TGR-STA-0049: QUIC C2 and Custom RAT Operations
An intruder is using HTTP/3 (QUIC) over UDP 443 for command and control and loading custom RAT modules to perform data collection, while masking their activity with synthetic background noise.
Based on research by Unit 42 2026-11-17 12 steps · 5 queries T1003.001 T1021.002 T1047 T1055 T1071.001 T1547.001 T1572 T1574.002
Brief
Context
Recent research from Unit 42 titled QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments details the advanced tradecraft of TGR-STA-0049, a cyberespionage group targeting strategic government entities. The group stands out for its early adoption of HTTP/3 (QUIC) as a stealthy command and control protocol. This choice allows them to bypass traditional network security stacks that are not yet equipped to perform deep packet inspection on UDP-based web traffic.
Hunt Flow
The hunt begins by identifying the potential beachhead. We scope high-value internet-facing infrastructure, specifically Exchange, IIS, nginx, and Apache servers, to establish the primary attack surface. This scoping step focuses the subsequent high-volume telemetry queries on the hosts most likely to be targeted for initial exploitation based on the group's known preferences. The second phase searches for C2 evidence using two parallel tracks. The first track looks for DNS resolutions to known malicious domains identified in the research. The second track performs a behavioral search for any non-browser processes communicating over UDP 443. This is a critical pivot; identifying QUIC traffic from an unexpected process is a strong indicator of protocol tunneling or a custom RAT. An analyst triages these findings to confirm which hosts show active, unauthorized C2 activity. Once the hunt identifies a potential beachhead, we look for indicators of the post-exploitation lifecycle. This involves searching for internal SMB and port scanning activity, which suggests the deployment of the actor's hostscan or SmbBrute modules. Simultaneously, the hunt checks for unauthorized process access to LSASS memory, a signature behavior of the group's credential harvesting tradecraft. By correlating these endpoint events with the initial network findings, we can reach a high-confidence verdict despite the actor's attempts at camouflage.
Blind Spots
The primary network-layer blind spot is the visibility gap within the encrypted QUIC stream. If a network sensor cannot parse HTTP/3 over UDP, the specific commands and hashed endpoints remain invisible at the network layer. On the host, the group's synthetic noise engine is designed to drown out malicious activity within a sea of benign-looking events. Success depends on the analyst's ability to distinguish these RAT-generated artifacts from legitimate system automation using a well-defined heuristic baseline.
In this series
Steps
-
Scope potential beachhead servers
Query · scopingIdentify internet-facing web or Exchange servers that were primary targets for initial exploitation.
reads hb_software_inventorysqlSELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%exchange%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%iis%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%apache%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%nginx%') AND asset_scope = 'endpoint'What a hit looks like. A list of hostnames representing the exposed server surface area. Silence suggests the estate does not run these platforms.
-
DNS resolutions to C2 domains
Query · enrichmentFind DNS queries for the specific domains identified in the research.
reads hb_dns_activitysqlSELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. High-fidelity indicator of a host attempting to reach threat actor infrastructure.
-
Non-browser QUIC network flows
Query · baselineIdentify behavioral QUIC (UDP 443) traffic from processes that are not standard web browsers.
reads hb_network_connectionsqlSELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE protocol = 'udp' AND dst_endpoint_port = 443 AND NOT instr(',' || '{{browser_processes}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. Anomalous processes communicating over UDP 443, suggesting evasion of standard TCP-based deep packet inspection.
-
Early-stage triage
Agent triageSynthesize the scoping and network findings to identify hosts requiring deep post-exploitation investigation.
-
Internal SMB and port scanning
Query · triageDetect automated internal reconnaissance through high-volume outbound SMB connections.
reads hb_network_connectionsqlSELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) as connection_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND dst_endpoint_port IN (445, 139) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip HAVING connection_count > 5 ORDER BY connection_count DESCWhat a hit looks like. A single host reaching out to multiple internal IP addresses via SMB, suggesting the use of SmbBrute or hostscan modules.
-
Credential harvesting via LSASS
Query · detection candidateIdentify process access to LSASS memory from non-standard locations, characteristic of RAT collection modules.
reads hb_resource_activitysqlSELECT device_hostname, actor_process_name, object_name, access_mask, time FROM hb_resource_activity WHERE object_type = 'Process' AND LOWER(object_name) LIKE '%lsass.exe' AND actor_process_name NOT LIKE 'C:\Windows\System32\%' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. Non-system processes accessing LSASS memory for credential theft. Silence on high-value servers is evidence of absence for this specific technique.
-
Full lifecycle triage
Agent triageCorrelate early-stage beachhead evidence with follow-on collection and lateral movement to reach a final verdict.
