{
  "hunt": {
    "name": "Optimizely Injected Script: Visitor, Session and Site-Owner Exposure",
    "description": "On 16 Nov 2026 malicious JavaScript was added to Optimizely Web Experimentation projects of 178 organisations, so sites such as BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab and Salesforce served it to their visitors from Optimizely's own CDN for most of a day. This hunt answers three questions. Which of our people loaded it, and what did it take from them: card details, cookies, or an iPhone exploit attempt? Was any stolen session reused? And, if we run Optimizely ourselves, did our own site serve it? It starts from DNS, proxy and connection logs for the published hosts, adds two behaviour steps that look for new cross-site script hosts so a rotated host is not missed, checks sign-ins for the exposed users, and ends with manual checks for cards, iPhones, our own Optimizely projects and crypto transfers.",
    "meta": {
      "type": "investigation",
      "name": "Optimizely Injected Script: Visitor, Session and Site-Owner Exposure",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1195.002",
        "attack.t1189",
        "attack.t1059.007",
        "attack.t1056.003",
        "attack.t1041",
        "attack.t1539",
        "attack.t1113",
        "attack.t1550.004",
        "attack.t1203",
        "attack.t1565.002",
        "collection",
        "credential access",
        "execution",
        "impact",
        "initial access"
      ],
      "tlp": "clear",
      "severity": "high",
      "hypothesis": "Staff browsers that visited a site carrying the tampered Optimizely snippet on 16 Nov 2026 loaded the attacker's script, and some sent card details, readable cookies or iPhone traffic to the attacker; separately, the organisation's own Optimizely project may have served the script to its customers.",
      "rationale": "Run it for the window 04:00 UTC 16 Nov to 06:00 UTC 17 Nov 2026 and check first that proxy and DNS logs still cover it. Start with the scoping step and paste its hosts into scope_hosts, then paste the users the first triage names into scope_users before the sign-in step. Finance, purchasing and anyone who uses crypto or pays by card on the listed sites come first.",
      "analysis": "A blocklist rule would flag 1688360.cc and stop. The hunt has to decide, per person, whether the script only loaded or also took card data, cookies or an iPhone exploit attempt, then follow cookies into sign-ins and cards and phones into manual checks, and look for a host the published list misses. That needs judgement across proxy, DNS, connection and sign-in data.",
      "hunt": {
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "justification": "A domain block stops nothing that already ran and did not stop the inline variant. Visitors who typed a card or were signed in on an affected page need follow-up whether or not the domain is now dead, and an Optimizely customer must check its own project."
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "BleepingComputer: Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware",
          "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/optimizely-supply-chain-attack-delivers-malware-to-cnn-fox-news-bbc-salesforce-sites/"
        },
        {
          "name": "Scott Helme (Report URI): World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely",
          "url": "https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/"
        },
        {
          "name": "StepSecurity: OPTIMJACK, Optimizely-hosted scripts with crypto clipper and card skimmer",
          "url": "https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer"
        },
        {
          "name": "Optimizely status: Web Experimentation security incident",
          "url": "https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z"
        }
      ],
      "guardrails": {
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "missing_data": "not_benign",
        "claims": "no_unsupported"
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "optimjack-third-party-script-impact",
          "relation": "sibling",
          "reason": "The Unit 42 generated hunt for the same incident scopes Optimizely CDN traffic; this one adds the attacker hosts, the exfiltration paths, session reuse and the site-owner and wallet checks."
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "summary": "On 16 Nov 2026 an attacker added JavaScript to the Project JavaScript of Optimizely Web Experimentation projects belonging to 178 organisations, so major sites served it from Optimizely's own CDN. The code loaded track.js from 1688360.cc, which swapped cryptocurrency addresses, skimmed card details to /card.php, sent readable cookies and screenshots to /hit.php, and loaded iOS exploit kits on iPhones and iPads. Most files were clean by 21:52 UTC and all by 23:11 UTC.",
        "stages": [
          {
            "slug": "project-tampering",
            "name": "Optimizely project tampering",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1195.002"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Project JavaScript field changed on 16 Nov 2026",
              "loader for https://1688360.cc/track.js, plain or atob()-encoded",
              "inline payload run with eval when the host is blocked"
            ]
          },
          {
            "slug": "visitor-exposure",
            "name": "Visitor browsers load the payload",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1189",
              "T1059.007"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "1688360.cc/track.js fetched with an affected site as referrer",
              "webshell.lol/get.js",
              "cdn.optimizely.com snippet fetched just before"
            ]
          },
          {
            "slug": "card-skimming",
            "name": "Card skimming",
            "tactic": "collection",
            "techniques": [
              "T1056.003",
              "T1041"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "sendBeacon POST to 1688360.cc/card.php with fields n, e, c, u"
            ]
          },
          {
            "slug": "session-theft",
            "name": "Cookie and screenshot theft",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1539",
              "T1113",
              "T1550.004"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "POST to 1688360.cc/hit.php with page URL, document.cookie and screenshot",
              "html2canvas.min.js loaded from 1688360.cc",
              "sign-in or session use from a new address after exposure"
            ]
          },
          {
            "slug": "ios-exploit-delivery",
            "name": "iOS exploit kit delivery",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1203"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "boot.js from .icu hosts on iPhone and iPad user agents",
              "hidden iframe /JIUJIU888/weifile.html on iOS 18.6 or earlier",
              "kit paths /A8/, /B9/, /D11/, /D12/, /C10/"
            ]
          },
          {
            "slug": "crypto-address-swapping",
            "name": "Crypto address swapping",
            "tactic": "impact",
            "techniques": [
              "T1565.002"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "wallet addresses on the page or clipboard replaced with attacker wallets"
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "project-tampering",
          "status": "not_visible",
          "steps": [
            "site-owner-review"
          ],
          "reason": "The change was made inside Optimizely; only the project change history, token list and CSP reports show it, so the site-owner check is a manual step.",
          "blind_spot": "optimizely-change-history"
        },
        {
          "stage": "visitor-exposure",
          "status": "covered",
          "steps": [
            "resolve-attacker-hosts",
            "requests-to-attacker-hosts",
            "connections-to-attacker-ips",
            "new-script-hosts-after-optimizely",
            "new-domains-on-exposed-hosts"
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "card-skimming",
          "status": "covered",
          "steps": [
            "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
            "exposed-user-follow-up"
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "session-theft",
          "status": "covered",
          "steps": [
            "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
            "sign-ins-from-new-sources",
            "assess-session-reuse"
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "ios-exploit-delivery",
          "status": "covered",
          "steps": [
            "apple-mobile-requests",
            "exposed-user-follow-up"
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "crypto-address-swapping",
          "status": "covered",
          "steps": [
            "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
            "wallet-transfer-check"
          ],
          "reason": "The swap itself is invisible; a /hit.php POST shows it fired on a page, and the transfer check against the wallet list is manual."
