{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "SCKit represents a direct threat to the trust relationship between MSPs and their customers. By abusing legitimate remote-access tools to hijack technician sessions, the threat actor can achieve broad lateral movement that bypasses standard perimeter controls."
      },
      "name": "SCKit Persistence and RelayTrap Targeting",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1053.005",
        "attack.t1059.001",
        "attack.t1071",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1547.001",
        "attack.t1562.001",
        "command and control",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "sckit-abuses-screenconnect-to-deploy-remote-access-and-target-technician-sessions",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "unauthorized-screenconnect-client-deployment",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on the persistent toolkit and technician targeting, whereas deployment focuses on the initial MSI installer activity.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single detection rule for Registry Run keys or DNS lookups would be prone to false positives from legitimate support activity. This hunt uses the agent to weigh multiple independent signals (vulnerability status, rare persistence scripts, and named artifact execution) to confirm a sophisticated toolkit installation.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "persistence-establishment",
          "steps": [
            "rare-persistence-scripts",
            "sckit-artifact-execution"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-and-infrastructure-communication",
          "steps": [
            "infrastructure-dns-lookups"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
          "steps": [
            "vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts",
            "sckit-artifact-execution",
            "agent-triage"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "unauthorized-client-installation",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "ScreenConnect Management Abuse",
            "slug": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Unauthorized commands issued via RMM+ extension APIs",
              "ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi requested with c=Exploited parameters",
              "Abuse of ConnectWise Automate/LabTech extensions"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Malicious MSI Deployment",
            "slug": "unauthorized-client-installation",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "curl.exe -o C:\\Windows\\Temp\\sc.msi",
              "msiexec.exe /i C:\\Windows\\Temp\\sc.msi /qn /norestart",
              "Silent installation of unauthorized ScreenConnect guest clients"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "SCKit Payload Extraction",
            "slug": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Stage0Loader.ps1",
              "Panel-Lateral.ps1",
              "Panel-Lateral-free.ps1",
              "LabConfig.ps1",
              "PowerShell decoder extracting toolkit using device-specific material"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Persistence via Tasks and Registry",
            "slug": "persistence-establishment",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1547.001",
              "T1053.005",
              "T1562.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "schtasks.exe creating malicious maintenance tasks",
              "Registry Run keys for SCKit launchers",
              "trapkit\\install.ps1",
              "Stop-LabTrap.bat"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Command and Control Infrastructure",
            "slug": "c2-and-infrastructure-communication",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "185.99.255.28",
              "155.94.150.39",
              "ns.mo7sen.dev",
              "sc.payproofkit.com",
              "cdn007-digitaldownloads.com",
              "relaytrap.cs",
              "newnewnew.gotdns.org",
              "soxnewwork.homedns.org"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Technician Session Hijacking",
            "slug": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "CVE-2026-84869",
              "RelayTrap component delivery to connecting technicians",
              "TrapWatch.ps1",
              "ToolboxRelayUploader.exe",
              "Lite-Alert.ps1"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Threat actors abuse vulnerabilities in ScreenConnect server extensions or hijacked management consoles to deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and the SCKit malware toolkit. The campaign establishes long-term persistence on customer endpoints to host RelayTrap, a component that targets IT technicians' workstations with malicious payloads during support sessions."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "The scoping query targets the vulnerability used for initial access. The hunt also checks all hosts for persistence regardless of patch status to identify infections that occurred before patching.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder who has compromised a ScreenConnect client is maintaining access via script-based Registry persistence and is using the RelayTrap component to target connecting technician sessions.",
      "parameters": {
        "c2_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "msrc-blog-sckit-screenconnect",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "ns.mo7sen.dev",
            "sc.payproofkit.com",
            "relaytrap.cs",
            "cdn007-digitaldownloads.com",
            "suspscreenconnectdownload.ea",
            "tikise.ea",
            "relaypersist.fc",
            "screlaytrap.ec",
            "screenconnect.sc",
            "screenconnect.dc"
          ],
          "description": "C2 and relay domains identified in the research."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Specific hostnames to focus on; leave empty to hunt the whole estate."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of activity to examine."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/",
          "name": "Microsoft Security Blog \u2014 SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "incomplete-telemetry",
          "risk": "A host without an agent will not appear in registry or process logs, leaving persistence unobserved and session hijacking possible.",
          "stage": "persistence-establishment",
          "question": "Are there unmanaged hosts in the environment that SCKit has successfully compromised?",
          "requires": "EDR agent coverage across all MSP-managed endpoints"
        },
        {
          "id": "ephemeral-processes",
          "risk": "If using snapshot-based process activity (hb_process_activity) without historical logs, short-lived toolkit components may be missed.",
          "stage": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
          "question": "Did the RelayTrap component execute and terminate between sampling intervals?",
          "requires": "High-frequency process sampling or full process log retention"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "SCKit Persistence and RelayTrap Targeting",
    "description": "This hunt identifies long-term SCKit infections following the abuse of ScreenConnect clients. It begins by scoping the estate to endpoints running unpatched or vulnerable ScreenConnect clients (CVE-2026-84869). It then executes a fan-out to find independent evidence of the toolkit's presence: rare batch or PowerShell scripts persisting in Registry Run keys, the execution of named SCKit artifacts like TrapWatch or Lite-Alert, and network communication with known malicious relay infrastructure. An agent triages these signals to identify compromised customer endpoints that may be attempting to hijack technician sessions."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "sckit-abuses-screenconnect-to-deploy-remote-access-and-target-technician-sessions",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "persistence-establishment",
            "steps": [
              "rare-persistence-scripts",
              "sckit-artifact-execution"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-and-infrastructure-communication",
            "steps": [
              "infrastructure-dns-lookups"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
            "steps": [
              "vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts",
              "sckit-artifact-execution",
              "agent-triage"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "unauthorized-client-installation",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder who has compromised a ScreenConnect client is maintaining access via script-based Registry persistence and is using the RelayTrap component to target connecting technician sessions.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "incomplete-telemetry",
            "risk": "A host without an agent will not appear in registry or process logs, leaving persistence unobserved and session hijacking possible.",
            "stage": "persistence-establishment",
            "question": "Are there unmanaged hosts in the environment that SCKit has successfully compromised?",
            "requires": "EDR agent coverage across all MSP-managed endpoints"
