{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "As AI-assisted cybercrime toolchains lower the skill barrier for script generation and automated scanning, a behavioral baseline for sensitive file access and reverse shell patterns is required to catch intrusions that bypass standard signature-based rules."
      },
      "name": "AI-Assisted Execution and C2 Tunneling",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1059",
        "attack.t1059.001",
        "attack.t1572",
        "attack.t1552",
        "attack.t1105",
        "attack.t1071.001",
        "command and control",
        "credential access",
        "execution",
        "exfiltration",
        "initial access"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "next-exploit-opportunities-how-a-threat-actor-used-ai-to-help-plan-and-execute-multiple-types-of",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "vast-ai-gpu-cracking-abuse",
          "reason": "Detection of cloud-based hash cracking using Vast.ai is a separate behavioral signal handled by infrastructure-specific hunts.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "ai-web-exploit-db-exfil",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "While single rules alert on individual reverse shell commands, this hunt correlates infrastructure (C2 IPs), rare script-block patterns, and a fleet-wide prevalence check for secret scraping. This context is essential to differentiate between a developer running scripts and an AI-enabled adversary automating secret discovery.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "reverse-shell-execution",
          "steps": [
            "script-execution-patterns",
            "process-execution-utilities"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-and-tunneling",
          "steps": [
            "network-to-actor-ip"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "automated-credential-scraping",
          "steps": [
            "credential-scraping-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "web-application-enumeration",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the '\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "targeted-credential-brute-force",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the '\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "database-collection-exfiltration",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the '\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "WordPress REST API and Subdomain Enumeration",
            "slug": "web-application-enumeration",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/wp-json/wp/v2/users",
              "162.243.3.92",
              "WordPress author sitemaps",
              "Subdomain enumeration (LMS, student portal, administration dashboard)"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "AI-Generated Brute Force Campaign",
            "slug": "targeted-credential-brute-force",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1110"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Brute force generator script",
              "Wordlist with 117 usernames and 28 passwords",
              "Multiple failed WordPress login attempts"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "MongoDB Database Exfiltration",
            "slug": "database-collection-exfiltration",
            "tactic": "exfiltration",
            "techniques": [
              "T1041"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "MongoDB collection dump",
              "Exfiltration manifest file",
              "Student and faculty PII records"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Script-Based Reverse Shell Deployment",
            "slug": "reverse-shell-execution",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059",
              "T1059.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Base64-encoded PowerShell reverse shell",
              "VBScript payload delivery",
              "QubesOS VM setup script with ncat"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "C2 Communication and Proxy Tunneling",
            "slug": "c2-and-tunneling",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "162.243.3.92",
              "Python-based C2 listener",
              "SSH tunnel for Wi-Fi hash collection",
              "Vast.ai connection",
              "Discord webhooks"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Automated Secret and Credential Scraping",
            "slug": "automated-credential-scraping",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1552"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Go-based credential-scanning toolkit",
              "Extraction of .env values",
              "S3 signed URLs",
              "Google Cloud service account keys",
              "CDN API keys"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "The BUGSTER threat actor uses jailbroken AI assistants to coordinate multi-stage attacks including WordPress enumeration, targeted brute-force campaigns, and MongoDB exfiltration against educational institutions. The operation leverages automated pipelines for Wi-Fi password cracking via cloud GPUs, credential scraping for cloud secrets, and Python-based command-and-control infrastructure."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Focus first on hosts that trigger the lead query for 162.243.3.92. If empty, the hunt is a baseline check for rare secret scraping across the whole estate.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder is deploying AI-generated scripts for reverse shells and automated secret-scraping toolkits, using a centralized C2 infrastructure to coordinate post-exploitation activity.",
      "parameters": {
        "actor_ips": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "unit42-ai-cybercrime",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-10-21"
          },
          "type": "list[ip]",
          "default": [
            "162.243.3.92"
          ],
          "description": "Known actor-controlled C2 or proxy IP addresses."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hosts identified in the lead query to focus the expensive behavioral search."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "sensitive_files": {
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            ".env",
            "id_rsa",
            "aws_access_key",
            "service_account_key.json",
            "credentials.db"
          ],
          "description": "Filenames or extensions targeted by automated scraping tools."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-assisted-cybercrime-analysis/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-assisted-cybercrime-analysis/",
          "name": "Unit 42 \u2014 AI-Assisted Cybercrime Analysis"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "no-network-logging",
          "risk": "Endpoints missing agent coverage contribute no flow data, bypassing the gate.",
