---
analysis: A detection rule fires on a known shell; this hunt performs forensic triage
  by cross-referencing vulnerability scan status, internet exposure, and anomalous
  server-side error patterns to satisfy a specific regulatory mandate.
blind_spots:
- id: no-volatile-memory-access
  question: Was fileless code injected into memory without spawning a separate process?
  requires: Forensic RAM capture (e.g. Velociraptor)
  risk: A sophisticated buffer overflow (like CVE-2026-0300) can execute code entirely
    in memory; without volatile data capture, this hunt may return a false negative.
  stage: post-exploitation-triage
- id: http-body-inspection
  question: Did the HTTP request contain a JWT bypass or exploit payload in the body?
  requires: hb_http_activity with request_body or WAF logs
  risk: Surface telemetry sees only metadata; if the exploit doesn't trigger a 403/500
    or a child process, it remains invisible.
  stage: unauthenticated-exploit-bypass
coverage:
- stage: exposed-vulnerable-applications
  status: covered
  steps:
  - vulnerability-scoping
- stage: unauthenticated-exploit-bypass
  status: covered
  steps:
  - rare-portal-errors
- stage: elevated-execution
  status: covered
  steps:
  - service-shell-execution
- blind_spot: no-volatile-memory-access
  reason: Requires volatile memory analysis or network traffic pcaps which are not
    present in the listed surfaces.
  stage: post-exploitation-triage
  status: not_visible
guardrails:
  claims: no_unsupported
  evidence: citation_required
  missing_data: not_benign
  telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
  applicability: campaign-specific
  handoff: keep-as-periodic-hunt
  justification: CISA BOD 26-04 mandates that organizations must run a forensic investigation
    in parallel with patching for Tier 1 vulnerabilities. Failure to do so leaves
    an organization blind to intruders who gained access before the patch was applied.
  methodology: model-assisted
  trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An attacker has exploited a publicly exposed, KEV-listed application (SharePoint,
  PAN-OS, or N-central) before remediation, establishing initial access or executing
  code with high privileges.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.004
- attack.t1021.001
- attack.t1074.001
- execution
- initial access
- lateral movement
name: BOD 26-04 Critical Vulnerability Triage
parameters:
  cve_ids:
    default:
    - CVE-2026-0300
    - CVE-2026-18556
    - CVE-2026-18577
    - CVE-2026-55040
    - CVE-2026-63520
    description: Target KEV-listed vulnerabilities from the CISA catalog.
    from:
      kind: article
      observed: '2026-11-04'
      ref: Rapid7 BOD 26-04
    type: list[string]
  lookback_days:
    default: '14'
    description: Days of history to examine for exploitation evidence.
    type: number
  scope_hosts:
    default: []
    description: Hostnames identified as vulnerable in the scoping step; leave empty
      to scan the entire estate.
    type: list[host]
  shell_names:
    default:
    - cmd.exe
    - powershell.exe
    - sh
    - bash
    - zsh
    description: Standard shell processes often used for arbitrary code execution.
    type: list[string]
  vulnerable_parents:
    default:
    - w3wp.exe
    - java
    - pan_auth
    - authd
    - tomcat
    description: Processes associated with the vulnerable services (SharePoint, PAN-OS,
      N-central).
    type: list[string]
  vulnerable_paths:
    default:
    - /portal/
    - /_layouts/15/
    - /ncentral/
    description: Sensitive URL paths associated with the vulnerable service portals.
    type: list[path]
provenance:
  authors:
  - name: Huntbase hunt generation
    org: huntbase.io
  generated:
    by: huntbase-hunt-generation
    from: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/it-racing-the-three-day-clock-cisa-bod-26-04
    gates:
    - dry-run
    - lint
    model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Focus first on hosts confirmed as internet-facing in hb_exposed_assets.
  Use the device_uid from hb_vulnerability_finding to retrieve the Network Hostname
  from hb_devices to correctly populate scope_hosts for the behavioral steps.
references:
- name: "Rapid7 \u2014 The Race Against the 3-Day Clock: How Rapid7 Helps Meet BOD\
    \ 26-04 Compliance"
  url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/it-racing-the-three-day-clock-cisa-bod-26-04
related:
- hunt: shadow-it-exposed-service-discovery
  reason: Correct identification of the external attack surface is required to accurately
    scope BOD 26-04 timelines.
  relation: precedes
scenario:
  stages:
  - name: Public Asset Exposure
    observables:
    - microsoft 365
    - palo alto
    - sharepoint
    - n-central
    - User-ID Authentication Portal
    - Captive Portal
    - CVE-2026-55040
    - CVE-2026-63520
    - CVE-2026-0300
    - CVE-2026-18556
    - CVE-2026-18577
    slug: exposed-vulnerable-applications
    tactic: initial-access
    techniques:
    - T1190
  - name: Vulnerability Exploitation
    observables:
    - JWT bypass
    - buffer overflow
    - specially crafted packets
    - authentication bypass
    - account takeover
    slug: unauthenticated-exploit-bypass
    tactic: initial-access
    techniques:
    - T1190
  - name: System-Level Execution
    observables:
    - SharePoint service account
    - root privileges
    - arbitrary code execution
    - unauthenticated RCE
    slug: elevated-execution
    tactic: execution
    techniques:
    - T1059
  - name: Post-Exploitation Activity
    observables:
    - lateral movement
    - data staging
    - volatile data capture
    - persistence establishment
    slug: post-exploitation-triage
    tactic: lateral-movement
    techniques:
    - T1021
    - T1083
    - T1074
  summary: Adversaries exploit publicly exposed, high-impact vulnerabilities in SharePoint,
    PAN-OS, and N-central to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution or administrative
    takeover. Under CISA BOD 26-04, these Tier 1 exploits require rapid forensic triage
    within 72 hours to detect post-exploitation behaviors such as lateral movement
    and data staging.
severity: high
targets:
  analyst:
    name: Tier-2 analyst
    role: analyst
  endpoint:
    category: endpoint
    name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
    telemetry:
    - endpoint
  hunter:
    agent: true
    name: Hunt agent
  web:
    category: siem
    name: Web server / proxy logs
    telemetry:
    - network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---