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "no-url-path-visibility",
          "stage": "card-skimming",
          "requires": "TLS inspection on the forward proxy (or a secure web gateway that logs full URLs and methods)",
          "question": "Did the browser fetch /track.js or POST to /card.php and /hit.php, or only connect to the host?",
          "risk": "Without decryption the proxy logs the host but not the path or method, so card and cookie theft cannot be told apart from a script load and every visitor must be treated as possibly skimmed."
        },
        {
          "id": "unmanaged-mobile-devices",
          "stage": "ios-exploit-delivery",
          "requires": "MDM inventory with iOS versions and mobile threat defence on corporate and BYOD iPhones and iPads",
          "question": "Which iPhones and iPads visited an affected site, on what iOS version, and off the corporate network?",
          "risk": "Phones on cellular data or home Wi-Fi never touch the proxy or DNS logs, and the exploit kits targeted exactly those devices."
        },
        {
          "id": "browser-dns-over-https",
          "stage": "visitor-exposure",
          "requires": "DNS-over-HTTPS disabled by browser policy, or DoH resolver traffic logged",
          "question": "Did browsers resolve 1688360.cc through a built-in DoH resolver?",
          "risk": "Lookups made over DoH do not reach hb_dns_activity, so the scoping step under-counts exposed hosts."
        },
        {
          "id": "proxy-and-dns-retention",
          "requires": "At least 30 days of proxy and DNS log retention, reaching back to 9 Nov 2026",
          "question": "Do the logs still cover 9 to 17 Nov 2026?",
          "risk": "Short retention removes the exposure window entirely and silence then means nothing."
        },
        {
          "id": "inline-fallback-variant",
          "stage": "visitor-exposure",
          "requires": "Client-side script monitoring or CSP reporting on the visited sites",
          "question": "Did a browser run the inline copy of the payload that needs no track.js fetch?",
          "risk": "One loader variant ran an embedded copy of the payload with eval when track.js could not load, so no script fetch is logged; only its later POSTs to the payload host can show, and a network block on that host stops those too. (The atob() variant still fetches track.js; it only defeats string searches of the snippet.)"
        },
        {
          "id": "session-replay-not-in-signin-logs",
          "stage": "session-theft",
          "requires": "Audit logs of the affected SaaS apps (session and IP history) and the HttpOnly flags of their session cookies",
          "question": "Was a cookie sent to /hit.php replayed against the app it came from?",
          "risk": "Replaying a cookie does not create an identity-provider sign-in, so hb_auth_signin can be silent while a session is abused. HttpOnly cookies were not readable by the script, so the real risk depends on each site's cookie flags."
        },
        {
          "id": "optimizely-change-history",
          "stage": "project-tampering",
          "requires": "Optimizely project change history, API token list and CSP violation reports for the organisation's own sites",
          "question": "Was the organisation's own Optimizely project changed on 16 Nov 2026?",
          "risk": "None of this is in hb_ telemetry; if the organisation's snippet carried the payload, its customers were the victims and only the manual review finds it."
        },
        {
          "id": "in-page-address-swap",
          "stage": "crypto-address-swapping",
          "requires": "Transfer records from exchanges and wallets used by the organisation",
          "question": "Did anyone send cryptocurrency to a swapped address?",
          "risk": "The swap happens in the page and clipboard; only /hit.php shows it fired, and only with TLS inspection."
