{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Device code phishing bypasses MFA by using the victim's own session. This hunt provides a negative result over the estate for a specific, highly-disguised campaign identified by recent threat research."
      },
      "name": "Microsoft Teams Booking Device Code Phishing",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1566.002",
        "attack.t1204.001",
        "attack.t1027.013",
        "attack.t1684.001",
        "attack.t1528",
        "attack.t1539",
        "attack.t1557",
        "attack.t1550.004",
        "attack.t1090",
        "credential access",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement"
      ],
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "m365-token-theft-by-adversary-in-the-middle",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on device code lures specifically; AiTM attacks like Evilginx require different telemetry for proxy interception.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "category": "identity",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single detection rule cannot correlate a DNS resolution of a redirector (Phase 1) with an anomalous programmatic sign-in (Phase 2) hours later. This phased hunt uses an agent to link user behavior across disparate surfaces.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-redirect-chain",
          "steps": [
            "dns-redirect-chain"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "phishing-infrastructure-interaction",
          "steps": [
            "http-phishing-interaction",
            "triage-early-interaction"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "credential-access-device-code",
          "steps": [
            "anomalous-cmsi-logins"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "session-replay-and-abuse",
          "steps": [
            "programmatic-ua-prevalence",
            "correlate-attack-chain"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Multi-stage Phishing Redirects",
            "slug": "initial-access-redirect-chain",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1566.002"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com",
              "share.google/?q=UltJkMsVWI5V9GJM1",
              "www.google.com/share.google?q=UltJkMsVWI5V9GJM1"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Teams Booking Lure Interaction",
            "slug": "phishing-infrastructure-interaction",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1204.001",
              "T1027.013",
              "T1684.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "gpimmlgration.com",
              "X-Antibot-Token",
              "X-WinHello",
              "X-Automatic-Target-Country",
              "X-Visitor-Country",
              "Idempotency-Key",
              "/static-export/api/device/start",
              "AES-256-GCM encrypted phishing kit"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Device Code Token Theft",
            "slug": "credential-access-device-code",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1528",
              "T1539",
              "T1557"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "microsoft.com/devicelogin",
              "Cmsi:Cmsi login flow",
              "Microsoft Authentication Broker client"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Session Replay via Residential Proxy",
            "slug": "session-replay-and-abuse",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1550.004",
              "T1078.004",
              "T1090"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "python-requests",
              "node",
              "ASN and region change within same session ID",
              "Residential callback proxy traffic"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "This campaign leverages a deceptive Microsoft Teams booking workflow to facilitate device code phishing. Attackers lead victims through a multi-stage redirect chain to a typosquatted domain hosting an encrypted phishing kit that initiates a Microsoft device code sign-in, ultimately capturing OAuth tokens and session cookies for account takeovers via residential proxies."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Scope to hosts with Microsoft Teams installed. Focus on users in executive or finance roles who are more likely to be targeted by such a sophisticated spear-phishing lure.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An attacker is using a multi-stage redirect chain and a convincing Microsoft Teams booking lure to trick users into authorizing a device code, subsequently replaying the stolen session tokens via residential proxies using programmatic tools.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Limit the hunt to specific hosts; leave empty to hunt across the entire estate."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "phishing_backend": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/crafty-microsoft-teams-booking-flow-disguises-device-code-phishing",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-12"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "gpimmlgration.com",
            "cloudflare.com"
          ],
          "description": "Domains hosting the phishing kit backend or lure page."
        },
        "programmatic_uas": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/crafty-microsoft-teams-booking-flow-disguises-device-code-phishing",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-12"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "python-requests",
            "node"
          ],
          "description": "Programmatic user agents used for session replay and automation."
