{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Agentic offensive frameworks outpace manual human response. A negative result confirms the web perimeter is not currently subject to automated AI-driven exploitation loops."
      },
      "name": "High-Tempo Host Execution and C2 Burst Analysis",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1176",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1059",
        "attack.t1053.005",
        "attack.t1090.003",
        "command and control",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "inside-the-loop-five-ai-attack-frameworks-that-never-ask-permission",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
          "reason": "This hunt identifies entry points on hosts; abusing cloud credentials using agentic loops is a parallel cloud-native hunt.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "agentic-identity-cloud-exploitation",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single detection rule may catch a browser spawning a shell; this hunt distinguishes an agentic loop from a one-off anomaly by correlating that shell with the high-tempo 30-second network buckets that provide the framework's instructions.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
          "steps": [
            "scoping-vulnerable-hosts",
            "high-tempo-http",
            "dns-c2-lookups",
            "browser-shell-execution"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "high-tempo-command-execution",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "persistence-via-implants-and-webshells",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-and-proxy-infrastructure",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Initial Access via Extensions and Exploits",
            "slug": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1176",
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "ARTEX browser extension recording authenticated sessions",
              "Vulnerability discovery scanning using stock settings",
              "Exploitation of public-facing web applications",
              "User-Agent strings identifying frameworks"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Agentic Cloud and Identity Access",
            "slug": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1078"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Sign-ins to AWS, Entra ID, Slack, and GitHub",
              "Abuse of recorded session tokens from extensions",
              "Automation of cloud CLI tools for account access"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "High-Tempo Command and Tool Execution",
            "slug": "high-tempo-command-execution",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059",
              "T1558.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Command bursts occurring in 2-25 second intervals",
              "Execution of curl, shells, and cloud CLIs",
              "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server function calls (HexStrike)",
              "Reflector agents sending human-like message responses (PentAGI)",
              "Credential access actions including Kerberoasting"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Persistence via Implants and WebShells",
            "slug": "persistence-via-implants-and-webshells",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1505.003",
              "T1547.001",
              "T1053.005"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "CyberStrikeAI WebShell manager connections",
              "Creation of custom implants checking in every 5 seconds",
              "Registry Run keys for implant startup",
              "Windows Scheduled Tasks for recurring execution",
              "Dropping of coding agent workers in containers (Cairn)"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "C2 and Proxy Infrastructure",
            "slug": "c2-and-proxy-infrastructure",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1090.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Connections to Telegram, Slack, Discord, and DingTalk C2 listeners",
              "DNS queries for update.pentagi.com and com.apple.systemupdate",
              "Traffic targeting 224.0.0.0",
              "Routing through multi-hop proxies to bypass IP bans"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Agentic offensive frameworks like ARTEX and CyberStrikeAI automate attack sequences using LLM planners to orchestrate tools like scanners, cloud CLIs, and custom implants in high-tempo bursts. These frameworks frequently bypass human authorization, interacting with cloud control planes and host endpoints via rapid-fire command execution and persistent backdoors."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Focus the behavioral parallel stage on the hostnames resolved from the scoping-vulnerable-hosts step. Prioritize servers and workstations where browser sessions are frequent and vulnerabilities exist.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An adversary is using agentic offensive frameworks like ARTEX or CyberStrikeAI to automate initial access and command execution, evidenced by high-frequency network bursts and browser processes spawning system shells.",
      "parameters": {
        "c2_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "elastic-security-labs-agentic-offensive-frameworks",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "com.apple.systemupdate",
            "update.pentagi.com"
          ],
          "description": "Infrastructure domains associated with the agentic frameworks mentioned in the research."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Hunt Designer",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Specific hostnames identified as vulnerable; leave empty for an unscoped fleet hunt."
        },
        "shell_names": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Tradecraft: T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "cmd.exe",
            "powershell.exe",
            "pwsh.exe",
            "bash",
            "sh",
            "python.exe",
            "python3"
          ],
          "description": "Interpreters used by frameworks for automated command execution."
        },
        "browser_names": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Tradecraft: T1176 Software Extensions",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "chrome.exe",
            "msedge.exe",
            "firefox.exe",
            "brave.exe",
            "google-chrome",
            "firefox"
          ],
          "description": "Browser process names suspected of hosting malicious extensions."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Hunt Designer",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine for behavioral patterns."
