{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Ivanti appliances are critical perimeter assets frequently targeted by zero-day chains. With reports of UTA0576 bypassing standard integrity checks, a multi-surface behavioral hunt is required to ensure the integrity of the network edge."
      },
      "name": "Ivanti Appliance Exploitation and Persistence",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1059.006",
        "attack.t1068",
        "attack.t1070.002",
        "attack.t1071.001",
        "command and control",
        "defense evasion",
        "discovery",
        "execution",
        "initial access"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "discovery-ad-secrets",
          "reason": "Hunting for the theft of LAPS or BitLocker secrets from Active Directory requires examining Domain Controller logs, which is a separate identity-focused hunt.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "network": {
          "name": "Network telemetry",
          "category": "network",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "This hunt correlates edge exploit signals (HTTP headers) with follow-on appliance-internal activity (rare root processes and log deletion). A single rule cannot link these disparate telemetry sources into a unified attack chain narrative, especially when binaries are rare and paths rotate.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
          "steps": [
            "exploit-header-signals"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-root-payloads",
          "steps": [
            "rare-root-payloads"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "defense-evasion-selective-deletion",
          "steps": [
            "selective-log-deletion"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-external-comms",
          "steps": [
            "network-c2-connections"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "discovery-ad-secrets",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Web Application Exploitation",
            "slug": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi",
              "X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi",
              "X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/runtime/tmp/",
              "CVE-2026-104935",
              "CVE-2026-118527"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Root-Level Payload Execution",
            "slug": "execution-root-payloads",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.006",
              "T1068"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "ml.py",
              "rq5.py",
              "mk.py",
              "rr.py",
              "pu.txt",
              "sp_out.txt",
              "spray_hits.json",
              "dsstatmond",
              "ics-root-run-inband-*.pl",
              "CVE-2026-111357"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Defense Evasion and Log Tampering",
            "slug": "defense-evasion-selective-deletion",
            "tactic": "defense-evasion",
            "techniques": [
              "T1070.002"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog",
              "/var/log/audit/audit.log",
              "/data/.icscap/",
              "h.py"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Active Directory Secret Discovery",
            "slug": "discovery-ad-secrets",
            "tactic": "discovery",
            "techniques": [
              "T1087.002",
              "T1212"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Active Directory queries for Windows LAPS passwords",
              "Active Directory queries for BitLocker recovery keys"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Command and Control Traffic",
            "slug": "c2-external-comms",
            "tactic": "c2",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "108.165.147.64"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "The threat actor UTA0576 exploited a chain of three zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2026-104935, CVE-2026-111357, and CVE-2026-118527) to gain unauthenticated root access. After establishing a foothold, they deployed Python payloads to steal credentials and queried Active Directory for high-value targets including LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys."
      },
      "severity": "critical",
      "rationale": "Target all Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) appliances. Prioritize appliances running versions older than 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6 identified in the vulnerability scan data.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has exploited a zero-day vulnerability chain on an Ivanti Connect Secure appliance to gain root access, evidenced by X-DSCGI-PATH header anomalies followed by the execution of rare python payloads and selective log tampering.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "analyst-defined",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-02"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Optional list of hostnames to scope the hunt; leave empty for fleet-wide."
        },
        "target_cves": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Rapid7",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-02"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "CVE-2026-104935",
            "CVE-2026-111357",
            "CVE-2026-118527"
          ],
          "description": "Target CVE identifiers for the Ivanti exploit chain."
