GTA 6 Hype: RAT C2 and Data Theft
An adversary is leveraging Grand Theft Auto VI hype to deploy RATs and infostealers that use ngrok tunnels for command and control and Discord for credential exfiltration.
Based on research by Huntress 2026-09-20 9 steps · 3 queries T1071.001 T1090.003 T1115 T1555 T1572
Brief
The Threat of GTA VI Hype
Huntress recently detailed how adversaries exploit the anticipation for Grand Theft Auto VI in their report Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware. Attackers distribute fake installers that bundle functional malware, including NJRAT and DCRAT, to gain remote access and steal credentials from unsuspecting users.
How the Hunt Flows
The hunt begins by scoping execution. A query against hb_process_activity identifies every process launching from %TEMP% or C:\Users\Default. These paths represent the primary execution stages for the reported malware bundle. This step produces a broad list of candidates, as many legitimate installers also run from these locations.
To isolate the threat, the hunt applies a prevalence filter. It stack-counts the discovered binaries across the fleet and keeps only those appearing on three or fewer hosts. This rarity signal separates unique malware variants from common enterprise software and routine updates.
In the final phase, the hunt correlates these rare processes with network activity. It checks for outbound connections to ngrok infrastructure, specific malicious IPs, or Discord. This step confirms the command-and-control behavior and identifies potential exfiltration events. An analyst or agent then triages the overlap between rare execution paths and suspicious network destinations to provide a final verdict.
Blind Spots
This hunt relies heavily on network telemetry. If a host lacks hb_network_connection logs, the hunt only flags rare binaries without confirming C2 activity, which increases the false positive rate. Additionally, without TLS inspection for hb_http_activity, an analyst identifies connections to Discord webhooks but cannot confirm exactly which credentials or files the adversary exfiltrated.
In this series
Steps
-
Execution from temporary and default user paths
Query · scopingIdentify processes launching from %TEMP% or C:\Users\Default which are the primary execution stages for this malware bundle.
reads hb_process_activitysqlSELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_path, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\temp\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\users\default\%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. A list of processes running from user-writable paths. Most will be legitimate installers, which the prevalence step will filter.
-
Prevalence of binaries in temporary paths
Query · baselineFilter the lead results by identifying binaries that are rare across the fleet, suggesting they are malware variants rather than enterprise software.
reads hb_process_activitysqlSELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\temp\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\users\default\%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY path HAVING host_count <= 3What a hit looks like. A stack-counted list of binaries; paths seen on 3 or fewer hosts are the primary indicators of opportunistic malware.
-
Malicious C2 and ngrok network activity
Query · detection candidateMatch host connections to the reported RAT infrastructure and identify potential Discord data exfiltration.
reads hb_network_connectionsqlSELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_hostname, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (instr(',' || '{{c2_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(dst_endpoint_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. Outbound connections to AWS, ngrok, or Discord hosts. Silence proves absence only for the specified indicators.
-
Triage binary and network evidence
Agent triageWeigh process rarity against network signals.
-
Route on verdict
DecisionDirect action based on agent analysis.
-
Isolate host and preserve evidence
Response actionContain the threat and prevent further exfiltration.
-
Analyst review and exfiltration check
Analyst taskExamine the scope of stolen credentials and confirm initial infection source.
-
Close out
Analyst taskDocument the hunt result.
Coverage
Scenario coverage
| Stage | Covered | How, or why not |
|---|---|---|
| RAT Command and Control with Tunneling T1090.003 · T1572 |
Yes | suspicious-path-execution, binary-rarity-baseline, c2-network-activity |
| Infostealer Collection and Exfiltration T1555 · T1115 |
Yes | suspicious-path-execution, c2-network-activity |
| Initial Access via SEO Poisoning T1190 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware' series. |
| Fake Installer Execution and Staging | Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware' series. |
| Wiper Impact and Recovery Inhibition T1486 · T1490 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware' series. |
Blind spots
- Needs hb_network_connection from all endpoints. A host without network logging will only be flagged based on binary rarity, which is a lower confidence signal without network correlation. It would answer whether the host communicated with the C2 servers.
- Needs hb_http_activity with full URL/Payload inspection. Without TLS inspection, the analyst can see the connection to Discord but cannot confirm the nature of the exfiltrated data. It would answer what specific credentials were sent to Discord webhooks.
