{
  "hunt": {
    "meta": {
      "tlp": "clear",
      "hunt": {
        "handoff": "keep-as-periodic-hunt",
        "trigger": "intel-report",
        "methodology": "model-assisted",
        "applicability": "campaign-specific",
        "justification": "UAT-12643 utilizes signed binaries to bypass initial application allowlisting. A negative result across targeted host profiles confirms the environment is currently free of this actor's primary stager tradecraft."
      },
      "name": "UAT-12643 Stager Abuse and Registry Persistence",
      "type": "investigation",
      "labels": [
        "hunt",
        "attack.t1218",
        "attack.t1218.005",
        "attack.t1547.001",
        "attack.t1195.002",
        "attack.t1204.002",
        "collection",
        "command and control",
        "execution",
        "initial access",
        "persistence"
      ],
      "series": {
        "slug": "uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infoste",
        "index": 1,
        "title": "UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing",
        "total": 2
      },
      "related": [
        {
          "hunt": "collection-and-infostealing",
          "reason": "This hunt focuses on initial access and persistence; the infostealing and clipboard hijacking behaviors are handled by a separate behavioral hunt.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        },
        {
          "hunt": "c2-and-cloud-exfiltration",
          "reason": "Network C2 via Solana transactions and exfiltration to Discord/GoFile is handled by a network-heavy companion hunt.",
          "relation": "out-of-scope-alternative"
        }
      ],
      "targets": {
        "hunter": {
          "name": "Hunt agent",
          "agent": true
        },
        "analyst": {
          "name": "Tier-2 analyst",
          "role": "analyst"
        },
        "endpoint": {
          "name": "Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)",
          "category": "endpoint",
          "telemetry": [
            "endpoint"
          ]
        }
      },
      "analysis": "A single rule on certutil or MpCmdRun triggers excessive noise. This hunt uses a gated flow to first scope to targeted host software, then correlates the lead with fleet-wide binary rarity and specific masquerading (like RuntimeBroker in AppData) to confirm the threat.",
      "coverage": [
        {
          "stage": "weaponized-stager-delivery",
          "steps": [
            "scoping-targeted-software",
            "lolbin-stager-lead"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "lolbin-stager-execution",
          "steps": [
            "lolbin-stager-lead",
            "masqueraded-binary-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "persistence-via-masquerading",
          "steps": [
            "persistence-registry-check",
            "masqueraded-binary-prevalence"
          ],
          "status": "covered"
        },
        {
          "stage": "collection-and-infostealing",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        },
        {
          "stage": "c2-and-cloud-exfiltration",
          "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing' series.",
          "status": "out_of_scope"
        }
      ],
      "scenario": {
        "stages": [
          {
            "name": "Weaponized Stager Delivery",
            "slug": "weaponized-stager-delivery",
            "tactic": "initial-access",
            "techniques": [
              "T1204.002",
              "T1195.002"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "LNK files using document icons",
              "weaponized HTA files",
              "MSBuild XML project files (dl.xml)",
              "trojanized Viber or MicroSIP installers"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "LOLBin Stager Execution",
            "slug": "lolbin-stager-execution",
            "tactic": "execution",
            "techniques": [
              "T1218",
              "T1218.005"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile",
              "certutil -urlcache -f",
              "mshta.exe executing JavaScript",
              "msbuild.exe with C# CodeTaskFactory tasks",
              "RuntimeBroker.exe (masquerading downloaded payload)",
              "BITS/7.8 User-Agent string"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Persistence via Masquerading",
            "slug": "persistence-via-masquerading",
            "tactic": "persistence",
            "techniques": [
              "T1547.001"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "%APPDATA%\\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe",
              "Registry Run key 'MsgEdgeUpdate'",
              "FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN and FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM attributes"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "Infostealing and Collection",
            "slug": "collection-and-infostealing",
            "tactic": "collection",
            "techniques": [
              "T1115",
              "T1555"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Good Game Python infostealer",
              "clipboard polling loop every 500ms",
              "mutex 'UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc'",
              "screenshot PNG and webcam PNG in temporary directories"
            ]
          },
          {
            "name": "C2 and Cloud Exfiltration",
            "slug": "c2-and-cloud-exfiltration",
            "tactic": "command-and-control",
            "techniques": [
              "T1041",
              "T1090.003",
              "T1572"
            ],
            "observables": [
              "Solana blockchain transaction memo URLs",
              "gofile.io",
              "upload.gofile.io",
              "Discord webhooks",
              "41.216.188.11",
              "ports 5173, 5656, 5959",
              "ipwhois.app",
              "kora.pyc",
              "platform.system",
              "shutil.copy"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "summary": "North Korea-aligned actor UAT-12643 targets European finance, crypto, and VoIP users using weaponized LNK, HTA, and MSBuild stagers to deliver the Overlord RAT and a cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker. The campaign leverages Solana blockchain transaction memos for C2 resilience and exfiltrates data to GoFile.io via Discord webhooks."