        },
        "attacker_ips": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Rapid7",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-02"
          },
          "type": "list[ip]",
          "default": [
            "108.165.147.64"
          ],
          "description": "Known attacker IP addresses from Volexity research."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "hunt-standard",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-11-02"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "malicious_payload_patterns": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Rapid7",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-02"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "ml.py",
            "rq5.py",
            "mk.py",
            "rr.py",
            "h.py"
          ],
          "description": "Known malicious filenames dropped by the threat actor."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
          "name": "Rapid7 \u2014 Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "appliance-telemetry-gap",
          "risk": "If the appliance does not export process-level telemetry, root payload execution will be invisible to this hunt.",
          "stage": "execution-root-payloads",
          "question": "Can we see internal process execution on the closed appliance?",
          "requires": "EDR or native Linux audit telemetry from the ICS appliance"
        },
        {
          "id": "header-logging-missing",
          "risk": "Many standard access log configurations omit custom headers; if the header is not captured, the primary exploit indicator is missed.",
          "stage": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
          "question": "Does the web server log the X-DSCGI-PATH header?",
          "requires": "hb_http_activity with custom header logging"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Ivanti Appliance Exploitation and Persistence",
    "description": "This hunt identifies the exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) appliances by tracking the UTA0576 attack chain. It follows a phased approach, first scoping the estate for vulnerable versions and then searching for initial access indicators in HTTP headers and network connections to known adversary infrastructure.\n\nIf early signals are present, the hunt pivots to examine root-level post-exploitation activity on the appliance itself. This includes searching for rare python scripts executed from temporary directories and identifying attempts to delete system audit and debug logs. This multi-surface correlation is designed to overcome the limitations of the vendor's integrity checker, which the actor is known to bypass."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
            "steps": [
              "exploit-header-signals"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-root-payloads",
            "steps": [
              "rare-root-payloads"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "defense-evasion-selective-deletion",
            "steps": [
              "selective-log-deletion"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-external-comms",
            "steps": [
              "network-c2-connections"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "discovery-ad-secrets",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has exploited a zero-day vulnerability chain on an Ivanti Connect Secure appliance to gain root access, evidenced by X-DSCGI-PATH header anomalies followed by the execution of rare python payloads and selective log tampering.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "appliance-telemetry-gap",
            "risk": "If the appliance does not export process-level telemetry, root payload execution will be invisible to this hunt.",
            "stage": "execution-root-payloads",
            "question": "Can we see internal process execution on the closed appliance?",
            "requires": "EDR or native Linux audit telemetry from the ICS appliance"
          },
          {
            "id": "header-logging-missing",
            "risk": "Many standard access log configurations omit custom headers; if the header is not captured, the primary exploit indicator is missed.",
            "stage": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
            "question": "Does the web server log the X-DSCGI-PATH header?",
            "requires": "hb_http_activity with custom header logging"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Target all Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) appliances. Prioritize appliances running versions older than 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6 identified in the vulnerability scan data.",
        "beyond_detection": "This hunt correlates edge exploit signals (HTTP headers) with follow-on appliance-internal activity (rare root processes and log deletion). A single rule cannot link these disparate telemetry sources into a unified attack chain narrative, especially when binaries are rare and paths rotate."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "identify-vulnerable-appliances",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Identify Vulnerable Ivanti Appliances",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT resource_uid, cve_uid, severity, status FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE instr(',' || '{{target_cves}}' || ',', ',' || cve_uid || ',') > 0 AND status != 'suppressed' ORDER BY severity_id DESC",
        "surface": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "description": "Scope the estate for appliances that remain vulnerable to the exploitation chain.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of resource UIDs representing Ivanti appliances still exposed to the CVEs. Silence implies no known vulnerable assets in the current inventory."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Identify Vulnerable Ivanti Appliances",
        "reads": [
          "resource_uid",
          "cve_uid",
          "severity",
          "status"
        ],
        "source": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT resource_uid, cve_uid, severity, status FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE instr(',' || '{{target_cves}}' || ',', ',' || cve_uid || ',') > 0 AND status != 'suppressed' ORDER BY severity_id DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of resource UIDs representing Ivanti appliances still exposed to the CVEs. Silence implies no known vulnerable assets in the current inventory.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "exploit-header-signals",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Exploitation Header Signals",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_path, url_query, log_line, src_endpoint_ip, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (url_path LIKE '%welcome.cgi%' OR url_query LIKE '%welcome.cgi%') AND (LOWER(log_line) LIKE '%x-dscgi-path%' OR LOWER(url_query) LIKE '%x-dscgi-path%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Identify web requests containing the X-DSCGI-PATH header associated with the Ivanti exploit chain.",
        "expected_signal": "HTTP requests targeting the vulnerable endpoint with specific path injection headers. Silence proves no such header was observed in captured logs."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "identify-vulnerable-appliances"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Exploitation Header Signals",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "url_query",
          "log_line",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_path, url_query, log_line, src_endpoint_ip, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (url_path LIKE '%welcome.cgi%' OR url_query LIKE '%welcome.cgi%') AND (LOWER(log_line) LIKE '%x-dscgi-path%' OR LOWER(url_query) LIKE '%x-dscgi-path%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "HTTP requests targeting the vulnerable endpoint with specific path injection headers. Silence proves no such header was observed in captured logs.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "network-c2-connections",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Adversary Infrastructure Connections",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, direction, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_network_connection",
