{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Unsupported and end-of-life IoT devices are vulnerable beachheads that lack standard security controls; identifying their compromise through network behavior is vital to protecting the primary enterprise network."
      },
      "name": "Compromised IoT Network Activity",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1566",
        "attack.t1071.001",
        "attack.t1071.004",
        "execution",
        "impact",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "my-iot-devices-are-no-longer-supported-is-my-smart-home-safe",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "My IoT devices are no longer supported \u2013 is my smart home safe?",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "initial-access-eol-exploitation",
          "reason": "Vulnerability management and the exploitation of EoL software are handled in the vulnerability-focused hunt in this series.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "exposed-iot-posture-operational-impact",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "This hunt uses a gated flow to correlate DNS failure patterns with follow-on behavioral evidence. A single rule would only catch a static domain; this hunt identifies the pivot from C2 failure to internal lateral movement across multiple telemetry surfaces.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "botnet-conscription-and-c2",
          "steps": [
            "dns-failed-lookups-lead"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "dns-redirection-and-phishing",
          "steps": [
            "http-phishing-traffic"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "lateral-movement-from-iot",
          "steps": [
            "internal-port-probing"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-eol-exploitation",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'My IoT devices are no longer supported \u2013 is my smart home safe?' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "operational-impact",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'My IoT devices are no longer supported \u2013 is my smart home safe?' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Exploitation of EoL IoT Devices",
            "slug": "initial-access-eol-exploitation",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "exposed management ports on DVRs and webcams",
              "unpatched firmware on refrigerator controllers",
              "no-name Android TV boxes with insecure services",
              "pre-installed malware on smart devices"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Botnet Conscription and C2 Communication",
            "slug": "botnet-conscription-and-c2",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Mozi botnet communication",
              "BADBOX 2.0 botnet traffic",
              "outbound connections to known botnet controllers",
              "unusual process launches on Android TV boxes"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Traffic Redirection to Phishing Sites",
            "slug": "dns-redirection-and-phishing",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1566"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "router DNS settings redirection",
              "HTTP traffic to malicious phishing domains",
              "hijacked router management traffic"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Lateral Pivoting from IoT Devices",
            "slug": "lateral-movement-from-iot",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "internal network scanning from IoT device IP addresses",
              "unauthorized connections to computer management ports from smart TVs",
              "accessing internal assets via hijacked routers"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Operational Impact on Smart Devices",
            "slug": "operational-impact",
            "tactic": "impact",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "unauthorized temperature adjustments in smart controllers",
              "remote operation of smart door locks",
              "accessing unauthorized smart camera feeds"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Attackers target unpatched vulnerabilities in End-of-Life (EoL) IoT devices, such as routers, cameras, and smart controllers, to gain initial network access. Once compromised, these devices are used to pivot into internal networks, redirect users to phishing sites, or are conscripted into large-scale botnets like Mozi and BADBOX 2.0."
      },
      "severity": "medium",
      "rationale": "Target IoT-specific VLANs, guest networks, and industrial control subnets first. Focus the lead query on these zones to minimize noise from enterprise IT equipment.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "End-of-life IoT devices have been conscripted into botnets or hijacked for traffic redirection, evidenced by anomalous DNS failure patterns, internal lateral probing, or HTTP connections to phishing infrastructure.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "analyst-scoping",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-01-01"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Suspicious IPs identified from the lead; leave empty to scan the entire estate in behavioral steps."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "hunt-standard",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-01-01"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "management_ports": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "threat-intel",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-01-01"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "22",
            "23",
            "80",
            "443",
            "3389",
            "5555",
            "5900"
          ],
          "description": "Management ports commonly targeted during internal propagation."
        },
        "phishing_indicators": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "threat-intel",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-01-01"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "login.router-update.invalid",
            "security-check.wifi-auth.invalid",
            "portal.isp-verify.invalid"
          ],
          "description": "Known malicious domains used for redirection or phishing."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/internet-of-things/iot-devices-no-longer-supported-smart-home-safe/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/internet-of-things/iot-devices-no-longer-supported-smart-home-safe/",
          "name": "ESET Research \u2014 IoT devices no longer supported"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "gateway-logging-gap",
          "risk": "Lateral movement between devices on the same subnet that does not pass through a monitored L3 gateway will be invisible to these queries.",
          "owner": "Network Engineering",
          "stage": "botnet-conscription-and-c2",
          "question": "whether the device is communicating with other hosts on the same L2 subnet",
          "requires": "hb_network_connection from access-layer switches",
          "remediation": "Deploy network sensors at the access layer or use private VLANs to force all traffic through a monitored point."
