{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "TGR-STA-0049 is a sophisticated actor targeting government entities; early detection of their initial access vectors is vital to prevent multi-stage espionage and data theft."
      },
      "name": "TGR-STA-0049 Initial Access via Exploitation and Phishing",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1505.003",
        "attack.t1566",
        "attack.t1204.002",
        "collection",
        "command and control",
        "defense evasion",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "quic-and-covert-novel-http-3-powered-rats-target-southeast-asian-governments",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "tgr-sta-0049-execution-and-persistence",
          "reason": "Once a beachhead is confirmed, the next phase is tracking RAT deployment and sideloading.",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "This hunt combines infrastructure scoping with a behavioral prevalence baseline of web directories, correlating rare file drops with network IOCs. A single rule would alert on Suo5 filenames; this hunt identifies Suo5 even if renamed, by focusing on the rarity of the creation event in the context of scoped servers.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
          "steps": [
            "identify-vulnerable-servers",
            "rare-webshell-creations",
            "phishing-domain-resolutions"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-sideloading-rat-deployment",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "discovery-and-lateral-movement",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "exfiltration-and-collection",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Server Exploitation and Phishing",
            "slug": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190",
              "T1505.003",
              "T1566"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx, or Suo5 web shells on Exchange or web servers",
              "Decoy PDF documents targeting government sectors",
              "Lookalike domains: www.wkuyda.com, www.thailisting.net, www.yangon.it.com"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Execution via Sideloading and RAT Deployment",
            "slug": "execution-sideloading-rat-deployment",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1574.002",
              "T1218",
              "T1059.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "DLL side-loading of modified legitimate binaries",
              "XOR-encrypted shellcode embedded in payloads",
              "PerfectPioneer RAT (Go-based)",
              "KUKURAT modular agent",
              "Decoy installers"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Defense Evasion and Heuristic Camouflage",
            "slug": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
            "tactic": "defense-evasion",
            "techniques": [
              "T1055",
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "KUKURAT heuristic camouflage engine generating synthetic baseline noise",
              "PerfectPioneer isDangerousCommand validation engine",
              "Process injection commands (process_inject)",
              "UAC bypass modules"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "HTTP/3 QUIC Command and Control",
            "slug": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071",
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "HTTP/3 over UDP port 443",
              "Hashed C2 URL endpoints (e.g., /c8a4e192)",
              "C2 Domains: ads-edge.com, www.maui-cocktailbar.com, www.cloudflacecdn.com, www.police.gr.com, www.investigationj6.com, www.sacofficegov.com"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Discovery and Lateral Movement",
            "slug": "discovery-and-lateral-movement",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1018",
              "T1021.002",
              "T1047"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "MyPsExec.dll module",
              "SmbBrute.dll module",
              "Async port and host scanning modules (portscan, hostscan)",
              "WMI command execution (ComExec.dll)"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Exfiltration and Credential Collection",
            "slug": "exfiltration-and-collection",
            "tactic": "collection",
            "techniques": [
              "T1003.001",
              "T1056.001",
              "T1041"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "BofLoader.dll for Beacon Object File execution",
              "Keylogger module activity",
              "LSASS memory access for credential harvesting",
              "File upload/download activity (file_upload, file_download)",
              "Screenshot module"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "TGR-STA-0049 is a Southeast Asian espionage campaign deploying custom Go-based RATs (PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT) via server exploitation and phishing. The campaign features early adoption of HTTP/3 (QUIC) for command and control and an automated heuristic camouflage engine designed to blend malicious endpoint activity into a baseline of synthetic noise."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "The hunt begins with a scoping query on hb_software_inventory to identify public-facing web infrastructure. Phishing activity is searched estate-wide.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has established a beachhead by exploiting a public-facing server to drop a web shell or by baiting a user into resolving a lookalike domain associated with the TGR-STA-0049 campaign.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Specific hostnames to focus on; leave empty to search the whole estate."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "lookalike_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "unit42-tgr-sta-0049",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "www.wkuyda.com",
            "www.thailisting.net",
            "www.yangon.it.com"
          ],
          "description": "Lookalike domains observed in phishing decoys."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/",
          "name": "Unit 42 \u2014 QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "no-dns-visibility",
          "risk": "Attackers using DNS-over-HTTPS would bypass the hb_dns_activity surface entirely.",
          "owner": "Network Engineering",
          "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
          "question": "Did the host resolve the lookalike domain using a non-standard or encrypted resolver?",
          "requires": "hb_dns_activity on workstations",
          "remediation": "Block outbound DoH at the firewall and enforce internal resolvers."
