--- analysis: A simple rule triggers on a filename; this hunt correlates the absence of identity controls (MFA) with the prevalence-weighted execution of those tools across a scoped asset inventory, providing the context an analyst needs to confirm an intrusion. blind_spots: - id: mfa-reporting-gap question: whether MFA was actually bypassed or just not reported requires: VPN provider MFA status fields risk: Some providers do not export MFA status in authentication logs, which could lead to false positives if the hunt assumes absence of the field means absence of the control. stage: initial-access-external-remote-services - id: ephemeral-tooling question: whether the adversary used non-prevalent filenames requires: hb_process_activity or hb_file_activity risk: Adversaries often rename tools like AdaptixC2 components; the hunt relies on known filenames which may be rotated. stage: c2-red-team-tooling coverage: - stage: initial-access-external-remote-services status: covered steps: - find-vpn-endpoints - rare-unprotected-logons - stage: c2-red-team-tooling status: covered steps: - detect-implant-execution - reason: "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201CAI slowdown?\u201D\ ' series." stage: persistence-and-defense-evasion-patchers status: out_of_scope - reason: "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201CAI slowdown?\u201D\ ' series." stage: execution-ai-generated-scripts status: out_of_scope - reason: "Belongs to another part of the 'Should you care about an \u201CAI slowdown?\u201D\ ' series." stage: impact-double-extortion-ransomware status: out_of_scope guardrails: claims: no_unsupported evidence: citation_required missing_data: not_benign telemetry: untrusted hunt: applicability: campaign-specific handoff: promote-to-detection justification: External remote services are the primary entry point for the ransomware actors described in the Talos research. Validating that these services are protected by MFA and free of red-team implants is a critical baseline defense. methodology: model-assisted trigger: intel-report hypothesis: An intruder accessed the environment via an external remote service using a single-factor credential and deployed red-team framework implants to maintain command and control. labels: - hunt - attack.t1133 - attack.t1071.001 - attack.t1078 name: Remote access abuse and red-team implants parameters: lookback_days: default: '14' description: Days of history to examine for sign-ins and process execution. type: number malicious_filenames: default: - vid001.exe - wcinstaller_nonadmin.exe - secoh-qad.exe - aact.exe - content.js description: Implant and tool filenames identified in Talos telemetry. from: kind: article observed: '2026-09-17' ref: talos-ai-slowdown-2026 type: list[string] scope_hosts: default: [] description: Target hosts found in the scoping step; leave empty to hunt across the full estate. type: list[host] provenance: authors: - name: Huntbase hunt generation org: huntbase.io generated: by: huntbase-hunt-generation from: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown/ gates: - dry-run - lint model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview rationale: Start by identifying hosts running Cisco AnyConnect or other VPN software to narrow the scope of remote access investigations. references: - name: "Talos \u2014 Should you care about an AI slowdown?" url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown/ related: - hunt: lateral-movement-red-team-tools reason: This hunt focuses on initial access via VPN; lateral movement would require analysis of internal authentication and SMB traffic. relation: out-of-scope-alternative scenario: stages: - name: VPN Access and Credential Abuse observables: - External-facing VPN services - Administrative account logins - Sign-ins without multi-factor authentication (MFA) slug: initial-access-external-remote-services tactic: initial-access techniques: - T1133 - name: AdaptixC2 Command and Control observables: - AdaptixC2 framework - VID001.exe - WCInstaller_NonAdmin.exe - w32.9f1f11a708-100.sbx.tg - w32.c4dd71e347-95.sbx.tg slug: c2-red-team-tooling tactic: command-and-control techniques: - T1071 - name: System Patching and Bypass Tools observables: - SECOH-QAD.exe - AAct.exe - win.tool.procpatcher - w32.fed979f93b-95.sbx.tg slug: persistence-and-defense-evasion-patchers tactic: persistence techniques: - T1562 - name: AI-Driven Destructive Scripting observables: - content.js - w32.38d053135d-95.sbx.tg - LLM-generated destructive scripts slug: execution-ai-generated-scripts tactic: execution techniques: - T1059 - name: Data Encryption and Double Extortion observables: - Encryption of local and remote drives - Attempts to disable backup systems - Double-extortion communications slug: impact-double-extortion-ransomware tactic: impact techniques: - T1486 summary: The Qilin and The Gentlemen ransomware groups are targeting Japanese SMEs using a combination of AI-generated destructive scripts and the AdaptixC2 red-teaming framework. Initial access is typically gained via external remote services like VPNs, leading to lateral movement, data theft, and double-extortion ransomware attacks. series: index: 1 slug: should-you-care-about-an-ai-slowdown title: "Should you care about an \u201CAI slowdown?