        },
        "burst_threshold": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "elastic-security-labs-agentic-offensive-frameworks",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "20",
          "description": "Minimum HTTP request count per source IP within a 30-second window to qualify as a potential automated burst."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex",
          "name": "Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "no-http-payload-visibility",
          "risk": "Without payload visibility, the hunt relies on tempo and parentage, which may increase false positives from benign automation.",
          "owner": "Infrastructure Team",
          "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
          "question": "What specific framework commands or exploit payloads were contained in the HTTP traffic?",
          "requires": "hb_http_activity with full_log_line or request_body",
          "remediation": "Enable full request logging on reverse proxies for critical web paths."
        },
        {
          "id": "browser-extension-inventory-gap",
          "risk": "While parentage identifies the browser, it does not confirm the responsible extension ID without manual forensic investigation.",
          "owner": "Endpoint Management",
          "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
          "question": "Which specific extension is responsible for the shell execution?",
          "requires": "hb_software_inventory containing browser extension IDs",
          "remediation": "Configure osquery to collect the chrome_extensions table across the estate."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "High-Tempo Host Execution and C2 Burst Analysis",
    "description": "Agentic offensive frameworks represent a shift from human-speed operators to automated planning loops that issue commands in intervals as short as two seconds. These frameworks often exploit web vulnerabilities (T1190) or abuse authenticated browser sessions via extensions (T1176). This hunt identifies the entry point by scoping to vulnerable internet-facing assets and then correlating three signals: high-density HTTP request patterns measured in 30-second windows, resolution of known framework-associated domains, and browser processes executing command-line interpreters. An agent weighs these behaviors per host to distinguish automated AI loops from benign web traffic or human administration."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "inside-the-loop-five-ai-attack-frameworks-that-never-ask-permission",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
            "steps": [
              "scoping-vulnerable-hosts",
              "high-tempo-http",
              "dns-c2-lookups",
              "browser-shell-execution"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "agentic-cloud-identity-access",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "high-tempo-command-execution",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "persistence-via-implants-and-webshells",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-and-proxy-infrastructure",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An adversary is using agentic offensive frameworks like ARTEX or CyberStrikeAI to automate initial access and command execution, evidenced by high-frequency network bursts and browser processes spawning system shells.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "no-http-payload-visibility",
            "risk": "Without payload visibility, the hunt relies on tempo and parentage, which may increase false positives from benign automation.",
            "owner": "Infrastructure Team",
            "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
            "question": "What specific framework commands or exploit payloads were contained in the HTTP traffic?",
            "requires": "hb_http_activity with full_log_line or request_body",
            "remediation": "Enable full request logging on reverse proxies for critical web paths."
          },
          {
            "id": "browser-extension-inventory-gap",
            "risk": "While parentage identifies the browser, it does not confirm the responsible extension ID without manual forensic investigation.",
            "owner": "Endpoint Management",
            "stage": "initial-access-extensions-and-exploits",
            "question": "Which specific extension is responsible for the shell execution?",
            "requires": "hb_software_inventory containing browser extension IDs",
            "remediation": "Configure osquery to collect the chrome_extensions table across the estate."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus the behavioral parallel stage on the hostnames resolved from the scoping-vulnerable-hosts step. Prioritize servers and workstations where browser sessions are frequent and vulnerabilities exist.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single detection rule may catch a browser spawning a shell; this hunt distinguishes an agentic loop from a one-off anomaly by correlating that shell with the high-tempo 30-second network buckets that provide the framework's instructions."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "scoping-vulnerable-hosts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Identify vulnerable web-facing assets",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, resource_uid, title, cve_uid, severity FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE severity_id >= 4 AND (LOWER(title) LIKE '%rce%' OR LOWER(title) LIKE '%injection%' OR LOWER(title) LIKE '%web%')",
        "surface": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "description": "Identify hosts with high-severity vulnerabilities in web-facing components. The analyst should resolve these device_uids to hostnames and populate the scope_hosts parameter for subsequent steps.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of vulnerable resources. The presence of these hosts prioritizes the behavioral checks in the parallel stage."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Identify vulnerable web-facing assets",
        "reads": [
          "device_uid",
          "resource_uid",
          "title",
          "cve_uid",
          "severity",
          "severity_id"
        ],
        "source": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, resource_uid, title, cve_uid, severity FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE severity_id >= 4 AND (LOWER(title) LIKE '%rce%' OR LOWER(title) LIKE '%injection%' OR LOWER(title) LIKE '%web%')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of vulnerable resources. The presence of these hosts prioritizes the behavioral checks in the parallel stage.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "high-tempo-http",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "High-tempo HTTP bursts",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M', time) || ':' || (CASE WHEN CAST(strftime('%S', time) AS INT) < 30 THEN '00' ELSE '30' END) AS window_30s, COUNT(*) AS req_count FROM hb_http_activity WHERE time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY device_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, window_30s HAVING req_count >= {{burst_threshold}}",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Detect external IPs hitting hosts with request density exceeding human interaction by bucketing traffic into 30-second windows.",
