{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "TGR-STA-0049 is an advanced cyberespionage group targeting strategic government entities. Their adoption of HTTP/3 and automated camouflage represents a significant evasion leap that standard security policies may bypass."
      },
      "name": "TGR-STA-0049: QUIC C2 and Custom RAT Operations",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1071.001",
        "attack.t1572",
        "attack.t1003.001",
        "attack.t1021.002",
        "attack.t1047",
        "attack.t1055",
        "attack.t1547.001",
        "attack.t1574.002",
        "collection",
        "command and control",
        "defense evasion",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "quic-and-covert-novel-http-3-powered-rats-target-southeast-asian-governments",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "exchange-server-webshell-scoping",
          "reason": "The broader topic of Exchange exploitation is handled by specialized server-hygiene hunts.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "tgr-sta-0049-initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "This hunt correlates novel network protocols (QUIC) with post-exploitation behaviors across four different telemetry surfaces. A single detection rule cannot reliably track the progression from a UDP 443 flow to LSASS memory harvesting and lateral SMB scanning while compensating for heuristic camouflage.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
          "steps": [
            "lsass-access-activity",
            "camouflage-investigation"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
          "steps": [
            "dns-lookups",
            "quic-network-flows"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "discovery-and-lateral-movement",
          "steps": [
            "smb-lateral-scanning"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "exfiltration-and-collection",
          "steps": [
            "lsass-access-activity"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-sideloading-rat-deployment",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Server Exploitation and Phishing",
            "slug": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190",
              "T1505.003",
              "T1566"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx, or Suo5 web shells on Exchange or web servers",
              "Decoy PDF documents targeting government sectors",
              "Lookalike domains: www.wkuyda.com, www.thailisting.net, www.yangon.it.com"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Execution via Sideloading and RAT Deployment",
            "slug": "execution-sideloading-rat-deployment",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1574.002",
              "T1218",
              "T1059.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "DLL side-loading of modified legitimate binaries",
              "XOR-encrypted shellcode embedded in payloads",
              "PerfectPioneer RAT (Go-based)",
              "KUKURAT modular agent",
              "Decoy installers"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Defense Evasion and Heuristic Camouflage",
            "slug": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
            "tactic": "defense-evasion",
            "techniques": [
              "T1055",
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "KUKURAT heuristic camouflage engine generating synthetic baseline noise",
              "PerfectPioneer isDangerousCommand validation engine",
              "Process injection commands (process_inject)",
              "UAC bypass modules"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "HTTP/3 QUIC Command and Control",
            "slug": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071",
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "HTTP/3 over UDP port 443",
              "Hashed C2 URL endpoints (e.g., /c8a4e192)",
              "C2 Domains: ads-edge.com, www.maui-cocktailbar.com, www.cloudflacecdn.com, www.police.gr.com, www.investigationj6.com, www.sacofficegov.com"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Discovery and Lateral Movement",
            "slug": "discovery-and-lateral-movement",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1018",
              "T1021.002",
              "T1047"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "MyPsExec.dll module",
              "SmbBrute.dll module",
              "Async port and host scanning modules (portscan, hostscan)",
              "WMI command execution (ComExec.dll)"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Exfiltration and Credential Collection",
            "slug": "exfiltration-and-collection",
            "tactic": "collection",
            "techniques": [
              "T1003.001",
              "T1056.001",
              "T1041"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "BofLoader.dll for Beacon Object File execution",
              "Keylogger module activity",
              "LSASS memory access for credential harvesting",
              "File upload/download activity (file_upload, file_download)",
              "Screenshot module"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "TGR-STA-0049 is a Southeast Asian espionage campaign deploying custom Go-based RATs (PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT) via server exploitation and phishing. The campaign features early adoption of HTTP/3 (QUIC) for command and control and an automated heuristic camouflage engine designed to blend malicious endpoint activity into a baseline of synthetic noise."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Start with high-value internet-facing infrastructure (Exchange and Web servers). The lookback period should be at least 14 days to capture the progression from initial beaconing to internal scanning.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder is using HTTP/3 (QUIC) over UDP 443 for command and control and loading custom RAT modules to perform data collection, while masking their activity with synthetic background noise.",
      "parameters": {
        "c2_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "unit42-tgr-sta-0049",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "ads-edge.com",
            "www.maui-cocktailbar.com",
            "www.cloudflacecdn.com",
            "www.police.gr.com",
            "www.investigationj6.com",
            "www.sacofficegov.com"
          ],
          "description": "Known C2 domains for KUKURAT and PerfectPioneer."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "scoping-output",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-05-22"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hostnames of internet-facing servers to constrain the hunt."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "hunt-standard",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-05-22"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "browser_processes": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "hunt-designer",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-05-22"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "chrome.exe",
            "msedge.exe",
            "firefox.exe",
            "brave.exe",
            "opera.exe"
          ],
          "description": "Standard browser processes to exclude from behavioral QUIC traffic search."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/",
          "name": "Unit 42: QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "quic-visibility-gap",
          "risk": "If network sensors cannot parse HTTP/3 over UDP, specific command identifiers remain invisible at the network layer.",
          "owner": "Network Operations",
          "stage": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
          "question": "Are we seeing the specific malicious hashed endpoints inside the encrypted QUIC stream?",
          "requires": "Deep packet inspection of UDP 443 (QUIC) traffic.",
          "remediation": "Update IDS/IPS signatures to support QUIC/HTTP3 parsing or rely on endpoint-level network telemetry."