      },
      "severity": "high",
      "rationale": "Scoping is essential to narrow the lead query to hosts running Viber or MicroSIP, as UAT-12643 specifically targets these softphone/messaging environments with trojanized installers.",
      "guardrails": {
        "claims": "no_unsupported",
        "evidence": "citation_required",
        "telemetry": "untrusted",
        "missing_data": "not_benign"
      },
      "hypothesis": "An adversary is using signed Windows binaries to stage payloads on hosts running targeted software, establishing persistence through masqueraded Edge updater binaries in user-writable paths.",
      "parameters": {
        "scope_hosts": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "analyst-entry",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-11-18"
          },
          "type": "list[host]",
          "default": [],
          "description": "List of hostnames identified in the scoping step; leave empty to run across the whole estate."
        },
        "lookback_days": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "hunt-standard",
            "kind": "manual",
            "observed": "2024-11-18"
          },
          "type": "number",
          "default": "14",
          "description": "Days of history to examine."
        },
        "malicious_filenames": {
          "from": {
            "ref": "talos-uat12643",
            "kind": "article",
            "observed": "2024-11-18"
          },
          "type": "list[string]",
          "default": [
            "RuntimeBroker.exe",
            "s.exe",
            "MsgEdgeUpdate.exe",
            "Ovl.exe",
            "Client.exe",
            "Ova.exe",
            "microsip-config.exe"
          ],
          "description": "Filenames observed in the UAT-12643 staging directory and persistence mechanisms."
        }
      },
      "provenance": {
        "authors": [
          {
            "org": "huntbase.io",
            "name": "Huntbase hunt generation"
          }
        ],
        "generated": {
          "by": "huntbase-hunt-generation",
          "from": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/",
          "gates": [
            "dry-run",
            "lint"
          ],
          "model": "hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview"
        }
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/",
          "name": "Cisco Talos \u2014 UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing"
        }
      ],
      "blind_spots": [
        {
          "id": "missing-process-telemetry",
          "risk": "If command-line arguments are not logged, the download behavior of LOLBins is indistinguishable from routine execution.",
          "stage": "lolbin-stager-execution",
          "question": "whether MpCmdRun was used to download a file",
          "requires": "hb_process_activity with command-line arguments"
        },
        {
          "id": "missing-registry-telemetry",
          "risk": "Hosts without registry write event logging will hide the creation of persistence mechanisms.",
          "stage": "persistence-via-masquerading",
          "question": "whether the MsgEdgeUpdate run key was created",
          "requires": "hb_registry_activity with set-value logging"
        },
        {
          "id": "msbuild-in-memory-compilation",
          "risk": "The MSBuild downloader leaves no file on disk, making it invisible to file-based scanners and standard process-path monitors.",
          "stage": "lolbin-stager-execution",
          "question": "whether MSBuild compiled and executed C# directly in memory",
          "requires": "AMSI logs or memory scan"
        }
      ]
    },
    "name": "UAT-12643 Stager Abuse and Registry Persistence",
    "description": "This hunt identifies the execution of Living-off-the-Land Binaries used by UAT-12643 to download and stage malware. It begins by scoping hosts with targeted messaging and VoIP software, then lead-queries for certutil, MpCmdRun, and MSBuild abuse. If suspicious stagers are found, the hunt fans out to correlate these with rare binaries in user-profile directories and the specific registry run key 'MsgEdgeUpdate'. An agent synthesizes the staging and persistence evidence to route high-confidence hits to host isolation."
