Outlook Silent NTLM Credential Leakage
High severity TLP:CLEAR Research by Rapid7 Published 18 Nov 2026
Hypothesis
An attacker is exploiting CVE-2026-124194 by forcing Outlook to initiate outbound SMB connections to an external listener, silently leaking the user's NTLM v2 hash upon opening a crafted file.
Brief
Why now
The Rapid7 — Patch Tuesday - November 2026 report (https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026) describes CVE-2026-124194 as a critical spoofing vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook. This flaw allows an adversary to trigger outbound NTLM authentication by forcing the client to load a crafted file. Because this process happens silently, traditional detection rules often fail to distinguish malicious hash leakage from legitimate network traffic. This hunt provides a structured way to verify if these silent leaks occur in your environment.
How the hunt flows
The hunt identifies vulnerable Outlook hosts first. The first query pulls data from the hb_vulnerability_finding surface to locate assets where scanners confirmed the presence of CVE-2026-124194. This initial scoping step ensures the analyst focuses on the endpoints where exploitation is technically possible, which reduces the volume of telemetry to be reviewed in subsequent phases.
Next, the hunt baselines legitimate Outlook network destinations. Using the hb_network_connection surface, the query stack-counts all outbound connections from the Outlook process to external IP addresses. By identifying destinations that appear on only a few hosts, the analyst isolates rare or unique IPs that likely represent attacker-controlled infrastructure rather than standard Microsoft or cloud services.
The core of the hunt targets the specific behavioral signature of hash theft. The hunt searches for instances where Outlook initiates a connection on port 445 (SMB) to a non-private external address. Since Outlook has no standard requirement to perform SMB operations over the public internet, any signal here strongly suggests forced NTLM authentication.
Finally, the analyst correlates the findings into a triage verdict. The workflow examines the overlap between the vulnerable hosts identified in the scoping phase and the suspicious SMB egress found later. This correlation allows us to distinguish between systems that are merely unpatched and those where exploitation behavior suggests an active credential theft attempt.
What the hunt cannot see
This hunt relies on consistent network connection telemetry from the endpoint. If a host lacks EDR coverage or if logging is disabled, an outbound leak will go unrecorded. Furthermore, the vulnerability may attempt to fall back to WebDAV over port 80 or 443 if SMB is blocked. This hunt focuses primarily on port 445; identifying WebDAV-based leaks requires deep packet inspection or proxy logs to differentiate them from normal web traffic.
Steps
-
Query, scoping
Identify vulnerable Outlook hosts
Locate assets where vulnerability scanners have confirmed the presence of CVE-2026-124194 to focus analysis on at-risk endpoints.
sql, reads hb_vulnerability_findingSELECT resource_uid, device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_atFROM hb_vulnerability_findingWHERE cve_uid = '{{cve_id}}' AND status != 'suppressed'What a hit looks like. A list of unique IDs and versions for exposed assets. Silence suggests the patch is applied or the scanner has not yet detected the vulnerability.
-
Query, baseline
Baseline Outlook external destinations
Stack-count outbound destinations from Outlook to external IPs to identify rare endpoints that might be attacker-controlled listeners.
sql, reads hb_network_connectionSELECT dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seenFROM hb_network_connectionWHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe') AND direction = 'outbound' AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)GROUP BY dst_endpoint_ipHAVING host_count <= 3ORDER BY host_count ASCWhat a hit looks like. A list of external IPs contacted by Outlook on very few hosts. Legitimate Microsoft services should show high host counts.
-
Query, detection candidate
Detect forced SMB authentication
Focus on the specific behavioral signature of hash theft: Outlook connecting to an external IP on port 445 (SMB).
sql, reads hb_network_connectionSELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, timeFROM hb_network_connectionWHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe') AND dst_endpoint_port = 445 AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)What a hit looks like. Any row showing Outlook connecting to an external SMB listener is highly suspicious and indicative of forced NTLM authentication.
-
Agent triage
Evaluate exposure and behavioral evidence
Correlate vulnerability status with unusual outbound SMB traffic to identify hosts likely targeted for credential theft.
-
Decision
Route on triage results
Direct the workflow to remediation review if exploitation evidence exists, or close-out if only general exposure is identified.
-
Analyst task
Remediation and perimeter verification
Address confirmed exploitation attempts and ensure perimeter blocks are active.
-
Analyst task
Exposure audit close-out
Document the exposure status across the estate when no exploitation evidence was found.
