{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "With exploitation occurring within three days of disclosure on average, organizations cannot wait for a patching window; a negative result over vulnerable assets is the only way to confirm a breach has not already occurred."
      },
      "name": "Rapid Vulnerability Exploitation and Remote Access",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1190",
        "attack.t1021.001",
        "attack.t1486",
        "impact",
        "initial access",
        "lateral movement"
      ],
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "unauthenticated-web-exploit-crashes",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on access and encryption; monitoring for application crashes (T1190) following unauthenticated requests is a sibling hunt.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        },
        "identity": {
          "name": "Identity / sign-in telemetry",
          "category": "identity",
          "telemetry": [
            "identity"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single detection rule triggers on an RDP login; this hunt correlates the high-risk state of a host (critical vulnerability) with the subsequent behavioral indicators of breach (rare IP login and file volume) across three surfaces, providing context an automated rule lacks.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "initial-access-exploit-public-facing",
          "steps": [
            "vulnerability-lead",
            "evaluate-lead"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "lateral-movement-rdp-access",
          "steps": [
            "rare-rdp-logins"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "impact-data-encryption",
          "steps": [
            "file-activity-spikes"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Exploitation of Public-Facing Applications",
            "slug": "initial-access-exploit-public-facing",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1190"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "exploitation of high-severity vulnerabilities (CVSS 9+) within 3-7 days of disclosure",
              "unauthenticated access to internet-facing services",
              "exploit attempts targeting web servers or network devices",
              "application crashes following failed exploit attempts"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Unauthorized Remote Desktop Access",
            "slug": "lateral-movement-rdp-access",
            "tactic": "lateral-movement",
            "techniques": [
              "T1021.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections on port 3389",
              "Logon Type 10 (Remote Interactive) events",
              "Internet-exposed RDP services",
              "authentication attempts following underground forum access sales"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Ransomware and Data Encryption",
            "slug": "impact-data-encryption",
            "tactic": "impact",
            "techniques": [
              "T1486"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "high-volume file modifications and renames",
              "creation of ransom notes",
              "deployment of encryption utilities",
              "anti-malware detections for ransomware families"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Attackers are exploiting high-severity vulnerabilities in public-facing applications within an average of three days of disclosure, with nearly 80% of targets requiring no authentication. These campaigns frequently leverage Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement or access monetization, often resulting in ransomware deployment and data encryption."
      },
      "severity": "medium",
      "rationale": "Start with servers and internet-facing assets identified in hb_vulnerability_finding with Severity 5. Use the device_uid to identify specific hosts and ensure their hostnames are included in scope_hosts for the behavioral checks.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has exploited a high-severity vulnerability within the first 72 hours of disclosure to gain initial access, subsequently establishing RDP persistence or initiating ransomware encryption.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "analyst-defined",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2026-10-21"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Specific hostnames identified in the scoping phase to focus the behavioral queries."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "rapid7-q3-2026",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-10-21"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine, covering the critical window after vulnerability disclosure."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-q3-2026-threat-update-attackers-exploiting-vulnerabilities-within-3-days",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-q3-2026-threat-update-attackers-exploiting-vulnerabilities-within-3-days",
          "name": "Rapid7 \u2014 Q3 2026 Threat Update"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "unscanned-assets",
          "risk": "A host without a recent scan may be exploited before its vulnerability is even known to this hunt.",
          "stage": "initial-access-exploit-public-facing",
          "question": "Which hosts have critical vulnerabilities but have not been scanned recently?",
          "requires": "hb_vulnerability_finding with comprehensive fleet coverage"
        },
        {
          "id": "rdp-log-retention",
          "risk": "Attackers who established access several weeks ago through a vulnerability disclosure will not be seen if logs have rotated.",
          "stage": "lateral-movement-rdp-access",
          "question": "Did an RDP login occur before the current log retention window?",
          "requires": "hb_auth_signin retention longer than the exploit window"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Rapid Vulnerability Exploitation and Remote Access",
    "description": "Research indicates that attackers now exploit critical vulnerabilities within an average of three days from public disclosure. This hunt identifies hosts exposed to critical vulnerabilities and gates intensive behavioral monitoring for those specific assets. It monitors for rare external RDP connections\u2014often sold on underground forums\u2014and high-volume file modifications characteristic of early-stage ransomware impact."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "initial-access-exploit-public-facing",
            "steps": [
              "vulnerability-lead",
              "evaluate-lead"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "lateral-movement-rdp-access",
            "steps": [
              "rare-rdp-logins"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "impact-data-encryption",
            "steps": [
              "file-activity-spikes"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has exploited a high-severity vulnerability within the first 72 hours of disclosure to gain initial access, subsequently establishing RDP persistence or initiating ransomware encryption.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "unscanned-assets",
            "risk": "A host without a recent scan may be exploited before its vulnerability is even known to this hunt.",
            "stage": "initial-access-exploit-public-facing",
            "question": "Which hosts have critical vulnerabilities but have not been scanned recently?",
            "requires": "hb_vulnerability_finding with comprehensive fleet coverage"
          },
          {
            "id": "rdp-log-retention",
            "risk": "Attackers who established access several weeks ago through a vulnerability disclosure will not be seen if logs have rotated.",
            "stage": "lateral-movement-rdp-access",
            "question": "Did an RDP login occur before the current log retention window?",
            "requires": "hb_auth_signin retention longer than the exploit window"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start with servers and internet-facing assets identified in hb_vulnerability_finding with Severity 5. Use the device_uid to identify specific hosts and ensure their hostnames are included in scope_hosts for the behavioral checks.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single detection rule triggers on an RDP login; this hunt correlates the high-risk state of a host (critical vulnerability) with the subsequent behavioral indicators of breach (rare IP login and file volume) across three surfaces, providing context an automated rule lacks."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "vulnerability-lead",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Recently discovered critical vulnerabilities",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, resource_uid, cve_uid, title, severity FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE severity_id = 5 AND status != 'suppressed' AND resource_type = 'host'",