Parameters & data
Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
c2_domains | list[domain] | 7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io, a0700877.xsph.ru, discord.com | C2 domains and hostnames observed in the malware traffic. |
c2_ips | list[ip] | 35.157.111.131, 3.68.56.232, 3.67.15.169, 141.8.197.42 | C2 IP addresses for NJRAT and DCRAT identified in the report. |
lookback_days | number | 14 | Days of history to examine. |
scope_hosts | list[host] | — | Optional list of hostnames to focus the hunt; leave empty for fleet-wide. |
Telemetry
| Source | Category | Telemetry |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) | endpoint | endpoint |
| Network telemetry | network | network |
Source
---
analysis: This hunt combines behavioral path execution, stack-counted prevalence,
and network indicator matching to find variants that a static hash-based rule would
miss.
blind_spots:
- id: missing-network-telemetry
question: whether the host communicated with the C2 servers
requires: hb_network_connection from all endpoints
risk: A host without network logging will only be flagged based on binary rarity,
which is a lower confidence signal without network correlation.
stage: rat-c2-and-tunneling
- id: tls-inspection-gap
question: what specific credentials were sent to Discord webhooks
requires: hb_http_activity with full URL/Payload inspection
risk: Without TLS inspection, the analyst can see the connection to Discord but
cannot confirm the nature of the exfiltrated data.
stage: infostealer-credential-theft
coverage:
- stage: rat-c2-and-tunneling
status: covered
steps:
- suspicious-path-execution
- binary-rarity-baseline
- c2-network-activity
- stage: infostealer-credential-theft
status: covered
steps:
- suspicious-path-execution
- c2-network-activity
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware'
series.
stage: initial-access-seo-poisoning
status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware'
series.
stage: fake-installer-deployment
status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware'
series.
stage: wiper-impact-and-recovery-inhibition
status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
claims: no_unsupported
evidence: citation_required
missing_data: not_benign
telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
applicability: campaign-specific
handoff: keep-as-periodic-hunt
justification: The use of 'leaked' software hype to distribute multifunctional malware
is a persistent threat to corporate identity; confirming the absence of these
RATs protects the enterprise fleet.
methodology: model-assisted
trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An adversary is leveraging Grand Theft Auto VI hype to deploy RATs and
infostealers that use ngrok tunnels for command and control and Discord for credential
exfiltration.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1090.003
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1115
- attack.t1071.001
name: 'GTA 6 Hype: RAT C2 and Data Theft'
parameters:
c2_domains:
default:
- 7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io
- a0700877.xsph.ru
- discord.com
description: C2 domains and hostnames observed in the malware traffic.
from:
kind: article
observed: '2026-09-09'
ref: huntress-gta6
type: list[domain]
c2_ips:
default:
- 35.157.111.131
- 3.68.56.232
- 3.67.15.169
- 141.8.197.42
description: C2 IP addresses for NJRAT and DCRAT identified in the report.
from:
kind: article
observed: '2026-09-09'
ref: huntress-gta6
type: list[ip]
lookback_days:
default: '14'
description: Days of history to examine.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2026-09-09'
ref: standard-retention
type: number
scope_hosts:
default: []
description: Optional list of hostnames to focus the hunt; leave empty for fleet-wide.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2026-09-09'
ref: analyst-scoping
type: list[host]
provenance:
authors:
- name: Huntbase hunt generation
org: huntbase.io
generated:
by: huntbase-hunt-generation
from: https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-gta6-download-malware-analysis
gates:
- dry-run
- lint
model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Start with end-user workstations where users are most likely to search
for game leaks. Focus on the last 14 days following any high-profile game announcements.
references:
- name: "Huntress \u2014 Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware"
url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-gta6-download-malware-analysis
related:
- hunt: gta6-hype-wiper-logic
reason: This hunt focuses on C2 and exfiltration; the wiper functionality (encryption
and Shadow Copy deletion) is a distinct behavioral phase.
relation: out-of-scope-alternative
- hunt: gta6-malicious-installer-wiper-activity
relation: follows
scenario:
stages:
- name: Initial Access via SEO Poisoning
observables:
- gta6installer.exe
- https://clck.ru/34uJnp
- Large ISO files masquerading as GTA6
slug: initial-access-seo-poisoning
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1190
- name: Fake Installer Execution and Staging
observables:
- '%TEMP%\checkinternetconnection.bat'
- '%TEMP%\find.vbs'
- '%TEMP%\licensechecker.exe'
- '%TEMP%\rockstar.exe'
- '%TEMP%\steam.exe'
- '%TEMP%\rockstargames.exe'
- '%TEMP%\YandexPackLoader.exe'
- C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
- WScript.exe find.vbs
slug: fake-installer-deployment
tactic: execution
- name: RAT Command and Control with Tunneling
observables:
- 7.tcp.eu.ngrok.io:12684
- 35.157.111.131
- 3.68.56.232
- 3.67.15.169
- a0700877.xsph.ru
- 141.8.197.42
- any.ran.exe
- UserOOBEBroker.exe
slug: rat-c2-and-tunneling
tactic: command-and-control
techniques:
- T1090.003
- T1572
- name: Infostealer Collection and Exfiltration
observables:
- adminapp.exe
- Mercurial Grabber
- https://discord.com/api/webhooks/995445114254139543/NmpxQmuBCD6sm3UkVvupGtx-Y0M_A86oJHp00O-l8F4jakfVhqFXzMBoy1uBDdj2rBLc
slug: infostealer-credential-theft
tactic: credential-access
techniques:
- T1555
- T1115
- name: Wiper Impact and Recovery Inhibition
observables:
- gta6.exe
- '%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\svchost.exe'
- vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
- bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No
- read_it.txt
- YOU HAVE BEEN HACKED BY THE ASHA HACKER TEAM!
