{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "promote-to-detection",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "The use of a rebranded open-source VPN bridge allows an attacker to maintain a high-bandwidth, long-term persistence channel that bypasses standard malware signatures. Identifying these tunnels is critical for preventing persistent data exfiltration."
      },
      "name": "Rebranded SoftEther VPN Tunneling",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1036.005",
        "attack.t1027.005",
        "attack.t1027.013",
        "attack.t1133",
        "attack.t1071",
        "attack.t1090.001",
        "attack.t1140",
        "attack.t1587.001",
        "attack.t1599",
        "attack.t1686.003",
        "command and control",
        "defense evasion",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "targets": {
        "web": {
          "name": "Web server / proxy logs",
          "category": "siem",
          "telemetry": [
            "network"
          ]
        },
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A simple detection rule would only find the file name netcapa.exe; this hunt correlates that metadata with persistent service activity, unique configuration file names, and masqueraded network behavior to confirm a targeted Webworm intrusion.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "modified-binary-execution",
          "steps": [
            "inventory-scoping",
            "vpn-bridge-persistence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "defense-evasion-config",
          "steps": [
            "rare-process-metadata",
            "encrypted-config-lookup"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "custom-c2-communication",
          "steps": [
            "masqueraded-c2-traffic"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Modified VPN Bridge Execution",
            "slug": "modified-binary-execution",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1036.005",
              "T1133",
              "T1587.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "netcapa.exe",
              "SEVPNBRIDGE",
              "Network Monitor Software",
              "Network Systems Solutions Inc.",
              "vpnbridge.pdb",
              "4, 44, 0, 9807"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Internal Rebranding and Encrypted Config",
            "slug": "defense-evasion-config",
            "tactic": "defense-evasion",
            "techniques": [
              "T1027.005",
              "T1027.013",
              "T1140"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "setting.conf",
              "RCEN",
              "NtMonitor VPN",
              "SoftEther Project",
              "hamcore.se2"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Custom C2 Tunneling",
            "slug": "custom-c2-communication",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1071",
              "T1090.001",
              "T1599"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "/update/alive.cgi",
              "/update/picture.cgi",
              "AS 20473",
              "image/jpeg",
              "89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a 00 00 00 0d 49 48 44 52"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "Webworm (China-aligned APT) has modified the open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge into a custom variant known as 'NtMonitor' to maintain stealthy persistence. The actor rebrands the binary metadata, encrypts the configuration files, and alters the network handshake and HTTP endpoints to evade standard VPN detection signatures."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Start by examining systems with Network Systems Solutions Inc in their software inventory. Focus on external-facing servers where a VPN bridge would logically be deployed to provide ingress.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An intruder has established a persistent, covert tunnel by deploying a customized SoftEther VPN bridge that masquerades as legitimate network monitor software using modified PE metadata and encrypted configuration files.",
      "parameters": {
        "c2_paths": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-spying-on-governments-no-malware-custom-webworms-toolkit-softether-bridge",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-19"
          },
          "type": "list[path]",
          "default": [
            "/update/alive.cgi",
            "/update/picture.cgi"
          ],
          "description": "Masqueraded HTTP endpoints used by the custom VPN protocol."
        },
        "fake_vendor": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-spying-on-governments-no-malware-custom-webworms-toolkit-softether-bridge",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2026-11-19"
          },
          "type": "string",
          "default": "Network Systems Solutions Inc",
          "description": "The fake company name used in the tool PE metadata."
        },
        "scope_hosts": {
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "Narrow the hunt to specific hosts; leave empty for the entire estate."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-spying-on-governments-no-malware-custom-webworms-toolkit-softether-bridge",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint",
            "critic"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-spying-on-governments-no-malware-custom-webworms-toolkit-softether-bridge",
          "name": "Rapid7 \u2014 Spying on Governments with Zero Lines of Malware"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "encrypted-tls",
          "risk": "If the SoftEther bridge uses HTTPS and traffic is not decrypted at the sensor, the URL paths will be invisible.",
          "stage": "custom-c2-communication",
          "question": "whether the custom CGI paths are visible in HTTPS sessions",
          "requires": "TLS inspection on hb_http_activity",
          "remediation": "Enable TLS inspection for outbound traffic to unknown IP spaces."