Coverage
2 of 2 stages covered
| Stage and ATT&CK technique | Covered | How, or why not |
|---|---|---|
| Opening of Malicious File in Outlook T1203 T1204.002 |
Yes | find-vulnerable-outlook-assets |
| Forced NTLM Authentication Leak T1187 |
Yes | stack-outlook-external-ips, detect-suspicious-outlook-egress |
Blind spots
- Needs hb_network_connection from all scoped hosts. A successful hash theft via port 445 may occur without a corresponding log entry on unmonitored systems. It would answer: whether Outlook attempted a leak from a host where EDR or network logging is disabled
- Needs Deep Packet Inspection or Proxy logs. While port 445 is the primary target, the vulnerability may attempt WebDAV fallback; this traffic is difficult to distinguish from legitimate web browsing without specialized inspection. It would answer: whether Outlook utilized WebDAV over port 80 or 443 to leak hashes
Parameters and data
Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
cve_id | string | CVE-2026-124194 | The specific CVE identifier for the Outlook spoofing vulnerability. |
lookback_days | number | 14 | Days of history to examine. |
scope_hosts | list[host] | none | Optional list of hostnames to focus the search; leave empty to hunt across the whole estate. |
Data sources
| Source | Category | Telemetry |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) | endpoint | endpoint |
| Network telemetry | network | network |
Source
An open hunt.md file. It runs anywhere that reads the format.
---
analysis: A static rule for Outlook connections to port 445 provides only a partial
picture. This hunt correlates vulnerability status from the inventory plane with
network prevalence baselining to distinguish legitimate Office 365 traffic from
targeted credential beaconing.
blind_spots:
- id: limited-network-telemetry
question: whether Outlook attempted a leak from a host where EDR or network logging
is disabled
requires: hb_network_connection from all scoped hosts
risk: A successful hash theft via port 445 may occur without a corresponding log
entry on unmonitored systems.
stage: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
- id: webdav-fallback-visibility
question: whether Outlook utilized WebDAV over port 80 or 443 to leak hashes
requires: Deep Packet Inspection or Proxy logs
risk: While port 445 is the primary target, the vulnerability may attempt WebDAV
fallback; this traffic is difficult to distinguish from legitimate web browsing
without specialized inspection.
stage: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
coverage:
- stage: outlook-vulnerability-exploitation
status: covered
steps:
- find-vulnerable-outlook-assets
- stage: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
status: covered
steps:
- stack-outlook-external-ips
- detect-suspicious-outlook-egress
guardrails:
claims: no_unsupported
evidence: citation_required
missing_data: not_benign
telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
applicability: campaign-specific
handoff: promote-to-detection
justification: CVE-2026-124194 is an actively exploited-in-the-wild vulnerability
that enables silent credential theft. NTLM hash leakage allows for offline cracking
and relay attacks, representing a high risk to the identity security of the enterprise.
methodology: model-assisted
trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An attacker is exploiting CVE-2026-124194 by forcing Outlook to initiate
outbound SMB connections to an external listener, silently leaking the user's NTLM
v2 hash upon opening a crafted file.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1203
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1187
- credential access
- initial access
name: Outlook Silent NTLM Credential Leakage
parameters:
cve_id:
default: CVE-2026-124194
description: The specific CVE identifier for the Outlook spoofing vulnerability.
from:
kind: article
observed: '2026-11-10'
ref: rapid7-patch-tuesday-nov-2026
type: string
lookback_days:
default: '14'
description: Days of history to examine.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2026-11-10'
ref: standard-retention
type: number
scope_hosts:
default: []
description: Optional list of hostnames to focus the search; leave empty to hunt
across the whole estate.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2026-11-10'
ref: analyst-scoping
type: list[host]
provenance:
authors:
- name: Huntbase hunt generation
org: huntbase.io
generated:
by: huntbase-hunt-generation
from: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026
gates:
- dry-run
- lint
model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: The hunt should prioritize hosts running Windows with classic Outlook.
If hb_vulnerability_finding is unavailable, use hb_software_inventory to identify
hosts with Outlook versions older than the November 2026 patch cycle.
references:
- name: "Rapid7 \u2014 Patch Tuesday - November 2026"
url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026
related:
- hunt: ntlm-relay-attempt-detection
reason: This hunt focuses on the outbound leakage originating from Outlook; detecting
the internal use of those stolen hashes is a separate forensic problem handled
by authentication monitoring.
relation: out-of-scope-alternative
scenario:
stages:
- name: Opening of Malicious File in Outlook
observables:
- outlook.exe
- specially crafted malicious file
- CVE-2026-124194
slug: outlook-vulnerability-exploitation
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1203
- T1204.002
- name: Forced NTLM Authentication Leak
observables:
- NTLM v2 hash
- outbound SMB connection on port 445
- outbound HTTP/WebDAV connection
- attacker-controlled location
slug: forced-ntlm-authentication-leak
tactic: credential-access
techniques:
- T1187
summary: Attackers exploit CVE-2026-124194, a spoofing vulnerability in Microsoft
Outlook, by sending a specially crafted malicious file. When a user opens the
file, Outlook silently initiates an outbound connection to an external attacker-controlled
server, resulting in the leakage of the user's NTLMv2 hash for credential theft
or relay.
