{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Credential phishing impersonating platform outages has a high success rate. Confirming a negative result across the estate ensures the perimeter blocks were effective, while a positive result enables containment before mailbox data is exfiltrated."
      },
      "name": "Microsoft 365 Service Health Impersonation and Account Abuse",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1566.002",
        "attack.t1566",
        "attack.t1036",
        "attack.t1204.001",
        "attack.t1071",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1041",
        "execution",
        "impact",
        "initial access",
        "microsoft-365"
      ],
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "m365-inbox-rule-manipulation-baseline",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on phishing-led rule changes; a sibling hunt baselines all rule changes regardless of vector.",
          "relation": "sibling"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "category": "identity",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        },
        "microsoft-365": {
          "name": "microsoft 365",
          "category": "siem",
          "huntbase": {
            "product": "microsoft-365"
          }
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A standard rule would alert on the phishing email, but this hunt correlates the delivery with specific host interaction (DNS) and specific account impact (rare API calls) in one flow, providing the end-to-end evidence an analyst needs to confirm an intrusion.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-service-outage-phishing",
          "steps": [
            "phishing-emails-lead"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-tracking-link-interaction",
          "steps": [
            "dns-tracking-interaction"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "impact-account-compromise-activity",
          "steps": [
            "rare-cloud-api-impact"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Outage-Themed Phishing Delivery",
            "slug": "initial-access-service-outage-phishing",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1566.002",
              "T1566",
              "T1036"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Sender domains: moments-notice.com, planetmaison.com, newbooker.com, em4493.moments-notice.com, em.newbooker.com",
              "Subject patterns: 'Outage \u2013 ', 'Strengthen \u2013 Security ', 'Restore \u2014 4 messages '",
              "Display names ending in 'Outage Notification' or 'Service Health'",
              "Lure text referencing Exchange Online, Outlook, Teams, SharePoint, and Copilot",
              "Urgency claims of 24-hour message deletion"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Malicious Link Redirection",
            "slug": "execution-tracking-link-interaction",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1204.001",
              "T1071",
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Click-tracking domains: u113727626.ct.sendgrid.net, u118254266.ct.sendgrid.net, u118250677.ct.sendgrid.net",
              "Tracking subdomains: url.newbooker.com, url7489.newbooker.com",
              "Destination domains: reallifeaccounting.com, outagefixed.sbs, outagerestored.sbs",
              "URL paths: /themelist0.html, /topics_pxyk/themelist0.html",
              "Attacker IP: 162.120.17.69"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Assessed Account Abuse",
            "slug": "impact-account-compromise-activity",
            "tactic": "impact",
            "techniques": [
              "T1041"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Sign-ins from 162.120.17.69",
              "Creation of new inbox or forwarding rules",
              "OAuth application consent operations",
              "Anomalous access to SharePoint or Teams data following login"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "A high-volume phishing campaign leveraged Microsoft 365 outage-themed lures to trick users into clicking recipient-specific tracking links. These links redirected victims to a common destination infrastructure for assessed credential phishing, often referencing Exchange Online disruptions and requiring immediate action to restore 'held' messages."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "The lead query is a cheap search on mail telemetry for specific lures. Because the campaign is high-volume and uses specific domains, we start broad across all mailboxes. Scoping is only applied at the DNS level if an analyst needs to re-run for specific hosts identified in the lead.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has gained initial access by sending phishing emails that impersonate Microsoft 365 outage notifications, inducing users to click tracking links that lead to credential theft and subsequent unauthorized cloud API activity.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "analyst-defined",
            "kind": "manual"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Optional list of hostnames to narrow the expensive DNS query; leave empty for fleet-wide."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "huntbase-standard",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-17"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "sender_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "ms-blog-2026-11",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "moments-notice.com",
            "planetmaison.com",
            "newbooker.com",
            "em4493.moments-notice.com",
            "em.newbooker.com"
          ],
          "description": "Observed sender domains from the campaign report."
