{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Adversaries are increasingly using non-standard architectures and native platform features like Docker mounts to evade traditional detections. This hunt provides a systematic audit of these advanced persistence techniques across multiple telemetry surfaces."
      },
      "name": "Advanced Persistence and Payload Staging",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1105",
        "attack.t1059.003",
        "attack.t1574",
        "attack.t1610",
        "attack.t1543.003",
        "credential access",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities",
          "reason": "The initial exploitation of Citrix or Cisco devices is handled in a separate hunt focused on web and perimeter appliance logs.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "perimeter-exploitation-ntlm-redirection",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "The hunt synthesizes staging behavior (chmod, fetch commands) with persistent state (ELF modification, Docker mounts) and infrastructure signals (rare LoongArch64 architecture) into one decision. A single detection rule would struggle to correlate these temporally separated events without high noise.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "execution-fetch-payload-delivery",
          "steps": [
            "execution-leads",
            "network-fetch-audit"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "persistence-linux-elf-injection",
          "steps": [
            "file-integrity-audit"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "persistence-privileged-container-mount",
          "steps": [
            "execution-leads"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "credential-access-ntlm-disclosure",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Exploitation of Perimeter and Developer Tools",
            "slug": "initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "HTTP POST to /forgot-password in Flowise",
              "Unauthenticated CI lint API calls to GitLab",
              "PHP file uploads to /wp-content/plugins/bug-library/",
              "Command injection patterns in Citrix NetScaler login logs",
              "SQL injection patterns in Cisco Secure Email Gateway S/MIME handling",
              "CVE-2025-58434",
              "CVE-2026-88771",
              "CVE-2026-97229",
              "CVE-2026-76443",
              "CVE-2024-5450"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "NTLMv2 Hash Disclosure via UNC Path",
            "slug": "credential-access-ntlm-disclosure",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1557.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "OpenBullet2 forced SMB authentication via UNC path proxy source",
              "Outbound SMB (port 445) connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure",
              "CVE-2026-39908"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Multi-Protocol Fetch Payload Execution",
            "slug": "execution-fetch-payload-delivery",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1105",
              "T1059.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Fetch commands using FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, or TFTP to download LoongArch64 payloads",
              "Execution of chmod on downloaded files",
              "Reverse shell or bind shell activity (e.g., shell_reverse_tcp)"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Linux ELF Executable Payload Injection",
            "slug": "persistence-linux-elf-injection",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1574"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Code cave and segment injection in Linux ELF files",
              "Architecture-specific trampolines for x86, x64, or AArch64",
              "Modified ELF binaries on disk"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Docker Container Persistence and Host Access",
            "slug": "persistence-privileged-container-mount",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1610",
              "T1543.003"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Creation of privileged Docker containers",
              "Bind-mounting host filesystem (e.g., C: drive on Windows or root on Linux) to a container",
              "Docker Desktop creating persistent Alpine containers on Windows",
              "Portainer API activity to create containers with host access"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "This campaign involves the use of newly released Metasploit modules targeting unauthenticated RCE and authentication bypass vulnerabilities in perimeter devices and developer tools like Citrix NetScaler, Cisco Secure Email Gateway, Flowise, and GitLab. After initial access, attackers leverage specialized Linux ELF injection techniques and privileged Docker container creation for persistent access and payload execution."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Focus on Linux servers, Docker hosts, and systems with direct internet egress. Use the scope_hosts parameter if focusing on specific segments containing perimeter appliances.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder is staging non-standard architecture payloads using multi-protocol fetch adapters and establishing persistence via Linux ELF binary injection or privileged Docker containers with host root mounts.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Optional list of hostnames to narrow the search."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "suspicious_paths": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "common-attack-patterns",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-05-22"
          },
          "type": "list[path]",
          "default": [
            "/tmp",
            "/var/tmp",
            "/dev/shm",
            "c:\\users\\public",
            "c:\\windows\\temp"
          ],
          "description": "Lowercase directory paths where payload staging is common."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more",
          "name": "Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "incomplete-process-auditing",
          "risk": "A host without process auditing will never trigger the lead query, allowing the intrusion to proceed unseen.",
          "stage": "execution-fetch-payload-delivery",
          "question": "whether the initial fetch or chmod commands were executed",
          "requires": "EDR process logging on every endpoint"
        },
        {
          "id": "restricted-telemetry-retention",
          "risk": "The fan-out queries depend on file and network surfaces; missing telemetry here prevents corroboration of the lead.",
          "question": "whether the follow-on staging activity occurred on hosts without deep auditing",
          "requires": "Full network and file auditing across the estate"
        },
        {
