{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Blockchain dead-drops remove the single point of failure (DNS/Hosting) that defenders traditionally rely on for takedowns. A negative result confirms this resilient channel is not currently active."
      },
      "name": "Decentralized Blockchain C2 Resolution",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1090.004",
        "attack.t1102.001",
        "command and control",
        "execution",
        "impact",
        "initial access"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "the-challenge-of-defending-against-bulletproof-dead-drops-on-public-blockchains",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "initial-access-via-web-exploitation",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on the C2 resilience phase; initial entry into the environment via vulnerability exploitation is a separate hypothesis.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A static rule for blockchain domains triggers too many false positives from developer activity. This hunt uses multi-surface correlation (DNS -> HTTP -> Network) and a temporal constraint to isolate the automated resolution-to-beaconing sequence.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "c2-blockchain-dead-drop-resolution",
          "steps": [
            "dns-to-blockchain-rpc",
            "http-rpc-post-activity"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-primary-beaconing",
          "steps": [
            "rare-outbound-beacons"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-exploit",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-overlord-rat",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "impact-data-encryption",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Exploitation of Public-Facing Application",
            "slug": "initial-access-exploit",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "anomalous web server errors",
              "unexpected inbound traffic to public-facing web applications"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Overlord RAT Execution",
            "slug": "execution-overlord-rat",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "observables": [
              "Overlord RAT binary",
              "in-memory decryption of C2 configurations",
              "lightweight decrypter process activity"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Blockchain RPC Dead-Drop Resolution",
            "slug": "c2-blockchain-dead-drop-resolution",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1090.004"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "outbound JSON-RPC queries to Infura (infura.io)",
              "outbound JSON-RPC queries to QuickNode (quicnode.pro)",
              "outbound JSON-RPC queries to Tatum (tatum.io)",
              "JSON-RPC methods: eth_call, getTransaction, getSignaturesForAddress",
              "base-encoded data in HTTP POST request bodies",
              "DNS resolution for public blockchain node providers"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "C2 Infrastructure Beaconing",
            "slug": "c2-primary-beaconing",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "observables": [
              "outbound connections to dynamically resolved C2 IP addresses",
              "beaconing traffic to previously unknown domains"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Data Encrypted for Impact",
            "slug": "impact-data-encryption",
            "tactic": "impact",
            "techniques": [
              "T1486"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "rapid file modification and encryption",
              "ransomware notes on system drives"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "The threat actor UAT-12643 utilizes the Overlord RAT to retrieve encrypted command-and-control configurations from public blockchains including Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana. By using JSON-RPC queries to public node providers like Infura and QuickNode, the malware resolves its C2 infrastructure through immutable ledger data such as Solana Memo transactions or Ethereum smart contracts."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Start by identifying all hosts interacting with public blockchain RPC providers. Widen the search if initial results are concentrated in developer or research departments where such traffic is baseline.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An adversary is using public blockchain ledgers as dead-drop resolvers for C2 configuration, identified by outbound RPC calls to node providers followed by rare network beaconing to resolved endpoints.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Paste the hostnames identified in the lead query here to focus the subsequent analysis."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "History in days to examine for RPC activity and subsequent beaconing."
        },
        "rpc_providers": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-challenge-of-defending-against-bulletproof-dead-drops-on-public-blockchains/",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-18"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "infura.io",
            "quicnode.pro",
            "tatum.io",
            "mainnet.solana.com",
            "api.mainnet-beta.solana.com",
            "ethereum.publicnode.com"
          ],
          "description": "Public blockchain RPC and node provider domains used as dead drops."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-challenge-of-defending-against-bulletproof-dead-drops-on-public-blockchains/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-challenge-of-defending-against-bulletproof-dead-drops-on-public-blockchains/",
          "name": "The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "incomplete-rpc-telemetry",
          "risk": "Without the POST body, we cannot distinguish between a legitimate node status check and a specific coordinate retrieval call.",
          "stage": "c2-blockchain-dead-drop-resolution",
          "question": "Which specific JSON-RPC methods (eth_call, getSignaturesForAddress) were called?",
          "requires": "hb_http_activity with full JSON-RPC body capture"
        },
        {
          "id": "tls-encrypted-rpc-payloads",
          "risk": "HTTPS to standard providers like Infura masks the malicious payload from traditional NIDS/DPI.",
          "stage": "c2-blockchain-dead-drop-resolution",
          "question": "Is the content of the RPC call an encrypted C2 URL?",
          "requires": "TLS inspection at the gateway or endpoint"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Decentralized Blockchain C2 Resolution",
    "description": "This hunt identifies attempts to resolve command-and-control infrastructure using Web3 nodes. It looks for DNS and HTTP traffic directed at public blockchain RPC providers that correlate with rare outbound network connections. By abusing immutable ledgers like Solana and Ethereum, attackers bypass traditional domain sinkholing. The hunt baselines typical developer RPC usage and highlights hosts that reach out to the blockchain and then initiate unique outbound sessions, often targeting non-standard ports within a narrow temporal window."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "the-challenge-of-defending-against-bulletproof-dead-drops-on-public-blockchains",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "c2-blockchain-dead-drop-resolution",
            "steps": [
              "dns-to-blockchain-rpc",
              "http-rpc-post-activity"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-primary-beaconing",
            "steps": [
              "rare-outbound-beacons"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-exploit",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-overlord-rat",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "impact-data-encryption",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An adversary is using public blockchain ledgers as dead-drop resolvers for C2 configuration, identified by outbound RPC calls to node providers followed by rare network beaconing to resolved endpoints.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "incomplete-rpc-telemetry",
            "risk": "Without the POST body, we cannot distinguish between a legitimate node status check and a specific coordinate retrieval call.",
            "stage": "c2-blockchain-dead-drop-resolution",
            "question": "Which specific JSON-RPC methods (eth_call, getSignaturesForAddress) were called?",
            "requires": "hb_http_activity with full JSON-RPC body capture"
          },
          {
            "id": "tls-encrypted-rpc-payloads",
            "risk": "HTTPS to standard providers like Infura masks the malicious payload from traditional NIDS/DPI.",
            "stage": "c2-blockchain-dead-drop-resolution",