        }
      ],
      "parameters": {
        "payload_domains": {
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "1688360.cc",
            "webshell.lol"
          ],
          "description": "Hosts the injected Optimizely code loaded from and sent data to. 1688360.cc served /track.js and received /card.php and /hit.php; webshell.lol (/get.js) was the injector in the first Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC on 16 Nov 2026.",
          "from": {
            "kind": "article",
            "ref": "https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          }
        },
        "ios_stage_domains": {
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "5vobauua3ojpklx.icu",
            "eil786npto9u5bq.icu",
            "l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu",
            "je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu",
            "q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu",
            "ios-hack.icu",
            "p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu",
            "1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu",
            "gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu"
          ],
          "description": "Hosts that track.js used on iPhone and iPad to load boot.js and the exploit kits, plus fallback C2s and hosts sharing their certificates and IPs.",
          "from": {
            "kind": "article",
            "ref": "https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          }
        },
        "attacker_ips": {
          "type": "list[ip]",
          "default": [
            "136.113.106.136",
            "34.96.213.201",
            "34.87.36.58"
          ],
          "description": "Last known addresses of 1688360.cc and the .icu iOS hosts (Google Cloud). Shared cloud ranges: treat a match as a lead, not a verdict.",
          "from": {
            "kind": "article",
            "ref": "https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          }
        },
        "exfil_paths": {
          "type": "list[path]",
          "default": [
            "/card.php",
            "/hit.php"
          ],
          "description": "Paths on the payload host that received stolen data: /card.php (card number, expiry, CVV via sendBeacon) and /hit.php (page URL, readable cookies, screenshot).",
          "from": {
            "kind": "article",
            "ref": "https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          }
        },
        "optimizely_domains": {
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "cdn.optimizely.com"
          ],
          "description": "Hosts that serve Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets. Add a first-party snippet host (such as opt.<site>) if your proxy sees one.",
          "from": {
            "kind": "article",
            "ref": "https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          }
        },
        "exposure_start": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "2026-11-16T04:00:00Z",
          "description": "Start of the exposure window (UTC). The first Optimizely injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on 16 Nov 2026; researchers advise searching from 04:00."
        },
        "exposure_end": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "2026-11-17T06:00:00Z",
          "description": "End of the exposure window (UTC). All files were clean by 23:11 UTC on 16 Nov and 1688360.cc was suspended at 00:37 UTC on 17 Nov; the extra hours allow for cached snippets and open tabs (an assumption, not a published time)."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "30",
          "description": "Days of history to read. It must reach back to 9 Nov 2026, when the first .icu hosts were registered, and give the baseline steps clean history before exposure_start. Increase it if you run the hunt after 9 Dec 2026."
        },
        "pivot_minutes": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "5",
          "description": "How soon after an Optimizely snippet fetch a request to a new host counts as following it."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hosts that resolved or connected to the attacker hosts, pasted from the scoping step. Empty means every host."
        },
        "scope_users": {
          "type": "list[user]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Users named by the exposure triage (proxy actor_user_name or the owner of an exposed host). Empty means every user, which is noisy."
        }
      },
      "targets": {
        "endpoint": {
          "category": "endpoint",
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "category": "identity",
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        },
        "network": {
          "category": "network",
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "web": {
          "category": "siem",
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "agent": true,
          "name": "Hunt agent"
        },
        "analyst": {
          "role": "analyst",
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst"
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "name": "Huntbase",
            "org": "huntbase.io"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "hand-authored-with-claude",
          "model": "claude-opus-5-5",
          "from": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/optimizely-supply-chain-attack-delivers-malware-to-cnn-fox-news-bbc-salesforce-sites/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "rationale": "Staff browsers that visited a site carrying the tampered Optimizely snippet on 16 Nov 2026 loaded the attacker's script, and some sent card details, readable cookies or iPhone traffic to the attacker; separately, the organisation's own Optimizely project may have served the script to its customers.",
        "tags": [],
        "scoping_notes": "Run it for the window 04:00 UTC 16 Nov to 06:00 UTC 17 Nov 2026 and check first that proxy and DNS logs still cover it. Start with the scoping step and paste its hosts into scope_hosts, then paste the users the first triage names into scope_users before the sign-in step. Finance, purchasing and anyone who uses crypto or pays by card on the listed sites come first.",
        "beyond_detection": "A blocklist rule would flag 1688360.cc and stop. The hunt has to decide, per person, whether the script only loaded or also took card data, cookies or an iPhone exploit attempt, then follow cookies into sign-ins and cards and phones into manual checks, and look for a host the published list misses. That needs judgement across proxy, DNS, connection and sign-in data.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "no-url-path-visibility",
            "stage": "card-skimming",
            "requires": "TLS inspection on the forward proxy (or a secure web gateway that logs full URLs and methods)",
            "question": "Did the browser fetch /track.js or POST to /card.php and /hit.php, or only connect to the host?",
            "risk": "Without decryption the proxy logs the host but not the path or method, so card and cookie theft cannot be told apart from a script load and every visitor must be treated as possibly skimmed."
          },
          {
            "id": "unmanaged-mobile-devices",
            "stage": "ios-exploit-delivery",
            "requires": "MDM inventory with iOS versions and mobile threat defence on corporate and BYOD iPhones and iPads",
            "question": "Which iPhones and iPads visited an affected site, on what iOS version, and off the corporate network?",
            "risk": "Phones on cellular data or home Wi-Fi never touch the proxy or DNS logs, and the exploit kits targeted exactly those devices."
          },
          {
            "id": "browser-dns-over-https",
            "stage": "visitor-exposure",
            "requires": "DNS-over-HTTPS disabled by browser policy, or DoH resolver traffic logged",
            "question": "Did browsers resolve 1688360.cc through a built-in DoH resolver?",
            "risk": "Lookups made over DoH do not reach hb_dns_activity, so the scoping step under-counts exposed hosts."
