{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 allows unauthenticated RCE on Confluence servers, making it a critical threat to intellectual property and internal credentials. Identifying post-exploit harvesting behavior provides high assurance that the organization is not compromised."
      },
      "name": "Axis RCE and Confluence Credential Harvesting",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1059.004",
        "attack.t1105",
        "attack.t1572",
        "attack.t1083",
        "attack.t1552.001",
        "attack.t1213",
        "discovery",
        "execution",
        "exfiltration",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on the initial Confluence foothold and local harvesting; the subsequent identity pivot to cloud resources belongs in a follow-on identity hunt.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single detection rule may catch the Java-to-bash execution, but this hunt correlates the initial HTTP exploit attempt, the use of tunneling services, and rare access to the attachment store, providing the full context of a credential harvesting campaign.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
          "steps": [
            "soap-exploit-leads"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
          "steps": [
            "java-shell-execution",
            "tunnel-dns-activity"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "discovery-credential-harvesting",
          "steps": [
            "attachment-access-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Unauthenticated Axis SOAP RCE",
            "slug": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "POST /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2",
              "HTTP 500 Internal Server Error",
              "CVE-2026-90436"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Automated shell execution and tunneling",
            "slug": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.004",
              "T1105",
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "confluence service account",
              "Java process launching bash and curl",
              "hex-encoded shell commands",
              "trycloudflare.com",
              "free.pinggy.net",
              "webhook.site",
              "wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy.net",
              "sequential task IDs",
              "labeled delimiters in command output"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Confluence data and credential harvesting",
            "slug": "discovery-credential-harvesting",
            "tactic": "discovery",
            "techniques": [
              "T1083",
              "T1552.001",
              "T1213"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/attachments/v4/",
              "MySQL authentication using Confluence credentials",
              "parsing Office documents for credentials",
              "Luhn checks for payment card numbers",
              "searching for 'VPN', 'token', 'encryption keys'"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Identity service enumeration and AS-REP roasting",
            "slug": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1087.002",
              "T1558.004"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Atlassian Crowd API queries",
              "Impacket GetNPUsers.py against Domain Controller",
              "AS-REP roasting"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Cloud data warehouse and M365 access",
            "slug": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
            "tactic": "exfiltration",
            "techniques": [
              "T1537",
              "T1078.004"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Production cloud data warehouse queries",
              "M365 sign-in via legacy authentication",
              "IP 192.238.253.176"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Attackers exploit a critical unauthenticated RCE in Apache Axis (CVE-2026-90436) affecting Atlassian Confluence and N-able N-central to gain initial footprints. Using AI-assisted automation, they harvest credentials from local databases and file attachments before pivoting to internal identity services and production cloud environments."
      },
      "severity": "critical",
      "rationale": "Focus on internet-exposed Atlassian Confluence Data Center servers. The lead query is highly effective if HTTP access logs are retained; if not, proceed directly to the process execution step using the whole estate.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An adversary exploits the Apache Axis SOAP vulnerability (CVE-2026-90436) in Atlassian Confluence to execute shell commands and harvest credentials from the attachment store.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hosts identified as potential exploit targets from the lead query; paste these back in to refine the fan-out queries."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "tunnel_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Rapid7",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "webhook.site"
          ],
          "description": "Base domains for tunneling and exfiltration services identified in the report."
