{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "ScreenConnect is a high-trust administrative tool; unauthorized clients provide persistent, unmonitored access that bypasses firewall and identity perimeters. Verifying the integrity of the support infrastructure is critical for MSP-managed estates."
      },
      "name": "Unauthorized ScreenConnect Client Deployment",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1059",
        "attack.t1059.001",
        "command and control",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "sckit-abuses-screenconnect-to-deploy-remote-access-and-target-technician-sessions",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "sckit-persistence-mechanisms",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on initial deployment; persistence via scheduled tasks and run keys is handled by a sibling hunt in the series.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A simple detection rule might flag sc.msi, but this hunt uses a gated flow to correlate behavioral markers (c=Exploited) with script block analysis and fleet-wide prevalence. This context allows an analyst to distinguish targeted SCKit intrusions from legitimate MSP software maintenance.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
          "steps": [
            "lead-unauthorized-msi-install",
            "msi-cmd-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "unauthorized-client-installation",
          "steps": [
            "lead-unauthorized-msi-install"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
          "steps": [
            "script-block-activity"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "persistence-establishment",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-and-infrastructure-communication",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "ScreenConnect Management Abuse",
            "slug": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Unauthorized commands issued via RMM+ extension APIs",
              "ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi requested with c=Exploited parameters",
              "Abuse of ConnectWise Automate/LabTech extensions"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Malicious MSI Deployment",
            "slug": "unauthorized-client-installation",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "curl.exe -o C:\\Windows\\Temp\\sc.msi",
              "msiexec.exe /i C:\\Windows\\Temp\\sc.msi /qn /norestart",
              "Silent installation of unauthorized ScreenConnect guest clients"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "SCKit Payload Extraction",
            "slug": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Stage0Loader.ps1",
              "Panel-Lateral.ps1",
              "Panel-Lateral-free.ps1",
              "LabConfig.ps1",
              "PowerShell decoder extracting toolkit using device-specific material"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Persistence via Tasks and Registry",
            "slug": "persistence-establishment",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1547.001",
              "T1053.005",
              "T1562.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "schtasks.exe creating malicious maintenance tasks",
              "Registry Run keys for SCKit launchers",
              "trapkit\\install.ps1",
              "Stop-LabTrap.bat"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Command and Control Infrastructure",
            "slug": "c2-and-infrastructure-communication",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "185.99.255.28",
              "155.94.150.39",
              "ns.mo7sen.dev",
              "sc.payproofkit.com",
              "cdn007-digitaldownloads.com",
              "relaytrap.cs",
              "newnewnew.gotdns.org",
              "soxnewwork.homedns.org"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Technician Session Hijacking",
            "slug": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "CVE-2026-84869",
              "RelayTrap component delivery to connecting technicians",
              "TrapWatch.ps1",
              "ToolboxRelayUploader.exe",
              "Lite-Alert.ps1"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Threat actors abuse vulnerabilities in ScreenConnect server extensions or hijacked management consoles to deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and the SCKit malware toolkit. The campaign establishes long-term persistence on customer endpoints to host RelayTrap, a component that targets IT technicians' workstations with malicious payloads during support sessions."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Start with endpoints identified in the scoping query as having ScreenConnect or ConnectWise software. Focus initial behavioral analysis on hosts showing curl activity or silent msiexec parameters.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has abused ScreenConnect management consoles or extension vulnerabilities to silently deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and the SCKit loader toolkit to managed endpoints.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "analyst-input",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hostnames to focus the behavioral search on; leave empty for fleet-wide."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "hunt-standard",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "sckit_scripts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "msrc-blog-sckit",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-13"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "stage0loader.ps1",
            "panel-lateral.ps1",
            "panel-lateral-free.ps1",
            "labconfig.ps1",
            "lite-alert.ps1",
            "trapwatch.ps1",
            "install.ps1"
          ],
          "description": "Filenames of the SCKit loader scripts identified in threat research."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/",
          "name": "MSRC Blog \u2014 SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "unmanaged-endpoints",
          "risk": "Intruders targeting hosts without an agent will leave no traces in this hunt, creating a blind beachhead.",
          "owner": "IT Operations",
          "stage": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
          "question": "Are unauthorized clients installed on unmanaged endpoints?",
          "requires": "comprehensive hb_software_inventory coverage",
          "remediation": "Audit agent coverage against network-discovered ScreenConnect clients."
