Outlook Silent NTLM Credential Leakage

High severity TLP:CLEAR Research by Rapid7 Published 18 Nov 2026

Hypothesis

An attacker is exploiting CVE-2026-124194 by forcing Outlook to initiate outbound SMB connections to an external listener, silently leaking the user's NTLM v2 hash upon opening a crafted file.

Brief

Why now

The Rapid7 — Patch Tuesday - November 2026 report (https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026) describes CVE-2026-124194 as a critical spoofing vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook. This flaw allows an adversary to trigger outbound NTLM authentication by forcing the client to load a crafted file. Because this process happens silently, traditional detection rules often fail to distinguish malicious hash leakage from legitimate network traffic. This hunt provides a structured way to verify if these silent leaks occur in your environment.

How the hunt flows

The hunt identifies vulnerable Outlook hosts first. The first query pulls data from the hb_vulnerability_finding surface to locate assets where scanners confirmed the presence of CVE-2026-124194. This initial scoping step ensures the analyst focuses on the endpoints where exploitation is technically possible, which reduces the volume of telemetry to be reviewed in subsequent phases.

Next, the hunt baselines legitimate Outlook network destinations. Using the hb_network_connection surface, the query stack-counts all outbound connections from the Outlook process to external IP addresses. By identifying destinations that appear on only a few hosts, the analyst isolates rare or unique IPs that likely represent attacker-controlled infrastructure rather than standard Microsoft or cloud services.

The core of the hunt targets the specific behavioral signature of hash theft. The hunt searches for instances where Outlook initiates a connection on port 445 (SMB) to a non-private external address. Since Outlook has no standard requirement to perform SMB operations over the public internet, any signal here strongly suggests forced NTLM authentication.

Finally, the analyst correlates the findings into a triage verdict. The workflow examines the overlap between the vulnerable hosts identified in the scoping phase and the suspicious SMB egress found later. This correlation allows us to distinguish between systems that are merely unpatched and those where exploitation behavior suggests an active credential theft attempt.

What the hunt cannot see

This hunt relies on consistent network connection telemetry from the endpoint. If a host lacks EDR coverage or if logging is disabled, an outbound leak will go unrecorded. Furthermore, the vulnerability may attempt to fall back to WebDAV over port 80 or 443 if SMB is blocked. This hunt focuses primarily on port 445; identifying WebDAV-based leaks requires deep packet inspection or proxy logs to differentiate them from normal web traffic.

Steps

  1. Query, scoping

    Identify vulnerable Outlook hosts

    Locate assets where vulnerability scanners have confirmed the presence of CVE-2026-124194 to focus analysis on at-risk endpoints.

    sql, reads hb_vulnerability_finding
    SELECT resource_uid, device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_atFROM hb_vulnerability_findingWHERE cve_uid = '{{cve_id}}'  AND status != 'suppressed'

    What a hit looks like. A list of unique IDs and versions for exposed assets. Silence suggests the patch is applied or the scanner has not yet detected the vulnerability.

  2. Query, baseline

    Baseline Outlook external destinations

    Stack-count outbound destinations from Outlook to external IPs to identify rare endpoints that might be attacker-controlled listeners.

    sql, reads hb_network_connection
    SELECT dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seenFROM hb_network_connectionWHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe')  AND direction = 'outbound'  AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%')  AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')  AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)GROUP BY dst_endpoint_ipHAVING host_count <= 3ORDER BY host_count ASC

    What a hit looks like. A list of external IPs contacted by Outlook on very few hosts. Legitimate Microsoft services should show high host counts.

  3. Query, detection candidate

    Detect forced SMB authentication

    Focus on the specific behavioral signature of hash theft: Outlook connecting to an external IP on port 445 (SMB).

    sql, reads hb_network_connection
    SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, timeFROM hb_network_connectionWHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe')  AND dst_endpoint_port = 445  AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%')  AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')  AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)

    What a hit looks like. Any row showing Outlook connecting to an external SMB listener is highly suspicious and indicative of forced NTLM authentication.

  4. Agent triage

    Evaluate exposure and behavioral evidence

    Correlate vulnerability status with unusual outbound SMB traffic to identify hosts likely targeted for credential theft.

  5. Decision

    Route on triage results

    Direct the workflow to remediation review if exploitation evidence exists, or close-out if only general exposure is identified.

  6. Analyst task

    Remediation and perimeter verification

    Address confirmed exploitation attempts and ensure perimeter blocks are active.

  7. Analyst task

    Exposure audit close-out

    Document the exposure status across the estate when no exploitation evidence was found.

