Threat hunts for Ivanti

8 hunts covering Ivanti, each with a hypothesis, the queries that test it and what the hunt cannot see.

8 hunts, newest first

All 486 hunts
  1. Ivanti VPN AD Sensitive Attribute Access

    An intruder uses a compromised Ivanti Connect Secure appliance to query Active Directory for sensitive attributes, such as LAPS passwords or BitLocker recovery keys, to prepare for lateral movement.

    High Rapid7 Part 2 of 2 · 3 queries, 8 steps CVE-2026-104935, CVE-2026-111357
  2. Ivanti Appliance Exploitation and Persistence

    An intruder has exploited a zero-day vulnerability chain on an Ivanti Connect Secure appliance to gain root access, evidenced by X-DSCGI-PATH header anomalies followed by the execution of rare python payloads and selective log tampering.

    Critical Rapid7 Part 1 of 2 · 5 queries, 11 steps CVE-2026-104935, CVE-2026-111357
  3. Regional Government and Infrastructure Espionage Activity

    An espionage actor has established a beachhead via edge appliance exploitation or archive delivery, established persistence through scheduled tasks, and is maintaining access via a PowerShell-based reverse shell.

    High Cisco Talos 5 queries, 11 steps CVE-2026-104935
  4. Akira Ransomware Exfiltration and Impact

    An adversary is exfiltrating bulk data via SFTP using FileZilla and executing Akira ransomware, evidenced by massive outbound network transfers and the destruction of Volume Shadow Copies.

    Critical The DFIR Report Part 3 of 3 · 3 queries, 8 steps command and control, credential access
  5. Bumblebee Persistence and AD Credential Harvesting

    An adversary has established internal persistence through unauthorized remote access tools like RustDesk and is performing Active Directory credential harvesting by dumping the NTDS database and LSASS memory.

    High The DFIR Report Part 2 of 3 · 3 queries, 8 steps command and control, credential access
  6. Bumblebee Delivery and C2 Establishment

    An intruder has lured an administrator to a look-alike download page via SEO poisoning, leading to a trojanized installer that side-loads Bumblebee via consent.exe and establishes AdaptixC2.

    High The DFIR Report Part 1 of 3 · 4 queries, 11 steps command and control, credential access
  7. ChocoPoC: Mapbox Dead-Drop C2 and Exfiltration

    An adversary is using trojanised Python packages to establish C2 via DoH and Mapbox datasets on researcher workstations, subsequently exfiltrating credentials from local password stores.

    High Sekoia Part 2 of 2 · 3 queries, 8 steps CVE-2025-55182, CVE-2025-64446
  8. Bumblebee Delivery and Persistence

    An intruder has delivered Bumblebee malware through a trojanized MSI installer via SEO poisoning, using DLL side-loading of consent.exe and establishing persistence with remote management tools like RustDesk.

    High The DFIR Report Part 1 of 2 · 4 queries, 11 steps credential access, execution

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