Threat hunts for Entra ID
21 hunts covering Entra ID, each with a hypothesis, the queries that test it and what the hunt cannot see.
21 hunts, newest first
All 486 hunts-
Agent-Framework Exfiltration to Webhook.site
An intruder is exfiltrating harvested cloud and developer credentials from Python runtimes to a malicious webhook.site endpoint following the agent-framework PyPI compromise.
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Malicious Python Package Persistence and Secret Theft
An intruder has installed a compromised version of the agent-framework package which persists via a .pth hook and harvests cloud credentials by reading environment variables from the /proc filesystem and local configuration files.
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High-Tempo Host Execution and C2 Burst Analysis
An adversary is using agentic offensive frameworks like ARTEX or CyberStrikeAI to automate initial access and command execution, evidenced by high-frequency network bursts and browser processes spawning system shells.
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Agentic Identity and Cloud Control Plane Exploitation
An intruder is using an agentic framework to automate cloud API interactions and identity access, characterized by successful sign-ins from unmanaged devices followed by high-tempo API bursts and local CLI tool usage.
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Abuse of Clean Hosting Infrastructure for Identity Attacks
An adversary uses trusted developer or cloud hosting platforms to bypass identity risk scoring, using legacy protocols (ROPC) or Device Code Flow to steal or replay session tokens.
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Storm-3358: ARTEX AI Abuse and Cloud API Exploitation
An adversary is using an agentic AI framework to perform rapid-fire credential spraying and API enumeration, leading to lateral movement via RDP and data exfiltration from compromised cloud identities.
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Suspicious Perimeter Reconnaissance and Web Exploitation
An intruder is using automated agentic tools to identify exposed secrets on public-facing assets and is exploiting web vulnerabilities via command injection in user-agent headers to gain initial access.
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Agentic AI Cloud Resource Abuse (ARTEX)
An adversary is using an agentic AI framework to automate cloud discovery and data exfiltration, identified by rapid, self-correcting API probing patterns and service principal abuse from campaign-associated infrastructure.
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Entra ID Identity Hijack and Persistence
An adversary has replayed session tokens stolen through AiTM relays to register rogue devices and establish persistent MFA methods in the victim tenant.
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Mobile Ingress and Device Code Hijacking
An adversary is targeting employees with mobile phishing links (smishing) that lure them into performing Entra ID device-code authentication, allowing the attacker to hijack cloud sessions from compromised or unmanaged mobile devices.
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TeamFiltration Cloud Identity Spray and Pivot
An adversary is using the TeamFiltration framework to spray M365 service accounts with default passwords from AWS infrastructure, subsequently harvesting data via the Graph API and probing internal VPN endpoints.
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Sideloaded AppX OAuth Token Theft
An adversary has enabled Developer Mode and sideloaded a malicious AppX package to abuse WWAHost.exe, allowing them to capture MFA-compliant OAuth tokens via a legitimate Microsoft login dialog.
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Knight Office Token Theft and Device Persistence
An adversary has stolen Microsoft 365 session tokens via a device-code phishing flow and secured persistence by enrolling an unauthorized rogue device into the Entra ID tenant.
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Knight Office Phishing Delivery and Redirects
An adversary is using Monday.com redirects and .vu landing pages to deliver Knight Office phishing lures to M365 users.
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Entra ID Agent User Impersonation and Teams Abuse
An attacker uses the Entra ID Agent User OAuth flow to impersonate an AI agent and dispatch malicious content via Microsoft Teams using Graph API cmdlets.
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Bulk Directory Discovery via AAD Graph API
An adversary uses legacy Azure AD Graph API endpoints and known offensive Client IDs to perform bulk directory enumeration, specifically targeting internal API versions that expose sensitive authentication methods.
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Obfuscated Identity and Host Access
An adversary is using multi-hop proxies or tunnels to mask their origin during authentication to cloud identity providers, subsequently using that access to reach internal hosts and execute local commands.
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Spring Ring: NTLM Relay and RAT C2
An attacker has deployed a custom Python environment to facilitate NTLM relay attacks and a PowerShell-based RAT that beacons to external command-and-control infrastructure.
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Microsoft Teams Vishing and Malicious Payload Execution
An adversary is using external Microsoft Teams accounts to masquerade as IT support and coerce employees into executing RMM tools or custom payloads that perform discovery and persistence.
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Suspicious ingress tool transfer via native utilities
An adversary is using native Linux or macOS utilities like curl or wget to download malicious payloads from external infrastructure, hiding their activity within the high volume of legitimate cloud automation.
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Entra ID Assistive Agent Impersonation
An adversary has gained initial access by tricking a user into consenting to an assistive agent blueprint, then used an on-behalf-of flow to execute malicious Graph API actions from a macOS-based PowerShell environment.
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