        },
        "tracking_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "ms-blog-2026-11",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "u113727626.ct.sendgrid.net",
            "u118254266.ct.sendgrid.net",
            "u118250677.ct.sendgrid.net",
            "url.newbooker.com",
            "url7489.newbooker.com",
            "reallifeaccounting.com",
            "outagefixed.sbs",
            "outagerestored.sbs"
          ],
          "description": "Infrastructure used for click-tracking and redirection."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/16/high-volume-phishing-campaign-uses-microsoft-365-outage-lures-target-multiple-industry-sectors-2/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/16/high-volume-phishing-campaign-uses-microsoft-365-outage-lures-target-multiple-industry-sectors-2/",
          "name": "High volume phishing campaign uses Microsoft 365 outage lures \u2014 Microsoft Security Blog"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "mail-log-visibility",
          "risk": "If certain mailbox types or external tenants are not integrated, the lead query will return zero rows even if phishing was successful.",
          "owner": "Messaging Team",
          "stage": "initial-access-service-outage-phishing",
          "question": "whether all delivered phishing emails were visible to the lead query",
          "requires": "Complete M365 Unified Audit Log ingestion",
          "remediation": "Ensure all M365 tenants are enrolled in centralized audit logging."
        },
        {
          "id": "no-api-retention",
          "risk": "A compromise that happened 20 days ago would be missed if logs roll over quickly.",
          "owner": "Platform Engineering",
          "stage": "impact-account-compromise-activity",
          "question": "whether the impact occurred outside the current lookback window",
          "requires": "hb_cloud_api_activity retention > 14 days",
          "remediation": "Increase cloud API log retention to at least 30 days."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Microsoft 365 Service Health Impersonation and Account Abuse",
    "description": "This hunt targets a coordinated phishing campaign using service-health lures. It employs a gated flow where a cheap lead query on mail telemetry determines if campaign-specific lures exist. If confirmed, the hunt fans out to verify user interaction via DNS tracking infrastructure and identifies post-compromise impact through rare cloud API operations, such as the creation of new inbox rules or OAuth application consents. An agent correlates the delivery, interaction, and impact to confirm an active intrusion."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-service-outage-phishing",
            "steps": [
              "phishing-emails-lead"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-tracking-link-interaction",
            "steps": [
              "dns-tracking-interaction"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "impact-account-compromise-activity",
            "steps": [
              "rare-cloud-api-impact"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has gained initial access by sending phishing emails that impersonate Microsoft 365 outage notifications, inducing users to click tracking links that lead to credential theft and subsequent unauthorized cloud API activity.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "mail-log-visibility",
            "risk": "If certain mailbox types or external tenants are not integrated, the lead query will return zero rows even if phishing was successful.",
            "owner": "Messaging Team",
            "stage": "initial-access-service-outage-phishing",
            "question": "whether all delivered phishing emails were visible to the lead query",
            "requires": "Complete M365 Unified Audit Log ingestion",
            "remediation": "Ensure all M365 tenants are enrolled in centralized audit logging."
          },
          {
            "id": "no-api-retention",
            "risk": "A compromise that happened 20 days ago would be missed if logs roll over quickly.",
            "owner": "Platform Engineering",
            "stage": "impact-account-compromise-activity",
            "question": "whether the impact occurred outside the current lookback window",
            "requires": "hb_cloud_api_activity retention > 14 days",
            "remediation": "Increase cloud API log retention to at least 30 days."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "The lead query is a cheap search on mail telemetry for specific lures. Because the campaign is high-volume and uses specific domains, we start broad across all mailboxes. Scoping is only applied at the DNS level if an analyst needs to re-run for specific hosts identified in the lead.",
        "beyond_detection": "A standard rule would alert on the phishing email, but this hunt correlates the delivery with specific host interaction (DNS) and specific account impact (rare API calls) in one flow, providing the end-to-end evidence an analyst needs to confirm an intrusion."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "phishing-emails-lead",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Lead: Outage-themed phishing lures",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "microsoft-365",
        "content": "SELECT sender, \"from\", subject, sent_date_time, internet_message_id, tenant_id FROM microsoft365_mail_message WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sender_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(SUBSTR(sender, INSTR(sender, '@') + 1)) || ',') > 0 OR subject LIKE 'Outage -%' OR subject LIKE 'Strengthen - Security%' OR subject LIKE 'Restore \u2014 4 messages%') AND sent_date_time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "product": "microsoft-365",
        "surface": "microsoft365_mail_message",
        "extension": "microsoft-365",
        "description": "Identify suspicious emails using the campaign's specific sender domains and subject line patterns.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows identify specific phishing emails delivered to users. Silence suggests the campaign has not targeted the tenant in the current window."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Lead: Outage-themed phishing lures",
        "reads": [
          "sender",
          "from",
          "subject",
          "sent_date_time",
          "internet_message_id",
          "tenant_id"
        ],
        "source": "microsoft365_mail_message",
        "target": "microsoft-365",
        "content": "SELECT sender, \"from\", subject, sent_date_time, internet_message_id, tenant_id FROM microsoft365_mail_message WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sender_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(SUBSTR(sender, INSTR(sender, '@') + 1)) || ',') > 0 OR subject LIKE 'Outage -%' OR subject LIKE 'Strengthen - Security%' OR subject LIKE 'Restore \u2014 4 messages%') AND sent_date_time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows identify specific phishing emails delivered to users. Silence suggests the campaign has not targeted the tenant in the current window.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17",
        "target_extension": "microsoft-365"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "verify-lead",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Verify phishing campaign relevance",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "microsoft-365"