          },
          {
            "id": "proxy-and-dns-retention",
            "requires": "At least 30 days of proxy and DNS log retention, reaching back to 9 Nov 2026",
            "question": "Do the logs still cover 9 to 17 Nov 2026?",
            "risk": "Short retention removes the exposure window entirely and silence then means nothing."
          },
          {
            "id": "inline-fallback-variant",
            "stage": "visitor-exposure",
            "requires": "Client-side script monitoring or CSP reporting on the visited sites",
            "question": "Did a browser run the inline copy of the payload that needs no track.js fetch?",
            "risk": "One loader variant ran an embedded copy of the payload with eval when track.js could not load, so no script fetch is logged; only its later POSTs to the payload host can show, and a network block on that host stops those too. (The atob() variant still fetches track.js; it only defeats string searches of the snippet.)"
          },
          {
            "id": "session-replay-not-in-signin-logs",
            "stage": "session-theft",
            "requires": "Audit logs of the affected SaaS apps (session and IP history) and the HttpOnly flags of their session cookies",
            "question": "Was a cookie sent to /hit.php replayed against the app it came from?",
            "risk": "Replaying a cookie does not create an identity-provider sign-in, so hb_auth_signin can be silent while a session is abused. HttpOnly cookies were not readable by the script, so the real risk depends on each site's cookie flags."
          },
          {
            "id": "optimizely-change-history",
            "stage": "project-tampering",
            "requires": "Optimizely project change history, API token list and CSP violation reports for the organisation's own sites",
            "question": "Was the organisation's own Optimizely project changed on 16 Nov 2026?",
            "risk": "None of this is in hb_ telemetry; if the organisation's snippet carried the payload, its customers were the victims and only the manual review finds it."
          },
          {
            "id": "in-page-address-swap",
            "stage": "crypto-address-swapping",
            "requires": "Transfer records from exchanges and wallets used by the organisation",
            "question": "Did anyone send cryptocurrency to a swapped address?",
            "risk": "The swap happens in the page and clipboard; only /hit.php shows it fired, and only with TLS inspection."
          }
        ],
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "project-tampering",
            "status": "not_visible",
            "steps": [
              "site-owner-review"
            ],
            "reason": "The change was made inside Optimizely; only the project change history, token list and CSP reports show it, so the site-owner check is a manual step.",
            "blind_spot": "optimizely-change-history"
          },
          {
            "stage": "visitor-exposure",
            "status": "covered",
            "steps": [
              "resolve-attacker-hosts",
              "requests-to-attacker-hosts",
              "connections-to-attacker-ips",
              "new-script-hosts-after-optimizely",
              "new-domains-on-exposed-hosts"
            ]
          },
          {
            "stage": "card-skimming",
            "status": "covered",
            "steps": [
              "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
              "exposed-user-follow-up"
            ]
          },
          {
            "stage": "session-theft",
            "status": "covered",
            "steps": [
              "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
              "sign-ins-from-new-sources",
              "assess-session-reuse"
            ]
          },
          {
            "stage": "ios-exploit-delivery",
            "status": "covered",
            "steps": [
              "apple-mobile-requests",
              "exposed-user-follow-up"
            ]
          },
          {
            "stage": "crypto-address-swapping",
            "status": "covered",
            "steps": [
              "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
              "wallet-transfer-check"
            ],
            "reason": "The swap itself is invisible; a /hit.php POST shows it fired on a page, and the transfer check against the wallet list is manual."
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "resolve-attacker-hosts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Hosts that resolved the attacker domains",
      "config": {
        "description": "Find managed devices that looked up the payload host or the iOS stage hosts. DNS sees the lookup even when the proxy cannot see the URL, so this is the widest list of browsers that ran the injected code.",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, actor_user_name, process_name, LOWER(query_hostname) AS domain, COUNT(*) AS lookups, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{ios_stage_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, actor_user_name, process_name, LOWER(query_hostname) ORDER BY first_seen",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "role": "scoping",
        "expected_signal": "Devices and users whose browser looked up 1688360.cc, webshell.lol or an iOS stage host, with first and last lookup. Paste the hosts into scope_hosts. Silence does not clear the estate: browsers using DNS-over-HTTPS bypass these logs."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, actor_user_name, process_name, LOWER(query_hostname) AS domain, COUNT(*) AS lookups, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{ios_stage_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, actor_user_name, process_name, LOWER(query_hostname) ORDER BY first_seen",
        "label": "Hosts that resolved the attacker domains",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "Devices and users whose browser looked up 1688360.cc, webshell.lol or an iOS stage host, with first and last lookup. Paste the hosts into scope_hosts. Silence does not clear the estate: browsers using DNS-over-HTTPS bypass these logs.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "scoping"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "requests-to-attacker-hosts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Proxy requests to the attacker hosts",
      "config": {
        "description": "List every proxied request to the payload host, with the referring page. The referrer names the site the user was on when the injected snippet ran, and the user agent shows the browser and device.",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname) AS host, url_path, http_method, referrer, user_agent, status_code, COUNT(*) AS requests, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname), url_path, http_method, referrer, user_agent, status_code ORDER BY first_seen",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "web",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "role": "triage",