\u201D" total: 2 severity: high targets: analyst: name: Tier-2 analyst role: analyst endpoint: category: endpoint name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) telemetry: - endpoint hunter: agent: true name: Hunt agent identity: category: identity name: Identity / sign-in telemetry telemetry: - identity tlp: clear type: investigation --- # Remote access abuse and red-team implants This hunt examines the intersection of identity and endpoint security following research into ransomware actors that use AI-assisted scripts and red-team frameworks like AdaptixC2. The hunt first identifies hosts running VPN clients, then searches for successful sign-ins without multi-factor authentication and the execution of specific implants identified by Talos. An agent weighs these independent signals to identify potential beachheads where defensive fundamentals were bypassed. Analysts then review the findings to isolate confirmed threats. ## find-vpn-endpoints Identify the hosts most likely to be targets for external remote service abuse by looking for installed VPN clients. ```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping ~~~yaml expected: The query lists hosts running VPN clients. These hosts represent the primary attack surface for external access abuse. reads: - device_hostname - package_name - package_version - vendor_name silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_software_inventory verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-09-28' ~~~ SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version, vendor_name FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(vendor_name) LIKE '%cisco%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%anyconnect%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%secure client%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%vpn%') ``` ## parallel-leads parallel: - → rare-unprotected-logons - → detect-implant-execution join: → triage-verdict ## rare-unprotected-logons Find successful remote logons that lacked MFA and are rare across the fleet, suggesting a possible beachhead. ```sqlite target=identity role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts) ~~~yaml baseline: compare: first_seen window: '{{lookback_days}}d' expected: A row identifies a user and IP that logged in successfully without MFA to only one or two hosts. Fleet-wide logins are likely authorized exceptions. prevalence: by: device_hostname key: - actor_user_name - src_endpoint_ip rare_below: 3 reads: - actor_user_name - device_hostname - event_type - logon_type - mfa - src_endpoint_ip - status_id - time silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_auth_signin verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-09-28' ~~~ SELECT actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, device_hostname, logon_type, MIN(time) AS first_seen, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE (mfa = 'false' OR mfa IS NULL) AND status_id = 1 AND (LOWER(logon_type) IN ('remote interactive', 'network') OR LOWER(event_type) LIKE '%vpn%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip HAVING host_count <= 2 ``` ## detect-implant-execution Identify the execution of specific binaries and red-team tools used by ransomware actors. ```sqlite target=endpoint role=detection-candidate params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, malicious_filenames=malicious_filenames, scope_hosts=scope_hosts) ~~~yaml expected: Process events for known AdaptixC2 or Procpatcher filenames. Any hit on a host from the scoping step is a high-confidence lead. reads: - device_hostname - process_cmd_line - process_name - process_original_file_name - time - user_name silence: not_evidence_of_absence source: hb_process_activity verified: dry-run verified_at: '2026-09-28' ~~~ SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, process_original_file_name, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || LOWER('{{malicious_filenames}}') || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 OR instr(',' || LOWER('{{malicious_filenames}}') || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_original_file_name) || ',') > 0 OR instr(LOWER(process_cmd_line), 'content.js') > 0) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ``` ## triage-verdict ```agent target=hunter cite: required context: - rare-unprotected-logons - detect-implant-execution max_iterations: 4 objective: Determine if any host showing unprotected VPN sign-ins subsequently executed malicious binaries identified in the Talos report within a 24-hour window. success_criteria: A per-host verdict of malicious, suspicious, or benign based on temporal correlation between access and execution. tools: - endpoint - identity ``` ## route if~: "the triage verdict is malicious for at least one host correlating remote access and red-team tooling" (confidence: high, judge=hunter) then: → isolate-host indeterminate: → analyst-review unavailable: → analyst-review (blind_spot: mfa-reporting-gap) else: → close-out ## isolate-host ```action target=endpoint ~~~yaml approval: required ~~~ Isolate the host and revoke the credentials of the user account found in the sign-in query. Collect the malicious binary for further analysis. ``` → analyst-review ## analyst-review ```manual target=analyst Review the cited rows. Verify if the source IP of the sign-in is known-malicious or geolocates to an unusual region. Check for secondary persistence like new services or scheduled tasks. ``` → close-out ## close-out ```manual target=analyst Document the findings. If the hunt was negative, confirm that remote services are strictly following MFA policies and identify any administrative accounts that should be enrolled. ``` → end