-
Route on final verdict
DecisionRoute the hunt based on the agent's findings.
-
Isolate compromised host
Response actionContain the potentially infected server to prevent data exfiltration.
-
Investigate heuristic camouflage
Analyst taskManual review of synthetic baseline noise used to hide malicious indicators.
-
Hunt close out
Analyst taskDocument findings and finalize the hunt.
Coverage
Scenario coverage
| Stage | Covered | How, or why not |
|---|---|---|
| Defense Evasion and Heuristic Camouflage T1055 · T1572 |
Yes | lsass-access-activity, camouflage-investigation |
| HTTP/3 QUIC Command and Control T1071 · T1572 |
Yes | dns-lookups, quic-network-flows |
| Discovery and Lateral Movement T1018 · T1021.002 · T1047 |
Yes | smb-lateral-scanning |
| Exfiltration and Credential Collection T1003.001 · T1056.001 · T1041 |
Yes | lsass-access-activity |
| Server Exploitation and Phishing T1190 · T1505.003 · T1566 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series. |
| Execution via Sideloading and RAT Deployment T1574.002 · T1218 · T1059.001 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' series. |
Blind spots
- Needs Deep packet inspection of UDP 443 (QUIC) traffic.. If network sensors cannot parse HTTP/3 over UDP, specific command identifiers remain invisible at the network layer. It would answer Are we seeing the specific malicious hashed endpoints inside the encrypted QUIC stream?. Remediation: Update IDS/IPS signatures to support QUIC/HTTP3 parsing or rely on endpoint-level network telemetry.
- Needs Heuristic baseline of normal automated file and registry activity.. KUKURAT's camouflage engine is designed to hide malicious activity within synthetic volume; a lack of established baseline leads to false negatives. It would answer Can the analyst distinguish RAT-generated noise from legitimate OS or application automation?. Remediation: Implement stack-counting for high-volume automated file and registry events.
Parameters & data
Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
browser_processes | list[string] | chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, brave.exe, opera.exe | Standard browser processes to exclude from behavioral QUIC traffic search. |
c2_domains | list[domain] | ads-edge.com, www.maui-cocktailbar.com, www.cloudflacecdn.com, www.police.gr.com, www.investigationj6.com, www.sacofficegov.com | Known C2 domains for KUKURAT and PerfectPioneer. |
lookback_days | number | 14 | Days of history to examine. |
scope_hosts | list[host] | — | Hostnames of internet-facing servers to constrain the hunt. |
Telemetry
| Source | Category | Telemetry |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) | endpoint | endpoint |
| Network telemetry | network | network |
Source
---
analysis: This hunt correlates novel network protocols (QUIC) with post-exploitation
behaviors across four different telemetry surfaces. A single detection rule cannot
reliably track the progression from a UDP 443 flow to LSASS memory harvesting and
lateral SMB scanning while compensating for heuristic camouflage.
blind_spots:
- id: quic-visibility-gap
owner: Network Operations
question: Are we seeing the specific malicious hashed endpoints inside the encrypted
QUIC stream?
remediation: Update IDS/IPS signatures to support QUIC/HTTP3 parsing or rely on
endpoint-level network telemetry.
requires: Deep packet inspection of UDP 443 (QUIC) traffic.
risk: If network sensors cannot parse HTTP/3 over UDP, specific command identifiers
remain invisible at the network layer.
stage: command-and-control-http3-quic
- id: synthetic-noise-drowning
owner: Detection Engineering
question: Can the analyst distinguish RAT-generated noise from legitimate OS or
application automation?
remediation: Implement stack-counting for high-volume automated file and registry
events.
requires: Heuristic baseline of normal automated file and registry activity.
risk: KUKURAT's camouflage engine is designed to hide malicious activity within
synthetic volume; a lack of established baseline leads to false negatives.
stage: defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage
coverage:
- stage: defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage
status: covered
steps:
- lsass-access-activity
- camouflage-investigation
- stage: command-and-control-http3-quic
status: covered
steps:
- dns-lookups
- quic-network-flows
- stage: discovery-and-lateral-movement
status: covered
steps:
- smb-lateral-scanning
- stage: exfiltration-and-collection
status: covered
steps:
- lsass-access-activity
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered
RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments'' series.'
stage: initial-access-exploitation-phishing
status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered
RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments'' series.'
stage: execution-sideloading-rat-deployment
status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
claims: no_unsupported
evidence: citation_required
missing_data: not_benign
telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
applicability: campaign-specific
handoff: promote-to-detection
justification: TGR-STA-0049 is an advanced cyberespionage group targeting strategic
government entities. Their adoption of HTTP/3 and automated camouflage represents
a significant evasion leap that standard security policies may bypass.
