{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "Threat actors targeting Ivanti appliances frequently move to the identity plane to gain broad administrative access. Detecting this transition is critical for preventing lateral movement and complete domain compromise."
      },
      "name": "Ivanti VPN AD Sensitive Attribute Access",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1087.002",
        "attack.t1212",
        "command and control",
        "defense evasion",
        "discovery",
        "execution",
        "initial access"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
        "index": 2,
        "title": "Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "ivanti-vpn-root-payload-execution",
          "reason": "Initial access and execution of payloads on the appliance itself are handled in a separate hunt focused on endpoint process and file activity.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "ivanti-appliance-exploitation-persistence",
          "relation": "follows"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "category": "identity",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A standard detection rule for LAPS access is often too noisy for large environments. This hunt uses a multi-stage approach by scoping to vulnerable appliances and applying prevalence baselining to separate legitimate management activity from attacker discovery.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "discovery-ad-secrets",
          "steps": [
            "discovery-attribute-access",
            "baseline-attribute-readers"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses specifically on post-compromise AD activity; web exploitation is handled in the appliance-side hunt.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "execution-root-payloads",
          "reason": "Payload execution on the Ivanti appliance is covered by endpoint-centric hunts.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "defense-evasion-selective-deletion",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-external-comms",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Web Application Exploitation",
            "slug": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi",
              "X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi",
              "X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/runtime/tmp/",
              "CVE-2026-104935",
              "CVE-2026-118527"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Root-Level Payload Execution",
            "slug": "execution-root-payloads",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1059.006",
              "T1068"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "ml.py",
              "rq5.py",
              "mk.py",
              "rr.py",
              "pu.txt",
              "sp_out.txt",
              "spray_hits.json",
              "dsstatmond",
              "ics-root-run-inband-*.pl",
              "CVE-2026-111357"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Defense Evasion and Log Tampering",
            "slug": "defense-evasion-selective-deletion",
            "tactic": "defense-evasion",
            "techniques": [
              "T1070.002"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog",
              "/var/log/audit/audit.log",
              "/data/.icscap/",
              "h.py"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Active Directory Secret Discovery",
            "slug": "discovery-ad-secrets",
            "tactic": "discovery",
            "techniques": [
              "T1087.002",
              "T1212"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Active Directory queries for Windows LAPS passwords",
              "Active Directory queries for BitLocker recovery keys"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Command and Control Traffic",
            "slug": "c2-external-comms",
            "tactic": "c2",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "108.165.147.64"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "The threat actor UTA0576 exploited a chain of three zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2026-104935, CVE-2026-111357, and CVE-2026-118527) to gain unauthenticated root access. After establishing a foothold, they deployed Python payloads to steal credentials and queried Active Directory for high-value targets including LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Start by identifying Ivanti appliances in the vulnerability findings and pasting their associated service accounts into the appliance_accounts parameter. If none are found, widen the hunt to any rare access of LAPS or BitLocker attributes from non-admin accounts across all Domain Controllers.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder uses a compromised Ivanti Connect Secure appliance to query Active Directory for sensitive attributes, such as LAPS passwords or BitLocker recovery keys, to prepare for lateral movement.",
      "parameters": {
        "ivanti_cves": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-02"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "CVE-2026-104935",
            "CVE-2026-111357",
            "CVE-2026-118527"
          ],
          "description": "CVE IDs associated with the Ivanti Connect Secure exploitation chain."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Domain Controllers to narrow the Active Directory search."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine for Active Directory queries."
        },
        "appliance_accounts": {
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "List of user accounts associated with Ivanti appliances, discovered in the scoping step."
