{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "The exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 provides an immediate foothold that leads to identity theft and high-value data exfiltration. Because attackers are known to pivot from application servers to cloud resources using service accounts, a negative result across both endpoint and cloud surfaces is required to confirm that the intrusion has not progressed to the data exfiltration stage."
      },
      "name": "Identity Pivot and Cloud Resource Access following Axis RCE",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1087.002",
        "attack.t1558.004",
        "attack.t1537",
        "attack.t1078.004",
        "discovery",
        "execution",
        "exfiltration",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "confluence-axis-rce-initial-execution",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on the lateral movement and exfiltration that follows the initial RCE on the application server.",
          "relation": "follows"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "axis-rce-confluence-credential-harvesting",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A static detection rule might catch 'GetNPUsers.py', but this hunt uses stack-counting to identify rare enumeration scripts on vulnerable servers and then pivots into cloud API activity to correlate that activity with sensitive data access. This context allows an analyst to distinguish between a developer testing a script and an active intruder exfiltrating data.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
          "steps": [
            "rare-identity-enumeration-tools"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
          "steps": [
            "suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "discovery-credential-harvesting",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Unauthenticated Axis SOAP RCE",
            "slug": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "POST /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2",
              "HTTP 500 Internal Server Error",
              "CVE-2026-90436"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Automated shell execution and tunneling",
            "slug": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.004",
              "T1105",
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "confluence service account",
              "Java process launching bash and curl",
              "hex-encoded shell commands",
              "trycloudflare.com",
              "free.pinggy.net",
              "webhook.site",
              "wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy.net",
              "sequential task IDs",
              "labeled delimiters in command output"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Confluence data and credential harvesting",
            "slug": "discovery-credential-harvesting",
            "tactic": "discovery",
            "techniques": [
              "T1083",
              "T1552.001",
              "T1213"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/attachments/v4/",
              "MySQL authentication using Confluence credentials",
              "parsing Office documents for credentials",
              "Luhn checks for payment card numbers",
              "searching for 'VPN', 'token', 'encryption keys'"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Identity service enumeration and AS-REP roasting",
            "slug": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1087.002",
              "T1558.004"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Atlassian Crowd API queries",
              "Impacket GetNPUsers.py against Domain Controller",
              "AS-REP roasting"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Cloud data warehouse and M365 access",
            "slug": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
            "tactic": "exfiltration",
            "techniques": [
              "T1537",
              "T1078.004"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Production cloud data warehouse queries",
              "M365 sign-in via legacy authentication",
              "IP 192.238.253.176"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Attackers exploit a critical unauthenticated RCE in Apache Axis (CVE-2026-90436) affecting Atlassian Confluence and N-able N-central to gain initial footprints. Using AI-assisted automation, they harvest credentials from local databases and file attachments before pivoting to internal identity services and production cloud environments."
      },
      "severity": "critical",
      "rationale": "Begin by identifying all hosts specifically detected as vulnerable to CVE-2026-90436. Focus the hunt on these hosts and any service accounts they use for database or cloud integration.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has pivoted from a compromised application server to internal identity services for AS-REP roasting and accessed cloud data warehouses using stolen service account credentials.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Optional: Specific hosts identified as vulnerable in the scoping step."
        },
        "attacker_ips": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Rapid7 CVE-2026-90436",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-17"
          },
          "type": "list[ip]",
          "default": [
            "192.238.253.176",
            "5.133.47.243",
            "163.182.68.109",
            "104.13.106.166",
            "157.20.241.16",
            "139.99.69.109",
            "79.76.51.56"
          ],
          "description": "Observed attacker IP addresses associated with the intrusion."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "impacket_strings": {
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "GetNPUsers.py",
            "GetADUsers.py",
            "secretsdump.py",
            "psexec.py",
            "GetUserSPNs.py"
          ],
          "description": "Impacket tool filenames used for identity enumeration."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited",
          "name": "Rapid7 \u2014 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "cloud-api-visibility-gap",
          "risk": "While we see the API calls, the exact content of the queries or the rows returned might not be visible if the provider does not supply detailed payload logs to the management plane.",
          "owner": "Cloud Architecture Team",
          "stage": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
          "question": "Which specific data records were exfiltrated from the warehouse?",
          "requires": "Audit logging for specific data warehouse providers (Snowflake/BigQuery) integrated with hb_cloud_api_activity",
          "remediation": "Enable high-verbosity audit logging for all production data warehouses and stream to the central log repository."