methodology: model-assisted
trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An intruder is using HTTP/3 (QUIC) over UDP 443 for command and control
and loading custom RAT modules to perform data collection, while masking their activity
with synthetic background noise.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1574.002
- collection
- command and control
- defense evasion
- execution
- initial access
- lateral movement
name: 'TGR-STA-0049: QUIC C2 and Custom RAT Operations'
parameters:
browser_processes:
default:
- chrome.exe
- msedge.exe
- firefox.exe
- brave.exe
- opera.exe
description: Standard browser processes to exclude from behavioral QUIC traffic
search.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2024-05-22'
ref: hunt-designer
type: list[string]
c2_domains:
default:
- ads-edge.com
- www.maui-cocktailbar.com
- www.cloudflacecdn.com
- www.police.gr.com
- www.investigationj6.com
- www.sacofficegov.com
description: Known C2 domains for KUKURAT and PerfectPioneer.
from:
kind: article
observed: '2026-11-16'
ref: unit42-tgr-sta-0049
type: list[domain]
lookback_days:
default: '14'
description: Days of history to examine.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2024-05-22'
ref: hunt-standard
type: number
scope_hosts:
default: []
description: Hostnames of internet-facing servers to constrain the hunt.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2024-05-22'
ref: scoping-output
type: list[host]
provenance:
authors:
- name: Huntbase hunt generation
org: huntbase.io
generated:
by: huntbase-hunt-generation
from: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/
gates:
- dry-run
- lint
model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Start with high-value internet-facing infrastructure (Exchange and Web
servers). The lookback period should be at least 14 days to capture the progression
from initial beaconing to internal scanning.
references:
- name: 'Unit 42: QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian
Governments'
url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/
related:
- hunt: exchange-server-webshell-scoping
reason: The broader topic of Exchange exploitation is handled by specialized server-hygiene
hunts.
relation: out-of-scope-alternative
- hunt: tgr-sta-0049-initial-access-exploitation-phishing
relation: follows
scenario:
stages:
- name: Server Exploitation and Phishing
observables:
- ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx, or Suo5 web shells on Exchange or web servers
- Decoy PDF documents targeting government sectors
- 'Lookalike domains: www.wkuyda.com, www.thailisting.net, www.yangon.it.com'
slug: initial-access-exploitation-phishing
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1190
- T1505.003
- T1566
- name: Execution via Sideloading and RAT Deployment
observables:
- DLL side-loading of modified legitimate binaries
- XOR-encrypted shellcode embedded in payloads
- PerfectPioneer RAT (Go-based)
- KUKURAT modular agent
- Decoy installers
slug: execution-sideloading-rat-deployment
tactic: execution
techniques:
- T1574.002
- T1218
- T1059.001
- name: Defense Evasion and Heuristic Camouflage
observables:
- KUKURAT heuristic camouflage engine generating synthetic baseline noise
- PerfectPioneer isDangerousCommand validation engine
- Process injection commands (process_inject)
- UAC bypass modules
slug: defense-evasion-stealth-and-camouflage
tactic: defense-evasion
techniques:
- T1055
- T1572
- name: HTTP/3 QUIC Command and Control
observables:
- HTTP/3 over UDP port 443
- Hashed C2 URL endpoints (e.g., /c8a4e192)
- 'C2 Domains: ads-edge.com, www.maui-cocktailbar.com, www.cloudflacecdn.com,
www.police.gr.com, www.investigationj6.com, www.sacofficegov.com'
slug: command-and-control-http3-quic
tactic: command-and-control
techniques:
- T1071
- T1572
- name: Discovery and Lateral Movement
observables:
- MyPsExec.dll module
- SmbBrute.dll module
- Async port and host scanning modules (portscan, hostscan)
- WMI command execution (ComExec.dll)
slug: discovery-and-lateral-movement
tactic: lateral-movement
techniques:
- T1018
- T1021.002
- T1047
- name: Exfiltration and Credential Collection
observables:
- BofLoader.dll for Beacon Object File execution
- Keylogger module activity
- LSASS memory access for credential harvesting
- File upload/download activity (file_upload, file_download)
- Screenshot module
slug: exfiltration-and-collection
tactic: collection
techniques:
- T1003.001
- T1056.001
- T1041
summary: TGR-STA-0049 is a Southeast Asian espionage campaign deploying custom Go-based
RATs (PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT) via server exploitation and phishing. The campaign
features early adoption of HTTP/3 (QUIC) for command and control and an automated
heuristic camouflage engine designed to blend malicious endpoint activity into
a baseline of synthetic noise.