Coverage

2 of 2 stages covered

Stage and ATT&CK techniqueCoveredHow, or why not
Opening of Malicious File in Outlook
T1203 T1204.002
Yes find-vulnerable-outlook-assets
Forced NTLM Authentication Leak
T1187
Yes stack-outlook-external-ips, detect-suspicious-outlook-egress

Blind spots

  • Needs hb_network_connection from all scoped hosts. A successful hash theft via port 445 may occur without a corresponding log entry on unmonitored systems. It would answer: whether Outlook attempted a leak from a host where EDR or network logging is disabled
  • Needs Deep Packet Inspection or Proxy logs. While port 445 is the primary target, the vulnerability may attempt WebDAV fallback; this traffic is difficult to distinguish from legitimate web browsing without specialized inspection. It would answer: whether Outlook utilized WebDAV over port 80 or 443 to leak hashes

Parameters and data

Parameters

ParameterTypeDefaultWhat it is
cve_idstringCVE-2026-124194The specific CVE identifier for the Outlook spoofing vulnerability.
lookback_daysnumber14Days of history to examine.
scope_hostslist[host]noneOptional list of hostnames to focus the search; leave empty to hunt across the whole estate.

Data sources

SourceCategoryTelemetry
Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)endpointendpoint
Network telemetrynetworknetwork

Source

An open hunt.md file. It runs anywhere that reads the format.

hunt.md
---
analysis: A static rule for Outlook connections to port 445 provides only a partial
  picture. This hunt correlates vulnerability status from the inventory plane with
  network prevalence baselining to distinguish legitimate Office 365 traffic from
  targeted credential beaconing.
blind_spots:
- id: limited-network-telemetry
  question: whether Outlook attempted a leak from a host where EDR or network logging
    is disabled
  requires: hb_network_connection from all scoped hosts
  risk: A successful hash theft via port 445 may occur without a corresponding log
    entry on unmonitored systems.
  stage: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
- id: webdav-fallback-visibility
  question: whether Outlook utilized WebDAV over port 80 or 443 to leak hashes
  requires: Deep Packet Inspection or Proxy logs
  risk: While port 445 is the primary target, the vulnerability may attempt WebDAV
    fallback; this traffic is difficult to distinguish from legitimate web browsing
    without specialized inspection.
  stage: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
coverage:
- stage: outlook-vulnerability-exploitation
  status: covered
  steps:
  - find-vulnerable-outlook-assets
- stage: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
  status: covered
  steps:
  - stack-outlook-external-ips
  - detect-suspicious-outlook-egress
guardrails:
  claims: no_unsupported
  evidence: citation_required
  missing_data: not_benign
  telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
  applicability: campaign-specific
  handoff: promote-to-detection
  justification: CVE-2026-124194 is an actively exploited-in-the-wild vulnerability
    that enables silent credential theft. NTLM hash leakage allows for offline cracking
    and relay attacks, representing a high risk to the identity security of the enterprise.
  methodology: model-assisted
  trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An attacker is exploiting CVE-2026-124194 by forcing Outlook to initiate
  outbound SMB connections to an external listener, silently leaking the user's NTLM
  v2 hash upon opening a crafted file.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1203
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1187
- credential access
- initial access
name: Outlook Silent NTLM Credential Leakage
parameters:
  cve_id:
    default: CVE-2026-124194
    description: The specific CVE identifier for the Outlook spoofing vulnerability.
    from:
      kind: article
      observed: '2026-11-10'
      ref: rapid7-patch-tuesday-nov-2026
    type: string
  lookback_days:
    default: '14'
    description: Days of history to examine.
    from:
      kind: manual
      observed: '2026-11-10'
      ref: standard-retention
    type: number
  scope_hosts:
    default: []
    description: Optional list of hostnames to focus the search; leave empty to hunt
      across the whole estate.
    from:
      kind: manual
      observed: '2026-11-10'
      ref: analyst-scoping
    type: list[host]
provenance:
  authors:
  - name: Huntbase hunt generation
    org: huntbase.io
  generated:
    by: huntbase-hunt-generation
    from: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026
    gates:
    - dry-run
    - lint
    model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: The hunt should prioritize hosts running Windows with classic Outlook.
  If hb_vulnerability_finding is unavailable, use hb_software_inventory to identify
  hosts with Outlook versions older than the November 2026 patch cycle.
references:
- name: "Rapid7 \u2014 Patch Tuesday - November 2026"
  url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026
related:
- hunt: ntlm-relay-attempt-detection
  reason: This hunt focuses on the outbound leakage originating from Outlook; detecting
    the internal use of those stolen hashes is a separate forensic problem handled
    by authentication monitoring.
  relation: out-of-scope-alternative
scenario:
  stages:
  - name: Opening of Malicious File in Outlook
    observables:
    - outlook.exe
    - specially crafted malicious file
    - CVE-2026-124194
    slug: outlook-vulnerability-exploitation
    tactic: initial-access
    techniques:
    - T1203
    - T1204.002
  - name: Forced NTLM Authentication Leak
    observables:
    - NTLM v2 hash
    - outbound SMB connection on port 445
    - outbound HTTP/WebDAV connection
    - attacker-controlled location
    slug: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
    tactic: credential-access
    techniques:
    - T1187
  summary: Attackers exploit CVE-2026-124194, a spoofing vulnerability in Microsoft
    Outlook, by sending a specially crafted malicious file. When a user opens the
    file, Outlook silently initiates an outbound connection to an external attacker-controlled
    server, resulting in the leakage of the user's NTLMv2 hash for credential theft
    or relay.
severity: high
targets:
  analyst:
    name: Tier-2 analyst
    role: analyst
  endpoint:
    category: endpoint
    name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
    telemetry:
    - endpoint
  hunter:
    agent: true
    name: Hunt agent
  network:
    category: network
    name: Network telemetry
    telemetry:
    - network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---


