---
analysis: A simple detection rule on the URI or the SMB port lacks context. This hunt
  correlates the vulnerability state (vulnerable software present) with the behavior
  (URI hit) and the specific outcome (uncommon outbound SMB connection) to settle
  on a verdict.
blind_spots:
- id: tls-encryption-blind-spot
  question: What were the full URI and body of the request on encrypted channels?
  requires: TLS inspection or decrypted HTTP logs
  risk: Attackers can hide exploit payloads in HTTPS traffic, making URI-based detection
    impossible without decryption.
  stage: initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities
- id: smb-egress-filtering
  question: Were there failed SMB connection attempts to external IPs?
  requires: Firewall logs with reject actions
  risk: If port 445 is blocked at the perimeter, the network connection surface may
    not show the attempt, leaving the successful exploit (initial access) undetected
    if it relies on SMB for the second stage.
  stage: credential-access-ntlm-disclosure
coverage:
- stage: initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities
  status: covered
  steps:
  - vulnerable-host-inventory
  - perimeter-http-exploitation
- stage: credential-access-ntlm-disclosure
  status: covered
  steps:
  - smb-redirection-attempts
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules
    in Network Perimeter Devices and much more'' series.'
  stage: execution-fetch-payload-delivery
  status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules
    in Network Perimeter Devices and much more'' series.'
  stage: persistence-linux-elf-injection
  status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules
    in Network Perimeter Devices and much more'' series.'
  stage: persistence-privileged-container-mount
  status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
  claims: no_unsupported
  evidence: citation_required
  missing_data: not_benign
  telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
  applicability: campaign-specific
  handoff: keep-as-periodic-hunt
  justification: Exploitation of perimeter devices leads to immediate unauthenticated
    network access or high-value credential theft; verifying the integrity of these
    public-facing services is a critical security obligation.
  methodology: model-assisted
  trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An attacker is exploiting vulnerabilities in perimeter applications (like
  Flowise or Citrix) to gain initial access or force NTLM authentication to a remote
  UNC path for credential theft.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1557.001
- credential access
- execution
- initial access
- persistence
name: Perimeter Exploitation and NTLM Redirection
parameters:
  lookback_days:
    default: '14'
    description: Days of history to examine.
    type: number
  scope_hosts:
    default: []
    description: Specific hosts to investigate; leave empty to hunt across the entire
      estate.
    type: list[host]
  target_uris:
    default:
    - /forgot-password
    - /api/v1/lint
    - /wp-content/plugins/bug-library/
    description: URI paths associated with the latest Metasploit module releases.
    type: list[string]
provenance:
  authors:
  - name: Huntbase hunt generation
    org: huntbase.io
  generated:
    by: huntbase-hunt-generation
    from: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more
    gates:
    - dry-run
    - lint
    - critic
    model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Start by identifying all servers running Flowise, GitLab, Citrix, and Cisco
  gateway software. Use the HTTP activity surface to look for URIs associated with
  Metasploit modules, specifically focusing on unauthenticated endpoints.
references:
- name: "Rapid7 \u2014 Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter\
    \ Devices"
  url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more
related:
- hunt: smb-egress-to-non-rfc1918
  reason: A broader hunt for any outbound SMB traffic regardless of perimeter application
    exploitation.
  relation: sibling
scenario:
  stages:
  - name: Exploitation of Perimeter and Developer Tools
    observables:
    - HTTP POST to /forgot-password in Flowise
    - Unauthenticated CI lint API calls to GitLab
    - PHP file uploads to /wp-content/plugins/bug-library/
    - Command injection patterns in Citrix NetScaler login logs
    - SQL injection patterns in Cisco Secure Email Gateway S/MIME handling
    - CVE-2025-58434
    - CVE-2026-88771
    - CVE-2026-97229
    - CVE-2026-76443
    - CVE-2024-5450
    slug: initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities
    tactic: initial-access
    techniques:
    - T1190
  - name: NTLMv2 Hash Disclosure via UNC Path
    observables:
    - OpenBullet2 forced SMB authentication via UNC path proxy source
    - Outbound SMB (port 445) connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure
    - CVE-2026-39908
    slug: credential-access-ntlm-disclosure
    tactic: credential-access
    techniques:
    - T1557.001
  - name: Multi-Protocol Fetch Payload Execution
    observables:
    - Fetch commands using FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, or TFTP to download LoongArch64 payloads
    - Execution of chmod on downloaded files
    - Reverse shell or bind shell activity (e.g., shell_reverse_tcp)
    slug: execution-fetch-payload-delivery
    tactic: execution
    techniques:
    - T1105
    - T1059.003
  - name: Linux ELF Executable Payload Injection
    observables:
    - Code cave and segment injection in Linux ELF files
    - Architecture-specific trampolines for x86, x64, or AArch64
    - Modified ELF binaries on disk
    slug: persistence-linux-elf-injection
    tactic: persistence
    techniques:
    - T1574
  - name: Docker Container Persistence and Host Access
    observables:
    - Creation of privileged Docker containers
    - 'Bind-mounting host filesystem (e.g., C: drive on Windows or root on Linux)
      to a container'
    - Docker Desktop creating persistent Alpine containers on Windows
    - Portainer API activity to create containers with host access
    slug: persistence-privileged-container-mount
    tactic: persistence
    techniques:
    - T1610
    - T1543.003
  summary: This campaign involves the use of newly released Metasploit modules targeting
    unauthenticated RCE and authentication bypass vulnerabilities in perimeter devices
    and developer tools like Citrix NetScaler, Cisco Secure Email Gateway, Flowise,
    and GitLab. After initial access, attackers leverage specialized Linux ELF injection
    techniques and privileged Docker container creation for persistent access and
    payload execution.
series:
  index: 1
  slug: metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more
  title: 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much
    more'
  total: 2
severity: high
targets:
  analyst:
    name: Tier-2 analyst
    role: analyst
  endpoint:
    category: endpoint
    name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
    telemetry:
    - endpoint
  hunter:
    agent: true
    name: Hunt agent
  network:
    category: network
    name: Network telemetry
    telemetry:
    - network
  web:
    category: siem
    name: Web server / proxy logs
    telemetry:
    - network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---