        },
        "sensitive_attributes": {
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "ms-MCSC-Password",
            "ms-LAPS-Password",
            "ms-FVE-RecoveryPassword"
          ],
          "description": "AD attributes used to store LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
          "name": "Rapid7 \u2014 Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "ad-audit-log-gaps",
          "risk": "Attackers can harvest secrets without detection if auditing is only enabled for objects and not specifically for sensitive attributes like ms-LAPS-Password.",
          "owner": "Identity Engineering",
          "stage": "discovery-ad-secrets",
          "question": "whether the attacker queried LAPS or BitLocker attributes if the DC did not log the specific attribute read",
          "requires": "Active Directory Object Access auditing (Event ID 4662) and appropriate SACLs on sensitive attributes",
          "remediation": "Enable Audit Object Access and ensure SACLs are set to audit Read access for the Everyone or Authenticated Users group on LAPS/BitLocker attributes."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Ivanti VPN AD Sensitive Attribute Access",
    "description": "This hunt targets post-compromise activity following the exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527). Attackers like UTA0576 often pivot from the network edge to the identity plane. We specifically look for unusual Active Directory attribute access targeting Windows LAPS and BitLocker recovery information, which are high-value objectives for credential harvesting. The hunt first scopes vulnerable appliances and then uses Active Directory object access logs to identify anomalous queries for these secrets, using the appliance identities discovered during scoping."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527",
          "index": 2,
          "title": "Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "discovery-ad-secrets",
            "steps": [
              "discovery-attribute-access",
              "baseline-attribute-readers"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-web-exploitation",
            "reason": "This hunt focuses specifically on post-compromise AD activity; web exploitation is handled in the appliance-side hunt.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "execution-root-payloads",
            "reason": "Payload execution on the Ivanti appliance is covered by endpoint-centric hunts.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "defense-evasion-selective-deletion",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-external-comms",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder uses a compromised Ivanti Connect Secure appliance to query Active Directory for sensitive attributes, such as LAPS passwords or BitLocker recovery keys, to prepare for lateral movement.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "ad-audit-log-gaps",
            "risk": "Attackers can harvest secrets without detection if auditing is only enabled for objects and not specifically for sensitive attributes like ms-LAPS-Password.",
            "owner": "Identity Engineering",
            "stage": "discovery-ad-secrets",
            "question": "whether the attacker queried LAPS or BitLocker attributes if the DC did not log the specific attribute read",
            "requires": "Active Directory Object Access auditing (Event ID 4662) and appropriate SACLs on sensitive attributes",
            "remediation": "Enable Audit Object Access and ensure SACLs are set to audit Read access for the Everyone or Authenticated Users group on LAPS/BitLocker attributes."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start by identifying Ivanti appliances in the vulnerability findings and pasting their associated service accounts into the appliance_accounts parameter. If none are found, widen the hunt to any rare access of LAPS or BitLocker attributes from non-admin accounts across all Domain Controllers.",
        "beyond_detection": "A standard detection rule for LAPS access is often too noisy for large environments. This hunt uses a multi-stage approach by scoping to vulnerable appliances and applying prevalence baselining to separate legitimate management activity from attacker discovery."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "scoping-vulnerable-appliances",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Identify vulnerable Ivanti appliances",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT resource_uid, device_uid, cve_uid, severity, status FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE instr(',' || '{{ivanti_cves}}' || ',', ',' || cve_uid || ',') > 0",
        "surface": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "description": "Find hosts currently flagged with the relevant Ivanti CVEs to focus the search for compromised accounts.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of resource IDs or device IDs vulnerable to the ICS exploit chain. Silence implies no vulnerable appliances were detected in the inventory."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Identify vulnerable Ivanti appliances",
        "reads": [
          "resource_uid",
          "device_uid",
          "cve_uid",
          "severity",
          "status"
        ],
        "source": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT resource_uid, device_uid, cve_uid, severity, status FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE instr(',' || '{{ivanti_cves}}' || ',', ',' || cve_uid || ',') > 0",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of resource IDs or device IDs vulnerable to the ICS exploit chain. Silence implies no vulnerable appliances were detected in the inventory.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "discovery-attribute-access",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Sensitive attribute access logs",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, entity_name, attribute_name, time, device_hostname FROM hb_entity_management WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sensitive_attributes}}' || ',', ',' || attribute_name || ',') > 0) AND ('{{appliance_accounts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{appliance_accounts}}' || ',', ',' || actor_user_name || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_entity_management",
