{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "The harvesting of passport scans and biometrics is a critical precursor to high-impact identity theft and initial access. Detecting these interactions early allows for the revocation of identities before they are used to breach the environment."
      },
      "name": "PII Harvesting and Remote Service Abuse",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1566",
        "attack.t1133",
        "initial access"
      ],
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "unusual-geo-remote-signin",
          "reason": "This hunt specifically links the sign-in to the preceding PII harvesting interaction; a general geo-anomaly hunt is a sibling but lacks the causative chain.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "category": "identity",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single rule on large uploads or rare DNS would be too noisy. This hunt correlates the temporal relationship between visiting a suspicious domain, performing a large upload, and the subsequent appearance of auth anomalies, providing the context an analyst needs to confirm identity theft.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "phishing-redirection-and-seo",
          "steps": [
            "dns-leads",
            "evaluate-leads"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "pii-biometric-harvesting",
          "steps": [
            "pii-upload-check"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "unauthorized-remote-access",
          "steps": [
            "remote-access-check",
            "final-triage"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Redirection via Copycat Phishing and SEO",
            "slug": "phishing-redirection-and-seo",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1566"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Copycat visa portals",
              "Fake travel permit sites",
              "Malicious search ranking links",
              "Redirections to suspicious domains"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "PII and Biometric Harvesting",
            "slug": "pii-biometric-harvesting",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1566"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "HTTP POST requests to unauthorized domains",
              "Upload of passport scans",
              "Upload of selfies or video-face scans",
              "Data submission to intermediary sites"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Unauthorized Access via Stolen ID",
            "slug": "unauthorized-remote-access",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1133"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Logins to VPN or Citrix gateways using stolen credentials",
              "Remote service authentication from unfamiliar locations",
              "Password resets using harvested PII",
              "Account unlock attempts"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Adversaries use copycat phishing sites and SEO poisoning to lure users into uploading sensitive identification documents, such as passports and biometrics, to fake visa or travel portals. This harvested personally identifiable information (PII) is subsequently used to bypass security measures, commit identity fraud, or gain unauthorized access to accounts through external-facing remote services."
      },
      "severity": "medium",
      "rationale": "Focus on users in departments that frequently handle international travel or visa documentation. Prioritize hosts with rare DNS resolutions matching travel-themed keywords.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has redirected users to a copycat visa or identity portal to harvest passport scans and selfies, then used the stolen identities to authenticate to external remote services from unusual locations.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Hostnames to narrow follow-on queries after the lead identifies potential victims."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine for the lead and subsequent activities."
        },
        "upload_min_bytes": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "100000",
          "description": "Minimum body size in bytes for an HTTP POST to be considered a document or biometric upload (100KB)."
        },
        "identity_themed_domains": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/privacy/is-it-safe-upload-passport-id-online/",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-16"
          },
          "type": "list[domain]",
          "default": [
            "uk-visa-portal.com",
            "visa-verify-status.online",
            "identity-check-portal.net",
            "passport-verification.io",
            "travel-permit-gov.info"
          ],
          "description": "List of domains suspected of being copycat visa or identity portals."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/privacy/is-it-safe-upload-passport-id-online/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/privacy/is-it-safe-upload-passport-id-online/",
          "name": "ESET Research \u2014 Is it safe to upload my passport or ID online?"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "no-dns-telemetry",
          "risk": "An attacker using DNS-over-HTTPS would bypass the lead query, making the harvesting interaction invisible.",
          "stage": "phishing-redirection-and-seo",
          "question": "whether the initial redirection to the portal occurred via DoH or a non-enrolled resolver",
          "requires": "hb_dns_activity from the endpoint or resolver"
        },
        {
          "id": "encrypted-traffic-blind-spot",
          "risk": "Without TLS inspection, the query relies entirely on body length as a proxy for biometric upload, increasing false positives from legitimate encrypted traffic.",
          "stage": "pii-biometric-harvesting",
          "question": "whether the POST request body actually contained an image or passport scan",
          "requires": "TLS inspection on hb_http_activity"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "PII Harvesting and Remote Service Abuse",
    "description": "This hunt identifies the progression from initial phishing redirection to credential abuse. It starts by finding rare DNS lookups to domains that mimic legitimate travel or identity portals. If an agent confirms these domains are suspicious, the hunt scopes to those hosts to find large HTTP POST requests (indicative of image uploads) and subsequent authentication anomalies on VPN or Citrix gateways. An analyst then weighs the complete chain to confirm a compromise."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "phishing-redirection-and-seo",
            "steps": [
              "dns-leads",
              "evaluate-leads"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "pii-biometric-harvesting",
            "steps": [
              "pii-upload-check"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "unauthorized-remote-access",
            "steps": [
              "remote-access-check",
              "final-triage"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has redirected users to a copycat visa or identity portal to harvest passport scans and selfies, then used the stolen identities to authenticate to external remote services from unusual locations.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "no-dns-telemetry",
            "risk": "An attacker using DNS-over-HTTPS would bypass the lead query, making the harvesting interaction invisible.",
            "stage": "phishing-redirection-and-seo",
            "question": "whether the initial redirection to the portal occurred via DoH or a non-enrolled resolver",
            "requires": "hb_dns_activity from the endpoint or resolver"
          },
          {
            "id": "encrypted-traffic-blind-spot",
            "risk": "Without TLS inspection, the query relies entirely on body length as a proxy for biometric upload, increasing false positives from legitimate encrypted traffic.",
            "stage": "pii-biometric-harvesting",
            "question": "whether the POST request body actually contained an image or passport scan",
            "requires": "TLS inspection on hb_http_activity"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Focus on users in departments that frequently handle international travel or visa documentation. Prioritize hosts with rare DNS resolutions matching travel-themed keywords.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single rule on large uploads or rare DNS would be too noisy. This hunt correlates the temporal relationship between visiting a suspicious domain, performing a large upload, and the subsequent appearance of auth anomalies, providing the context an analyst needs to confirm identity theft."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "dns-leads",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "DNS lookups to identity copycat domains",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS lookup_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{identity_themed_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostname ORDER BY lookup_count ASC",
