--- analysis: A simple alert for Bitdefender stopping is too noisy for most environments. This hunt correlates the RDP source (who), the service disruption (what), and the rare binary execution (why) into a single analytical verdict. blind_spots: - id: missing-service-telemetry question: whether services were disabled via registry or killed directly as a process requires: hb_service_activity with event_code 7036 risk: Stopping a service via process termination or registry modification (Start=4) might not trigger the specific SCM event used in this hunt. stage: defense-evasion-service-stop - id: ephemeral-staging-paths question: whether the attacker used a random, non-PerfLogs path for staging requires: hb_process_activity process_path risk: Filtering on specific staging paths may miss tools run from deep user profile directories if not caught by the prevalence check. stage: lsass-credential-dumping coverage: - stage: rdp-lateral-access status: covered steps: - rdp-scoping - stage: defense-evasion-service-stop status: covered steps: - bitdefender-disruption - stage: lsass-credential-dumping status: covered steps: - rare-perflogs-processes - reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Up a Creek Without a Command Line: Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack'' series.' stage: gost-tunneling-persistence status: out_of_scope - reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Up a Creek Without a Command Line: Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack'' series.' stage: rclone-data-exfiltration status: out_of_scope - reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Up a Creek Without a Command Line: Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack'' series.' stage: inhibit-recovery-shadow-copy-deletion status: out_of_scope - reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Up a Creek Without a Command Line: Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack'' series.' stage: akira-data-encryption status: out_of_scope guardrails: claims: no_unsupported evidence: citation_required missing_data: not_benign telemetry: untrusted hunt: applicability: campaign-specific handoff: promote-to-detection justification: Akira affiliates consistently use RDP for lateral movement and disable endpoint security to proceed with credential theft. Detecting these precursor steps allows for containment before encryption starts. methodology: model-assisted trigger: intel-report hypothesis: An adversary has gained lateral access via RDP and is disabling security software to perform credential dumping from staging directories like PerfLogs. labels: - hunt - attack.t1021.001 - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1562.001 - command and control - credential access - defense evasion - exfiltration - impact - lateral movement name: 'Akira: Remote Access and Security Software Disruption' parameters: attacker_workstation: default: C1IFRYXI description: Workstation name associated with the threat actor in the Huntress report. from: kind: article observed: '2024-10-06' ref: Huntress Akira Mapping type: string lookback_days: default: '14' description: Days of history to examine. from: kind: manual observed: '2024-10-06' ref: hunt-standard-lookback type: number scope_hosts: default: [] description: Optional list of hosts to narrow the investigation based on scoping results. type: list[host] provenance: authors: - name: Huntbase hunt generation org: huntbase.io generated: by: huntbase-hunt-generation from: https://www.huntress.com/blog/mapping-akira-ransomware-attack gates: - dry-run - lint - critic model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview rationale: Begin the hunt on domain controllers and servers with public-facing services. Use the attacker workstation name 'C1IFRYXI' as a high-fidelity starting point. references: - name: "Huntress \u2014 Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack" url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/mapping-akira-ransomware-attack related: - hunt: akira-persistence-and-exfiltration reason: This hunt covers initial access and blinding; the next hunt in the series focuses on GOST tunneling and RClone exfiltration. relation: follows scenario: stages: - name: RDP Lateral Access observables: - Workstation name C1IFRYXI - RDP connection from non-customer workstation slug: rdp-lateral-access tactic: lateral-movement techniques: - T1021.001 - name: Bitdefender Service Disablement observables: - Bitdefender Endpoint Update Service stopped - Bitdefender Endpoint Integration Service stopped - Bitdefender Endpoint Protected Service stopped - Bitdefender Endpoint Security Service stopped slug: defense-evasion-service-stop tactic: defense-evasion - name: LSASS Credential Dumping observables: - procdump.exe - C:\PerfLogs\procdump.exe - lsass.exe dump slug: lsass-credential-dumping tactic: credential-access techniques: - T1003.001 - name: GOST Tunneling Persistence observables: - C:\PerfLogs\Temp\svchost.exe - C:\PerfLogs\Temp\config.dll - d00833318a04caa019c6f95dcb3598ad947d405010bfb2f3cbd04530a00bc3a4 - 64.227.4.134 slug: gost-tunneling-persistence tactic: command-and-control techniques: - T1572 - T1041 - name: RClone Data Exfiltration observables: - rclone.exe - C:\PerfLogs\rclone.exe slug: rclone-data-exfiltration tactic: exfiltration techniques: - T1567.002 - name: Recovery Inhibition via Shadow Copy Deletion observables: - powershell.exe -Command Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject slug: inhibit-recovery-shadow-copy-deletion tactic: impact techniques: - T1490 - T1047 - T1059.001 - name: Akira Data Encryption observables: - win.exe - 1f1bb322591b6d27fd2946e373d7d2efc2f4e1e66818846060d391600b600fba - Akira log files - Shellbags access to Shares