            "question": "Is the content of the RPC call an encrypted C2 URL?",
            "requires": "TLS inspection at the gateway or endpoint"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start by identifying all hosts interacting with public blockchain RPC providers. Widen the search if initial results are concentrated in developer or research departments where such traffic is baseline.",
        "beyond_detection": "A static rule for blockchain domains triggers too many false positives from developer activity. This hunt uses multi-surface correlation (DNS -> HTTP -> Network) and a temporal constraint to isolate the automated resolution-to-beaconing sequence."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "dns-to-blockchain-rpc",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "DNS lookups to blockchain RPC nodes",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, pid, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS lookup_count, MIN(time) AS first_lookup FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{rpc_providers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, process_name, pid, query_hostname",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Identify hosts and processes resolving known blockchain RPC provider domains as a lead for potential dead-drop resolution.",
        "expected_signal": "Hosts and specific processes resolving blockchain domains. Legitimate developer activity will show high volume across multiple distinct providers; malicious resolution is typically low volume and tied to unusual processes."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "DNS lookups to blockchain RPC nodes",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "pid",
          "process_name",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, pid, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS lookup_count, MIN(time) AS first_lookup FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{rpc_providers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, process_name, pid, query_hostname",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Hosts and specific processes resolving blockchain domains. Legitimate developer activity will show high volume across multiple distinct providers; malicious resolution is typically low volume and tied to unusual processes.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-19"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "http-rpc-post-activity",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "HTTP POST activity to RPC endpoints",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, http_method, user_agent, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{rpc_providers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND http_method = 'POST' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Focus on the HTTP POST requests that carry JSON-RPC payloads, which are required for querying specific blockchain data like transactions or logs.",
        "expected_signal": "POST requests to RPC providers from the scoping hosts. Analysts should look for unusual User-Agents or paths that do not match standard browser or developer tool patterns."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "dns-to-blockchain-rpc"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "HTTP POST activity to RPC endpoints",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "http_method",
          "time",
          "url_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "user_agent"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, http_method, user_agent, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{rpc_providers}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND http_method = 'POST' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "POST requests to RPC providers from the scoping hosts. Analysts should look for unusual User-Agents or paths that do not match standard browser or developer tool patterns.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-19"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-outbound-beacons",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare outbound connections from RPC hosts",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND disposition = 'Allowed' AND (dst_endpoint_port NOT IN (80, 443, 53)) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Identify non-standard outbound connections occurring on hosts that have also performed blockchain RPC lookups, prioritizing non-standard ports.",
        "expected_signal": "A connection to a rare external IP address on a non-standard port. Correlation is strongest when this connection follows an RPC lookup by the same host."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "dns-to-blockchain-rpc"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare outbound connections from RPC hosts",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "direction",
          "disposition",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND disposition = 'Allowed' AND (dst_endpoint_port NOT IN (80, 443, 53)) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, process_name HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A connection to a rare external IP address on a non-standard port. Correlation is strongest when this connection follows an RPC lookup by the same host.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "dst_endpoint_ip",
            "dst_endpoint_port"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-19"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-rpc-behavior",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate blockchain-to-C2 sequence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "dns-to-blockchain-rpc",
          "http-rpc-post-activity",
          "rare-outbound-beacons"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if a host is resolving C2 coordinates via blockchain. Specifically look for rare outbound network connections that occur shortly after (within 5-10 minutes) the identified RPC activity on the same host. Evaluate if the processes involved in both steps are consistent or related.",
        "description": "Analyze the temporal and behavioural relationship between blockchain interaction and rare network egress.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A verdict of malicious when a host interacts with a blockchain RPC provider and then, within minutes, initiates a rare connection to a new IP address.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict of malicious, suspicious, or benign citing the specific correlated RPC and beaconing rows."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "http-rpc-post-activity",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "rare-outbound-beacons",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on triage verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "The triage-rpc-behavior verdict is malicious for at least one host.",
        "condition": "The triage-rpc-behavior verdict is malicious for at least one host.",
        "blind_spot": "incomplete-rpc-telemetry",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the hunt based on the agent's correlation of blockchain resolution and beaconing behaviour.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-rpc-behavior"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-infected-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate host and capture memory",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Neutralize the threat and preserve the in-memory artifacts characteristic of Overlord RAT and similar blockchain-backed malware.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host from the network. Capture a full memory dump before rebooting or shutting down to preserve in-memory decrypters and the resolved C2 coordinates.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst forensic review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the agent's findings and investigate the origin of the malicious process.",
        "instructions": "Review the process tree for the processes identified in the RPC lookups and outbound connections. Inspect any available HTTP payload data for Base64 or hex-encoded C2 strings. Validate if the activity matches the Overlord RAT's Solana-based dead-drop pattern."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-infected-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt closure and tuning",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Record findings and update exclusions to reduce false positives for legitimate developer activity.",
        "instructions": "Document all confirmed malicious hosts and the resolved C2 IP addresses. If legitimate developer workstations were flagged, record their hostnames and typical RPC patterns for inclusion in the scope_hosts exclusion list for future runs."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "analyst-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}