        },
        {
          "id": "unmanaged-device-blind-spot",
          "risk": "Without agent coverage, identifying the physical device for remediation is delayed, extending the window of risk.",
          "owner": "Asset Management",
          "stage": "lateral-movement-from-iot",
          "question": "what the specific model and owner are for the identified suspicious IP",
          "requires": "accurate CMDB or MAC OUI integration",
          "remediation": "Integrate DHCP fingerprinting or MAC OUI lookups into the central telemetry lake."
        },
        {
          "id": "encrypted-dns-blind-spot",
          "risk": "If the botnet uses DoH, the lead query will be silent, and the compromise will only be visible in later behavioral stages.",
          "owner": "Security Operations",
          "stage": "botnet-conscription-and-c2",
          "question": "whether the botnet is using DNS-over-HTTPS to hide C2 lookups",
          "requires": "hb_http_activity targeting known DoH endpoints",
          "remediation": "Block outbound DoH traffic from IoT subnets and enforce internal DNS resolution."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Compromised IoT Network Activity",
    "description": "This hunt identifies the network-level behaviors of unmanaged IoT devices that have been compromised. It uses a gated flow, starting with a lead query that identifies hosts with high DNS failure rates, which often indicates botnet C2 or DGA activity. Only when these leads are verified does the hunt pivot into expensive behavioral analysis to find evidence of lateral movement (internal port scanning) and initial access redirection (phishing traffic). The hunt is designed for devices that lack endpoint agents by focusing on network telemetry surfaces."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "my-iot-devices-are-no-longer-supported-is-my-smart-home-safe",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "My IoT devices are no longer supported \u2013 is my smart home safe?",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "botnet-conscription-and-c2",
            "steps": [
              "dns-failed-lookups-lead"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "dns-redirection-and-phishing",
            "steps": [
              "http-phishing-traffic"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "lateral-movement-from-iot",
            "steps": [
              "internal-port-probing"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-eol-exploitation",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'My IoT devices are no longer supported \u2013 is my smart home safe?' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "operational-impact",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'My IoT devices are no longer supported \u2013 is my smart home safe?' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "End-of-life IoT devices have been conscripted into botnets or hijacked for traffic redirection, evidenced by anomalous DNS failure patterns, internal lateral probing, or HTTP connections to phishing infrastructure.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "gateway-logging-gap",
            "risk": "Lateral movement between devices on the same subnet that does not pass through a monitored L3 gateway will be invisible to these queries.",
            "owner": "Network Engineering",
            "stage": "botnet-conscription-and-c2",
            "question": "whether the device is communicating with other hosts on the same L2 subnet",
            "requires": "hb_network_connection from access-layer switches",
            "remediation": "Deploy network sensors at the access layer or use private VLANs to force all traffic through a monitored point."
          },
          {
            "id": "unmanaged-device-blind-spot",
            "risk": "Without agent coverage, identifying the physical device for remediation is delayed, extending the window of risk.",
            "owner": "Asset Management",
            "stage": "lateral-movement-from-iot",
            "question": "what the specific model and owner are for the identified suspicious IP",
            "requires": "accurate CMDB or MAC OUI integration",
            "remediation": "Integrate DHCP fingerprinting or MAC OUI lookups into the central telemetry lake."
          },
          {
            "id": "encrypted-dns-blind-spot",
            "risk": "If the botnet uses DoH, the lead query will be silent, and the compromise will only be visible in later behavioral stages.",
            "owner": "Security Operations",
            "stage": "botnet-conscription-and-c2",
            "question": "whether the botnet is using DNS-over-HTTPS to hide C2 lookups",
            "requires": "hb_http_activity targeting known DoH endpoints",
            "remediation": "Block outbound DoH traffic from IoT subnets and enforce internal DNS resolution."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Target IoT-specific VLANs, guest networks, and industrial control subnets first. Focus the lead query on these zones to minimize noise from enterprise IT equipment.",
        "beyond_detection": "This hunt uses a gated flow to correlate DNS failure patterns with follow-on behavioral evidence. A single rule would only catch a static domain; this hunt identifies the pivot from C2 failure to internal lateral movement across multiple telemetry surfaces."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "dns-failed-lookups-lead",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Lead: High DNS failure volume",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) as fail_count, COUNT(DISTINCT query_hostname) as unique_domains, MIN(time) as first_seen, MAX(time) as last_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE rcode IN ('NXDOMAIN', 'SERVFAIL') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip HAVING fail_count > 50 ORDER BY fail_count DESC",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Identify internal IPs generating a high volume of NXDOMAIN or SERVFAIL responses, suggesting automated C2 or DGA attempts.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of IPs with persistent lookup failures. Silence suggests no heavy automated C2 activity is visible on this surface."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Lead: High DNS failure volume",
        "reads": [
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "rcode",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) as fail_count, COUNT(DISTINCT query_hostname) as unique_domains, MIN(time) as first_seen, MAX(time) as last_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE rcode IN ('NXDOMAIN', 'SERVFAIL') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip HAVING fail_count > 50 ORDER BY fail_count DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of IPs with persistent lookup failures. Silence suggests no heavy automated C2 activity is visible on this surface.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-21"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "evaluate-dns-lead",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate DNS leads",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "dns-failed-lookups-lead"
        ],
        "objective": "Review the DNS lookup failures and determine if the frequency and target domains suggest an automated botnet agent.",
