{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "N-central RMM servers are highly privileged infrastructure that can be used to pivot into thousands of managed endpoints; protecting them from unauthenticated RCE is a critical priority."
      },
      "name": "N-able N-central Initial Exploitation (Able2Shell)",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1203",
        "credential access",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "persistence",
        "privilege escalation"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "critical-vulnerabilities-in-n-able-n-central-prompt-hosted-shutdown",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "n-central-privilege-escalation-syslog-ng",
          "reason": "The privilege escalation to root via syslog-ng is a distinct post-exploitation step requiring different Linux audit telemetry.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "This is a hunt because it correlates external vulnerability scanning results with internal behavioral baselining of web traffic and process execution. A simple rule on shells spawning from a service directory might be too noisy without the context of an unauthenticated exploit attempt seen on the same host.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "n-central-exposure-and-scanning",
          "steps": [
            "vulnerable-instances-scope",
            "rare-web-paths-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "unauthenticated-rce-exploitation",
          "steps": [
            "post-exploitation-shell-activity"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "privilege-escalation-to-root",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "unauthorized-account-creation",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "credential-and-session-disclosure",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "N-central Exposure and Vulnerability Scanning",
            "slug": "n-central-exposure-and-scanning",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "N-able N-central instances before version 2026.4.1 (build 2026.4.1.26)",
              "N-central Appliance 2026.4.0.31",
              "HTTP scanning activity targeting N-central management interfaces"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Unauthenticated RCE via Web Vulnerabilities",
            "slug": "unauthenticated-rce-exploitation",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190",
              "T1203"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "XML external entity (XXE) payloads in HTTP requests",
              "OGNL injection strings in web parameters",
              "Path traversal sequences (../) in file-repository upload paths",
              "Administrator viewing malicious MMS3 patch metadata"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Local Privilege Escalation to Root",
            "slug": "privilege-escalation-to-root",
            "tactic": "privilege-escalation",
            "techniques": [
              "T1068",
              "T1548"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Modification of nable-writable syslog-ng configuration files",
              "Exploitation of insecure IPC channels",
              "nable service account spawning shell with root privileges"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Unauthorized Account Creation for Persistence",
            "slug": "unauthorized-account-creation",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1136.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "New local user accounts created on the N-central appliance",
              "Unauthorized administrative account creation"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Credential and Session Disclosure",
            "slug": "credential-and-session-disclosure",
            "tactic": "credential-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1555"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Access to ProductAdmin credentials",
              "Exploitation of session-handling weaknesses to disclose credentials"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "The Able2Shell disclosure identifies 33 vulnerabilities in the N-able N-central RMM platform, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) via XXE, OGNL injection, and path traversal. Once initial access is gained, attackers can escalate privileges to root through insecure IPC or syslog-ng configurations and maintain persistence via unauthorized account creation, putting downstream managed environments at risk."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "The hunt starts with known vulnerability findings for N-central; if scanner data is missing, the analyst should manually populate scope_hosts with the hostnames of known N-central management servers.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An adversary is exploiting unauthenticated XXE, OGNL injection, or path traversal vulnerabilities in N-able N-central to gain initial access and execute code on RMM management servers.",
      "parameters": {
        "cve_ids": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "Rapid7 Able2Shell",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-10"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "CVE-2026-125878",
            "CVE-2026-125879",
            "CVE-2026-125880",
            "CVE-2026-125881",
            "CVE-2026-125882",
            "CVE-2026-125883",
            "CVE-2026-91000"
          ],
          "description": "CVE IDs associated with the N-central Able2Shell disclosure."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hostnames to focus on; if empty, later queries run across the whole estate but filter on service paths."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-n-able-n-central-prompt-hosted-shutdown",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-n-able-n-central-prompt-hosted-shutdown",
          "name": "Rapid7 \u2014 Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "tls-inspection-gap",
          "risk": "Without TLS inspection, the hunt relies on request paths and post-exploitation process behavior, which may miss subtle exploit attempts that do not result in immediate shell spawns.",