        },
        "vulnerable_uris": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Rapid7",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "/plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2"
          ],
          "description": "The vulnerable Apache Axis SOAP endpoint in Confluence."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited",
          "name": "Rapid7 \u2014 ETR: Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "no-access-log-detail",
          "risk": "Missing the primary indicator of the initial exploit, leading to a false negative for the gated hunt.",
          "stage": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
          "question": "whether the specific vulnerable Axis endpoint was targeted and returned a 500 error",
          "requires": "hb_http_activity with response status code"
        },
        {
          "id": "limited-retention",
          "risk": "An intrusion that occurred several weeks ago might be missed if process logs rotate too quickly.",
          "stage": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
          "question": "whether the automated shell activity occurred outside the current telemetry window",
          "requires": "30 days of hb_process_activity retention"
        },
        {
          "id": "no-agent-coverage",
          "risk": "An unmanaged Confluence instance provides an invisible foothold for the attacker.",
          "question": "whether an unmonitored server is currently compromised",
          "requires": "an endpoint agent on every server"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Axis RCE and Confluence Credential Harvesting",
    "description": "The adversary exploits a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Axis. This hunt identifies the attack using a gated flow. The hunt first searches for HTTP 500 errors on the Axis SOAP endpoint. If potential exploit traffic is found, the hunt fans out to identify anomalous child processes spawned by the Java application, rare access to the Confluence attachment directory, and connections to known tunneling services. This approach allows an analyst to confirm the initial exploit, the execution of automated shells, and the subsequent harvesting of sensitive documents."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
            "steps": [
              "soap-exploit-leads"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
            "steps": [
              "java-shell-execution",
              "tunnel-dns-activity"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "discovery-credential-harvesting",
            "steps": [
              "attachment-access-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An adversary exploits the Apache Axis SOAP vulnerability (CVE-2026-90436) in Atlassian Confluence to execute shell commands and harvest credentials from the attachment store.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "no-access-log-detail",
            "risk": "Missing the primary indicator of the initial exploit, leading to a false negative for the gated hunt.",
            "stage": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
            "question": "whether the specific vulnerable Axis endpoint was targeted and returned a 500 error",
            "requires": "hb_http_activity with response status code"
          },
          {
            "id": "limited-retention",
            "risk": "An intrusion that occurred several weeks ago might be missed if process logs rotate too quickly.",
            "stage": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
            "question": "whether the automated shell activity occurred outside the current telemetry window",
            "requires": "30 days of hb_process_activity retention"
          },
          {
            "id": "no-agent-coverage",
            "risk": "An unmanaged Confluence instance provides an invisible foothold for the attacker.",
            "question": "whether an unmonitored server is currently compromised",
            "requires": "an endpoint agent on every server"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus on internet-exposed Atlassian Confluence Data Center servers. The lead query is highly effective if HTTP access logs are retained; if not, proceed directly to the process execution step using the whole estate.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single detection rule may catch the Java-to-bash execution, but this hunt correlates the initial HTTP exploit attempt, the use of tunneling services, and rare access to the attachment store, providing the full context of a credential harvesting campaign."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "soap-exploit-leads",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Lead: SOAP exploit requests",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, url_path, status_code, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{vulnerable_uris}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 AND status_code = 500 AND http_method = 'POST' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Identify potential Axis exploitation by finding HTTP POST requests to the SOAP endpoint that resulted in an Internal Server Error (500), matching the behavior observed in successful compromises.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows naming hosts that received suspicious POST requests to the Axis endpoint. Silence suggests no active targeting of the SOAP API in the window."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Lead: SOAP exploit requests",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "url_path",
          "status_code",
          "time",
          "http_method"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, url_path, status_code, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{vulnerable_uris}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 AND status_code = 500 AND http_method = 'POST' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows naming hosts that received suspicious POST requests to the Axis endpoint. Silence suggests no active targeting of the SOAP API in the window.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "evaluate-lead",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate lead",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "soap-exploit-leads"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the observed SOAP requests indicate a confirmed exploit attempt by analyzing source IP and request patterns.",
        "description": "Assess whether the HTTP 500 errors found in the lead query represent high-confidence exploit attempts against Confluence.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict on whether the SOAP traffic is likely malicious activity.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious or suspicious for at least one host, citing specific rows."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "soap-exploit-leads"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate-on-lead",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate on lead",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the evaluate-lead verdict identifies at least one host with suspicious SOAP exploit attempts",
        "condition": "the evaluate-lead verdict identifies at least one host with suspicious SOAP exploit attempts",