        },
        {
          "id": "synthetic-noise-drowning",
          "risk": "KUKURAT's camouflage engine is designed to hide malicious activity within synthetic volume; a lack of established baseline leads to false negatives.",
          "owner": "Detection Engineering",
          "stage": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
          "question": "Can the analyst distinguish RAT-generated noise from legitimate OS or application automation?",
          "requires": "Heuristic baseline of normal automated file and registry activity.",
          "remediation": "Implement stack-counting for high-volume automated file and registry events."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "TGR-STA-0049: QUIC C2 and Custom RAT Operations",
    "description": "This hunt targets the cyberespionage tradecraft of TGR-STA-0049, focusing on their adoption of HTTP/3 as a stealthy communication protocol and the deployment of the KUKURAT and PerfectPioneer RAT families. The hunt follows a phased approach: first, it identifies high-value internet-facing servers showing signs of behavioral QUIC C2 traffic or DNS resolutions to the report's indicators. Second, it pivots to investigate post-exploitation behavior including internal SMB scanning and credential harvesting from LSASS memory, reaching a final verdict on the host's compromise state despite the actor's heuristic camouflage."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "quic-and-covert-novel-http-3-powered-rats-target-southeast-asian-governments",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
            "steps": [
              "lsass-access-activity",
              "camouflage-investigation"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
            "steps": [
              "dns-lookups",
              "quic-network-flows"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "discovery-and-lateral-movement",
            "steps": [
              "smb-lateral-scanning"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "exfiltration-and-collection",
            "steps": [
              "lsass-access-activity"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-exploitation-phishing",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-sideloading-rat-deployment",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder is using HTTP/3 (QUIC) over UDP 443 for command and control and loading custom RAT modules to perform data collection, while masking their activity with synthetic background noise.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "quic-visibility-gap",
            "risk": "If network sensors cannot parse HTTP/3 over UDP, specific command identifiers remain invisible at the network layer.",
            "owner": "Network Operations",
            "stage": "command-and-control-http3-quic",
            "question": "Are we seeing the specific malicious hashed endpoints inside the encrypted QUIC stream?",
            "requires": "Deep packet inspection of UDP 443 (QUIC) traffic.",
            "remediation": "Update IDS/IPS signatures to support QUIC/HTTP3 parsing or rely on endpoint-level network telemetry."
          },
          {
            "id": "synthetic-noise-drowning",
            "risk": "KUKURAT's camouflage engine is designed to hide malicious activity within synthetic volume; a lack of established baseline leads to false negatives.",
            "owner": "Detection Engineering",
            "stage": "defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage",
            "question": "Can the analyst distinguish RAT-generated noise from legitimate OS or application automation?",
            "requires": "Heuristic baseline of normal automated file and registry activity.",
            "remediation": "Implement stack-counting for high-volume automated file and registry events."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start with high-value internet-facing infrastructure (Exchange and Web servers). The lookback period should be at least 14 days to capture the progression from initial beaconing to internal scanning.",
        "beyond_detection": "This hunt correlates novel network protocols (QUIC) with post-exploitation behaviors across four different telemetry surfaces. A single detection rule cannot reliably track the progression from a UDP 443 flow to LSASS memory harvesting and lateral SMB scanning while compensating for heuristic camouflage."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "scoping-servers",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Scope potential beachhead servers",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%exchange%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%iis%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%apache%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%nginx%') AND asset_scope = 'endpoint'",
        "surface": "hb_software_inventory",
        "description": "Identify internet-facing web or Exchange servers that were primary targets for initial exploitation.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of hostnames representing the exposed server surface area. Silence suggests the estate does not run these platforms."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Scope potential beachhead servers",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "package_name",
          "package_version"
        ],
        "source": "hb_software_inventory",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%exchange%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%iis%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%apache%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%nginx%') AND asset_scope = 'endpoint'",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of hostnames representing the exposed server surface area. Silence suggests the estate does not run these platforms.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "dns-lookups",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "DNS resolutions to C2 domains",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Find DNS queries for the specific domains identified in the research.",
        "expected_signal": "High-fidelity indicator of a host attempting to reach threat actor infrastructure."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-servers"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "DNS resolutions to C2 domains",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "High-fidelity indicator of a host attempting to reach threat actor infrastructure.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "quic-network-flows",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Non-browser QUIC network flows",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE protocol = 'udp' AND dst_endpoint_port = 443 AND NOT instr(',' || '{{browser_processes}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Identify behavioral QUIC (UDP 443) traffic from processes that are not standard web browsers.",
        "expected_signal": "Anomalous processes communicating over UDP 443, suggesting evasion of standard TCP-based deep packet inspection."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-servers"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Non-browser QUIC network flows",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "time",