        },
        {
          "id": "no-script-block-logging",
          "risk": "Without block-level logging, the hunt identifies the loader but not the actual commands SCKit ran after decryption.",
          "owner": "Security Engineering",
          "stage": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
          "question": "What did the decoded SCKit scripts execute in memory?",
          "requires": "hb_script_activity with full PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)",
          "remediation": "Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging via GPO for all managed endpoints."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Unauthorized ScreenConnect Client Deployment",
    "description": "This hunt identifies the initial entry and deployment phase of the SCKit campaign. It first scopes the estate for hosts with ScreenConnect software, then focuses on a lead query identifying silent installations (sc.msi) with session markers (c=Exploited) common in reported attacks. The hunt follows a gated flow: it only performs expensive PowerShell script analysis and fleet-wide command-line prevalence counting if the initial MSI lead is suspicious. This ensures high-fidelity triage of unauthorized support software without manual review of every legitimate installation."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "sckit-abuses-screenconnect-to-deploy-remote-access-and-target-technician-sessions",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
            "steps": [
              "lead-unauthorized-msi-install",
              "msi-cmd-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "unauthorized-client-installation",
            "steps": [
              "lead-unauthorized-msi-install"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
            "steps": [
              "script-block-activity"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "persistence-establishment",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-and-infrastructure-communication",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "relay-trap-technician-targeting",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has abused ScreenConnect management consoles or extension vulnerabilities to silently deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and the SCKit loader toolkit to managed endpoints.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "unmanaged-endpoints",
            "risk": "Intruders targeting hosts without an agent will leave no traces in this hunt, creating a blind beachhead.",
            "owner": "IT Operations",
            "stage": "initial-access-screenconnect-abuse",
            "question": "Are unauthorized clients installed on unmanaged endpoints?",
            "requires": "comprehensive hb_software_inventory coverage",
            "remediation": "Audit agent coverage against network-discovered ScreenConnect clients."
          },
          {
            "id": "no-script-block-logging",
            "risk": "Without block-level logging, the hunt identifies the loader but not the actual commands SCKit ran after decryption.",
            "owner": "Security Engineering",
            "stage": "sckit-powershell-deployment",
            "question": "What did the decoded SCKit scripts execute in memory?",
            "requires": "hb_script_activity with full PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)",
            "remediation": "Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging via GPO for all managed endpoints."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start with endpoints identified in the scoping query as having ScreenConnect or ConnectWise software. Focus initial behavioral analysis on hosts showing curl activity or silent msiexec parameters.",
        "beyond_detection": "A simple detection rule might flag sc.msi, but this hunt uses a gated flow to correlate behavioral markers (c=Exploited) with script block analysis and fleet-wide prevalence. This context allows an analyst to distinguish targeted SCKit intrusions from legitimate MSP software maintenance."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "identify-screenconnect-hosts",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Scope ScreenConnect installations",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%screenconnect%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%connectwise%')",
        "surface": "hb_software_inventory",
        "description": "Find the hosts that currently have ScreenConnect or ConnectWise software to narrow the hunt scope.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of hosts with ScreenConnect installed. Presence of the software is expected; silence means the software is not inventoried or is missing from the estate."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Scope ScreenConnect installations",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "package_name",
          "package_version"
        ],
        "source": "hb_software_inventory",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%screenconnect%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%connectwise%')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of hosts with ScreenConnect installed. Presence of the software is expected; silence means the software is not inventoried or is missing from the estate.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "lead-unauthorized-msi-install",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Lead: Silent MSI deployment with exploited markers",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%msiexec%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%curl%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify suspicious MSI installations involving sc.msi or session markers like c=Exploited initiated via curl or msiexec.",
        "expected_signal": "Command lines showing curl downloading sc.msi or msiexec installing it silently. The presence of session markers in the URL is a high-confidence lead."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "identify-screenconnect-hosts"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Lead: Silent MSI deployment with exploited markers",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%msiexec%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%curl%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Command lines showing curl downloading sc.msi or msiexec installing it silently. The presence of session markers in the URL is a high-confidence lead.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "evaluate-lead",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate MSI installation lead",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "lead-unauthorized-msi-install"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the command lines in lead-unauthorized-msi-install match the research for SCKit deployment, specifically focusing on unauthorized download sources or c=Exploited markers.",