        },
        {
          "id": "impacket-renaming",
          "risk": "If the attacker renames 'GetNPUsers.py' to a legitimate script name, the baseline step relies solely on command-line pattern matching, which can be bypassed if the script is run through a custom interpreter.",
          "owner": "Endpoint Security Admin",
          "stage": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
          "question": "Did the attacker rename the Impacket tools to bypass name-based detection?",
          "requires": "hb_process_activity with on-disk binary verification",
          "remediation": "Enable file hash auditing for all Python script executions on application servers."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Identity Pivot and Cloud Resource Access following Axis RCE",
    "description": "After gaining an initial foothold on Atlassian Confluence or N-able N-central servers, attackers are known to perform identity service enumeration using Impacket and then access cloud data warehouses using acquired integration credentials. This hunt identifies these pivots by finding rare enumeration tools on vulnerable hosts and corroborating them with anomalous cloud API calls and sign-ins from known attacker infrastructure. An agent weighs the endpoint and cloud telemetry together to determine if an intrusion has progressed to the data exfiltration stage."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
            "steps": [
              "rare-identity-enumeration-tools"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
            "steps": [
              "suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-axis-soap-rce",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-automated-shell-c2",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "discovery-credential-harvesting",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has pivoted from a compromised application server to internal identity services for AS-REP roasting and accessed cloud data warehouses using stolen service account credentials.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "cloud-api-visibility-gap",
            "risk": "While we see the API calls, the exact content of the queries or the rows returned might not be visible if the provider does not supply detailed payload logs to the management plane.",
            "owner": "Cloud Architecture Team",
            "stage": "exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access",
            "question": "Which specific data records were exfiltrated from the warehouse?",
            "requires": "Audit logging for specific data warehouse providers (Snowflake/BigQuery) integrated with hb_cloud_api_activity",
            "remediation": "Enable high-verbosity audit logging for all production data warehouses and stream to the central log repository."
          },
          {
            "id": "impacket-renaming",
            "risk": "If the attacker renames 'GetNPUsers.py' to a legitimate script name, the baseline step relies solely on command-line pattern matching, which can be bypassed if the script is run through a custom interpreter.",
            "owner": "Endpoint Security Admin",
            "stage": "lateral-movement-identity-pivot",
            "question": "Did the attacker rename the Impacket tools to bypass name-based detection?",
            "requires": "hb_process_activity with on-disk binary verification",
            "remediation": "Enable file hash auditing for all Python script executions on application servers."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Begin by identifying all hosts specifically detected as vulnerable to CVE-2026-90436. Focus the hunt on these hosts and any service accounts they use for database or cloud integration.",
        "beyond_detection": "A static detection rule might catch 'GetNPUsers.py', but this hunt uses stack-counting to identify rare enumeration scripts on vulnerable servers and then pivots into cloud API activity to correlate that activity with sensitive data access. This context allows an analyst to distinguish between a developer testing a script and an active intruder exfiltrating data."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "vulnerable-product-inventory",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Identify vulnerable Confluence and N-central hosts",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, title, severity, first_seen FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-90436' OR title LIKE '%Axis 1.x%'",
        "surface": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "description": "Identify hosts where the specific vulnerability CVE-2026-90436 has been detected to focus the investigation on the most likely targets.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of hosts specifically flagged with CVE-2026-90436. Zero rows means no scanner has identified the vulnerability yet."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Identify vulnerable Confluence and N-central hosts",
        "reads": [
          "device_uid",
          "title",
          "severity",
          "first_seen"
        ],
        "source": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, title, severity, first_seen FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-90436' OR title LIKE '%Axis 1.x%'",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of hosts specifically flagged with CVE-2026-90436. Zero rows means no scanner has identified the vulnerability yet.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-identity-enumeration-tools",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare identity enumeration tools",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_name) AS proc, process_cmd_line, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{impacket_strings}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_cmd_line) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%impacket%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%getnpusers%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY proc, process_cmd_line HAVING hosts < 5 ORDER BY hosts ASC",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify the use of Impacket or other identity enumeration tools; the actor uses these to find targets for lateral movement.",
        "expected_signal": "Rare command lines containing Impacket script names, particularly when running under a Python interpreter on the application servers."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vulnerable-product-inventory"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare identity enumeration tools",