          "protocol"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE protocol = 'udp' AND dst_endpoint_port = 443 AND NOT instr(',' || '{{browser_processes}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Anomalous processes communicating over UDP 443, suggesting evasion of standard TCP-based deep packet inspection.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "dst_endpoint_ip"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "early-agent",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Early-stage triage",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "scoping-servers",
          "dns-lookups",
          "quic-network-flows"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any scoped server shows evidence of C2 activity through listed domains or behavioral QUIC traffic.",
        "description": "Synthesize the scoping and network findings to identify hosts requiring deep post-exploitation investigation.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict indicating potential beachhead establishment.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict citing specific DNS queries or network rows."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "dns-lookups",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "quic-network-flows",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "smb-lateral-scanning",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Internal SMB and port scanning",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) as connection_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND dst_endpoint_port IN (445, 139) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip HAVING connection_count > 5 ORDER BY connection_count DESC",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Detect automated internal reconnaissance through high-volume outbound SMB connections.",
        "expected_signal": "A single host reaching out to multiple internal IP addresses via SMB, suggesting the use of SmbBrute or hostscan modules."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "early-agent"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "label": "Internal SMB and port scanning",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "time",
          "direction",
          "dst_endpoint_port"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) as connection_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND dst_endpoint_port IN (445, 139) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip HAVING connection_count > 5 ORDER BY connection_count DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A single host reaching out to multiple internal IP addresses via SMB, suggesting the use of SmbBrute or hostscan modules.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "lsass-access-activity",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Credential harvesting via LSASS",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, actor_process_name, object_name, access_mask, time FROM hb_resource_activity WHERE object_type = 'Process' AND LOWER(object_name) LIKE '%lsass.exe' AND actor_process_name NOT LIKE 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\%' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_resource_activity",
        "description": "Identify process access to LSASS memory from non-standard locations, characteristic of RAT collection modules.",
        "expected_signal": "Non-system processes accessing LSASS memory for credential theft. Silence on high-value servers is evidence of absence for this specific technique."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "early-agent"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Credential harvesting via LSASS",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "actor_process_name",
          "object_name",
          "access_mask",
          "time",
          "object_type"
        ],
        "source": "hb_resource_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, actor_process_name, object_name, access_mask, time FROM hb_resource_activity WHERE object_type = 'Process' AND LOWER(object_name) LIKE '%lsass.exe' AND actor_process_name NOT LIKE 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\%' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Non-system processes accessing LSASS memory for credential theft. Silence on high-value servers is evidence of absence for this specific technique.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-17"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "lifecycle-agent",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Full lifecycle triage",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "early-agent",
          "smb-lateral-scanning",
          "lsass-access-activity"
        ],
        "objective": "Decide if the progression of network behavior, internal scanning, and credential access confirms an intrusion by TGR-STA-0049.",
        "description": "Correlate early-stage beachhead evidence with follow-on collection and lateral movement to reach a final verdict.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A comprehensive per-host verdict linking the campaign stages.",
        "success_criteria": "A detailed verdict citing rows from both network and endpoint activities across the lifecycle."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "smb-lateral-scanning",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "lsass-access-activity",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on final verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the lifecycle-agent verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the lifecycle-agent verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "quic-visibility-gap",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route the hunt based on the agent's findings.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "lifecycle-agent"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate compromised host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Contain the potentially infected server to prevent data exfiltration.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host and initiate the TGR-STA-0049 incident response playbook.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "camouflage-investigation",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Investigate heuristic camouflage",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Manual review of synthetic baseline noise used to hide malicious indicators.",
        "instructions": "Review hb_registry_activity and hb_file_activity for high-volume, automated entries that appear benign but align with the compromise window. These are the likely heuristic camouflage artifacts used by KUKURAT to hide its actual functions."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "hunt-close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document findings and finalize the hunt.",
        "instructions": "Summarize the findings, document any new C2 domains or behavioral patterns, and decide if the LSASS memory access pattern should be promoted to a permanent rule."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "camouflage-investigation"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}