        "expected_signal": "GET /track.js (or /get.js on webshell.lol) with a referrer on a site that used Optimizely, from a named user or client IP. Here device_hostname is the proxy, so identify the person by actor_user_name or src_endpoint_ip. Without TLS inspection only the host is logged, not the path."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname) AS host, url_path, http_method, referrer, user_agent, status_code, COUNT(*) AS requests, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname), url_path, http_method, referrer, user_agent, status_code ORDER BY first_seen",
        "label": "Proxy requests to the attacker hosts",
        "target": "web",
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "http_method",
          "referrer",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "status_code",
          "time",
          "url_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "user_agent"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "GET /track.js (or /get.js on webshell.lol) with a referrer on a site that used Optimizely, from a named user or client IP. Here device_hostname is the proxy, so identify the person by actor_user_name or src_endpoint_ip. Without TLS inspection only the host is logged, not the path.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "triage"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "resolve-attacker-hosts"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Card and cookie data sent to the payload host",
      "config": {
        "description": "Find requests that carried stolen data out: /card.php receives card number, expiry and CVV after a card form is submitted; /hit.php receives the page URL, readable cookies and a screenshot after a wallet address is swapped. Any POST to the payload host is included, because the inline fallback variant sends data without first fetching track.js.",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname) AS host, url_path, http_method, referrer, user_agent, request_body_len, status_code, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND (instr(',' || '{{exfil_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 OR UPPER(http_method) = 'POST' OR activity_id = 6) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "web",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "role": "triage",
        "expected_signal": "A POST to /card.php means that user submitted a card on an affected page; a POST to /hit.php means the clipper fired on a wallet or payment page and sent the page's readable cookies. The referrer is the affected page. Needs TLS inspection to see the path and method."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname) AS host, url_path, http_method, referrer, user_agent, request_body_len, status_code, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND (instr(',' || '{{exfil_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 OR UPPER(http_method) = 'POST' OR activity_id = 6) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time",
        "label": "Card and cookie data sent to the payload host",
        "target": "web",
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "reads": [
          "activity_id",
          "actor_user_name",
          "http_method",
          "referrer",
          "request_body_len",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "status_code",
          "time",
          "url_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "user_agent"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "A POST to /card.php means that user submitted a card on an affected page; a POST to /hit.php means the clipper fired on a wallet or payment page and sent the page's readable cookies. The referrer is the affected page. Needs TLS inspection to see the path and method.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "triage"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "resolve-attacker-hosts"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "apple-mobile-requests",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "iPhone and iPad traffic to the exploit hosts",
      "config": {
        "description": "Find iPhones and iPads that reached the iOS stage hosts, or that loaded the payload. track.js only loaded the exploit chain for iPhone and iPad user agents.",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname) AS host, url_path, referrer, user_agent, COUNT(*) AS requests, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{ios_stage_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR (instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND (LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%iphone%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%ipad%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%ipod%'))) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname), url_path, referrer, user_agent ORDER BY first_seen",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "web",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "role": "triage",
        "expected_signal": "boot.js from a .icu host, or requests under /A8/, /B9/, /D11/, /D12/, /C10/ or /JIUJIU888/, from a corporate-Wi-Fi or VPN iPhone or iPad. The iOS version in the user agent decides the follow-up. iPadOS Safari often sends a desktop Mac user agent, so a .icu hit from a 'Mac' still counts."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname) AS host, url_path, referrer, user_agent, COUNT(*) AS requests, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{ios_stage_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR (instr(',' || '{{payload_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND (LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%iphone%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%ipad%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE '%ipod%'))) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, actor_user_name, LOWER(url_hostname), url_path, referrer, user_agent ORDER BY first_seen",
        "label": "iPhone and iPad traffic to the exploit hosts",
        "target": "web",
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "referrer",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "time",
          "url_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "user_agent"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "boot.js from a .icu host, or requests under /A8/, /B9/, /D11/, /D12/, /C10/ or /JIUJIU888/, from a corporate-Wi-Fi or VPN iPhone or iPad. The iOS version in the user agent decides the follow-up. iPadOS Safari often sends a desktop Mac user agent, so a .icu hit from a 'Mac' still counts.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "triage"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "resolve-attacker-hosts"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "connections-to-attacker-ips",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Connections to the attacker addresses",