          "stage": "c2-and-tunneling",
          "question": "whether the actor IP was contacted by hosts without agent-based network logging",
          "requires": "hb_network_connection with host-level egress IP"
        },
        {
          "id": "limited-script-visibility",
          "risk": "If script blocks are truncated or highly obfuscated, simple keyword matching for 'tcpclient' will fail.",
          "stage": "reverse-shell-execution",
          "question": "whether reverse shell payloads were split across multiple blocks or used obfuscation",
          "requires": "hb_script_activity with full block content"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "AI-Assisted Execution and C2 Tunneling",
    "description": "This hunt examines the execution and command-and-control phases of an intrusion, focusing on behaviors associated with AI-assisted cybercrime toolchains like BUGSTER. It uses a gated flow to first identify network leads to known actor infrastructure before fanning out into behavioral analysis of script execution, utility misuse, and rare credential-scraping processes. We look for specific PowerShell reverse shell signatures, ncat listeners, and automated searches for sensitive environment files and API keys."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "next-exploit-opportunities-how-a-threat-actor-used-ai-to-help-plan-and-execute-multiple-types-of",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "reverse-shell-execution",
            "steps": [
              "script-execution-patterns",
              "process-execution-utilities"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-and-tunneling",
            "steps": [
              "network-to-actor-ip"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "automated-credential-scraping",
            "steps": [
              "credential-scraping-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "web-application-enumeration",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the '\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "targeted-credential-brute-force",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the '\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "database-collection-exfiltration",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the '\u201cNext Exploit Opportunities\u201d: How a Threat Actor Used AI to Help Plan and Execute Multiple Types of Cybercrime Activities' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder is deploying AI-generated scripts for reverse shells and automated secret-scraping toolkits, using a centralized C2 infrastructure to coordinate post-exploitation activity.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "no-network-logging",
            "risk": "Endpoints missing agent coverage contribute no flow data, bypassing the gate.",
            "stage": "c2-and-tunneling",
            "question": "whether the actor IP was contacted by hosts without agent-based network logging",
            "requires": "hb_network_connection with host-level egress IP"
          },
          {
            "id": "limited-script-visibility",
            "risk": "If script blocks are truncated or highly obfuscated, simple keyword matching for 'tcpclient' will fail.",
            "stage": "reverse-shell-execution",
            "question": "whether reverse shell payloads were split across multiple blocks or used obfuscation",
            "requires": "hb_script_activity with full block content"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus first on hosts that trigger the lead query for 162.243.3.92. If empty, the hunt is a baseline check for rare secret scraping across the whole estate.",
        "beyond_detection": "While single rules alert on individual reverse shell commands, this hunt correlates infrastructure (C2 IPs), rare script-block patterns, and a fleet-wide prevalence check for secret scraping. This context is essential to differentiate between a developer running scripts and an AI-enabled adversary automating secret discovery."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "network-to-actor-ip",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Network connections to actor infrastructure",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, direction, protocol, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{actor_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Identifies hosts communicating with known actor infrastructure at 162.243.3.92 to establish initial scope.",
        "expected_signal": "A hit indicates a host reaching out to the actor's primary infrastructure. Silence suggests no known C2 traffic in this window."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Network connections to actor infrastructure",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "direction",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "protocol",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, direction, protocol, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{actor_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A hit indicates a host reaching out to the actor's primary infrastructure. Silence suggests no known C2 traffic in this window.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-10-22"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "read-lead",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Read lead connections",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "network-to-actor-ip"
        ],
        "objective": "Analyze which hosts in the network-to-actor-ip results show confirmed communication to {{actor_ips}}.",
        "description": "Is an assessment of the network activity to identify specific hosts for the deep-dive.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A summary of hosts communicating with the actor's C2 server.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict on whether the network lead is actionable."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "network-to-actor-ip"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "is-lead-real",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Is the lead real?",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the read-lead verdict identifies at least one host with confirmed network activity to {{actor_ips}}",
        "condition": "the read-lead verdict identifies at least one host with confirmed network activity to {{actor_ips}}",
        "blind_spot": "no-network-logging",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Is a gate for the expensive fan-out based on the initial network findings.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "read-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "script-execution-patterns",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Script-based reverse shell activity",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_content, time FROM hb_script_activity WHERE (LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%tcpclient%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%wscript.shell%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_script_activity",