          },
          {
            "id": "ephemeral-processes",
            "risk": "If using snapshot-based process activity (hb_process_activity) without historical logs, short-lived toolkit components may be missed.",
            "stage": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
            "question": "Did the RelayTrap component execute and terminate between sampling intervals?",
            "requires": "High-frequency process sampling or full process log retention"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "The scoping query targets the vulnerability used for initial access. The hunt also checks all hosts for persistence regardless of patch status to identify infections that occurred before patching.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single detection rule for Registry Run keys or DNS lookups would be prone to false positives from legitimate support activity. This hunt uses the agent to weigh multiple independent signals (vulnerability status, rare persistence scripts, and named artifact execution) to confirm a sophisticated toolkit installation."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Identify vulnerable ScreenConnect clients",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_at FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-84869' AND status != 'suppressed'",
        "surface": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "description": "Find hosts susceptible to unauthorized file execution via ScreenConnect (CVE-2026-84869).",
        "expected_signal": "Rows identify unpatched hosts. If none, the primary vector for SCKit deployment is mitigated, but the hunt continues for existing persistence."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Identify vulnerable ScreenConnect clients",
        "reads": [
          "device_uid",
          "affected_package_version",
          "severity",
          "collected_at"
        ],
        "source": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_at FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-84869' AND status != 'suppressed'",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows identify unpatched hosts. If none, the primary vector for SCKit deployment is mitigated, but the hunt continues for existing persistence.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-persistence-scripts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare script persistence in Run keys",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(reg_value_data) AS script_data, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE (LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\currentversion\\run%' OR LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\currentversion\\runonce%') AND (LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.bat%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.ps1%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.cmd%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC",
        "surface": "hb_registry_activity",
        "description": "Identify hosts where SCKit launchers or cleanup scripts (Stop-LabTrap.bat) have been added to registry startup keys.",
        "expected_signal": "Rare scripts (batch or PowerShell) persisting in Run keys. Malicious launchers like Run-Lateral-Full.bat will appear as unique entries."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare script persistence in Run keys",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "reg_target",
          "reg_value_data",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_registry_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(reg_value_data) AS script_data, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE (LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\currentversion\\run%' OR LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\currentversion\\runonce%') AND (LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.bat%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.ps1%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.cmd%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Rare scripts (batch or PowerShell) persisting in Run keys. Malicious launchers like Run-Lateral-Full.bat will appear as unique entries.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "reg_value_data"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "sckit-artifact-execution",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Execution of SCKit toolkit artifacts",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%trapwatch.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%lite-alert.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%stop-labtrap.bat%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%toolboxrelayuploader.exe%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Detect the running components of the SCKit worm and RelayTrap payload.",
        "expected_signal": "Processes executing specific SCKit scripts or the RelayTrap uploader. This is a high-confidence indicator of active infection."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Execution of SCKit toolkit artifacts",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%trapwatch.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%lite-alert.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%stop-labtrap.bat%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%toolboxrelayuploader.exe%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Processes executing specific SCKit scripts or the RelayTrap uploader. This is a high-confidence indicator of active infection.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "infrastructure-dns-lookups",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "DNS lookups to malicious relay infrastructure",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Correlate host activity with the known domains used for toolkit retrieval and RelayTrap communication.",
        "expected_signal": "DNS queries for domains like ns.mo7sen.dev or sc.payproofkit.com. Any match indicates a host communicating with the threat actor's infrastructure."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "DNS lookups to malicious relay infrastructure",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "DNS queries for domains like ns.mo7sen.dev or sc.payproofkit.com. Any match indicates a host communicating with the threat actor's infrastructure.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "agent-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage SCKit evidence per host",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts",
          "rare-persistence-scripts",
          "sckit-artifact-execution",
          "infrastructure-dns-lookups"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine which hosts are compromised by SCKit. A host is 'malicious' if it shows either artifact execution (TrapWatch/RelayTrap) or a combination of vulnerability (CVE-2026-84869) and rare script-based Run key persistence. Evaluate if the host process names suggest a technician workstation was the source of DNS lookups to the relays.",
        "description": "Synthesize vulnerability status, registry persistence, and artifact execution to identify confirmed SCKit infections.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A detailed verdict for each host based on the convergence of multiple indicators.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host with citations."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "rare-persistence-scripts",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "sckit-artifact-execution",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "infrastructure-dns-lookups",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route based on infection verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the agent-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the agent-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "incomplete-telemetry",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the hunt based on the severity of the findings.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "agent-triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate compromised host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Prevent further lateral movement and session hijacking by isolating the infected endpoint.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host from the network and revoke any active ScreenConnect sessions associated with the machine's client ID.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Detailed analyst investigation",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the extent of the session hijacking and check for downstream impacts on managed endpoints.",
        "instructions": "Verify if the compromised host was used by a technician. Check for evidence of RelayTrap delivery (RelayTrap.cs or compiled variants) and audit any ScreenConnect commands issued during the infection window."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close hunt and record coverage",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Finalize the hunt and document the estate's exposure to SCKit.",
        "instructions": "Document the number of endpoints patched against CVE-2026-84869. If no malicious activity was found, record the negative results for persistence and C2 communication."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}