slug: wiper-impact-and-recovery-inhibition
tactic: impact
techniques:
- T1486
- T1490
summary: Threat actors are exploiting Grand Theft Auto VI hype by distributing malicious
ISO files via SEO poisoning and gaming forums. The infection chain uses a fake
installer to deploy a variety of malware including NJRAT, DCRAT, Mercurial Grabber,
and Chaos ransomware, which acts as a wiper to destroy user data while inhibiting
system recovery.
series:
index: 2
slug: grand-theft-auto-vi-hype-leads-to-malware
title: Grand Theft Auto VI hype leads to malware
total: 2
severity: high
targets:
analyst:
name: Tier-2 analyst
role: analyst
endpoint:
category: endpoint
name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
telemetry:
- endpoint
hunter:
agent: true
name: Hunt agent
network:
category: network
name: Network telemetry
telemetry:
- network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---
# GTA 6 Hype: RAT C2 and Data Theft
This hunt identifies post-infection activity from fake GTA 6 installers by targeting the C2 and exfiltration phases. It looks for processes running from temporary paths that communicate with known malicious infrastructure or Discord webhooks. The hunt uses fleet-wide prevalence to isolate unique malware binaries from legitimate installer noise.
## suspicious-path-execution
<!-- Execution from temporary and default user paths -->
Identify processes launching from %TEMP% or C:\Users\Default which are the primary execution stages for this malware bundle.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: A list of processes running from user-writable paths. Most will be legitimate
installers, which the prevalence step will filter.
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_name
- process_path
- process_cmd_line
- user_name
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_process_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-09-20'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_path, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\temp\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\users\default\%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## corroborate-behavior
<!-- Corroborate with rarity and network signals -->
parallel:
- → binary-rarity-baseline
- → c2-network-activity
join: → triage-evidence
## binary-rarity-baseline
<!-- Prevalence of binaries in temporary paths -->
Filter the lead results by identifying binaries that are rare across the fleet, suggesting they are malware variants rather than enterprise software.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
baseline:
compare: first_seen
window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: A stack-counted list of binaries; paths seen on 3 or fewer hosts are the
primary indicators of opportunistic malware.
prevalence:
by: device_hostname
key:
- process_path
rare_below: 3
reads:
- process_path
- device_hostname
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_process_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-09-20'
~~~
SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\temp\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\users\default\%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY path HAVING host_count <= 3
```
## c2-network-activity
<!-- Malicious C2 and ngrok network activity -->
Match host connections to the reported RAT infrastructure and identify potential Discord data exfiltration.
```sqlite target=network role=detection-candidate params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts, c2_ips=c2_ips, c2_domains=c2_domains)
~~~yaml
expected: Outbound connections to AWS, ngrok, or Discord hosts. Silence proves absence
only for the specified indicators.
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_name
- dst_endpoint_ip
- dst_endpoint_hostname
- dst_endpoint_port
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-09-20'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_hostname, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (instr(',' || '{{c2_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(dst_endpoint_hostname) || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## triage-evidence
<!-- Triage binary and network evidence -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- suspicious-path-execution
- binary-rarity-baseline
- c2-network-activity
max_iterations: 5
objective: Identify high-confidence compromises by finding rare binaries in temporary
directories that are responsible for the detected C2 or Discord traffic.
success_criteria: A verdict of malicious or suspicious per host, citing specific rare
binaries and their associated network activity.
tools:
- endpoint
- network
```
## route-on-verdict
<!-- Route on verdict -->
if~: "the triage verdict confirms a rare binary is communicating with malicious infrastructure" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → contain-host
indeterminate: → analyst-manual-review
unavailable: → analyst-manual-review (blind_spot: missing-network-telemetry)
else: → close-out
## contain-host
<!-- Isolate host and preserve evidence -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the host from the network immediately to prevent further exfiltration. Preserve the identified rare binary for reverse engineering and forensic analysis.
```
→ analyst-manual-review
## analyst-manual-review
<!-- Analyst review and exfiltration check -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the host's activity leading up to the infection. Check hb_http_activity for specific Discord webhook paths used and confirm whether tokens or passwords were exfiltrated. Update the c2_domains parameter if new infrastructure is discovered.
```
→ end
## close-out
<!-- Close out -->
```manual target=analyst
Document the absence of the GTA 6 malware bundle. Record any benign temporary installers that were stack-counted for future exclusion lists.
```
→ end
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Machine-drafted by huntbase-hunt-generation using hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview, gated by dry-run, lint, then reviewed by a person.