        "description": "Identify connections from the appliance to known attacker IP addresses.",
        "expected_signal": "Any connection from an appliance to the listed C2 infrastructure. Silence means no traffic to these indicators was recorded."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "identify-vulnerable-appliances"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Adversary Infrastructure Connections",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "dst_endpoint_ip",
          "dst_endpoint_port",
          "direction",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_network_connection",
        "target": "network",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, direction, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || dst_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Any connection from an appliance to the listed C2 infrastructure. Silence means no traffic to these indicators was recorded.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "early-stage-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Early Stage Exploitation Assessment",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "exploit-header-signals",
          "network-c2-connections"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the Ivanti appliances show evidence of exploitation through header injection or known C2 traffic.",
        "description": "Evaluate whether the HTTP header signals and network connections indicate successful initial access.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict on the likelihood of initial compromise.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict for each affected host citing specific rows from HTTP and network sources."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "exploit-header-signals",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "network-c2-connections",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-root-payloads",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare Root Payloads in Temp Paths",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, process_cmd_line, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{malicious_payload_patterns}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 OR process_path LIKE '%/tmp/%' OR process_path LIKE '%/data/%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1, 2 HAVING hosts <= 5 ORDER BY hosts ASC",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify rare process executions from temporary paths or using known malicious filenames.",
        "expected_signal": "Processes running as root or from temporary directories seen on very few appliances. Silence proves no such rare execution was captured in the telemetry."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "early-stage-triage"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare Root Payloads in Temp Paths",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_path",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, process_cmd_line, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{malicious_payload_patterns}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 OR process_path LIKE '%/tmp/%' OR process_path LIKE '%/data/%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1, 2 HAVING hosts <= 5 ORDER BY hosts ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Processes running as root or from temporary directories seen on very few appliances. Silence proves no such rare execution was captured in the telemetry.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "process_path",
            "process_cmd_line"
          ],
          "rare_below": 5
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "selective-log-deletion",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Selective Log Deletion",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, file_path, activity_name, process_name, time FROM hb_file_activity WHERE activity_id = 4 AND (file_path LIKE '%/home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog%' OR file_path LIKE '%/var/log/audit/audit.log%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Detect deliberate removal of critical Ivanti debug and audit logs used to hide activity.",
        "expected_signal": "Deletion events for system-level audit logs. Silence means no deletions of these specific files were logged."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "early-stage-triage"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "triage",
        "label": "Selective Log Deletion",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "file_path",
          "activity_id",
          "activity_name",
          "process_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, file_path, activity_name, process_name, time FROM hb_file_activity WHERE activity_id = 4 AND (file_path LIKE '%/home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog%' OR file_path LIKE '%/var/log/audit/audit.log%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Deletion events for system-level audit logs. Silence means no deletions of these specific files were logged.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "full-attack-chain-analysis",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Full Attack Chain Analysis",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "network",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "early-stage-triage",
          "rare-root-payloads",
          "selective-log-deletion"
        ],
        "objective": "Assess if the appliance has moved from initial web exploitation (Agent 1) to root payload execution and log evasion.",
        "description": "Correlate early exploit leads with root execution and log tampering to confirm compromise.",
        "max_iterations": 4,
        "expected_signal": "A high-confidence final verdict for hosts displaying the full range of UTA0576 behaviors.",
        "success_criteria": "A final verdict citing the correlated chain of evidence from initial access to post-exploitation."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "rare-root-payloads",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "selective-log-deletion",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on Final Verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "The final attack chain analysis verdict is malicious for at least one Ivanti appliance.",
        "condition": "The final attack chain analysis verdict is malicious for at least one Ivanti appliance.",
        "blind_spot": "appliance-telemetry-gap",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Route to immediate containment for malicious findings or analyst review for suspicious signals.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "full-attack-chain-analysis"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-appliance",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate Malicious Appliance",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Isolate the compromised appliance to prevent lateral movement and further credential theft.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the identified Ivanti appliance and prepare to capture memory and disk images for deep forensics. Avoid rebooting until memory has been preserved.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "manual-forensic-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Manual Forensic Review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "An analyst reviews the correlated rows to confirm exploitation and identify any stolen secrets.",
        "instructions": "1. Review cited rows in the full-attack-chain-analysis step. 2. Verify if Active Directory queries for LAPS passwords or BitLocker keys were initiated from this host. 3. Confirm whether the appliance's local logs show evidence of deletion."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-appliance"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "remediation-and-close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Remediation and Close-out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Finalize remediation steps and close the hunt.",
        "instructions": "1. Apply updates 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6 to all appliances. 2. Rotate credentials for any service accounts active on the appliance during the breach window. 3. Document the final state of the fleet."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "manual-forensic-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}