        "reads": [
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "device_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_name) AS proc, process_cmd_line, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{impacket_strings}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_cmd_line) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%impacket%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%getnpusers%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY proc, process_cmd_line HAVING hosts < 5 ORDER BY hosts ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Rare command lines containing Impacket script names, particularly when running under a Python interpreter on the application servers.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "process_cmd_line"
          ],
          "rare_below": 5
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Suspicious cloud warehouse access",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT time, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, api_operation, api_service_name, resource_name FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%integration%' OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%service%') AND (LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%select%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%export%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%getobject%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%copyobject%') AND (LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%snowflake%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%bigquery%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%s3%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time DESC",
        "surface": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "description": "Filter for data-access and exfiltration-related calls to cloud warehouses originating from attacker infrastructure or service accounts.",
        "expected_signal": "Data access operations targeting cloud warehouses from reported attacker IPs or integration accounts that do not typically use these operations from the internet."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vulnerable-product-inventory"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Suspicious cloud warehouse access",
        "reads": [
          "time",
          "actor_user_name",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "api_operation",
          "api_service_name",
          "resource_name"
        ],
        "source": "hb_cloud_api_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT time, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, api_operation, api_service_name, resource_name FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%integration%' OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%service%') AND (LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%select%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%export%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%getobject%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%copyobject%') AND (LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%snowflake%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%bigquery%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%s3%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Data access operations targeting cloud warehouses from reported attacker IPs or integration accounts that do not typically use these operations from the internet.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "agent-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage identity and cloud evidence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "vulnerable-product-inventory",
          "rare-identity-enumeration-tools",
          "suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine whether the rare processes on vulnerable hosts and the cloud API calls from integration accounts or attacker IPs indicate a successful breach and data exfiltration.",
        "description": "Synthesize the findings from endpoint processes and cloud API activity to determine if a multi-stage pivot and exfiltration event occurred.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A synthesis of identity enumeration and cloud access that confirms the path of the intruder.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host and per-user verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign, citing specific rows for the pivot and the cloud access."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "rare-identity-enumeration-tools",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the agent-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host or service account",
        "condition": "the agent-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host or service account",
        "blind_spot": "cloud-api-visibility-gap",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route the investigation based on the agent's confidence and verdict.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "agent-triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-and-revoke",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate host and revoke credentials",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Neutralize the compromised beachhead and the stolen cloud account.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the compromised server, revoke all active sessions for the identified service account, and rotate its credentials immediately.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-manual-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst manual review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the agent's findings and assess the extent of the compromise.",
        "instructions": "Review the cited rows from both endpoint and cloud surfaces. Verify if other service accounts used by the vulnerable server have also been compromised."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-and-revoke"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "data-impact-assessment",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Data impact assessment",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Determine exactly what data was accessed in the cloud warehouse.",
        "instructions": "Coordinate with the data engineering team to review native audit logs for the impacted data warehouse (Snowflake/BigQuery) and identify the specific tables and rows accessed by the compromised credential."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "analyst-manual-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}