--- analysis: A single rule flags a known hash; this hunt pivots from the presence of activator tools to verify if the same host executes destructive scripts and modifies files at ransomware-scale. It identifies the intent (encryption) and the tool (activator) together, which a standard rule cannot correlate across surfaces. blind_spots: - id: incomplete-file-telemetry question: Can we see file renames on all network shares? requires: hb_file_activity with rename/update coverage risk: If the sensor does not capture SMB activity at the file level for remote drives, we will miss encryption occurring on shared storage. stage: impact-double-extortion-ransomware - id: obfuscated-scripts question: Does the script content capture de-obfuscated AI code? requires: hb_script_activity with full block content risk: Adversaries use AI to generate scripts that often include multi-stage obfuscation; if the agent only sees the first stage, it may misjudge the intent. stage: execution-ai-generated-scripts coverage: - stage: persistence-and-defense-evasion-patchers status: covered steps: - patcher-tool-execution - stage: execution-ai-generated-scripts status: covered steps: - suspicious-script-activity - stage: impact-double-extortion-ransomware status: covered steps: - high-volume-file-encryption - reason: "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201CAI slowdown?\u201D\ ' series." stage: initial-access-external-remote-services status: out_of_scope - reason: "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201CAI slowdown?\u201D\ ' series." stage: c2-red-team-tooling status: out_of_scope guardrails: claims: no_unsupported evidence: citation_required missing_data: not_benign telemetry: untrusted hunt: applicability: campaign-specific handoff: keep-as-periodic-hunt justification: The rise in ransomware activity by actors like Qilin using AI-driven automation requires proactive hunting for activator tools and destructive scripting. This hunt ensures that internal hosts are monitored for the 'cyber-vegetables' of intrusion even if perimeter defenses are bypassed. methodology: model-assisted trigger: intel-report hypothesis: An adversary has bypassed local security controls using system patchers and is executing AI-generated scripts to perform mass file encryption for ransomware extortion. labels: - hunt - attack.t1562 - attack.t1059 - attack.t1486 name: Host Intrusion and Destructive Impact parameters: lookback_days: default: '14' description: Days of history to examine. type: number patcher_hashes: default: - 9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f - fed979f93bcaf4e73ebd25748093a92095d5109cbd01d55f97bdc50ce509ad2f description: Hashes for known bypass tools and system patchers (e.g., SECOH-QAD.exe, AAct.exe). from: kind: article observed: '2026-09-17' ref: talos-ai-slowdown type: list[hash] patcher_names: default: - aact.exe - secoh-qad.exe - kmsauto.exe description: Original file names for known activator tools used to evade licensing/security. from: kind: article observed: '2026-09-17' ref: talos-ai-slowdown type: list[string] scope_hosts: default: [] description: Hosts identified in the first step; paste hostnames here to scope the subsequent queries. type: list[host] script_names: default: - content.js description: Filenames of suspicious scripts identified in the research. from: kind: article observed: '2026-09-17' ref: talos-ai-slowdown type: list[string] provenance: authors: - name: Huntbase hunt generation org: huntbase.io generated: by: huntbase-hunt-generation from: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown/ gates: - dry-run - lint model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview rationale: Focus on endpoints where users might have administrative rights or where legacy business applications are hosted, as these are primary targets for 'The Gentlemen' and Qilin actors. Use the first step to identify specific hosts and then paste them into the scope_hosts parameter. references: - name: "Cisco Talos \u2014 Should you care about an AI slowdown?" url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown/ related: - hunt: external-remote-service-auditing reason: Initial access via VPN or Citrix belongs to the companion hunt focused on external remote services. relation: out-of-scope-alternative - hunt: remote-access-abuse-red-team-implants relation: follows scenario: stages: - name: VPN Access and Credential Abuse observables: - External-facing VPN services - Administrative account logins - Sign-ins without multi-factor authentication (MFA) slug: initial-access-external-remote-services tactic: initial-access techniques: - T1133 - name: AdaptixC2 Command and Control observables: - AdaptixC2 framework - VID001.exe - WCInstaller_NonAdmin.exe - w32.9f1f11a708-100.sbx.tg - w32.c4dd71e347-95.sbx.tg slug: c2-red-team-tooling tactic: command-and-control techniques: - T1071 - name: System Patching and Bypass Tools observables: - SECOH-QAD.exe - AAct.exe - win.tool.procpatcher - w32.fed979f93b-95.sbx.tg slug: persistence-and-defense-evasion-patchers tactic: persistence techniques: - T1562 - name: AI-Driven Destructive Scripting observables: - content.js - w32.38d053135d-95.sbx.tg - LLM-generated destructive scripts slug: execution-ai-generated-scripts tactic: execution techniques: - T1059 - name: Data Encryption and Double Extortion observables: - Encryption of local and remote drives - Attempts to disable backup systems - Double-extortion communications slug: impact-double-extortion-ransomware tactic: impact techniques: - T1486 summary: The Qilin and The Gentlemen ransomware groups are targeting Japanese SMEs using a combination of AI-generated destructive scripts and the AdaptixC2 red-teaming framework. Initial access is typically gained via external remote services like VPNs, leading to lateral movement, data theft, and double-extortion ransomware attacks. series: index: 2 slug: should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown title: "Should you care about an \u201CAI slowdown?