  },
  "nodes": [
    {
      "id": "hypothesis",
      "type": "hypothesis",
      "label": "Hypothesis",
      "config": {
        "tags": [],
        "series": {
          "slug": "uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infoste",
          "index": 1,
          "title": "UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing",
          "total": 2
        },
        "coverage": [
          {
            "stage": "weaponized-stager-delivery",
            "steps": [
              "scoping-targeted-software",
              "lolbin-stager-lead"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "lolbin-stager-execution",
            "steps": [
              "lolbin-stager-lead",
              "masqueraded-binary-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "persistence-via-masquerading",
            "steps": [
              "persistence-registry-check",
              "masqueraded-binary-prevalence"
            ],
            "status": "covered"
          },
          {
            "stage": "collection-and-infostealing",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          },
          {
            "stage": "c2-and-cloud-exfiltration",
            "reason": "Belongs to another part of the 'UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing' series.",
            "status": "out_of_scope"
          }
        ],
        "rationale": "An adversary is using signed Windows binaries to stage payloads on hosts running targeted software, establishing persistence through masqueraded Edge updater binaries in user-writable paths.",
        "blind_spots": [
          {
            "id": "missing-process-telemetry",
            "risk": "If command-line arguments are not logged, the download behavior of LOLBins is indistinguishable from routine execution.",
            "stage": "lolbin-stager-execution",
            "question": "whether MpCmdRun was used to download a file",
            "requires": "hb_process_activity with command-line arguments"
          },
          {
            "id": "missing-registry-telemetry",
            "risk": "Hosts without registry write event logging will hide the creation of persistence mechanisms.",
            "stage": "persistence-via-masquerading",
            "question": "whether the MsgEdgeUpdate run key was created",
            "requires": "hb_registry_activity with set-value logging"
          },
          {
            "id": "msbuild-in-memory-compilation",
            "risk": "The MSBuild downloader leaves no file on disk, making it invisible to file-based scanners and standard process-path monitors.",
            "stage": "lolbin-stager-execution",
            "question": "whether MSBuild compiled and executed C# directly in memory",
            "requires": "AMSI logs or memory scan"
          }
        ],
        "scoping_notes": "Scoping is essential to narrow the lead query to hosts running Viber or MicroSIP, as UAT-12643 specifically targets these softphone/messaging environments with trojanized installers.",
        "beyond_detection": "A single rule on certutil or MpCmdRun triggers excessive noise. This hunt uses a gated flow to first scope to targeted host software, then correlates the lead with fleet-wide binary rarity and specific masquerading (like RuntimeBroker in AppData) to confirm the threat."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "scoping-targeted-software",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Scope Hosts with Targeted Software",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT DISTINCT device_hostname FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%viber%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%microsip%'",
        "surface": "hb_software_inventory",
        "description": "Identify hosts running software lures targeted by the actor, such as Viber or MicroSIP.",
        "expected_signal": "A list of hostnames. These are the primary targets for the behavioral lead query."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "hypothesis"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "scoping",
        "label": "Scope Hosts with Targeted Software",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "package_name"
        ],
        "source": "hb_software_inventory",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT DISTINCT device_hostname FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%viber%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%microsip%'",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A list of hostnames. These are the primary targets for the behavioral lead query.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-19"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "lolbin-stager-lead",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "LOLBin Downloader Lead Query",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ((LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\mpcmdrun.exe' AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%-downloadfile%') OR (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\certutil.exe' AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%-urlcache%') OR (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\mshta.exe' AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%.hta%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%javascript:%')) OR (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\msbuild.exe' AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%.xml%')) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Detect signed binaries performing remote downloads or executing suspicious scripts as seen in the stager phase.",
        "expected_signal": "Rows showing LOLBins with suspicious command arguments. Silence suggests no active staging using these specific methods."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "scoping-targeted-software"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "detection-candidate",
        "label": "LOLBin Downloader Lead Query",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "process_name",
          "process_cmd_line",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE ((LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\mpcmdrun.exe' AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%-downloadfile%') OR (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\certutil.exe' AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%-urlcache%') OR (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\mshta.exe' AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%.hta%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%javascript:%')) OR (LOWER(process_name) LIKE '%\\\\msbuild.exe' AND LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%.xml%')) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "Rows showing LOLBins with suspicious command arguments. Silence suggests no active staging using these specific methods.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-19"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "lead-agent",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Evaluate Stager Lead",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "lolbin-stager-lead"
        ],
        "objective": "Identify if the LOLBin was used to fetch an executable to a user-writable path or executed a script that could serve as a stager.",
        "description": "Determine if the LOLBin activity on targeted hosts indicates a malicious staging attempt.",
        "max_iterations": 3,
        "expected_signal": "A per-host verdict on the LOLBin activity.",