        "expected_signal": "Source IPs with high request counts within single 30-second buckets, indicating an automated agentic loop."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-vulnerable-hosts"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "High-tempo HTTP bursts",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M', time) || ':' || (CASE WHEN CAST(strftime('%S', time) AS INT) < 30 THEN '00' ELSE '30' END) AS window_30s, COUNT(*) AS req_count FROM hb_http_activity WHERE time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY device_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, window_30s HAVING req_count >= {{burst_threshold}}",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "new_this_window"
        },
        "expected": "Source IPs with high request counts within single 30-second buckets, indicating an automated agentic loop.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "src_endpoint_ip"
          ],
          "rare_below": 5
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "dns-c2-lookups",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Resolution of framework-associated domains",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS resolution_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostname",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Corroborate high-tempo network activity with resolutions for domains known to be used by agentic framework operators.",
        "expected_signal": "DNS resolutions for the framework-associated domains on the same hosts seeing high-tempo HTTP traffic."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-vulnerable-hosts"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Resolution of framework-associated domains",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS resolution_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostname",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "DNS resolutions for the framework-associated domains on the same hosts seeing high-tempo HTTP traffic.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "browser-shell-execution",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Browser processes spawning shells",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, parent_process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{browser_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(parent_process_name) || ',') > 0 AND instr(',' || '{{shell_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify shells executed by browsers, matching the T1176 tradecraft where extensions are used to drive local command execution.",
        "expected_signal": "Browser processes acting as parents to command shells or interpreters, specifically on the hosts being targeted by network bursts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-vulnerable-hosts"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Browser processes spawning shells",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "parent_process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, parent_process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{browser_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(parent_process_name) || ',') > 0 AND instr(',' || '{{shell_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Browser processes acting as parents to command shells or interpreters, specifically on the hosts being targeted by network bursts.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-agent",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage automated attack behavior",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "high-tempo-http",
          "dns-c2-lookups",
          "browser-shell-execution"
        ],
        "objective": "Analyze the timing and frequency of HTTP bursts in the 30-second windows in relation to the browser-originated shell commands. Determine if the command execution pattern follows the network activity buckets, indicating an agentic controller.",
        "description": "Analyze the alignment of high-frequency HTTP buckets and process execution to determine if an automated agentic loop is driving the endpoint.",
        "max_iterations": 4,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict on whether activity indicates the use of an offensive framework.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host, citing the alignment of network burst windows and process events."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "high-tempo-http",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "dns-c2-lookups",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "browser-shell-execution",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "decision-route",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Decision on triage results",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage-agent verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage-agent verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "no-http-payload-visibility",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route to containment or manual review based on the agent's high-tempo correlation findings.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-agent"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate compromised host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Halt the automated attack loop by isolating the affected endpoint and revoking sessions.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host from the network and revoke any active cloud sessions for the user accounts observed in the activity.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decision-route",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Manual analyst review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Investigate the isolated host to confirm the presence of a malicious browser extension or framework persistence.",
        "instructions": "Examine the browser profile and extensions on the isolated host. Review proxy or WAF logs for the specific request paths associated with the HTTP buckets identified."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decision-route",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "decision-route",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "hunt-closeout",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt closeout",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document findings and finalize detection improvements.",
        "instructions": "Record results. If malicious activity was confirmed, promote the browser shell execution query to a standing detection rule."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decision-route",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}