      "config": {
        "description": "Catch browsers whose lookups never reached the DNS logs (DNS-over-HTTPS) and whose traffic did not pass the proxy, by the last known IP addresses.",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, user_name, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, COUNT(*) AS connections, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, user_name, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port ORDER BY first_seen",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "network",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "role": "triage",
        "expected_signal": "A browser process connecting to one of the addresses on 443 inside the exposure window. These are Google Cloud addresses that can be reassigned, so a match outside 9 to 17 Nov 2026 is weak on its own."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, user_name, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, COUNT(*) AS connections, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, user_name, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port ORDER BY first_seen",
        "label": "Connections to the attacker addresses",
        "target": "network",
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "process_name",
          "time",
          "user_name"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "A browser process connecting to one of the addresses on 443 inside the exposure window. These are Google Cloud addresses that can be reassigned, so a match outside 9 to 17 Nov 2026 is weak on its own.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "triage"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "resolve-attacker-hosts"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "new-script-hosts-after-optimizely",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "New cross-site script and .php hosts",
      "config": {
        "description": "Behaviour that survives a change of host: during the exposure window, find hosts never seen in the baseline that browsers fetched script or .php paths from while on a different site. Rank them by how many unrelated sites referred to them and by how often the same client fetched an Optimizely snippet just before. One new host referred to by many unrelated sites is the shape of an injected third-party script.",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(h.url_hostname) AS host, COUNT(DISTINCT h.referrer) AS referring_pages, COUNT(DISTINCT h.src_endpoint_ip) AS clients, COUNT(DISTINCT h.actor_user_name) AS users, SUM(CASE WHEN UPPER(h.http_method) = 'POST' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS posts, SUM(CASE WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_http_activity o WHERE o.src_endpoint_ip = h.src_endpoint_ip AND instr(',' || '{{optimizely_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(o.url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND julianday(o.time) BETWEEN julianday(h.time) - {{pivot_minutes}} / 1440.0 AND julianday(h.time)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS after_optimizely, MIN(h.time) AS first_seen, MAX(h.time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity h WHERE h.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(h.time) BETWEEN julianday('{{exposure_start}}') AND julianday('{{exposure_end}}') AND (LOWER(h.url_path) LIKE '%.js' OR LOWER(h.url_path) LIKE '%.php') AND h.referrer IS NOT NULL AND h.referrer != '' AND instr(LOWER(h.referrer), LOWER(h.url_hostname)) = 0 AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_http_activity b WHERE LOWER(b.url_hostname) = LOWER(h.url_hostname) AND b.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(b.time) < julianday('{{exposure_start}}')) GROUP BY LOWER(h.url_hostname) ORDER BY referring_pages DESC, after_optimizely DESC, posts DESC LIMIT 200",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "web",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "role": "baseline",
        "expected_signal": "1688360.cc near the top if the proxy saw it. Any other first-seen host with many unrelated referring pages, POSTs to .php, and fetches soon after an Optimizely snippet is a candidate rotated host. Expect noise from new ad, analytics and CDN hosts; the referring-pages count and after_optimizely are what separate them. Snippets served from a first-party host or a consent manager do not show as Optimizely fetches."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(h.url_hostname) AS host, COUNT(DISTINCT h.referrer) AS referring_pages, COUNT(DISTINCT h.src_endpoint_ip) AS clients, COUNT(DISTINCT h.actor_user_name) AS users, SUM(CASE WHEN UPPER(h.http_method) = 'POST' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS posts, SUM(CASE WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_http_activity o WHERE o.src_endpoint_ip = h.src_endpoint_ip AND instr(',' || '{{optimizely_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(o.url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND julianday(o.time) BETWEEN julianday(h.time) - {{pivot_minutes}} / 1440.0 AND julianday(h.time)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS after_optimizely, MIN(h.time) AS first_seen, MAX(h.time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity h WHERE h.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(h.time) BETWEEN julianday('{{exposure_start}}') AND julianday('{{exposure_end}}') AND (LOWER(h.url_path) LIKE '%.js' OR LOWER(h.url_path) LIKE '%.php') AND h.referrer IS NOT NULL AND h.referrer != '' AND instr(LOWER(h.referrer), LOWER(h.url_hostname)) = 0 AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_http_activity b WHERE LOWER(b.url_hostname) = LOWER(h.url_hostname) AND b.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(b.time) < julianday('{{exposure_start}}')) GROUP BY LOWER(h.url_hostname) ORDER BY referring_pages DESC, after_optimizely DESC, posts DESC LIMIT 200",
        "label": "New cross-site script and .php hosts",
        "target": "web",
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "http_method",
          "referrer",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "time",
          "url_hostname",
          "url_path"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "1688360.cc near the top if the proxy saw it. Any other first-seen host with many unrelated referring pages, POSTs to .php, and fetches soon after an Optimizely snippet is a candidate rotated host. Expect noise from new ad, analytics and CDN hosts; the referring-pages count and after_optimizely are what separate them. Snippets served from a first-party host or a consent manager do not show as Optimizely fetches.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "baseline"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "resolve-attacker-hosts"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "new-domains-on-exposed-hosts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "First-seen domains on exposed hosts",