        },
        "redirect_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/crafty-microsoft-teams-booking-flow-disguises-device-code-phishing",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-12"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "share.google",
            "railway.com",
            "safelinks.protection.outlook.com"
          ],
          "description": "Domains observed in the initial redirection chain."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/crafty-microsoft-teams-booking-flow-disguises-device-code-phishing",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/crafty-microsoft-teams-booking-flow-disguises-device-code-phishing",
          "name": "Huntress \u2014 Crafty Microsoft Teams Booking Flow Disguises Device Code Phishing"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "encrypted-phishing-kit",
          "risk": "The kit is delivered as ciphertext and decrypted client-side; network sensors only see an encrypted blob, making it difficult to prove the kit ran.",
          "stage": "phishing-infrastructure-interaction",
          "question": "Whether the phishing kit successfully decrypted and executed in the user's browser",
          "requires": "Endpoint script memory inspection"
        },
        {
          "id": "residential-proxy-origin",
          "risk": "The attacker routes traffic through residential proxies; without specialized threat intelligence, these sign-ins appear as legitimate remote employees.",
          "stage": "session-replay-and-abuse",
          "question": "Whether the source IP for a sign-in is a legitimate residential address or a known callback proxy node",
          "requires": "Residential IP reputation feed"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Microsoft Teams Booking Device Code Phishing",
    "description": "This hunt follows the lifecycle of a device code phishing attack identified in recent research. It identifies users who interacted with a typosquatted Teams booking site through a redirect chain involving Google short links and then correlates that web interaction with subsequent anomalous identity events. The follow-on phase looks for the specific 'Cmsi:Cmsi' login flow and session abuse by programmatic user agents (Python, Node) replaying tokens through residential proxies. An agent correlates these two surfaces to confirm successful compromise."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-redirect-chain",
            "steps": [
              "dns-redirect-chain"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "phishing-infrastructure-interaction",
            "steps": [
              "http-phishing-interaction",
              "triage-early-interaction"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "credential-access-device-code",
            "steps": [
              "anomalous-cmsi-logins"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "session-replay-and-abuse",
            "steps": [
              "programmatic-ua-prevalence",
              "correlate-attack-chain"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An attacker is using a multi-stage redirect chain and a convincing Microsoft Teams booking lure to trick users into authorizing a device code, subsequently replaying the stolen session tokens via residential proxies using programmatic tools.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "encrypted-phishing-kit",
            "risk": "The kit is delivered as ciphertext and decrypted client-side; network sensors only see an encrypted blob, making it difficult to prove the kit ran.",
            "stage": "phishing-infrastructure-interaction",
            "question": "Whether the phishing kit successfully decrypted and executed in the user's browser",
            "requires": "Endpoint script memory inspection"
          },
          {
            "id": "residential-proxy-origin",
            "risk": "The attacker routes traffic through residential proxies; without specialized threat intelligence, these sign-ins appear as legitimate remote employees.",
            "stage": "session-replay-and-abuse",
            "question": "Whether the source IP for a sign-in is a legitimate residential address or a known callback proxy node",
            "requires": "Residential IP reputation feed"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Scope to hosts with Microsoft Teams installed. Focus on users in executive or finance roles who are more likely to be targeted by such a sophisticated spear-phishing lure.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single detection rule cannot correlate a DNS resolution of a redirector (Phase 1) with an anomalous programmatic sign-in (Phase 2) hours later. This phased hunt uses an agent to link user behavior across disparate surfaces."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "identify-potential-targets",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Identify potential targets with Microsoft Teams",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%teams%'",
        "surface": "hb_software_inventory",
        "description": "Identify hosts that have Microsoft Teams installed, as they are the primary targets for this specific lure.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of hosts where Teams is present. Silence indicates no Teams installation was visible to the inventory provider."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Identify potential targets with Microsoft Teams",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "package_name",
          "package_version"
        ],
        "source": "hb_software_inventory",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%teams%'",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of hosts where Teams is present. Silence indicates no Teams installation was visible to the inventory provider.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "dns-redirect-chain",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "DNS resolutions for phishing redirectors",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{redirect_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{phishing_backend}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Identify hosts resolving domains used in the attacker's multi-stage redirect chain.",
        "expected_signal": "Hosts resolving the known malicious or redirector domains. Silence means the lure was not triggered or used different domains."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "identify-potential-targets"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "DNS resolutions for phishing redirectors",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{redirect_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{phishing_backend}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Hosts resolving the known malicious or redirector domains. Silence means the lure was not triggered or used different domains.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "http-phishing-interaction",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "HTTP traffic to the phishing kit API",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, user_agent, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{phishing_backend}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(url_path) LIKE '%/api/device/%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Find direct HTTP requests to the attacker backend, specifically the /api/device/start endpoint described in the research.",
        "expected_signal": "Traffic matching the known backend infrastructure and API patterns. Silence suggests no active engagement with the kit."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "identify-potential-targets"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "HTTP traffic to the phishing kit API",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "url_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "user_agent",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, user_agent, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{phishing_backend}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(url_path) LIKE '%/api/device/%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Traffic matching the known backend infrastructure and API patterns. Silence suggests no active engagement with the kit.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-early-interaction",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage early lure interaction",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "dns-redirect-chain",