          "id": "disk-direct-write-visibility",
          "risk": "Sophisticated persistence that writes directly to disk blocks may not appear in hb_file_activity.",
          "stage": "persistence-linux-elf-injection",
          "question": "whether an ELF binary was modified via direct disk access bypassing standard syscalls",
          "requires": "Kernel-level file integrity monitoring"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Advanced Persistence and Payload Staging",
    "description": "This hunt examines tradecraft associated with recent Metasploit releases, focusing on post-exploitation staging and persistence. It targets the delivery of LoongArch64 payloads via FTP, TFTP, and HTTP, the modification of system-critical ELF binaries on Linux, and the use of Docker containers to mount host filesystems for high-privilege persistence. The hunt uses a gated flow, starting with a cheap lead query for suspicious process behavior before opening detailed network and file-level audits for corroboration."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "execution-fetch-payload-delivery",
            "steps": [
              "execution-leads",
              "network-fetch-audit"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "persistence-linux-elf-injection",
            "steps": [
              "file-integrity-audit"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "persistence-privileged-container-mount",
            "steps": [
              "execution-leads"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "credential-access-ntlm-disclosure",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder is staging non-standard architecture payloads using multi-protocol fetch adapters and establishing persistence via Linux ELF binary injection or privileged Docker containers with host root mounts.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "incomplete-process-auditing",
            "risk": "A host without process auditing will never trigger the lead query, allowing the intrusion to proceed unseen.",
            "stage": "execution-fetch-payload-delivery",
            "question": "whether the initial fetch or chmod commands were executed",
            "requires": "EDR process logging on every endpoint"
          },
          {
            "id": "restricted-telemetry-retention",
            "risk": "The fan-out queries depend on file and network surfaces; missing telemetry here prevents corroboration of the lead.",
            "question": "whether the follow-on staging activity occurred on hosts without deep auditing",
            "requires": "Full network and file auditing across the estate"
          },
          {
            "id": "disk-direct-write-visibility",
            "risk": "Sophisticated persistence that writes directly to disk blocks may not appear in hb_file_activity.",
            "stage": "persistence-linux-elf-injection",
            "question": "whether an ELF binary was modified via direct disk access bypassing standard syscalls",
            "requires": "Kernel-level file integrity monitoring"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus on Linux servers, Docker hosts, and systems with direct internet egress. Use the scope_hosts parameter if focusing on specific segments containing perimeter appliances.",
        "beyond_detection": "The hunt synthesizes staging behavior (chmod, fetch commands) with persistent state (ELF modification, Docker mounts) and infrastructure signals (rare LoongArch64 architecture) into one decision. A single detection rule would struggle to correlate these temporally separated events without high noise."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "execution-leads",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Suspicious execution and staging leads",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, current_directory, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%loongarch64%' OR (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%chmod%' AND (instr(process_cmd_line, ' +x') > 0 OR instr(process_cmd_line, ' 777') > 0)) OR (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%docker%' AND (instr(process_cmd_line, '--privileged') > 0 OR instr(process_cmd_line, '-v /') > 0))) AND ('{{suspicious_paths}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{suspicious_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(current_directory) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify initial signs of payload staging, rare architecture references, or dangerous Docker configurations in process command lines.",
        "expected_signal": "Process rows showing chmod commands in temporary directories, mentions of LoongArch64, or Docker commands with host filesystem mounts. Silence proves no common CLI staging patterns occurred."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Suspicious execution and staging leads",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "current_directory",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, current_directory, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%loongarch64%' OR (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%chmod%' AND (instr(process_cmd_line, ' +x') > 0 OR instr(process_cmd_line, ' 777') > 0)) OR (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%docker%' AND (instr(process_cmd_line, '--privileged') > 0 OR instr(process_cmd_line, '-v /') > 0))) AND ('{{suspicious_paths}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{suspicious_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(current_directory) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Process rows showing chmod commands in temporary directories, mentions of LoongArch64, or Docker commands with host filesystem mounts. Silence proves no common CLI staging patterns occurred.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "evaluate-leads",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate execution leads",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "execution-leads"
        ],
        "objective": "Decide if the processes in execution-leads represent unauthorized payload delivery, arch-specific binary execution, or dangerous container persistence.",
        "description": "Determine if the observed process activity warrants a deeper investigation into network and file-system activity.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict on whether the command-line activity is suspicious enough to open the gate.",