# Perimeter Exploitation and NTLM Redirection

This hunt targets recent Metasploit module releases for perimeter software. It first identifies hosts running vulnerable software, then concurrently examines HTTP logs for known exploitation paths and network logs for anomalous outbound SMB traffic (port 445). An agent evaluates whether these signals coincide, suggesting a successful exploit that redirected authentication to an attacker-controlled listener.

## vulnerable-host-inventory
<!-- Identify vulnerable perimeter software -->
Scope the hunt to hosts running software mentioned in the Metasploit wrap-up.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping
~~~yaml
expected: A list of hosts running potentially vulnerable perimeter or development
  applications.
reads:
- device_hostname
- package_name
- package_version
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_software_inventory
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%flowise%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%gitlab%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%netscaler%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%secure%email%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%wordpress%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%openbullet%')
```

## parallel-evidence-gathering
<!-- Parallel evidence gathering -->
parallel:
- → perimeter-http-exploitation
- → smb-redirection-attempts
join: → incident-triage

## perimeter-http-exploitation
<!-- Hunt for exploitation URI patterns -->
Find HTTP requests hitting specific endpoints associated with recent RCE modules.

```sqlite target=web role=detection-candidate params=(target_uris=target_uris, lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: Requests to sensitive paths like /forgot-password in Flowise or CI lint
  in GitLab.
reads:
- device_hostname
- url_path
- http_method
- src_endpoint_ip
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_http_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, url_path, http_method, src_endpoint_ip, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{target_uris}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(url_path) LIKE '%/wp-content/plugins/bug-library/%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)
```

## smb-redirection-attempts
<!-- Outbound SMB connection baseline -->
Identify anomalous outbound SMB connections that may indicate NTLM hash disclosure.

```sqlite target=network role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
baseline:
  compare: first_seen
  window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Rare outbound port 445 connections from perimeter servers to external IPs.
prevalence:
  by: device_hostname
  key:
  - dst_endpoint_ip
  rare_below: 5
reads:
- device_hostname
- dst_endpoint_ip
- dst_endpoint_port
- direction
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) AS connections, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE dst_endpoint_port = 445 AND direction = 'outbound' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip HAVING connections < 5
```

## incident-triage
<!-- Weigh perimeter evidence -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- vulnerable-host-inventory
- perimeter-http-exploitation
- smb-redirection-attempts
max_iterations: 4
objective: Determine if the perimeter server was successfully exploited based on URI
  hits and subsequent outbound SMB activity.
success_criteria: A verdict of malicious if exploit URIs match outbound SMB redirections.
tools:
- endpoint
- network
- web
```

## remediation-decision
<!-- Decide on containment -->
if~: "the incident-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → isolate-target
indeterminate: → manual-validation
unavailable: → manual-validation (blind_spot: tls-encryption-blind-spot)
else: → close-out-report

## isolate-target
<!-- Isolate affected host -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the endpoint to stop outbound SMB NTLM relaying and further RCE execution.
```
→ manual-validation

## manual-validation
<!-- Analyst manual validation -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the HTTP paths and SMB destination IP. Check if the SMB traffic follows the HTTP POST request immediately. Determine if the destination IP has a reputation for hosting NTLM relay listeners.
```
→ close-out-report

## close-out-report
<!-- Close out hunt report -->
```manual target=analyst
Summarize the findings. If Benign, record the URI hits as false positives for tuning. If Malicious, escalate to Incident Response.
```
→ end