folder slug: akira-data-encryption tactic: impact techniques: - T1486 summary: Akira ransomware affiliates gained access via RDP and disabled Bitdefender security services before using Procdump to harvest credentials. The attackers established persistence using the GOST tunnel tool and exfiltrated data via RClone before executing the Akira ransomware, which deleted volume shadow copies and encrypted files. series: index: 1 slug: up-a-creek-without-a-command-line-mapping-an-akira-ransomware-attack title: 'Up a Creek Without a Command Line: Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack' total: 2 severity: high targets: analyst: name: Tier-2 analyst role: analyst endpoint: category: endpoint name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) telemetry: - endpoint hunter: agent: true name: Hunt agent identity: category: identity name: Identity / sign-in telemetry telemetry: - identity tlp: clear type: investigation --- # Akira: Remote Access and Security Software Disruption This hunt identifies early-stage Akira ransomware activity by correlating inbound RDP connections with subsequent efforts to blind security tools. It specifically looks for the cessation of Bitdefender services and the execution of rare binaries from the PerfLogs directory, a known staging area for this threat actor. By examining authentication, service activity, and process telemetry, the hunt builds a timeline of compromise from initial lateral entry to the dumping of LSASS memory. An agent evaluates the combined evidence to distinguish between administrative maintenance and a coordinated ransomware precursor. ## rdp-scoping Identify hosts targeted by RDP sessions from the reported attacker workstation or other external sources. ```sqlite target=identity role=scoping params=(attacker_workstation=attacker_workstation, lookback_days=lookback_days) ~~~yaml expected: Hosts receiving RDP connections from the specific workstation name C1IFRYXI or high-volume remote interactive logins. reads: - device_hostname - src_endpoint_hostname - actor_user_name - time silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_auth_signin verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-10-08' ~~~ SELECT device_hostname, src_endpoint_hostname, actor_user_name, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE (LOWER(src_endpoint_hostname) = LOWER('{{attacker_workstation}}') OR (logon_type_id = 10 AND src_endpoint_hostname != '')) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ``` ## corroborate parallel: - → rare-perflogs-processes - → bitdefender-disruption join: → triage-compromise ## rare-perflogs-processes Find rare executables running from PerfLogs or Temp directories, which are used by Akira for staging tools like ProcDump. ```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days) ~~~yaml baseline: compare: first_seen window: '{{lookback_days}}d' expected: A binary like procdump.exe or svchost.exe (masqueraded) running from C:\PerfLogs on a small number of hosts. prevalence: by: device_hostname key: - path rare_below: 3 reads: - process_path - device_hostname - time silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_process_activity verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-10-08' ~~~ SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, COUNT(*) AS exec_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\perflogs\\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\temp\\%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY LOWER(process_path) HAVING hosts <= 3 ORDER BY hosts ASC ``` ## bitdefender-disruption Identify security service disablement following RDP access. ```sqlite target=endpoint role=detection-candidate params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days) ~~~yaml expected: Multiple Bitdefender services being stopped on a host shortly after an inbound RDP session. reads: - device_hostname - service_name - service_state - time silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_service_activity verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-10-08' ~~~ SELECT device_hostname, service_name, service_state, time FROM hb_service_activity WHERE (LOWER(service_name) LIKE '%bitdefender%') AND (LOWER(service_state) LIKE '%stop%' OR LOWER(service_state) LIKE '%disable%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ``` ## triage-compromise ```agent target=hunter cite: required context: - rdp-scoping - rare-perflogs-processes - bitdefender-disruption max_iterations: 3 objective: Determine if the evidence supports an active Akira intrusion where an RDP session was followed by the stopping of security services and the execution of staging tools in PerfLogs. success_criteria: A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host, citing the RDP source, the specific services stopped, and the path of the rare binary. tools: - endpoint - identity ``` ## route-verdict if~: "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host involving both service stops and rare binary execution" (confidence: high, judge=hunter) then: → isolate-host indeterminate: → analyst-review unavailable: → analyst-review (blind_spot: missing-service-telemetry) else: → close-out ## isolate-host ```action target=endpoint ~~~yaml approval: required ~~~ Isolate the host immediately. Do not reboot. Collect the PerfLogs directory and LSASS memory dump if found. ``` → analyst-review ## analyst-review ```manual target=analyst Review the agent verdict. Check hb_process_activity for rclone.exe or GOST-related configurations in C:\PerfLogs\Temp. ``` → close-out ## close-out ```manual target=analyst If no activity was found, record the hosts and time window. If legitimate maintenance caused a service stop, tune the detection candidate rule. ``` → end