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "Rebranded SoftEther VPN Tunneling",
    "description": "This hunt targets the NtMonitor variant of SoftEther VPN attributed to the Webworm APT. The actor rebrands the open-source tool as Network Monitor Software and uses masqueraded HTTP endpoints like /update/alive.cgi for C2. The hunt starts by identifying potential target hosts via software inventory, then fans out to find persistence through services, rare process metadata matching the actor's rebranding, the presence of the unique setting.conf encrypted configuration file, and custom HTTP URI paths. An agent triages these results to distinguish between legitimate network tools and the Webworm toolkit."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "modified-binary-execution",
            "steps": [
              "inventory-scoping",
              "vpn-bridge-persistence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "defense-evasion-config",
            "steps": [
              "rare-process-metadata",
              "encrypted-config-lookup"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "custom-c2-communication",
            "steps": [
              "masqueraded-c2-traffic"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An intruder has established a persistent, covert tunnel by deploying a customized SoftEther VPN bridge that masquerades as legitimate network monitor software using modified PE metadata and encrypted configuration files.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "encrypted-tls",
            "risk": "If the SoftEther bridge uses HTTPS and traffic is not decrypted at the sensor, the URL paths will be invisible.",
            "stage": "custom-c2-communication",
            "question": "whether the custom CGI paths are visible in HTTPS sessions",
            "requires": "TLS inspection on hb_http_activity",
            "remediation": "Enable TLS inspection for outbound traffic to unknown IP spaces."
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Start by examining systems with Network Systems Solutions Inc in their software inventory. Focus on external-facing servers where a VPN bridge would logically be deployed to provide ingress.",
        "beyond_detection": "A simple detection rule would only find the file name netcapa.exe; this hunt correlates that metadata with persistent service activity, unique configuration file names, and masqueraded network behavior to confirm a targeted Webworm intrusion."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "inventory-scoping",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Software Inventory Scoping",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, vendor_name, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(vendor_name) LIKE '%' || LOWER('{{fake_vendor}}') || '%' OR package_version = '4.44.0.9807')",
        "surface": "hb_software_inventory",
        "description": "Identify hosts running software with the actor's fake vendor name or the specific version of SoftEther used in the build.",
        "expected_signal": "Hosts with software attributed to the fake vendor or the exact version identified in the research. None proves this specific package is not registered in the inventory."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Software Inventory Scoping",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "vendor_name",
          "package_name",
          "package_version"
        ],
        "source": "hb_software_inventory",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, vendor_name, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(vendor_name) LIKE '%' || LOWER('{{fake_vendor}}') || '%' OR package_version = '4.44.0.9807')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Hosts with software attributed to the fake vendor or the exact version identified in the research. None proves this specific package is not registered in the inventory.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-20"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "vpn-bridge-persistence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "VPN Bridge Service Persistence",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, service_name, service_cmd_line, time FROM hb_service_activity WHERE (LOWER(service_name) = 'sevpnbridge' OR LOWER(service_cmd_line) LIKE '%netcapa.exe%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_service_activity",
        "description": "Find the persistent service installed by the actor, which often retains the original SoftEther service name.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows naming the SEVPNBRIDGE service or the netcapa.exe binary in the command line."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "inventory-scoping"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "VPN Bridge Service Persistence",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "service_name",
          "service_cmd_line",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_service_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, service_name, service_cmd_line, time FROM hb_service_activity WHERE (LOWER(service_name) = 'sevpnbridge' OR LOWER(service_cmd_line) LIKE '%netcapa.exe%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows naming the SEVPNBRIDGE service or the netcapa.exe binary in the command line.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-20"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "rare-process-metadata",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Rare Processes with Actor Metadata",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_original_file_name) = 'netcapa.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%netcapa.exe') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY path HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Stack-count processes using the netcapa.exe OriginalFileName to find rare deployments that deviate from fleet baseline.",
        "expected_signal": "A process binary seen on very few hosts. Stock network tools would appear across many servers, whereas the intruder's build is likely rare."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "inventory-scoping"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Rare Processes with Actor Metadata",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_path",