        "description": "Detect if an attacker used or hijacked an appliance account to query LAPS and BitLocker secrets in AD logs.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows indicating which appliance accounts read sensitive attributes. Unexpected reads by these accounts are a high-risk indicator of compromise."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-vulnerable-appliances"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Sensitive attribute access logs",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "entity_name",
          "attribute_name",
          "time",
          "device_hostname"
        ],
        "source": "hb_entity_management",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, entity_name, attribute_name, time, device_hostname FROM hb_entity_management WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sensitive_attributes}}' || ',', ',' || attribute_name || ',') > 0) AND ('{{appliance_accounts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{appliance_accounts}}' || ',', ',' || actor_user_name || ',') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows indicating which appliance accounts read sensitive attributes. Unexpected reads by these accounts are a high-risk indicator of compromise.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "baseline-attribute-readers",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare attribute readers prevalence",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS dc_count, COUNT(*) AS access_events, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_entity_management WHERE instr(',' || '{{sensitive_attributes}}' || ',', ',' || attribute_name || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY actor_user_name HAVING dc_count < 3",
        "surface": "hb_entity_management",
        "description": "Identify rare actors querying sensitive attributes to distinguish between legitimate management tools and manual attacker discovery.",
        "expected_signal": "A stack-count of actors who infrequently access secret attributes. Legitimate automation typically reads from many hosts; attacker activity appears as a rare event."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-vulnerable-appliances"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare attribute readers prevalence",
        "reads": [
          "actor_user_name",
          "device_hostname",
          "time",
          "attribute_name"
        ],
        "source": "hb_entity_management",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT actor_user_name, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS dc_count, COUNT(*) AS access_events, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_entity_management WHERE instr(',' || '{{sensitive_attributes}}' || ',', ',' || attribute_name || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY actor_user_name HAVING dc_count < 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A stack-count of actors who infrequently access secret attributes. Legitimate automation typically reads from many hosts; attacker activity appears as a rare event.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "actor_user_name"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "agent-triage-access",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage Active Directory discovery",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "scoping-vulnerable-appliances",
          "discovery-attribute-access",
          "baseline-attribute-readers"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any account associated with vulnerable Ivanti appliances or any rare principal is querying LAPS or BitLocker secrets in a way that suggests post-compromise reconnaissance.",
        "description": "Evaluate the vulnerability status and the observed AD access to determine if an attacker used a compromised appliance for secret discovery.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A per-account verdict stating whether the attribute access is malicious, suspicious, or benign.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict for every identified actor citing the specific attribute reads and prevalence findings."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "discovery-attribute-access",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "baseline-attribute-readers",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "decision-route-access",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on discovery verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one account querying sensitive AD attributes",
        "condition": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one account querying sensitive AD attributes",
        "blind_spot": "ad-audit-log-gaps",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the hunt based on the triage results, prioritising credential revocation for malicious activity.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "agent-triage-access"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "action-revoke-identity",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Revoke compromised account",
      "config": {
        "target": "identity",
        "description": "Immediately disable the compromised account to prevent further lateral movement or credential theft.",
        "instructions": "Disable the account identified by the agent as performing malicious AD discovery. Rotate the credentials if the account is used by the VPN appliance.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decision-route-access",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "task-verify-findings",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Manual verify findings",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the agent's findings and investigate the origin of the AD queries.",
        "instructions": "Review the hb_entity_management rows cited by the agent. Cross-reference the actor_user_name with known service accounts for Ivanti VPN appliances. Check for concurrent network connections from the appliances to the Domain Controllers."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decision-route-access",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "decision-route-access",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "action-revoke-identity"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "task-close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out hunt",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document the negative result or the resolution of a minor suspicion.",
        "instructions": "Record that no malicious AD attribute discovery was found associated with vulnerable Ivanti appliances. Note any tuning required for prevalence queries."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "decision-route-access",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}