          "stage": "unauthenticated-rce-exploitation",
          "question": "Are exploitation payloads like XXE or OGNL hidden within encrypted HTTPS traffic?",
          "requires": "hb_http_activity with decrypted payload content"
        },
        {
          "id": "scanner-latency",
          "risk": "If the last scan was before the disclosure or before the hotfix was released, the scoping step will provide an inaccurate list of vulnerable assets.",
          "stage": "n-central-exposure-and-scanning",
          "question": "Is the vulnerability scanner's view of N-central current?",
          "requires": "Recent hb_vulnerability_finding collection"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "N-able N-central Initial Exploitation (Able2Shell)",
    "description": "This hunt targets the initial exploitation phase of the N-able N-central 'Able2Shell' disclosure. It focuses on identifying exposed instances that have not yet applied Hotfix 2 and monitoring for subsequent unauthenticated remote code execution. The hunt first scopes the environment for vulnerable systems using existing vulnerability findings. It then identifies rare web request patterns on those systems that might indicate scanning or exploit attempts. Finally, it looks for suspicious process behavior, such as shells or file-transfer tools spawning from the N-central service context, which corroborates successful code execution. An agent weighs these signals to identify compromised RMM infrastructure."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "critical-vulnerabilities-in-n-able-n-central-prompt-hosted-shutdown",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "n-central-exposure-and-scanning",
            "steps": [
              "vulnerable-instances-scope",
              "rare-web-paths-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "unauthenticated-rce-exploitation",
            "steps": [
              "post-exploitation-shell-activity"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "privilege-escalation-to-root",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "unauthorized-account-creation",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "credential-and-session-disclosure",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An adversary is exploiting unauthenticated XXE, OGNL injection, or path traversal vulnerabilities in N-able N-central to gain initial access and execute code on RMM management servers.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "tls-inspection-gap",
            "risk": "Without TLS inspection, the hunt relies on request paths and post-exploitation process behavior, which may miss subtle exploit attempts that do not result in immediate shell spawns.",
            "stage": "unauthenticated-rce-exploitation",
            "question": "Are exploitation payloads like XXE or OGNL hidden within encrypted HTTPS traffic?",
            "requires": "hb_http_activity with decrypted payload content"
          },
          {
            "id": "scanner-latency",
            "risk": "If the last scan was before the disclosure or before the hotfix was released, the scoping step will provide an inaccurate list of vulnerable assets.",
            "stage": "n-central-exposure-and-scanning",
            "question": "Is the vulnerability scanner's view of N-central current?",
            "requires": "Recent hb_vulnerability_finding collection"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "The hunt starts with known vulnerability findings for N-central; if scanner data is missing, the analyst should manually populate scope_hosts with the hostnames of known N-central management servers.",
        "beyond_detection": "This is a hunt because it correlates external vulnerability scanning results with internal behavioral baselining of web traffic and process execution. A simple rule on shells spawning from a service directory might be too noisy without the context of an unauthenticated exploit attempt seen on the same host."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "vulnerable-instances-scope",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Vulnerable N-central instances",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, resource_uid, cve_uid, severity, status, title FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE instr(',' || '{{cve_ids}}' || ',', ',' || cve_uid || ',') > 0",
        "surface": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "description": "Identify hosts that the vulnerability scanner has already flagged with N-central CVEs.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of unique IDs for potentially vulnerable N-central servers. Silence indicates either a patched estate or that the scanner has not yet detected the vulnerabilities."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Vulnerable N-central instances",
        "reads": [
          "device_uid",
          "resource_uid",
          "cve_uid",
          "severity",
          "status",
          "title"
        ],
        "source": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, resource_uid, cve_uid, severity, status, title FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE instr(',' || '{{cve_ids}}' || ',', ',' || cve_uid || ',') > 0",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of unique IDs for potentially vulnerable N-central servers. Silence indicates either a patched estate or that the scanner has not yet detected the vulnerabilities.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-web-paths-prevalence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare request paths on RMM servers",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT url_path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (url_path LIKE '%/central/%' OR url_path LIKE '%/mms3/%' OR url_path LIKE '%/repository/%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY url_path HAVING host_count <= 5 ORDER BY host_count ASC",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Identify rare HTTP request paths that may indicate scanners or exploit attempts targeting N-central management endpoints.",