          "process_original_file_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_original_file_name) = 'netcapa.exe' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%netcapa.exe') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY path HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "A process binary seen on very few hosts. Stock network tools would appear across many servers, whereas the intruder's build is likely rare.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "process_path"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-20"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "masqueraded-c2-traffic",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Masqueraded HTTP C2 Traffic",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_path, url_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_http_activity",
        "description": "Identify outbound HTTP traffic to the specific CGI endpoints used by the custom SoftEther protocol.",
        "expected_signal": "Connections to /update/alive.cgi or /update/picture.cgi. Silence may mean traffic is encrypted and requires the blind spot note."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "inventory-scoping"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Masqueraded HTTP C2 Traffic",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "url_path",
          "url_hostname",
          "src_endpoint_ip",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_http_activity",
        "target": "web",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, url_path, url_hostname, src_endpoint_ip, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_paths}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Connections to /update/alive.cgi or /update/picture.cgi. Silence may mean traffic is encrypted and requires the blind spot note.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-20"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "encrypted-config-lookup",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Encrypted Config File Presence",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, file_path, file_name, time FROM hb_file_activity WHERE LOWER(file_name) = 'setting.conf' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_file_activity",
        "description": "Find the presence of the setting.conf file which contains the actor's custom encrypted configuration.",
        "expected_signal": "The creation or access of setting.conf, particularly in a directory containing netcapa.exe."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "inventory-scoping"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Encrypted Config File Presence",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "file_path",
          "file_name",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_file_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, file_path, file_name, time FROM hb_file_activity WHERE LOWER(file_name) = 'setting.conf' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "The creation or access of setting.conf, particularly in a directory containing netcapa.exe.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-20"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "triage-findings",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Triage VPN Findings",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint",
          "web"
        ],
        "context": [
          "vpn-bridge-persistence",
          "rare-process-metadata",
          "masqueraded-c2-traffic",
          "encrypted-config-lookup"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the evidence matches the NtMonitor variant of SoftEther VPN used by Webworm, specifically focusing on the combination of netcapa.exe, SEVPNBRIDGE, and the custom HTTP paths.",
        "description": "Correlate service, process, and network evidence to determine if a host is running the Webworm VPN variant.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict citing rows.",
        "success_criteria": "A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "vpn-bridge-persistence",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "rare-process-metadata",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "masqueraded-c2-traffic",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "encrypted-config-lookup",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "route-verdict",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route on Verdict",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "encrypted-tls",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Decide the next step based on the agent's confidence in the findings.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "triage-findings"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-beachhead",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate Beachhead",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Cut off the persistent VPN tunnel and prevent further lateral movement.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host from the network. Collect the netcapa.exe binary and setting.conf for forensic analysis and potential decryption of the bridge target IP.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "manual-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Manual Forensic Review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Verify the presence of 'NtMonitor' strings and the RCEN magic bytes in the configuration.",
        "instructions": "Inspect the collected binary for the pdb path vpnbridge.pdb and check setting.conf for the RCEN magic bytes. Use the Rapid7 python script to attempt decryption of the cascade target IP."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-beachhead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Hunt Close-out",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Document results and promote durable signals to detection rules.",
        "instructions": "Record the findings. If confirmed, promote the netcapa.exe OriginalFileName check to a permanent detection rule."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "route-verdict",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "manual-review"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}