        ],
        "context": [
          "phishing-emails-lead"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the identified mail records represent the Microsoft 365 outage phishing campaign.",
        "description": "Confirm if the detected emails match the high-volume outage campaign profile based on the reported lures.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A malicious verdict for emails using randomized tokens in subjects or observed sender domains.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-row verdict of malicious or benign."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "phishing-emails-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "is-lead-legit",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate on phishing evidence",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the verify-lead verdict is malicious for at least one email record",
        "condition": "the verify-lead verdict is malicious for at least one email record",
        "blind_spot": "mail-log-visibility",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route to expensive telemetry queries only if phishing emails are confirmed.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "verify-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "dns-tracking-interaction",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Scoped DNS interaction with tracking domains",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, answers, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)) AND instr(',' || '{{tracking_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Verify if scoped hosts resolved the campaign's tracking or redirection domains, indicating a link click.",
        "expected_signal": "Resolution of tracking domains by a host suggests a successful link click from a phishing email."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-legit",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Scoped DNS interaction with tracking domains",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "answers",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, answers, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)) AND instr(',' || '{{tracking_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Resolution of tracking domains by a host suggests a successful link click from a phishing email.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-cloud-api-impact",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare cloud API inbox rule manipulation",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT api_operation, actor_user_name, COUNT(DISTINCT actor_user_name) AS user_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE provider = 'm365' AND (api_operation IN ('New-InboxRule', 'Set-InboxRule', 'Consent to application')) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY api_operation, actor_user_name HAVING user_count <= 3",
        "surface": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "description": "Detect account impact by finding users performing rare inbox rule operations or OAuth consents typical of BEC.",
        "expected_signal": "Specific users creating inbox rules when such behavior is rare across the tenant. Silence suggests no automated rule manipulation has occurred."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-legit",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Rare cloud API inbox rule manipulation",
        "reads": [
          "api_operation",
          "actor_user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT api_operation, actor_user_name, COUNT(DISTINCT actor_user_name) AS user_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE provider = 'm365' AND (api_operation IN ('New-InboxRule', 'Set-InboxRule', 'Consent to application')) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY api_operation, actor_user_name HAVING user_count <= 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "new_this_window"
        },
        "expected": "Specific users creating inbox rules when such behavior is rare across the tenant. Silence suggests no automated rule manipulation has occurred.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "actor_user_name",
          "key": [
            "api_operation"
          ],
          "rare_below": 4
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-correlation",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Correlate email, interaction, and abuse",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "microsoft-365"
        ],
        "context": [
          "verify-lead",
          "dns-tracking-interaction",
          "rare-cloud-api-impact"
        ],
        "objective": "Evaluate the sequence of phishing delivery, tracking resolution, and cloud API changes to determine if an account takeover occurred.",
        "description": "An agent weighs the email receipt, DNS interaction, and rare API activity to confirm successful compromise.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A confirmed timeline showing a user receiving a lure, clicking the link, and their account subsequently being manipulated.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per user/host, citing rows from all surfaces."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "dns-tracking-interaction",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "rare-cloud-api-impact",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-triage",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on compromise verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage-correlation verdict is malicious for at least one user",
        "condition": "the triage-correlation verdict is malicious for at least one user",
        "blind_spot": "no-api-retention",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Initiate remediation if an active compromise is confirmed.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-correlation"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-account",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate compromised account",
      "config": {
        "target": "identity",
        "description": "Contain the impact by revoking sessions and rotating credentials.",
        "instructions": "Revoke all active refresh tokens for the identified users, reset their passwords, and initiate an audit of their mailbox for new rules.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Forensic analyst review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the automated correlation and determine the extent of data access.",
        "instructions": "Examine the timing between DNS resolution of the tracking domains and the creation of inbox rules. Check SharePoint and Teams logs for unusual file access from the same actor IP."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-legit",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "is-lead-legit",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-account"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out hunt",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Finalize documentation and record any identified blind spots.",
        "instructions": "Record the findings. If inbox rule manipulation was confirmed, promote the rare-cloud-api-impact query to a standing detection."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-legit",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}