        "blind_spot": "no-access-log-detail",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Halt the hunt if no suspicious lead exists, or proceed to expensive behavioral queries if exploit traffic is confirmed.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "java-shell-execution",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Java shell execution",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, parent_process_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND LOWER(parent_process_name) LIKE '%java%' AND (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%bash%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%sh%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%curl%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify Confluence's Java process spawning bash or network utilities, which indicates successful remote code execution from the Axis exploit.",
        "expected_signal": "A shell or curl process running under the confluence service account with a Java parent. This is a high-confidence indicator of exploitation."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Java shell execution",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "parent_process_name",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, parent_process_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND LOWER(parent_process_name) LIKE '%java%' AND (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%bash%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%sh%' OR LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%curl%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A shell or curl process running under the confluence service account with a Java parent. This is a high-confidence indicator of exploitation.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "attachment-access-prevalence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Attachment access prevalence",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, LOWER(process_name) AS proc, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_file_activity WHERE file_path LIKE '%/attachments/v4/%' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY proc HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Identify rare processes accessing the Confluence attachment directory, revealing the automated data harvesting observed in the report.",
        "expected_signal": "Rare processes interacting with the attachment store. Normal web server activity should appear across the fleet; attacker scripts will be rare."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Attachment access prevalence",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "file_path",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, LOWER(process_name) AS proc, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_file_activity WHERE file_path LIKE '%/attachments/v4/%' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY proc HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Rare processes interacting with the attachment store. Normal web server activity should appear across the fleet; attacker scripts will be rare.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "proc"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "tunnel-dns-activity",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Tunnel DNS activity",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, COUNT(*) AS lookups FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{tunnel_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(query_hostname) LIKE '%.trycloudflare.com' OR LOWER(query_hostname) LIKE '%.pinggy.net') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Look for DNS resolutions of Pinggy, Cloudflare Tunnels, and Webhook.site, which attackers use to receive shell commands and exfiltrate harvested data.",
        "expected_signal": "Hosts resolving tunnel provider subdomains. This corroborates C2 activity following a successful exploit."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Tunnel DNS activity",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, COUNT(*) AS lookups FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{tunnel_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(query_hostname) LIKE '%.trycloudflare.com' OR LOWER(query_hostname) LIKE '%.pinggy.net') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Hosts resolving tunnel provider subdomains. This corroborates C2 activity following a successful exploit.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-intrusion",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage intrusion",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "evaluate-lead",
          "java-shell-execution",
          "attachment-access-prevalence",
          "tunnel-dns-activity"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the evidence across HTTP, process, file, and DNS surfaces confirms a successful breach and data harvesting on the Confluence server.",
        "description": "Correlate the exploit lead with the observed shell execution and data harvesting evidence to reach a final verdict per host.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A comprehensive verdict for each suspected host.",
        "success_criteria": "A final verdict of malicious, suspicious, or benign per host, citing evidence from all four surfaces."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "java-shell-execution",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "attachment-access-prevalence",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "tunnel-dns-activity",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-triage",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on triage",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage-intrusion verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage-intrusion verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "limited-retention",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Initiate response actions for compromised hosts or route suspicious findings for analyst review.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-intrusion"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-server",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate server",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Prevent further exfiltration of harvested credentials by isolating the compromised server.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host from the network and preserve all logs for forensic analysis. Collect copies of any scripts found in the Confluence temporary directories.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Manually verify the intrusion and prepare for incident response if any credential harvesting is confirmed.",
        "instructions": "Review the cited SOAP requests and shell execution logs. Verify the contents of the attachment directory to identify which specific sensitive documents were accessed by the attacker's scripts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-server"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Finalize the hunt and record negative results.",
        "instructions": "Record the search parameters and the absence of identified indicators. Re-verify that the Remote XML-RPC & SOAP API is disabled on Confluence instances where possible."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-lead",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-triage",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}