        "success_criteria": "A per-host verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign, citing the command line and host."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "lolbin-stager-lead"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "gate-decision",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Gate: Pursue Corroboration?",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the lead-agent verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the lead-agent verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "missing-process-telemetry",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Open the more expensive queries for prevalence and registry activity only if the lead is credible.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "lead-agent"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "masqueraded-binary-prevalence",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Masqueraded Binary Prevalence",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{malicious_filenames}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 OR (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\appdata\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\temp\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\users\\\\public\\\\%')) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "surface": "hb_process_activity",
        "description": "Identify rare binaries in user-writable paths or those using specific report names like RuntimeBroker.exe or MsgEdgeUpdate.exe.",
        "expected_signal": "Rare binaries in suspicious locations or those exactly matching the actor's masquerading names."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-decision",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "baseline",
        "label": "Masqueraded Binary Prevalence",
        "reads": [
          "process_path",
          "device_hostname",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_process_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT LOWER(process_path) AS path, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{malicious_filenames}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 OR (LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\appdata\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\temp\\\\%' OR LOWER(process_path) LIKE '%\\\\users\\\\public\\\\%')) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING hosts <= 3",
        "silence": "not_evidence_of_absence",
        "baseline": {
          "window": "{{lookback_days}}d",
          "compare": "first_seen"
        },
        "expected": "Rare binaries in suspicious locations or those exactly matching the actor's masquerading names.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "prevalence": {
          "by": "device_hostname",
          "key": [
            "path"
          ],
          "rare_below": 3
        },
        "verified_at": "2026-11-19"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "persistence-registry-check",
      "type": "query",
      "label": "Run Key Persistence Check",
      "config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "source": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, reg_target, reg_value_data, time FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\\\currentversion\\\\run\\\\msgedgeupdate' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "surface": "hb_registry_activity",
        "description": "Verify if the specific 'MsgEdgeUpdate' registry key was used for persistence as reported.",
        "expected_signal": "A registry entry for MsgEdgeUpdate pointing at a payload. Silence suggests this specific persistence string was not used."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-decision",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ],
      "primitive_config": {
        "dsl": "sqlite",
        "role": "enrichment",
        "label": "Run Key Persistence Check",
        "reads": [
          "device_hostname",
          "reg_target",
          "reg_value_data",
          "time"
        ],
        "source": "hb_registry_activity",
        "target": "endpoint",
        "content": "SELECT device_hostname, reg_target, reg_value_data, time FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\\\\currentversion\\\\run\\\\msgedgeupdate' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')",
        "silence": "evidence_of_absence",
        "expected": "A registry entry for MsgEdgeUpdate pointing at a payload. Silence suggests this specific persistence string was not used.",
        "verified": "dry-run",
        "verified_at": "2026-11-19"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "final-triage",
      "type": "analytic",
      "label": "Final Verdict Synthesis",
      "config": {
        "cite": "required",
        "tools": [
          "endpoint"
        ],
        "context": [
          "lead-agent",
          "masqueraded-binary-prevalence",
          "persistence-registry-check"
        ],
        "objective": "Determine if the LOLBin activity, the rare binary in AppData, and the MsgEdgeUpdate registry key represent a confirmed intrusion.",
        "description": "Combine stager, prevalence, and persistence evidence into a single conclusion per host.",
        "max_iterations": 6,
        "expected_signal": "A high-confidence verdict on whether the host is compromised by UAT-12643.",
        "success_criteria": "A malicious verdict for any host showing the full stager-to-persistence chain."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "masqueraded-binary-prevalence",
          "kind": "merge"
        },
        {
          "id": "persistence-registry-check",
          "kind": "merge"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "final-decision",
      "type": "checkpoint",
      "label": "Route Final Response",
      "config": {
        "fuzzy": true,
        "judge": "hunter",
        "question": "the final-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "condition": "the final-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host",
        "blind_spot": "missing-registry-telemetry",
        "confidence": "high",
        "description": "Direct the workflow to containment or human review.",
        "checkpoint_type": "mandatory"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "final-triage"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "isolate-host",
      "type": "action",
      "label": "Isolate Malicious Host",
      "config": {
        "target": "endpoint",
        "description": "Terminate the threat and prevent data exfiltration.",
        "instructions": "Isolate the host, terminate the suspicious RuntimeBroker.exe or MsgEdgeUpdate.exe processes in user-writable paths, and delete the MsgEdgeUpdate Run registry key.",
        "action_approval": "required"
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "final-decision",
          "branch": "on_supports"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "analyst-review",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Analyst Triage Review",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Final human sign-off on the agent's synthesis and detections.",
        "instructions": "Review the cited rows. Confirm if the rare binary in AppData matches the XOR-encrypted hijacker description and whether it was launched via the identified LOLBin."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-decision",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "gate-decision",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "final-decision",
          "branch": "default"
        },
        {
          "id": "final-decision",
          "branch": "on_unavailable"
        },
        {
          "id": "final-decision",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        },
        {
          "id": "isolate-host"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "close-out",
      "type": "task",
      "label": "Close-out and Documentation",
      "config": {
        "assignee": "analyst",
        "description": "Finalize the hunt and record coverage gaps.",
        "instructions": "Document the hosts scoped and the findings. Note any hosts that were skipped due to lack of process or registry telemetry."
      },
      "parents": [
        {
          "id": "gate-decision",
          "branch": "on_refutes"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}