        "surface": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "description": "Identify hosts currently reporting critical vulnerabilities (Severity 5) to prioritize the hunt on the most likely targets for rapid exploitation.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of hosts and their associated critical vulnerabilities. Silence proves no critical vulnerabilities are currently detected on scanned assets."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Recently discovered critical vulnerabilities",
        "reads": [
          "device_uid",
          "resource_uid",
          "cve_uid",
          "title",
          "severity_id",
          "status",
          "resource_type"
        ],
        "source": "hb_vulnerability_finding",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_uid, resource_uid, cve_uid, title, severity FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE severity_id = 5 AND status != 'suppressed' AND resource_type = 'host'",
        "silence": "evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of hosts and their associated critical vulnerabilities. Silence proves no critical vulnerabilities are currently detected on scanned assets.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "evaluate-lead",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate vulnerability risk",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity"
        ],
        "context": [
          "vulnerability-lead"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if any hosts in the vulnerability-lead results have critical, unmitigated exposures that could be exploited without user interaction.",
        "description": "The agent reviews the lead findings to determine if any identified vulnerabilities pose an immediate risk that warrants expensive behavioral queries.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A verdict on whether to proceed with behavioral monitoring based on the vulnerability profile.",
        "success_criteria": "A recommendation to proceed to behavioral monitoring for specific high-risk hosts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vulnerability-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate-on-risk",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate on vulnerability risk",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the evaluate-lead verdict identifies at least one host with critical exposure requiring behavioral monitoring",
        "condition": "the evaluate-lead verdict identifies at least one host with critical exposure requiring behavioral monitoring",
        "blind_spot": "unscanned-assets",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Avoid running high-volume behavioral queries across the entire estate if no critical vulnerability exposure is present.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "evaluate-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-rdp-logins",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare external RDP logins",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, GROUP_CONCAT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS affected_hosts FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE activity_id = 1 AND (logon_type_id = 10 OR logon_type = 'Remote Interactive') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip HAVING host_count < 3",
        "surface": "hb_auth_signin",
        "description": "Search for RDP connections (Logon Type 10) from source IPs that are rare across the fleet, which may indicate unauthorized access sold on underground forums.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of rare source IPs that have logged into vulnerable hosts. Silence proves no rare RDP activity occurred in the window."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-risk",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare external RDP logins",
        "reads": [
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "device_hostname",
          "activity_id",
          "logon_type_id",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_auth_signin",
        "target": "identity",
        "content": "SELECT src_endpoint_ip, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen, GROUP_CONCAT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS affected_hosts FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE activity_id = 1 AND (logon_type_id = 10 OR logon_type = 'Remote Interactive') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY src_endpoint_ip HAVING host_count < 3",
        "silence": "evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A list of rare source IPs that have logged into vulnerable hosts. Silence proves no rare RDP activity occurred in the window.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "src_endpoint_ip"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "file-activity-spikes",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "High-volume file activity",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, COUNT(*) AS file_ops, GROUP_CONCAT(DISTINCT LOWER(file_path)) AS sample_paths FROM hb_file_activity WHERE activity_id IN (1, 4, 5) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname HAVING file_ops > 1000 ORDER BY file_ops DESC",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Detect potential ransomware impact by finding hosts with abnormal spikes in file creation, deletion, or modification events.",
        "expected_signal": "Hosts performing high-volume file operations. Silence proves no massive destructive file activity occurred on vulnerable hosts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-risk",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "High-volume file activity",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "activity_id",
          "file_path",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, COUNT(*) AS file_ops, GROUP_CONCAT(DISTINCT LOWER(file_path)) AS sample_paths FROM hb_file_activity WHERE activity_id IN (1, 4, 5) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname HAVING file_ops > 1000 ORDER BY file_ops DESC",
        "silence": "evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Hosts performing high-volume file operations. Silence proves no massive destructive file activity occurred on vulnerable hosts.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-18"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-compromise",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage compromise evidence",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "identity"
        ],
        "context": [
          "evaluate-lead",
          "rare-rdp-logins",
          "file-activity-spikes"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the rare RDP logins or file spikes on vulnerable hosts constitute an active breach or ransomware event.",
        "description": "A final agent evaluates the combined evidence of vulnerability exposure, rare RDP logins, and file spikes to determine if an intrusion is active.",
        "max_iterations": 5,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict citing specific evidence of compromise.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "rare-rdp-logins",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "file-activity-spikes",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-on-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on final verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage-compromise verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage-compromise verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "rdp-log-retention",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the hunt based on the triage agent's findings, prioritizing containment for malicious results.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-compromise"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate compromised host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Immediately disconnect a malicious host to stop lateral movement or further data encryption.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host(s) identified as malicious. Revoke active RDP sessions and reset credentials for any accounts logged into from rare external IPs.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "manual-investigation",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Manual investigation",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "An analyst reviews the behavioral evidence to confirm the exploit path and assess for any missing telemetry.",
        "instructions": "Review the cited rows from triage. Check hb_application_error for application crashes occurring near the logon times on vulnerable hosts to identify potential exploit attempts."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-risk",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate-on-risk",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Finalize the hunt, record findings, and recommend remediation for any unexploited vulnerabilities.",
        "instructions": "Document all findings. If critical vulnerabilities remain unpatched, prioritize their remediation within the 7-day window. Record any hosts identified in scoping that lacked endpoint telemetry."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-on-risk",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-on-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "manual-investigation"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}