{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "The rise in ransomware activity by actors like Qilin using AI-driven automation requires proactive hunting for activator tools and destructive scripting. This hunt ensures that internal hosts are monitored for the 'cyber-vegetables' of intrusion even if perimeter defenses are bypassed."
      },
      "name": "Host Intrusion and Destructive Impact",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1562",
        "attack.t1059",
        "attack.t1486"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "Should you care about an \u201cAI slowdown?\u201d",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "external-remote-service-auditing",
          "reason": "Initial access via VPN or Citrix belongs to the companion hunt focused on external remote services.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "remote-access-abuse-red-team-implants",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single rule flags a known hash; this hunt pivots from the presence of activator tools to verify if the same host executes destructive scripts and modifies files at ransomware-scale. It identifies the intent (encryption) and the tool (activator) together, which a standard rule cannot correlate across surfaces.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "persistence-and-defense-evasion-patchers",
          "steps": [
            "patcher-tool-execution"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-ai-generated-scripts",
          "steps": [
            "suspicious-script-activity"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "impact-double-extortion-ransomware",
          "steps": [
            "high-volume-file-encryption"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-external-remote-services",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201cAI slowdown?\u201d' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-red-team-tooling",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201cAI slowdown?\u201d' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "VPN Access and Credential Abuse",
            "slug": "initial-access-external-remote-services",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1133"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "External-facing VPN services",
              "Administrative account logins",
              "Sign-ins without multi-factor authentication (MFA)"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "AdaptixC2 Command and Control",
            "slug": "c2-red-team-tooling",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "AdaptixC2 framework",
              "VID001.exe",
              "WCInstaller_NonAdmin.exe",
              "w32.9f1f11a708-100.sbx.tg",
              "w32.c4dd71e347-95.sbx.tg"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "System Patching and Bypass Tools",
            "slug": "persistence-and-defense-evasion-patchers",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1562"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "SECOH-QAD.exe",
              "AAct.exe",
              "win.tool.procpatcher",
              "w32.fed979f93b-95.sbx.tg"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "AI-Driven Destructive Scripting",
            "slug": "execution-ai-generated-scripts",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "content.js",
              "w32.38d053135d-95.sbx.tg",
              "LLM-generated destructive scripts"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Data Encryption and Double Extortion",
            "slug": "impact-double-extortion-ransomware",
            "tactic": "impact",
            "techniques": [
              "T1486"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Encryption of local and remote drives",
              "Attempts to disable backup systems",
              "Double-extortion communications"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "The Qilin and The Gentlemen ransomware groups are targeting Japanese SMEs using a combination of AI-generated destructive scripts and the AdaptixC2 red-teaming framework. Initial access is typically gained via external remote services like VPNs, leading to lateral movement, data theft, and double-extortion ransomware attacks."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Focus on endpoints where users might have administrative rights or where legacy business applications are hosted, as these are primary targets for 'The Gentlemen' and Qilin actors. Use the first step to identify specific hosts and then paste them into the scope_hosts parameter.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An adversary has bypassed local security controls using system patchers and is executing AI-generated scripts to perform mass file encryption for ransomware extortion.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hosts identified in the first step; paste hostnames here to scope the subsequent queries."
        },
        "script_names": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "talos-ai-slowdown",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-09-17"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "content.js"
          ],
          "description": "Filenames of suspicious scripts identified in the research."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "patcher_names": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "talos-ai-slowdown",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-09-17"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "aact.exe",
            "secoh-qad.exe",
            "kmsauto.exe"
          ],
          "description": "Original file names for known activator tools used to evade licensing/security."
        },
        "patcher_hashes": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "talos-ai-slowdown",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-09-17"
          },
          "type": "list[hash]",
          "default": [
            "9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f",
            "fed979f93bcaf4e73ebd25748093a92095d5109cbd01d55f97bdc50ce509ad2f"
          ],
          "description": "Hashes for known bypass tools and system patchers (e.g., SECOH-QAD.exe, AAct.exe)."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown/",
          "name": "Cisco Talos \u2014 Should you care about an AI slowdown?"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "incomplete-file-telemetry",
          "risk": "If the sensor does not capture SMB activity at the file level for remote drives, we will miss encryption occurring on shared storage.",
          "stage": "impact-double-extortion-ransomware",
          "question": "Can we see file renames on all network shares?",
          "requires": "hb_file_activity with rename/update coverage"
        },
        {
          "id": "obfuscated-scripts",
          "risk": "Adversaries use AI to generate scripts that often include multi-stage obfuscation; if the agent only sees the first stage, it may misjudge the intent.",
          "stage": "execution-ai-generated-scripts",
          "question": "Does the script content capture de-obfuscated AI code?",
          "requires": "hb_script_activity with full block content"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Host Intrusion and Destructive Impact",
    "description": "This hunt identifies host intrusion by finding bypass tools and destructive scripting. It searches for activator tools like SECOH-QAD.exe that adversaries use to evade detection and license validation. The hunt then evaluates script execution and high-volume file touches specifically on the affected hosts to confirm ransomware impact. An agent weighs the correlation between these bypass tools, script content, and encryption behavior to settle on a verdict."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "Should you care about an \u201cAI slowdown?\u201d",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "persistence-and-defense-evasion-patchers",
            "steps": [
              "patcher-tool-execution"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-ai-generated-scripts",
            "steps": [
              "suspicious-script-activity"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "impact-double-extortion-ransomware",
            "steps": [
              "high-volume-file-encryption"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-external-remote-services",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201cAI slowdown?\u201d' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-red-team-tooling",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201cAI slowdown?\u201d' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An adversary has bypassed local security controls using system patchers and is executing AI-generated scripts to perform mass file encryption for ransomware extortion.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "incomplete-file-telemetry",
            "risk": "If the sensor does not capture SMB activity at the file level for remote drives, we will miss encryption occurring on shared storage.",
            "stage": "impact-double-extortion-ransomware",
            "question": "Can we see file renames on all network shares?",
            "requires": "hb_file_activity with rename/update coverage"
          },
          {
            "id": "obfuscated-scripts",
            "risk": "Adversaries use AI to generate scripts that often include multi-stage obfuscation; if the agent only sees the first stage, it may misjudge the intent.",
            "stage": "execution-ai-generated-scripts",
            "question": "Does the script content capture de-obfuscated AI code?",