          "http-phishing-interaction"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine which users likely clicked through the booking lure and triggered the device code API based on DNS and HTTP telemetry.",
        "description": "Analyze the web telemetry to identify specific hosts or users who likely completed the phishing booking flow.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A list of at-risk users who interacted with the phishing site, to be used for correlation in the identity phase.",
        "success_criteria": "A list of users and timestamps for further session abuse analysis."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "dns-redirect-chain",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "http-phishing-interaction",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "anomalous-cmsi-logins",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Sign-ins with Cmsi login flow",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "source": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_location_country, user_agent, event_type, status_detail, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE provider IN ('m365', 'azure_ad') AND (LOWER(event_type) LIKE '%cmsi:cmsi%' OR LOWER(status_detail) LIKE '%cmsi:cmsi%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_auth_signin",
        "description": "Identify device code authentication events tagged with the Cmsi:Cmsi flow, as identified in the Huntress research.",
        "expected_signal": "Logins explicitly using the device code flow pattern associated with the campaign. Silence means no successful device code flow was recorded with this specific tag."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-early-interaction"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "label": "Sign-ins with Cmsi login flow",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "src_location_country",
          "user_agent",
          "event_type",
          "status_detail",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_auth_signin",
        "target": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_location_country, user_agent, event_type, status_detail, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE provider IN ('m365', 'azure_ad') AND (LOWER(event_type) LIKE '%cmsi:cmsi%' OR LOWER(status_detail) LIKE '%cmsi:cmsi%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Logins explicitly using the device code flow pattern associated with the campaign. Silence means no successful device code flow was recorded with this specific tag.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "programmatic-ua-prevalence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Prevalence of programmatic user agents in sign-ins",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(user_agent) AS ua, COUNT(DISTINCT actor_user_name) AS users, COUNT(*) AS signins, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE provider IN ('m365', 'azure_ad') AND (instr(',' || '{{programmatic_uas}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(user_agent) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE 'python%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE 'node%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY LOWER(user_agent) HAVING users <= 3 ORDER BY users ASC",
        "surface": "hb_auth_signin",
        "description": "Stack-count user agents to identify rare programmatic sign-ins (Python, Node) that stand out from standard browser traffic.",
        "expected_signal": "A programmatic user agent seen for only a few users, suggesting attacker automation replaying session tokens. Standard browser traffic should be common across the fleet."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-early-interaction"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Prevalence of programmatic user agents in sign-ins",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "user_agent",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_auth_signin",
        "target": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(user_agent) AS ua, COUNT(DISTINCT actor_user_name) AS users, COUNT(*) AS signins, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE provider IN ('m365', 'azure_ad') AND (instr(',' || '{{programmatic_uas}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(user_agent) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE 'python%' OR LOWER(user_agent) LIKE 'node%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY LOWER(user_agent) HAVING users <= 3 ORDER BY users ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A programmatic user agent seen for only a few users, suggesting attacker automation replaying session tokens. Standard browser traffic should be common across the fleet.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "actor_user_name",
          "key": [
            "user_agent"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "correlate-attack-chain",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Correlate attack chain across surfaces",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "triage-early-interaction",
          "anomalous-cmsi-logins",
          "programmatic-ua-prevalence"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any user who interacted with the phishing loader subsequently showed signs of session abuse, such as Cmsi logins or programmatic access from anomalous IPs.",
        "description": "Link the web-based lure interaction from Phase 1 with the identity-based session abuse in Phase 2 for each user.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A timeline of events for each user confirming lure interaction was followed by anomalous login activity.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-user verdict citing specific rows from HTTP, DNS, and sign-in logs."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "anomalous-cmsi-logins",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "programmatic-ua-prevalence",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-evidence",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on evidence of compromise",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the correlated attack chain shows a user interacting with the lure and subsequent anomalous sign-ins",
        "condition": "the correlated attack chain shows a user interacting with the lure and subsequent anomalous sign-ins",
        "blind_spot": "residential-proxy-origin",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route the investigation based on whether the agent found a correlated attack chain for any account.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "correlate-attack-chain"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-identity",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Revoke sessions and isolate identity",
      "config": {
        "target": "identity",
        "description": "Terminate the attacker's replayed session and prevent further access.",
        "instructions": "Revoke all active M365 sessions for the compromised user and force a password reset. Review the account for new MFA enrollments or mailbox rules.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-evidence",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "forensic-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Forensic analyst review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Confirm the agent's findings and investigate the extent of post-compromise activity.",
        "instructions": "Verify the correlated events in the raw logs. Check for lateral movement or data exfiltration performed via the programmatic user agents (Python/Node)."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-evidence",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-evidence",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-identity"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out hunt",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document results and tune parameters for future runs.",
        "instructions": "Record all findings. If the programmatic user agent list is too noisy, refine it to only includes those not typically used for legitimate automation in this environment."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-evidence",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "forensic-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}