# Outlook Silent NTLM Credential Leakage

This hunt identifies Windows assets vulnerable to the silent spoofing vulnerability CVE-2026-124194 and monitors for the primary indicator of exploitation: Outlook initiating outbound connections on port 445 (SMB) to non-private IP addresses. The flow first identifies vulnerable hosts using scanner findings, baselines legitimate Outlook network activity to identify rare external destinations, and then focuses specifically on high-risk SMB egress that suggests forced authentication for hash theft.

## find-vulnerable-outlook-assets
<!-- Identify vulnerable Outlook hosts -->
Locate assets where vulnerability scanners have confirmed the presence of CVE-2026-124194 to focus analysis on at-risk endpoints.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping params=(cve_id=cve_id)
~~~yaml
expected: A list of unique IDs and versions for exposed assets. Silence suggests the
  patch is applied or the scanner has not yet detected the vulnerability.
reads:
- resource_uid
- device_uid
- affected_package_version
- severity
- collected_at
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_vulnerability_finding
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT resource_uid, device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_at FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = '{{cve_id}}' AND status != 'suppressed'
```

## stack-outlook-external-ips
<!-- Baseline Outlook external destinations -->
Stack-count outbound destinations from Outlook to external IPs to identify rare endpoints that might be attacker-controlled listeners.

```sqlite target=network role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
baseline:
  compare: first_seen
  window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: A list of external IPs contacted by Outlook on very few hosts. Legitimate
  Microsoft services should show high host counts.
prevalence:
  by: device_hostname
  key:
  - dst_endpoint_ip
  rare_below: 3
reads:
- dst_endpoint_ip
- device_hostname
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe') AND direction = 'outbound' AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY dst_endpoint_ip HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC
```

## detect-suspicious-outlook-egress
<!-- Detect forced SMB authentication -->
Focus on the specific behavioral signature of hash theft: Outlook connecting to an external IP on port 445 (SMB).

```sqlite target=network role=detection-candidate params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: Any row showing Outlook connecting to an external SMB listener is highly
  suspicious and indicative of forced NTLM authentication.
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_name
- dst_endpoint_ip
- dst_endpoint_port
- time
silence: evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe') AND dst_endpoint_port = 445 AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)
```

## triage-leakage-verdict
<!-- Evaluate exposure and behavioral evidence -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- find-vulnerable-outlook-assets
- stack-outlook-external-ips
- detect-suspicious-outlook-egress
max_iterations: 5
objective: Determine which hosts are vulnerable to CVE-2026-124194 and exhibit the
  forced authentication signature of outbound port 445 connections to rare external
  destinations.
success_criteria: A per-host verdict of 'vulnerable-and-exploited', 'vulnerable-only',
  or 'benign' based on the presence of the vulnerability and outbound SMB telemetry.
tools:
- endpoint
- network
```

## route-on-triage
<!-- Route on triage results -->
if~: "the triage-leakage-verdict confirms exploitation behavior (rare outbound SMB) on at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → remediation-review
indeterminate: → remediation-review
unavailable: → remediation-review (blind_spot: limited-network-telemetry)
else: → close-out

## remediation-review
<!-- Remediation and perimeter verification -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the external IP destinations identified in the triage verdict. If they are unaffiliated with corporate services, prioritize the November 2026 Outlook updates on those hosts. Ensure that the network perimeter is explicitly blocking outbound port 445 (SMB) and 137-139 (NetBIOS) to external destinations.
```
→ end

## close-out
<!-- Exposure audit close-out -->
```manual target=analyst
Record the number of vulnerable assets identified. If no suspicious SMB activity was found, recommend that patching for CVE-2026-124194 be prioritized in the standard maintenance window to reduce the exposure window.
```
→ end

Run this hunt against your own data.

In Huntbase, Scout runs every step across the tools you already connect, checks back through your history and returns a verdict with the evidence. The hunt.md file is open, so you can also take it anywhere that reads the format.

Drafted by machine (huntbase-hunt-generation, hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview), checked by dry-run, lint, then reviewed by a person.

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