        "expected_signal": "Unusual or one-off request paths targeting N-central specific directories. Common legitimate management traffic should be filtered by the host count threshold."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vulnerable-instances-scope"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare request paths on RMM servers",
        "reads": [
          "url_path",
          "device_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT url_path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_http_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (url_path LIKE '%/central/%' OR url_path LIKE '%/mms3/%' OR url_path LIKE '%/repository/%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY url_path HAVING host_count <= 5 ORDER BY host_count ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Unusual or one-off request paths targeting N-central specific directories. Common legitimate management traffic should be filtered by the host count threshold.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "url_path"
          ],
          "rare_below": 5
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "post-exploitation-shell-activity",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Shell activity from N-central context",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, parent_process_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%/nable/%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\nable\\%') AND (LOWER(process_name) IN ('sh','bash','zsh','dash','ash','cmd.exe','powershell.exe','python','perl','php','curl','wget')) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify shells or interpreters running from the N-central service directories, which is a high-fidelity indicator of RCE.",
        "expected_signal": "Any shell or script interpreter spawning within the N-central installation or user home path. Silence strongly suggests no successful execution has occurred on the surveyed hosts during the lookback period."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "rare-web-paths-prevalence"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Shell activity from N-central context",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "user_name",
          "parent_process_name",
          "time",
          "process_path"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, parent_process_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%/nable/%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\nable\\%') AND (LOWER(process_name) IN ('sh','bash','zsh','dash','ash','cmd.exe','powershell.exe','python','perl','php','curl','wget')) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Any shell or script interpreter spawning within the N-central installation or user home path. Silence strongly suggests no successful execution has occurred on the surveyed hosts during the lookback period.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "exploitation-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage N-central findings",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "vulnerable-instances-scope",
          "rare-web-paths-prevalence",
          "post-exploitation-shell-activity"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any N-central server shows signs of successful exploitation. Correlate vulnerable status from the scoping query with rare web paths and high-fidelity shell activity from the behaviour query. Prioritize hosts where shell processes spawn from the nable service context.",
        "description": "Analyze the combined evidence of exposure, scanning, and process behavior to identify compromised hosts.",
        "max_iterations": 4,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict of 'compromised', 'vulnerable', or 'benign'.",
        "success_criteria": "A summary citing specific hosts, their vulnerability status, and any suspicious process command lines discovered."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "post-exploitation-shell-activity"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "exploitation-route",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on evidence",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage verdict is suspicious or malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage verdict is suspicious or malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "tls-inspection-gap",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the analyst to remediation if exploitation is confirmed or likely.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "exploitation-triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "remediation-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Remediation and forensic review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Ensure vulnerable hosts are updated and compromised hosts are handled by IR.",
        "instructions": "1. Review all hosts identified as vulnerable and verify application of N-central 2026.4 Hotfix 2. 2. For any host where 'post-exploitation-shell-activity' found results, initiate incident response procedures to investigate for lateral movement and credential theft. 3. Confirm that Agents and Probes have been scheduled for upgrade."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "exploitation-route",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        },
        {
          "id": "exploitation-route",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "exploitation-route",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out hunt",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Record hunt findings and visibility gaps.",
        "instructions": "Document the number of vulnerable versus patched N-central instances. Record any identified exploitation attempts and summarize the remediation status of the environment."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "exploitation-route",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "remediation-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}