        "description": "Decide whether the observed lead represents a targeted intrusion attempt requiring further evidence collection.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A suspicious or benign verdict for each host based on the MSI command line structure.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict of suspicious or benign, citing specific command strings."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "lead-unauthorized-msi-install"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate-on-lead",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate on lead verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the evaluate-lead verdict is suspicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the evaluate-lead verdict is suspicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "unmanaged-endpoints",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Terminate the hunt if no suspicious installations are found, saving resources for the more expensive script analysis.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "script-block-activity",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "SCKit toolkit script execution",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_content, time FROM hb_script_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sckit_scripts}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(script_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%panel-lateral%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_script_activity",
        "description": "Identify the execution of the PowerShell-based decoders and loaders that extract the SCKit toolkit.",
        "expected_signal": "Script blocks matching the toolkit logic. Finding these on the same hosts as the MSI lead strongly corroborates a compromise."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "SCKit toolkit script execution",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "script_name",
          "script_content",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_script_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_content, time FROM hb_script_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sckit_scripts}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(script_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%panel-lateral%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Script blocks matching the toolkit logic. Finding these on the same hosts as the MSI lead strongly corroborates a compromise.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "msi-cmd-prevalence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Prevalence of MSI installation commands",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_cmd_line) AS cmd, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Stack-count the installation commands to separate legitimate fleet-wide management activity from unique, attacker-controlled outliers.",
        "expected_signal": "Command lines seen on only one or two hosts. Genuine MSP maintenance will typically have high host counts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Prevalence of MSI installation commands",
        "reads": [
          "process_cmd_line",
          "device_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_cmd_line) AS cmd, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Command lines seen on only one or two hosts. Genuine MSP maintenance will typically have high host counts.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "cmd"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-14"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-deployment",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage deployment activity",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "evaluate-lead",
          "script-block-activity",
          "msi-cmd-prevalence"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the host was targeted by SCKit by weighing the rarity of its MSI installation command line against the presence of known toolkit PowerShell script blocks.",
        "description": "Correlate the behavioral lead, PowerShell script content, and fleet-wide prevalence to reach a final verdict per host.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A high-confidence verdict of malicious, suspicious, or benign for every host showing evidence of ScreenConnect client deployment.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict citing specific rows from process and script surfaces."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "script-block-activity",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "msi-cmd-prevalence",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-triage",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on triage verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage-deployment verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage-deployment verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "unmanaged-endpoints",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route the host for immediate isolation or further manual review depending on the severity of the findings.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-deployment"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "contain-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate compromised host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Prevent further payload delivery and lateral movement from the unauthorized remote-access client.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host from the network immediately. Capture a forensic image and the unauthorized sc.msi installer for analysis.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-remediation-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst remediation review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the findings, identify the management server used to issue the commands, and audit for persistence.",
        "instructions": "Review the triage evidence. Identify the origin of the management commands (e.g., vulnerable RMM+ extension). Audit the registry and scheduled tasks for follow-on SCKit persistence components."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "contain-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out-hunt",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out hunt",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Record findings and findings to improve standing detections.",
        "instructions": "Log the number of affected hosts and the specific command line markers identified. If markers like c=Exploited are confirmed malicious, promote them to a standing detection rule."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-remediation-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}