        "description": "Identifies script blocks containing reverse shell signatures or AI-generated C2 patterns, filtered by the initial scope.",
        "expected_signal": "Execution of reverse shell code or VBScript droppers. High confidence when matching scoped hosts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-real",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Script-based reverse shell activity",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "script_content",
          "script_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_script_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_content, time FROM hb_script_activity WHERE (LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%tcpclient%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%wscript.shell%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Execution of reverse shell code or VBScript droppers. High confidence when matching scoped hosts.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-10-22"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "process-execution-utilities",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Execution of C2 and shell utilities",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%ncat%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '% -enc %') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Finds process command lines associated with tunneling utilities like ncat and reverse shells.",
        "expected_signal": "A hit suggests manual or scripted execution of networking tools commonly used by the actor for shells."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-real",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "label": "Execution of C2 and shell utilities",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%ncat%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '% -enc %') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A hit suggests manual or scripted execution of networking tools commonly used by the actor for shells.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-10-22"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "credential-scraping-prevalence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare access to sensitive files",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT file_name, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_file_activity WHERE (instr(',' || LOWER('{{sensitive_files}}') || ',', ',' || LOWER(file_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%.env%') AND activity_id = 2 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY file_name, process_name HAVING host_count < 3",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Identifies rare processes accessing secrets or environment files across the fleet, characteristic of automated scraping tools.",
        "expected_signal": "A rare file access event where a non-standard process reads a sensitive configuration file."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-real",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        },
        {
          "id": "is-lead-real",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare access to sensitive files",
        "reads": [
          "activity_id",
          "device_hostname",
          "file_name",
          "file_path",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT file_name, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_file_activity WHERE (instr(',' || LOWER('{{sensitive_files}}') || ',', ',' || LOWER(file_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(file_path) LIKE '%.env%') AND activity_id = 2 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY file_name, process_name HAVING host_count < 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A rare file access event where a non-standard process reads a sensitive configuration file.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "file_name",
            "process_name"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-10-22"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Synthesize and weigh evidence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network"
        ],
        "context": [
          "read-lead",
          "script-execution-patterns",
          "process-execution-utilities",
          "credential-scraping-prevalence"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any host exhibits signs of an AI-assisted intrusion. Even if network activity to {{actor_ips}} is absent, treat matches in script-execution-patterns or process-execution-utilities as high-confidence indicators of malicious execution.",
        "description": "Is a synthesis of network, script, and process findings to reach a compromise verdict.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict citing specific script content and network flows.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign for every host in the context."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "script-execution-patterns",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "process-execution-utilities",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "credential-scraping-prevalence",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-triage",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on triage verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host based on execution or scraping signals",
        "condition": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host based on execution or scraping signals",
        "blind_spot": "limited-script-visibility",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Routes the hunt to containment if malicious activity is confirmed.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "contain-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Is an isolation action to prevent further lateral movement or exfiltration.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host and revoke any cloud access keys or credentials identified in the scraping activity.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Is a human validation of findings and tuning.",
        "instructions": "Review the cited script blocks, process utility execution, and file access events. Verify if the process accessing sensitive files is an authorized developer tool or an unexpected scraper."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "is-lead-real",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "is-lead-real",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "contain-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Is a standard closure for negative results.",
        "instructions": "Log that no hosts contacted the known actor IP and that secret-file access patterns matched the baseline across the fleet."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}