        "success_criteria": "A clear verdict for every host found in the lead query."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "execution-leads"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate-on-leads",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate on leads",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the evaluate-leads verdict is suspicious or malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the evaluate-leads verdict is suspicious or malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "incomplete-process-auditing",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route to detailed evidence collection if the lead is suspicious, or close out early to save cost.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-leads"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "network-fetch-audit",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Audit fetch protocol activity",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) as host_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (dst_endpoint_port IN (21, 69) OR (dst_endpoint_port IN (80, 443) AND (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%curl%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%wget%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%fetch%'))) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name HAVING host_count <= 3",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Corroborate staging leads with rare outbound connections on FTP, TFTP, or HTTP from fetch-related binaries.",
        "expected_signal": "Connections to external IPs on unusual staging ports or from utilities used by the fetch payloads. Rare destinations indicate targeted staging infrastructure."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-leads",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Audit fetch protocol activity",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) as host_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (dst_endpoint_port IN (21, 69) OR (dst_endpoint_port IN (80, 443) AND (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%curl%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%wget%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%fetch%'))) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name HAVING host_count <= 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Connections to external IPs on unusual staging ports or from utilities used by the fetch payloads. Rare destinations indicate targeted staging infrastructure.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "dst_endpoint_ip"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "file-integrity-audit",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Audit system binary integrity",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, file_path, process_name, actor_user_name, activity_name, time FROM hb_file_activity WHERE (activity_id IN (1, 3, 5)) AND (file_path LIKE '/bin/%' OR file_path LIKE '/usr/bin/%' OR file_path LIKE '/sbin/%' OR file_path LIKE '/usr/sbin/%' OR instr(',' || '{{suspicious_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(file_path) || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Identify modification of core Linux binaries or new files in suspicious staging paths consistent with ELF injection.",
        "expected_signal": "File updates or creations in system binary paths or designated staging directories. Silence means no direct disk modification occurred in these paths."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-leads",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Audit system binary integrity",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "file_path",
          "process_name",
          "actor_user_name",
          "activity_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, file_path, process_name, actor_user_name, activity_name, time FROM hb_file_activity WHERE (activity_id IN (1, 3, 5)) AND (file_path LIKE '/bin/%' OR file_path LIKE '/usr/bin/%' OR file_path LIKE '/sbin/%' OR file_path LIKE '/usr/sbin/%' OR instr(',' || '{{suspicious_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(file_path) || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "File updates or creations in system binary paths or designated staging directories. Silence means no direct disk modification occurred in these paths.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-persistence",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage staging and persistence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "evaluate-leads",
          "network-fetch-audit",
          "file-integrity-audit"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the combined evidence confirms a persistent foothold established via binary injection, fetch payloads, or Docker container abuse.",
        "description": "Synthesize process, network, and file results into a final verdict for each host.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A final verdict citing the specific staging, networking, and file activity observed.",
        "success_criteria": "A malicious | suspicious | benign verdict per host with supporting row citations."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "network-fetch-audit",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "file-integrity-audit",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage-persistence verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage-persistence verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "restricted-telemetry-retention",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the hunt toward containment or manual analyst review.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-persistence"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-endpoint",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate endpoint",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Contain the high-confidence malicious host.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host and initiate collection of modified ELF binaries or Docker container configuration files for forensic analysis.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-manual-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst manual review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Confirm the automated findings and assess the extent of the intrusion.",
        "instructions": "Review the cited rows from all stages. For Linux binary modifications, check package manager integrity (rpm -V or debsums). For Docker containers, inspect the mount configuration and check for root access to the host."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-leads",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate-on-leads",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-endpoint"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "hunt-close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Record the hunt's findings and any telemetry gaps identified.",
        "instructions": "Document the findings, identifying any legitimate use of LoongArch64 or privileged Docker containers to tune future detections. Record which hosts were inaccessible due to missing telemetry."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-leads",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-manual-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}