      "config": {
        "description": "On the hosts from the scoping step, stack-count the domains first looked up during the exposure window across the fleet. Rare domains looked up only by exposed hosts may be a rotated payload or exfiltration host the published list misses.",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(d.query_hostname) AS domain, COUNT(DISTINCT d.device_hostname) AS devices, GROUP_CONCAT(DISTINCT d.process_name) AS processes, MIN(d.time) AS first_seen, MAX(d.time) AS last_seen FROM hb_dns_activity d WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || d.device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND d.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(d.time) BETWEEN julianday('{{exposure_start}}') AND julianday('{{exposure_end}}') AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_dns_activity b WHERE LOWER(b.query_hostname) = LOWER(d.query_hostname) AND b.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(b.time) < julianday('{{exposure_start}}')) GROUP BY LOWER(d.query_hostname) HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT d.device_hostname) < 20 ORDER BY devices DESC LIMIT 200",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "role": "baseline",
        "expected_signal": "Newly seen domains shared by several exposed hosts, especially random-looking .cc or .icu names like the published ones. Most rows will be ordinary new domains; read it with the referrers from the proxy steps."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(d.query_hostname) AS domain, COUNT(DISTINCT d.device_hostname) AS devices, GROUP_CONCAT(DISTINCT d.process_name) AS processes, MIN(d.time) AS first_seen, MAX(d.time) AS last_seen FROM hb_dns_activity d WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || d.device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND d.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(d.time) BETWEEN julianday('{{exposure_start}}') AND julianday('{{exposure_end}}') AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_dns_activity b WHERE LOWER(b.query_hostname) = LOWER(d.query_hostname) AND b.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(b.time) < julianday('{{exposure_start}}')) GROUP BY LOWER(d.query_hostname) HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT d.device_hostname) < 20 ORDER BY devices DESC LIMIT 200",
        "label": "First-seen domains on exposed hosts",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "Newly seen domains shared by several exposed hosts, especially random-looking .cc or .icu names like the published ones. Most rows will be ordinary new domains; read it with the referrers from the proxy steps.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "baseline"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "resolve-attacker-hosts"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "weigh-exposure",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Weigh exposure per user and device",
      "config": {
        "description": "Turn the six evidence sets into a per-user, per-device exposure picture.",
        "objective": "For each user, client IP or device that appears in the evidence, decide which of these happened, citing rows: (a) the browser loaded the injected code (lookup, connection or track.js/get.js fetch); (b) card data was sent (/card.php); (c) readable cookies and a screenshot were sent after a wallet swap (/hit.php); (d) an iPhone or iPad reached an iOS stage host, with the iOS version from the user agent; (e) a first-seen host from the behaviour steps looks like a rotated payload or exfil host. Name the referring site for each hit and say whether it is one of the organisation's own sites. Produce the user list for scope_users.",
        "context": [
          "resolve-attacker-hosts",
          "requests-to-attacker-hosts",
          "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
          "apple-mobile-requests",
          "connections-to-attacker-ips",
          "new-script-hosts-after-optimizely",
          "new-domains-on-exposed-hosts"
        ],
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity",
          "network",
          "web"
        ],
        "success_criteria": "A table of users and devices with exposure level (loaded, card sent, cookies sent, iOS reached, none), the referring site, first-seen time and cited rows, plus any candidate new host with the reason.",
        "cite": "required",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A per-user exposure table and a scope_users list."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "requests-to-attacker-hosts",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "apple-mobile-requests",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "connections-to-attacker-ips",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "new-script-hosts-after-optimizely",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "new-domains-on-exposed-hosts",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "sign-ins-from-new-sources",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Sign-ins from new addresses after exposure",
      "config": {
        "description": "For the exposed users, find successful sign-ins from source addresses the user had not used before the exposure window. Stolen cookies are replayed rather than signed in with, so this catches only the cases where the cookie led to a new sign-in or token refresh the identity provider logged.",
        "content": "SELECT s.actor_user_name, s.provider, s.app_id, s.dst_endpoint_name, s.client_app, s.src_endpoint_ip, s.src_location_country, s.user_agent, COUNT(*) AS sign_ins, MIN(s.time) AS first_seen, MAX(s.time) AS last_seen FROM hb_auth_signin s WHERE s.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(s.time) >= julianday('{{exposure_start}}') AND s.status_id = 1 AND s.src_endpoint_ip IS NOT NULL AND ('{{scope_users}}' = '' OR instr(',' || LOWER('{{scope_users}}') || ',', ',' || LOWER(s.actor_user_name) || ',') > 0) AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_auth_signin b WHERE LOWER(b.actor_user_name) = LOWER(s.actor_user_name) AND b.src_endpoint_ip = s.src_endpoint_ip AND b.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(b.time) < julianday('{{exposure_start}}')) GROUP BY s.actor_user_name, s.provider, s.app_id, s.dst_endpoint_name, s.client_app, s.src_endpoint_ip, s.src_location_country, s.user_agent ORDER BY first_seen",
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "source": "identity",
        "surface": "hb_auth_signin",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "expected_signal": "A successful sign-in for an exposed user from a new address or country after the exposure, especially to Salesforce, GitLab, Zoom, Smartsheet or Bitly, whose public pages carried the snippet. Silence is weak: cookie replay into the SaaS app itself appears in that app's audit log, not here."