        },
        {
          "id": "webshell-obfuscation",
          "risk": "A web shell with a benign filename would only be caught by the prevalence logic; manual code review is needed for confirmation.",
          "owner": "Security Operations",
          "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
          "question": "Is the new ASPX file a legitimate administrative tool or a web shell?",
          "requires": "hb_file_activity with file content analysis",
          "remediation": "Implement FIM on sensitive web server directories."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "TGR-STA-0049 Initial Access via Exploitation and Phishing",
    "description": "This hunt targets the initial access phase of the TGR-STA-0049 (PerfectPioneer/KUKURAT) campaign. It uses a dual-track approach to identify indicators of compromise: first, it identifies web and Exchange servers to monitor for rare ASPX file creations indicative of web shells like Godzilla or Suo5. Second, it monitors for DNS resolutions of lookalike domains used in phishing. An agent then correlates these signals to identify successful breaches."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "quic-and-covert-novel-http-3-powered-rats-target-southeast-asian-governments",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
            "steps": [
              "identify-vulnerable-servers",
              "rare-webshell-creations",
              "phishing-domain-resolutions"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-sideloading-rat-deployment",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "discovery-and-lateral-movement",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "exfiltration-and-collection",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has established a beachhead by exploiting a public-facing server to drop a web shell or by baiting a user into resolving a lookalike domain associated with the TGR-STA-0049 campaign.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "no-dns-visibility",
            "risk": "Attackers using DNS-over-HTTPS would bypass the hb_dns_activity surface entirely.",
            "owner": "Network Engineering",
            "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
            "question": "Did the host resolve the lookalike domain using a non-standard or encrypted resolver?",
            "requires": "hb_dns_activity on workstations",
            "remediation": "Block outbound DoH at the firewall and enforce internal resolvers."
          },
          {
            "id": "webshell-obfuscation",
            "risk": "A web shell with a benign filename would only be caught by the prevalence logic; manual code review is needed for confirmation.",
            "owner": "Security Operations",
            "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
            "question": "Is the new ASPX file a legitimate administrative tool or a web shell?",
            "requires": "hb_file_activity with file content analysis",
            "remediation": "Implement FIM on sensitive web server directories."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "The hunt begins with a scoping query on hb_software_inventory to identify public-facing web infrastructure. Phishing activity is searched estate-wide.",
        "beyond_detection": "This hunt combines infrastructure scoping with a behavioral prevalence baseline of web directories, correlating rare file drops with network IOCs. A single rule would alert on Suo5 filenames; this hunt identifies Suo5 even if renamed, by focusing on the rarity of the creation event in the context of scoped servers."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "identify-vulnerable-servers",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Scope web and Exchange servers",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT DISTINCT device_hostname FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%exchange%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%iis%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%apache%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%nginx%') AND asset_scope = 'endpoint'",
        "surface": "hb_software_inventory",
        "description": "Narrow the hunt to servers running software targeted for web shell exploitation.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of hosts running web or mail services. Silence means no such software is indexed."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Scope web and Exchange servers",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "package_name"
        ],
        "source": "hb_software_inventory",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT DISTINCT device_hostname FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%exchange%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%iis%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%apache%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%nginx%') AND asset_scope = 'endpoint'",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of hosts running web or mail services. Silence means no such software is indexed.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-webshell-creations",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare ASPX file creation",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(file_path) as path, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) as host_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_file_activity WHERE activity_id = 1 AND LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%.aspx' AND (LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\%' OR LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%\\\\front-end\\\\owa\\\\%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY 1, 2 HAVING host_count <= 2",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Find web shells by identifying ASPX files created in sensitive directories that are rare across the fleet.",
        "expected_signal": "A file path and process name appearing on only one or two hosts. Silence means no rare ASPX creations were detected in web paths."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "identify-vulnerable-servers"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare ASPX file creation",
        "reads": [
          "file_path",
          "process_name",
          "device_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(file_path) as path, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) as host_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_file_activity WHERE activity_id = 1 AND LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%.aspx' AND (LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\%' OR LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%\\\\front-end\\\\owa\\\\%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY 1, 2 HAVING host_count <= 2",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A file path and process name appearing on only one or two hosts. Silence means no rare ASPX creations were detected in web paths.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "file_path",
            "process_name"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "phishing-domain-resolutions",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "DNS resolutions of lookalike domains",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{lookalike_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Identify workstations interacting with domains identified as TGR-STA-0049 phishing infrastructure.",
        "expected_signal": "Hosts resolving malicious domains, likely from a browser or mail client. Silence means no recorded interaction."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "identify-vulnerable-servers"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "DNS resolutions of lookalike domains",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{lookalike_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Hosts resolving malicious domains, likely from a browser or mail client. Silence means no recorded interaction.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "agent-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate infection evidence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "identify-vulnerable-servers",
          "rare-webshell-creations",
          "phishing-domain-resolutions"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the rare ASPX creations on scoped servers or the lookalike domain resolutions on workstations indicate a successful TGR-STA-0049 breach.",
        "description": "Correlate server scoping with the leads to determine if a successful compromise occurred.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict of malicious, suspicious, or benign.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict per host citing specific rows and indicators."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "rare-webshell-creations",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "phishing-domain-resolutions",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "verdict-decision",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "The triage verdict is malicious for at least one host based on confirmed web shell creation or high-confidence phishing callback.",
        "condition": "The triage verdict is malicious for at least one host based on confirmed web shell creation or high-confidence phishing callback.",
        "blind_spot": "no-dns-visibility",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the workflow based on the agent's findings.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "agent-triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-beachhead",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Contain the threat actor's initial access point.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the compromised server or workstation immediately to prevent lateral movement.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "verdict-decision",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-forensic-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Forensic review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Manually confirm the malicious nature of the artifacts found.",
        "instructions": "Inspect the .aspx files identified on the server; check for Suo5 or Godzilla signatures. For phishing, retrieve and examine decoy PDFs if available in browser cache or mail downloads."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "verdict-decision",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "verdict-decision",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-beachhead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out-report",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out report",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document findings and negative results.",
        "instructions": "Record the scoped hosts and the DNS results. If malicious activity was found, pivot to the RAT deployment hunt."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "verdict-decision",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-forensic-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}