        "description": "Decide if the DNS failure pattern indicates a likely IoT botnet conscription.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-IP verdict classifying the behavior as suspicious or benign.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict for each IP citing specific failure counts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "dns-failed-lookups-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate-on-suspicious-dns",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate on suspicious DNS",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the evaluate-dns-lead verdict is suspicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the evaluate-dns-lead verdict is suspicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "gateway-logging-gap",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Restrict expensive behavioral queries to only those environments showing suspicious DNS signals.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-dns-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "internal-port-probing",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Internal management port probing",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, COUNT(DISTINCT dst_endpoint_ip) as internal_targets, MIN(time) as first_seen, MAX(time) as last_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0) AND instr(',' || '{{management_ports}}' || ',', ',' || CAST(dst_endpoint_port AS TEXT) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port HAVING internal_targets > 5 ORDER BY internal_targets DESC",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Detect anomalous internal scanning of management ports originating from the suspicious IPs.",
        "expected_signal": "One IP hitting multiple internal targets on ports like 23 (Telnet) or 5555 (ADB)."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-suspicious-dns",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Internal management port probing",
        "reads": [
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "direction",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, COUNT(DISTINCT dst_endpoint_ip) as internal_targets, MIN(time) as first_seen, MAX(time) as last_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0) AND instr(',' || '{{management_ports}}' || ',', ',' || CAST(dst_endpoint_port AS TEXT) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port HAVING internal_targets > 5 ORDER BY internal_targets DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "One IP hitting multiple internal targets on ports like 23 (Telnet) or 5555 (ADB).",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "src_endpoint_ip",
          "key": [
            "src_endpoint_ip",
            "dst_endpoint_port"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-21"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "http-phishing-traffic",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "HTTP phishing traffic",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, url_hostname, user_agent, COUNT(*) as req_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0) AND instr(',' || '{{phishing_indicators}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, url_hostname, user_agent ORDER BY req_count DESC",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Identify HTTP requests to known phishing domains, indicating a hijacked IoT gateway or router.",
        "expected_signal": "Connections to phishing infrastructure from internal IPs."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-suspicious-dns",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "HTTP phishing traffic",
        "reads": [
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "url_hostname",
          "user_agent",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, url_hostname, user_agent, COUNT(*) as req_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0) AND instr(',' || '{{phishing_indicators}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip, url_hostname, user_agent ORDER BY req_count DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Connections to phishing infrastructure from internal IPs.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-21"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "confirm-iot-compromise",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Confirm IoT compromise",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "evaluate-dns-lead",
          "internal-port-probing",
          "http-phishing-traffic"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the suspicious IP is a compromised IoT device by correlating the automated DNS behavior with internal scanning and phishing redirection.",
        "description": "Correlate all network-level findings to reach a final verdict on device compromise.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A detailed analysis citing DNS leads, internal probing, and HTTP indicators.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious or suspicious for any IP showing multiple indicators."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "internal-port-probing",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "http-phishing-traffic",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-to-containment",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route to containment",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the confirm-iot-compromise verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the confirm-iot-compromise verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "unmanaged-device-blind-spot",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Initiate automated or manual containment for devices with a malicious verdict.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "confirm-iot-compromise"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-compromised-ip",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate compromised IP",
      "config": {
        "target": "network",
        "description": "Contain the malicious IoT device at the network level.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the identified IPs at the firewall or router. Place the devices in a quarantine VLAN to prevent lateral movement and C2 participation.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-to-containment",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-validation",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst validation",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the triage findings and identify the physical device.",
        "instructions": "Review the cited IPs. Use MAC OUI lookups or internal inventories to identify the device manufacturer and model. Verify if the identified devices are end-of-life."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-suspicious-dns",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate-on-suspicious-dns",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-to-containment",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-to-containment",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-compromised-ip"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out-hunt",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt close-out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document results and plan for device decommissioning.",
        "instructions": "Record all compromised devices. Recommend decommissioning for any identified end-of-life equipment. Document any network segmentation gaps found during the hunt."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-suspicious-dns",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-to-containment",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-validation"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}