\u201D" total: 2 severity: high targets: analyst: name: Tier-2 analyst role: analyst endpoint: category: endpoint name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) telemetry: - endpoint hunter: agent: true name: Hunt agent tlp: clear type: investigation --- # Host Intrusion and Destructive Impact This hunt identifies host intrusion by finding bypass tools and destructive scripting. It searches for activator tools like SECOH-QAD.exe that adversaries use to evade detection and license validation. The hunt then evaluates script execution and high-volume file touches specifically on the affected hosts to confirm ransomware impact. An agent weighs the correlation between these bypass tools, script content, and encryption behavior to settle on a verdict. ## patcher-tool-execution Identify hosts running known activator or patching tools used to suppress security alerts or bypass licensing via hash, original filename, or path. ```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping params=(patcher_hashes=patcher_hashes, patcher_names=patcher_names, lookback_days=lookback_days) ~~~yaml expected: Rows identify specific hosts running known bypass tools. Silence suggests no known malicious patcher behavior occurred in the timeframe. reads: - device_hostname - process_name - process_path - process_hash_sha256 - process_original_file_name - user_name - time silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_process_activity verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-09-28' ~~~ SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_path, process_hash_sha256, process_original_file_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{patcher_hashes}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_hash_sha256) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || '{{patcher_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_original_file_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\kmsauto\\%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ``` ## fan-out-corroboration parallel: - → suspicious-script-activity - → high-volume-file-encryption join: → agent-triage ## suspicious-script-activity Locate destructive script execution by name or content keywords, restricted to the hosts found in the scoping step. ```sqlite target=endpoint role=enrichment params=(script_names=script_names, scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days) ~~~yaml expected: Script names from the report or scripts containing destructive keywords on scoped hosts. High signal when found on hosts running activator tools. reads: - device_hostname - script_name - script_type - actor_user_name - time - script_content silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_script_activity verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-09-28' ~~~ SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_type, actor_user_name, time, script_content FROM hb_script_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (instr(',' || '{{script_names}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(script_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%encrypt%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%delete%shadow%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ``` ## high-volume-file-encryption Detect mass file modification or renaming characteristic of ransomware impact on the scoped hosts. ```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days) ~~~yaml baseline: compare: first_seen window: '{{lookback_days}}d' expected: Processes touching more than 500 files on scoped hosts within the window. Validates ransomware behavior. prevalence: by: device_hostname key: - process_name rare_below: 3 reads: - device_hostname - process_name - time - activity_id silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_file_activity verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-09-28' ~~~ SELECT device_hostname, process_name, COUNT(*) as file_touches, MIN(time) as first_touch, MAX(time) as last_touch FROM hb_file_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND activity_id IN (3, 5) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, process_name HAVING file_touches > 500 ORDER BY file_touches DESC ``` ## agent-triage ```agent target=hunter cite: required context: - patcher-tool-execution - suspicious-script-activity - high-volume-file-encryption max_iterations: 4 objective: Determine if any host shows evidence of an active ransomware intrusion based on activator tool use and destructive scripts or file activity. success_criteria: A per-host verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign with cited rows. tools: - endpoint ``` ## decide-on-containment if~: "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host and includes evidence of mass file encryption" (confidence: high, judge=hunter) then: → isolate-infected-host indeterminate: → manual-investigation unavailable: → manual-investigation (blind_spot: incomplete-file-telemetry) else: → close-out-hunt ## isolate-infected-host ```action target=endpoint ~~~yaml approval: required ~~~ Isolate the identified host to prevent further data encryption or lateral movement. Revoke the credentials of the user involved. ``` → manual-investigation ## manual-investigation ```manual target=analyst Review the script content and file activity cited by the agent. Check for common ransomware extensions in the file activity rows. Determine if the script successfully disabled backups. ``` → close-out-hunt ## close-out-hunt ```manual target=analyst Document the hosts examined. If no malicious activity was found, record the absence of patcher tools as a successful hygiene check. Suggest new detection rules for the identified bypass hashes and behavioral original file names. ``` → end