steps": [
            "credential-harvesting-triage"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "cloud-privilege-manipulation",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Automated Vulnerability Probing",
            "slug": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Acunetix web scanner",
              "Nessus vulnerability scanner",
              "Interactsh out-of-band detection",
              "Inbound scanning traffic from ARTEX-associated C2 IPs"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "High-Velocity Credential Spraying",
            "slug": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1110.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Accelerated sign-in attempts against downstream Microsoft 365 tenants",
              "Compromised ConnectWise application credentials used for multi-tenant access"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Orchestrated C2 and Tunneling",
            "slug": "orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "VShell C2 framework",
              "AdaptixC2 framework",
              "Chisel TCP/UDP tunneling",
              "Net Proxy Server (NPS) tunneling",
              "multios.trojan.adaptixc2 signature"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Internal Discovery Automation",
            "slug": "internal-discovery-automation",
            "tactic": "discovery",
            "techniques": [
              "T1046"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "fscan internal network scanner",
              "multios.tool.fscan signature"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Automated Credential Harvesting",
            "slug": "automated-credential-harvesting",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1003.001",
              "T1555"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Mimikatz execution",
              "LSASS memory access",
              "Credential leak management services integration"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Cloud Privilege Manipulation",
            "slug": "cloud-privilege-manipulation",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1098"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Microsoft Graph API activity",
              "Entra ID application credential changes",
              "Role assignment and privilege modifications"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Threat actors are leveraging AI-driven penetration testing frameworks like ARTEX and PentAGI to automate reconnaissance, credential spraying, and post-exploitation at machine speed. These frameworks orchestrate a variety of offensive tools including C2 frameworks (VShell, AdaptixC2), tunneling utilities (Chisel, NPS), and internal scanners (fscan) to rapidly compromise targets across both endpoint and cloud environments."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Start with servers and high-value workstation segments. If the lead query is empty, consider widening the offensive_tools list to include generic names like 'scan.exe' or 'tunnel.exe'.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An automated attacker is coordinating dual-use offensive tools like VShell, Chisel, or fscan to perform high-velocity internal discovery and credential harvesting.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "List of hostnames from the scoping step to narrow the behavioral queries; leave empty to hunt across the whole estate."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of historical telemetry to examine."
        },
        "offensive_tools": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "fscan.exe",
            "vshell.exe",
            "chisel.exe",
            "nps.exe",
            "mimikatz.exe",
            "adaptix.exe",
            "gophish.exe"
          ],
          "description": "Names of offensive or dual-use binaries identified in ARTEX worker agent workflows."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/",
          "name": "Cisco Talos \u2014 ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "limited-network-visibility",
          "risk": "An automated agent could perform reconnaissance on unmonitored subnets without triggering the prevalence baseline.",
          "stage": "internal-discovery-automation",
          "question": "whether fscan is scanning segments not captured by endpoint sensors",
          "requires": "hb_network_connection for all internal segments"
        },
        {
          "id": "in-memory-tool-execution",
          "risk": "Tools executed entirely in memory bypass the file-name lead query and are only visible if the module load or process tampering is successfully audited.",
          "stage": "automated-credential-harvesting",
          "question": "whether tools like Mimikatz were loaded directly into memory via shellcode",
          "requires": "hb_process_activity (on_disk = 0) and hb_module_activity"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "ARTEX Automated Endpoint and Network Maneuvering",
    "description": "ARTEX and similar agentic frameworks coordinate worker agents to deploy offensive toolsets at machine speed. This hunt identifies the execution of common binaries used by these agents\u2014including VShell, Chisel, and fscan\u2014and correlates them with behavioral indicators of automated network scanning and unauthorized module loads into LSASS. By examining these signals across process, network, and module telemetry, an analyst can distinguish between a human operator and an objective-driven automated framework."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "artex-and-beyond-ai-enabled-penetration-testing-platforms",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "orchestrated-c2-and-tunneling",
            "steps": [
              "offensive-tool-lead",
              "network-discovery-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "internal-discovery-automation",
            "steps": [
              "network-discovery-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "automated-credential-harvesting",
            "steps": [
              "credential-harvesting-triage"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "automated-vulnerability-probing",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "high-velocity-credential-spraying",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "cloud-privilege-manipulation",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An automated attacker is coordinating dual-use offensive tools like VShell, Chisel, or fscan to perform high-velocity internal discovery and credential harvesting.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "limited-network-visibility",
            "risk": "An automated agent could perform reconnaissance on unmonitored subnets without triggering the prevalence baseline.",
            "stage": "internal-discovery-automation",
            "question": "whether fscan is scanning segments not captured by endpoint sensors",
            "requires": "hb_network_connection for all internal segments"
          },
          {
            "id": "in-memory-tool-execution",
            "risk": "Tools executed entirely in memory bypass the file-name lead query and are only visible if the module load or process tampering is successfully audited.",
            "stage": "automated-credential-harvesting",
            "question": "whether tools like Mimikatz were loaded directly into memory via shellcode",
            "requires": "hb_process_activity (on_disk = 0) and hb_module_activity"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start with servers and high-value workstation segments. If the lead query is empty, consider widening the offensive_tools list to include generic names like 'scan.exe' or 'tunnel.exe'.",