        "surface": "hb_dns_activity",
        "description": "Identify hosts that visited domains mimicking legitimate visa or identity portals.",
        "expected_signal": "A small number of hosts visiting a domain that is visually or semantically similar to a government portal. Silence suggests no interaction with these specific copycats."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "DNS lookups to identity copycat domains",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "query_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_dns_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS lookup_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{identity_themed_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostname ORDER BY lookup_count ASC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A small number of hosts visiting a domain that is visually or semantically similar to a government portal. Silence suggests no interaction with these specific copycats.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "query_hostname"
          ],
          "rare_below": 5
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "evaluate-leads",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate domain legitimacy",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "dns-leads"
        ],
        "objective": "Examine the DNS hits; identify if any queried hostnames are likely copycats or fake portals based on the report parameters.",
        "description": "Determine if any domains visited in the lead query appear to be illegitimate harvesting portals.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A verdict per domain on whether it is a suspected copycat phishing site.",
        "success_criteria": "A list of suspicious domains and the hosts that visited them."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "dns-leads"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate: Proceed with expensive scouting?",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the evaluate-leads verdict classifies at least one domain as suspicious",
        "condition": "the evaluate-leads verdict classifies at least one domain as suspicious",
        "blind_spot": "no-dns-telemetry",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Stop the hunt early if no suspicious portal interaction is confirmed.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-leads"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "pii-upload-check",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Potential PII uploads via HTTP POST",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, request_body_len, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE http_method = 'POST' AND request_body_len > {{upload_min_bytes}} AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Find large outbound POST requests that may represent passport scans or biometric uploads.",
        "expected_signal": "POST requests over 100KB to suspicious or rare domains following the DNS lead hit. Silence suggests no large data was transmitted to the suspected portals."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Potential PII uploads via HTTP POST",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "url_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "request_body_len",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, request_body_len, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE http_method = 'POST' AND request_body_len > {{upload_min_bytes}} AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "POST requests over 100KB to suspicious or rare domains following the DNS lead hit. Silence suggests no large data was transmitted to the suspected portals.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "remote-access-check",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Anomalous remote service sign-ins",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_location_country, logon_type, status, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE (logon_type IN ('Remote Interactive', 'Network') OR activity_id = 5) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time DESC",
        "surface": "hb_auth_signin",
        "description": "Identify unauthorized access to gateways using credentials likely stolen via the harvesting site.",
        "expected_signal": "Sign-ins from unfamiliar locations or unusual protocols for the users identified in the scoping phase."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "Anomalous remote service sign-ins",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "actor_user_name",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "src_location_country",
          "logon_type",
          "status",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_auth_signin",
        "target": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_location_country, logon_type, status, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE (logon_type IN ('Remote Interactive', 'Network') OR activity_id = 5) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time DESC",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Sign-ins from unfamiliar locations or unusual protocols for the users identified in the scoping phase.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "final-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Correlate harvesting and access anomalies",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "evaluate-leads",
          "pii-upload-check",
          "remote-access-check"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if users who visited the suspicious portals also performed large uploads and subsequently experienced anomalous remote authentication events.",
        "description": "Verify if the DNS visit, HTTP upload, and auth anomalies form a single attack chain per host.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict linking the phishing interaction to a potential remote access compromise.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign citing specific DNS, HTTP, and Auth rows."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "pii-upload-check",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "remote-access-check",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "outcome-route",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route based on compromise",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the final-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host and user",
        "condition": "the final-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host and user",
        "blind_spot": "encrypted-traffic-blind-spot",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Initiate containment for confirmed malicious chains.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "final-triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "contain-and-reset",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate host and revoke session",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Prevent further unauthorized access and stop potential data exfiltration.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the identified host and revoke all active cloud/VPN sessions for the affected user. Force a password reset.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "outcome-route",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst manual review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the correlated chain and assess if additional PII was leaked.",
        "instructions": "Review the DNS query times against the HTTP POST request times. Confirm if the remote access originated from a known malicious IP or unusual geographic region."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "outcome-route",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "outcome-route",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "contain-and-reset"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document findings and update blocklists.",
        "instructions": "Record the identified malicious domains for perimeter blocking and document the host/user combinations examined."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "outcome-route",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}