severity: high
targets:
analyst:
name: Tier-2 analyst
role: analyst
endpoint:
category: endpoint
name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
telemetry:
- endpoint
hunter:
agent: true
name: Hunt agent
network:
category: network
name: Network telemetry
telemetry:
- network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---
# Outlook Silent NTLM Credential Leakage
This hunt identifies Windows assets vulnerable to the silent spoofing vulnerability CVE-2026-124194 and monitors for the primary indicator of exploitation: Outlook initiating outbound connections on port 445 (SMB) to non-private IP addresses. The flow first identifies vulnerable hosts using scanner findings, baselines legitimate Outlook network activity to identify rare external destinations, and then focuses specifically on high-risk SMB egress that suggests forced authentication for hash theft.
## find-vulnerable-outlook-assets
<!-- Identify vulnerable Outlook hosts -->
Locate assets where vulnerability scanners have confirmed the presence of CVE-2026-124194 to focus analysis on at-risk endpoints.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping params=(cve_id=cve_id)
~~~yaml
expected: A list of unique IDs and versions for exposed assets. Silence suggests the
patch is applied or the scanner has not yet detected the vulnerability.
reads:
- resource_uid
- device_uid
- affected_package_version
- severity
- collected_at
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_vulnerability_finding
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT resource_uid, device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_at FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = '{{cve_id}}' AND status != 'suppressed'
```
## stack-outlook-external-ips
<!-- Baseline Outlook external destinations -->
Stack-count outbound destinations from Outlook to external IPs to identify rare endpoints that might be attacker-controlled listeners.
```sqlite target=network role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
baseline:
compare: first_seen
window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: A list of external IPs contacted by Outlook on very few hosts. Legitimate
Microsoft services should show high host counts.
prevalence:
by: device_hostname
key:
- dst_endpoint_ip
rare_below: 3
reads:
- dst_endpoint_ip
- device_hostname
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, MAX(time) AS last_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe') AND direction = 'outbound' AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY dst_endpoint_ip HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC
```
## detect-suspicious-outlook-egress
<!-- Detect forced SMB authentication -->
Focus on the specific behavioral signature of hash theft: Outlook connecting to an external IP on port 445 (SMB).
```sqlite target=network role=detection-candidate params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: Any row showing Outlook connecting to an external SMB listener is highly
suspicious and indicative of forced NTLM authentication.
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_name
- dst_endpoint_ip
- dst_endpoint_port
- time
silence: evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%outlook.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%outlook.exe') AND dst_endpoint_port = 445 AND NOT (dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '10.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '172.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '192.168.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '127.%' OR dst_endpoint_ip LIKE '169.254.%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)
```
## triage-leakage-verdict
<!-- Evaluate exposure and behavioral evidence -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- find-vulnerable-outlook-assets
- stack-outlook-external-ips
- detect-suspicious-outlook-egress
max_iterations: 5
objective: Determine which hosts are vulnerable to CVE-2026-124194 and exhibit the
forced authentication signature of outbound port 445 connections to rare external
destinations.
success_criteria: A per-host verdict of 'vulnerable-and-exploited', 'vulnerable-only',
or 'benign' based on the presence of the vulnerability and outbound SMB telemetry.
tools:
- endpoint
- network
```
## route-on-triage
<!-- Route on triage results -->
if~: "the triage-leakage-verdict confirms exploitation behavior (rare outbound SMB) on at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → remediation-review
indeterminate: → remediation-review
unavailable: → remediation-review (blind_spot: limited-network-telemetry)
else: → close-out
## remediation-review
<!-- Remediation and perimeter verification -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the external IP destinations identified in the triage verdict. If they are unaffiliated with corporate services, prioritize the November 2026 Outlook updates on those hosts. Ensure that the network perimeter is explicitly blocking outbound port 445 (SMB) and 137-139 (NetBIOS) to external destinations.
```
→ end
## close-out
<!-- Exposure audit close-out -->
```manual target=analyst
Record the number of vulnerable assets identified. If no suspicious SMB activity was found, recommend that patching for CVE-2026-124194 be prioritized in the standard maintenance window to reduce the exposure window.
```
→ end
Run this hunt against your own data.
In Huntbase, Scout runs every step across the tools you already connect, checks back through your history and returns a verdict with the evidence. The hunt.md file is open, so you can also take it anywhere that reads the format.
Drafted by machine (huntbase-hunt-generation, hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview), checked by dry-run, lint, then reviewed by a person.