        "beyond_detection": "While a rule can fire on a specific binary name, this hunt provides the context of machine-speed network scanning and LSASS module interaction, allowing an analyst to identify automated coordination rather than a manual pentest."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "offensive-tool-lead",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Offensive Tool Execution Lead",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, process_original_file_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{offensive_tools}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{offensive_tools}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_original_file_name) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify hosts executing binaries associated with ARTEX worker agents to narrow the search space.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows indicating the execution of known offensive tools. Silence suggests no direct matches for the named binaries occurred."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Offensive Tool Execution Lead",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "process_original_file_name",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, process_original_file_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{offensive_tools}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{offensive_tools}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_original_file_name) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows indicating the execution of known offensive tools. Silence suggests no direct matches for the named binaries occurred.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "network-discovery-prevalence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Network Discovery Prevalence",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT dst_endpoint_ip) AS unique_targets, COUNT(*) AS total_conns FROM hb_network_connection WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, process_name HAVING unique_targets > 15 ORDER BY unique_targets DESC",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Detect automated internal scanning by finding processes that contact a high volume of unique internal destination IPs.",
        "expected_signal": "Processes (like fscan or vshell) that target dozens of internal hosts in a short window. Genuine admin tools may show this, but rare process names should stand out."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "offensive-tool-lead"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Network Discovery Prevalence",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT dst_endpoint_ip) AS unique_targets, COUNT(*) AS total_conns FROM hb_network_connection WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, process_name HAVING unique_targets > 15 ORDER BY unique_targets DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "new_this_window"
        },
        "expected": "Processes (like fscan or vshell) that target dozens of internal hosts in a short window. Genuine admin tools may show this, but rare process names should stand out.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "process_name"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "credential-harvesting-triage",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Credential Harvesting Triage",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, module_path, module_signature_subject, time FROM hb_module_activity WHERE (LOWER(module_path) LIKE '%\\lsasrv.dll' OR LOWER(module_path) LIKE '%\\samlib.dll') AND NOT (LOWER(process_name) LIKE 'c:\\windows\\system32\\%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE 'c:\\windows\\syswow64\\%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_module_activity",
        "description": "Corroborate tool execution by finding module loads related to LSASS or SAM access from non-system directories.",
        "expected_signal": "Any row where a user-space binary is interacting with the credential databases. Silence proves the tools did not attempt LSASS memory access within the window."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "offensive-tool-lead"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "label": "Credential Harvesting Triage",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "module_path",
          "module_signature_subject",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_module_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, module_path, module_signature_subject, time FROM hb_module_activity WHERE (LOWER(module_path) LIKE '%\\lsasrv.dll' OR LOWER(module_path) LIKE '%\\samlib.dll') AND NOT (LOWER(process_name) LIKE 'c:\\windows\\system32\\%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE 'c:\\windows\\syswow64\\%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Any row where a user-space binary is interacting with the credential databases. Silence proves the tools did not attempt LSASS memory access within the window.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-orchestration",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage Orchestration",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "offensive-tool-lead",
          "network-discovery-prevalence",
          "credential-harvesting-triage"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the execution of offensive tools, the high-velocity network connections, and the LSASS module loads together indicate an automated AI-enabled framework like ARTEX on any single host.",
        "description": "Assess whether the observed tools and behaviors indicate an automated framework coordination.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict identifying malicious orchestration.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious, suspicious, or benign per host, citing the offensive binary name and connection volume."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "network-discovery-prevalence",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "credential-harvesting-triage",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on Verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host involving an offensive tool binary",
        "condition": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host involving an offensive tool binary",
        "blind_spot": "limited-network-visibility",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the hunt to containment or manual review.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-orchestration"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-endpoint",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate Affected Endpoint",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Disrupt the automated agent's planner by isolating the host.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host and terminate any processes identified by the triage agent as malicious.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-validation",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst Validation",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Confirm the findings and assess for the presence of the agent harness.",
        "instructions": "Review the process ancestry for the offensive binaries; search for unusual Python or Node.js processes that may be acting as the ARTEX agent harness coordinating the tools."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-endpoint"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "hunt-closeout",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt Close-out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document findings and ensure EDR health across the fleet.",
        "instructions": "Record the outcome and verify that all hosts in the affected segment have reporting EDR agents, as ARTEX frameworks often include bypass capabilities."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-validation"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}