            "requires": "hb_script_activity with full block content"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus on endpoints where users might have administrative rights or where legacy business applications are hosted, as these are primary targets for 'The Gentlemen' and Qilin actors. Use the first step to identify specific hosts and then paste them into the scope_hosts parameter.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single rule flags a known hash; this hunt pivots from the presence of activator tools to verify if the same host executes destructive scripts and modifies files at ransomware-scale. It identifies the intent (encryption) and the tool (activator) together, which a standard rule cannot correlate across surfaces."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "patcher-tool-execution",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Execution of Defense Evasion Patchers",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_path, process_hash_sha256, process_original_file_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{patcher_hashes}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_hash_sha256) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{patcher_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_original_file_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\kmsauto\\\\%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify hosts running known activator or patching tools used to suppress security alerts or bypass licensing via hash, original filename, or path.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows identify specific hosts running known bypass tools. Silence suggests no known malicious patcher behavior occurred in the timeframe."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Execution of Defense Evasion Patchers",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_path",
          "process_hash_sha256",
          "process_original_file_name",
          "user_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_path, process_hash_sha256, process_original_file_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{patcher_hashes}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_hash_sha256) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{patcher_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_original_file_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\kmsauto\\\\%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows identify specific hosts running known bypass tools. Silence suggests no known malicious patcher behavior occurred in the timeframe.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-09-28"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "suspicious-script-activity",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Suspicious Script Execution",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_type, actor_user_name, time, script_content FROM hb_script_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (instr(',' || '{{script_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(script_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%encrypt%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%delete%shadow%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_script_activity",
        "description": "Locate destructive script execution by name or content keywords, restricted to the hosts found in the scoping step.",
        "expected_signal": "Script names from the report or scripts containing destructive keywords on scoped hosts. High signal when found on hosts running activator tools."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "patcher-tool-execution"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Suspicious Script Execution",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "script_name",
          "script_type",
          "actor_user_name",
          "time",
          "script_content"
        ],
        "source": "hb_script_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_type, actor_user_name, time, script_content FROM hb_script_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (instr(',' || '{{script_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(script_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%encrypt%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%delete%shadow%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Script names from the report or scripts containing destructive keywords on scoped hosts. High signal when found on hosts running activator tools.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-09-28"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "high-volume-file-encryption",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "High-Volume File Encryption Lead",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, COUNT(*) as file_touches, MIN(time) as first_touch, MAX(time) as last_touch FROM hb_file_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND activity_id IN (3, 5) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, process_name HAVING file_touches > 500 ORDER BY file_touches DESC",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Detect mass file modification or renaming characteristic of ransomware impact on the scoped hosts.",
        "expected_signal": "Processes touching more than 500 files on scoped hosts within the window. Validates ransomware behavior."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "patcher-tool-execution"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "High-Volume File Encryption Lead",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "time",
          "activity_id"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, COUNT(*) as file_touches, MIN(time) as first_touch, MAX(time) as last_touch FROM hb_file_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND activity_id IN (3, 5) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, process_name HAVING file_touches > 500 ORDER BY file_touches DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Processes touching more than 500 files on scoped hosts within the window. Validates ransomware behavior.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "process_name"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-09-28"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "agent-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Weigh Intrusion and Impact Evidence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "patcher-tool-execution",
          "suspicious-script-activity",
          "high-volume-file-encryption"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any host shows evidence of an active ransomware intrusion based on activator tool use and destructive scripts or file activity.",
        "description": "Evaluate whether the combination of patcher execution, script activity, and mass file changes indicates a successful ransomware attack.",
        "max_iterations": 4,
        "expected_signal": "A detailed verdict per host citing the correlation between bypass tools and temporal impact events.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign with cited rows."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "suspicious-script-activity",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "high-volume-file-encryption",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "decide-on-containment",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Containment Route",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host and includes evidence of mass file encryption",
        "condition": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host and includes evidence of mass file encryption",
        "blind_spot": "incomplete-file-telemetry",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route malicious findings to automated containment and others to analyst review.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "agent-triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-infected-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate Infected Host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Stop the spread of ransomware encryption.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the identified host to prevent further data encryption or lateral movement. Revoke the credentials of the user involved.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decide-on-containment",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "manual-investigation",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Manual Analyst Review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the agent verdict and assess the extent of data loss.",
        "instructions": "Review the script content and file activity cited by the agent. Check for common ransomware extensions in the file activity rows. Determine if the script successfully disabled backups."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decide-on-containment",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "decide-on-containment",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-infected-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out-hunt",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close Out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Finalize findings and record tuning notes for detection engineering.",
        "instructions": "Document the hosts examined. If no malicious activity was found, record the absence of patcher tools as a successful hygiene check. Suggest new detection rules for the identified bypass hashes and behavioral original file names."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decide-on-containment",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "manual-investigation"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}