# BOD 26-04 Critical Vulnerability Triage

This hunt implements the mandatory forensic triage lifecycle established by CISA Binding Operational Directive 26-04. The directive requires that for Tier 1 vulnerabilities (actively exploited and providing total control), organizations must not only patch within 72 hours but also perform a concurrent forensic investigation to detect pre-patch compromise. This hunt scopes the estate to vulnerable assets, identifies anomalous web activity on those portals (specifically 403/500 errors indicating bypass attempts), and monitors for shells spawned by the vulnerable service daemons. An agent synthesizes the evidence to meet the triage reporting requirement.

## vulnerability-scoping
<!-- Identify KEV-listed vulnerable assets -->
Scope the estate to assets reporting target CVEs. While this surface uses device_uid, the agent will correlate this with hostnames from hb_devices to enable downstream triage on behavioral surfaces.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping params=(cve_ids=cve_ids)
~~~yaml
expected: A list of device identifiers that are confirmed vulnerable. Silence indicates
  no known vulnerable assets in current scan results.
reads:
- device_uid
- resource_uid
- cve_uid
- severity
- status
- first_seen
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_vulnerability_finding
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_uid, resource_uid, cve_uid, severity, status, first_seen FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE instr(',' || '{{cve_ids}}' || ',', ',' || cve_uid || ',') > 0 AND status != 'suppressed' AND resource_type IN ('device', 'virtual_machine')
```

## rare-portal-errors
<!-- Rare HTTP errors on vulnerable paths -->
Find unusual internal server errors or forbidden responses on the vulnerable portals, which often correlate with bypass attempts or failed exploit payloads.

```sqlite target=web role=baseline params=(vulnerable_paths=vulnerable_paths, scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
baseline:
  compare: new_this_window
  window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Anomalous 403 or 500 status codes on specific portal paths. Silence suggests
  no obvious failed exploit traffic matching these indicators.
prevalence:
  by: device_hostname
  key:
  - url_path
  - status_code
  rare_below: 10
reads:
- device_hostname
- url_path
- status_code
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_http_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, url_path, status_code, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, COUNT(*) AS requests FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (status_code = 403 OR status_code = 500) AND instr(',' || '{{vulnerable_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 AND (('{{scope_hosts}}' = '') OR (instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, url_path, status_code HAVING requests < 10 ORDER BY requests ASC
```

## service-shell-execution
<!-- Shells spawned by vulnerable services -->
Detect arbitrary code execution by identifying shells launched from the vulnerable service parents, including the Palo Alto and N-central daemons.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=detection-candidate params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, shell_names=shell_names, vulnerable_parents=vulnerable_parents, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
expected: A shell process running with service-level or root privileges. This is a
  high-fidelity indicator of exploitation.
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_name
- process_cmd_line
- parent_process_name
- user_name
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_process_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, parent_process_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (('{{scope_hosts}}' = '') OR (instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)) AND instr(',' || '{{shell_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 AND instr(',' || '{{vulnerable_parents}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(parent_process_name) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```

## forensic-triage-agent
<!-- Synthesize triage evidence -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- vulnerability-scoping
- rare-portal-errors
- service-shell-execution
max_iterations: 5
objective: Determine if any host identified as vulnerable (via device_uid correlation)
  shows evidence of exploitation in the HTTP or process logs. The verdict must distinguish
  between failed attempts (403/500 errors) and successful code execution (shells spawned
  by service parents).
success_criteria: A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host, citing specific
  rows for any compromise evidence found.
tools:
- endpoint
- web
```

## triage-decision
<!-- Evaluate compromise verdict -->
if~: "the forensic-triage-agent verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → remediation-review
indeterminate: → remediation-review
unavailable: → remediation-review (blind_spot: no-volatile-memory-access)
else: → compliance-close-out

## remediation-review
<!-- Remediation and escalation review -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the agent's cited rows. If exploitation is confirmed, activate the Incident Response plan immediately (Phase 6 of BOD 26-04). If only failed attempts were found, ensure the patching team has prioritized these specific assets for immediate remediation to close the exposure window.
```
→ compliance-close-out

## compliance-close-out
<!-- Compliance close-out -->
```manual target=analyst
Record the hosts examined, the search criteria used (403/500 errors and service-child processes), and the final forensic verdict. This documentation serves as the organization's proof of compliance with the 72-hour triage mandate.
```
→ end