      },
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "content": "SELECT s.actor_user_name, s.provider, s.app_id, s.dst_endpoint_name, s.client_app, s.src_endpoint_ip, s.src_location_country, s.user_agent, COUNT(*) AS sign_ins, MIN(s.time) AS first_seen, MAX(s.time) AS last_seen FROM hb_auth_signin s WHERE s.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(s.time) >= julianday('{{exposure_start}}') AND s.status_id = 1 AND s.src_endpoint_ip IS NOT NULL AND ('{{scope_users}}' = '' OR instr(',' || LOWER('{{scope_users}}') || ',', ',' || LOWER(s.actor_user_name) || ',') > 0) AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM hb_auth_signin b WHERE LOWER(b.actor_user_name) = LOWER(s.actor_user_name) AND b.src_endpoint_ip = s.src_endpoint_ip AND b.time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND julianday(b.time) < julianday('{{exposure_start}}')) GROUP BY s.actor_user_name, s.provider, s.app_id, s.dst_endpoint_name, s.client_app, s.src_endpoint_ip, s.src_location_country, s.user_agent ORDER BY first_seen",
        "label": "Sign-ins from new addresses after exposure",
        "target": "identity",
        "source": "hb_auth_signin",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "app_id",
          "client_app",
          "dst_endpoint_name",
          "provider",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "src_location_country",
          "status_id",
          "time",
          "user_agent"
        ],
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18",
        "expected": "A successful sign-in for an exposed user from a new address or country after the exposure, especially to Salesforce, GitLab, Zoom, Smartsheet or Bitly, whose public pages carried the snippet. Silence is weak: cookie replay into the SaaS app itself appears in that app's audit log, not here.",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "role": "enrichment"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "weigh-exposure"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "assess-session-reuse",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Assess session theft and reuse",
      "config": {
        "description": "Decide whether any exposed user's session was stolen or reused.",
        "objective": "For each user with a /hit.php POST or a new-source sign-in, decide whether a session was stolen or reused. Cookies sent to /hit.php were only those page JavaScript can read: HttpOnly cookies were not exposed, so judge the risk from the affected site and whether the user was signed in to it. Compare new sign-in addresses with the user's known travel, VPN and devices. Treat users whose iPhone or iPad reached an iOS stage host on an unpatched version (below 18.7.3, or 26 below 26.3) as session at risk too: in earlier campaigns these kits' payloads took cookies and keychain data. Note which users submitted a card and which devices need an iOS check.",
        "context": [
          "weigh-exposure",
          "data-sent-to-attacker-hosts",
          "sign-ins-from-new-sources"
        ],
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity",
          "network",
          "web"
        ],
        "success_criteria": "A verdict per user (session reused | session at risk | exposed only | not exposed) citing rows, and lists of card-submitting users and at-risk iOS devices.",
        "cite": "required",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "Per-user verdicts on session theft."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "sign-ins-from-new-sources"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-session-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on session verdict",
      "config": {
        "description": "Revoke sessions where theft is likely; otherwise review exposure and the owner-side checks.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory",
        "condition": "the assess-session-reuse verdict is 'session reused' or 'session at risk' for at least one user",
        "question": "the assess-session-reuse verdict is 'session reused' or 'session at risk' for at least one user",
        "fuzzy": true,
        "confidence": "medium",
        "judge": "hunter",
        "blind_spot": "no-url-path-visibility"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "assess-session-reuse"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "revoke-exposed-sessions",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Revoke sessions of affected users",
      "config": {
        "description": "End sessions that may have been stolen from an injected page.",
        "instructions": "For each user judged 'session reused' or 'session at risk': revoke active sessions and refresh tokens in the identity provider and in the affected SaaS app (for example Salesforce, GitLab, Zoom, Smartsheet or Bitly) and require MFA at next sign-in. Reset the password only where a sign-in from a new source succeeded. Do not isolate the laptop: the code ran in a web page and left nothing on the device.",
        "action_approval": "required",
        "target": "identity"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-session-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "exposed-user-follow-up",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Follow up cards and iPhones",
      "config": {
        "description": "Handle what the queries can only point at: payment cards and mobile devices.",
        "instructions": "Cards: for every user with a /card.php POST, and for anyone who paid by card on an affected site between 04:00 and 23:11 UTC on 16 Nov 2026, check the corporate or purchasing card statements, ask the issuer to reissue the card and watch for fraud. Tell users to do the same with personal cards. iPhones and iPads: for each device that reached an iOS stage host or loaded the payload, check the iOS version and Lockdown Mode status in MDM. In this campaign Coruna was served to iOS 13 to 17 (Google's analysis of the kit gives 13.0 to 17.2.1), DarkSword to iOS 18.x (Google: 18.4 to 18.7), and iOS 26 was only fingerprinted. The kit treats 18.7.3 and 26.3 as patched; one DarkSword bug stays open until 26.3. Devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier also loaded a hidden iframe and reloaded the page every 60 seconds. Update every device below 26.3 (or 18.7.3 where 26 is not available), review mobile threat defence alerts, and send any device with signs of compromise for forensic review with the vendor's tooling (for example MVT with the iVerify Coruna indicators). Lockdown Mode stops both kits. No source has shown a device was actually exploited in this campaign.",
        "assignee": "analyst"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-session-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-session-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-session-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "revoke-exposed-sessions"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "site-owner-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Check your own Optimizely projects",
      "config": {
        "description": "If the organisation runs Optimizely Web Experimentation, its own visitors may have been exposed.",
        "instructions": "Skip this if you do not use Optimizely Web Experimentation. Otherwise: in each project, read the Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code as served on 16 Nov 2026 and now, looking for 1688360.cc, webshell.lol, atob( and code you did not write; check the snippet's Last-Modified header and the project change history for edits on 16 Nov. Include snippets served from your own domain. List Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations, confirm Optimizely rotated them, and rotate any you did not create or cannot account for. Search CSP violation reports for 1688360.cc and the .icu hosts. If the snippet ran on login, checkout or payment pages, rotate secrets kept in non-HttpOnly cookies, and decide with legal and privacy whether customers must be told.",
        "assignee": "analyst"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "exposed-user-follow-up"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "wallet-transfer-check",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Check crypto transfers against attacker wallets",
      "config": {
        "description": "Address swapping happens inside the page and leaves no network trace of its own.",
        "instructions": "Ask treasury and finance whether anyone sent cryptocurrency between 04:00 UTC on 16 Nov and 06:00 UTC on 17 Nov 2026, from any device. Check each destination address against the attacker's swap-in wallets: BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW; ETH and BSC 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e; TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa; SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n; TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p; LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5; BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58; DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5. A user with a /hit.php POST had an address swapped on that page. Report any match to the exchange and the police, and record the hunt outcome.",
        "assignee": "analyst"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "site-owner-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}