series:
index: 2
slug: quic-and-covert-novel-http-3-powered-rats-target-southeast-asian-governments
title: 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments'
total: 2
severity: high
targets:
analyst:
name: Tier-2 analyst
role: analyst
endpoint:
category: endpoint
name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
telemetry:
- endpoint
hunter:
agent: true
name: Hunt agent
network:
category: network
name: Network telemetry
telemetry:
- network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---
# TGR-STA-0049: QUIC C2 and Custom RAT Operations
This hunt targets the cyberespionage tradecraft of TGR-STA-0049, focusing on their adoption of HTTP/3 as a stealthy communication protocol and the deployment of the KUKURAT and PerfectPioneer RAT families. The hunt follows a phased approach: first, it identifies high-value internet-facing servers showing signs of behavioral QUIC C2 traffic or DNS resolutions to the report's indicators. Second, it pivots to investigate post-exploitation behavior including internal SMB scanning and credential harvesting from LSASS memory, reaching a final verdict on the host's compromise state despite the actor's heuristic camouflage.
## scoping-servers
<!-- Scope potential beachhead servers -->
Identify internet-facing web or Exchange servers that were primary targets for initial exploitation.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping
~~~yaml
expected: A list of hostnames representing the exposed server surface area. Silence
suggests the estate does not run these platforms.
reads:
- device_hostname
- package_name
- package_version
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_software_inventory
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-17'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%exchange%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%iis%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%apache%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%nginx%') AND asset_scope = 'endpoint'
```
## early-parallel
<!-- Parallel search for C2 evidence -->
parallel:
- → dns-lookups
- → quic-network-flows
join: → early-agent
## dns-lookups
<!-- DNS resolutions to C2 domains -->
Find DNS queries for the specific domains identified in the research.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=enrichment params=(c2_domains=c2_domains, scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
expected: High-fidelity indicator of a host attempting to reach threat actor infrastructure.
reads:
- device_hostname
- query_hostname
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_dns_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-17'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## quic-network-flows
<!-- Non-browser QUIC network flows -->
Identify behavioral QUIC (UDP 443) traffic from processes that are not standard web browsers.
```sqlite target=network role=baseline params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days, browser_processes=browser_processes)
~~~yaml
baseline:
compare: first_seen
window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Anomalous processes communicating over UDP 443, suggesting evasion of standard
TCP-based deep packet inspection.
prevalence:
by: device_hostname
key:
- dst_endpoint_ip
rare_below: 3
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_name
- dst_endpoint_ip
- dst_endpoint_port
- time
- protocol
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-17'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_name, dst_endpoint_ip, dst_endpoint_port, time FROM hb_network_connection WHERE protocol = 'udp' AND dst_endpoint_port = 443 AND NOT instr(',' || '{{browser_processes}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_name) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## early-agent
<!-- Early-stage triage -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- scoping-servers
- dns-lookups
- quic-network-flows
max_iterations: 3
objective: Determine if any scoped server shows evidence of C2 activity through listed
domains or behavioral QUIC traffic.
success_criteria: A verdict citing specific DNS queries or network rows.
tools:
- endpoint
- network
```
## follow-on-parallel
<!-- Parallel search for post-exploitation -->
parallel:
- → smb-lateral-scanning
- → lsass-access-activity
join: → lifecycle-agent
## smb-lateral-scanning
<!-- Internal SMB and port scanning -->
Detect automated internal reconnaissance through high-volume outbound SMB connections.
```sqlite target=network role=triage params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: A single host reaching out to multiple internal IP addresses via SMB, suggesting
the use of SmbBrute or hostscan modules.
reads:
- device_hostname
- dst_endpoint_ip
- time
- direction
- dst_endpoint_port
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-17'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) as connection_count, MIN(time) as first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE direction = 'outbound' AND dst_endpoint_port IN (445, 139) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip HAVING connection_count > 5 ORDER BY connection_count DESC
```
## lsass-access-activity
<!-- Credential harvesting via LSASS -->
Identify process access to LSASS memory from non-standard locations, characteristic of RAT collection modules.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=detection-candidate params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: Non-system processes accessing LSASS memory for credential theft. Silence
on high-value servers is evidence of absence for this specific technique.
reads:
- device_hostname
- actor_process_name
- object_name
- access_mask
- time
- object_type
silence: evidence_of_absence
source: hb_resource_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-17'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, actor_process_name, object_name, access_mask, time FROM hb_resource_activity WHERE object_type = 'Process' AND LOWER(object_name) LIKE '%lsass.exe' AND actor_process_name NOT LIKE 'C:\Windows\System32\%' AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## lifecycle-agent
<!-- Full lifecycle triage -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- early-agent
- smb-lateral-scanning
- lsass-access-activity
max_iterations: 5
objective: Decide if the progression of network behavior, internal scanning, and credential
access confirms an intrusion by TGR-STA-0049.
success_criteria: A detailed verdict citing rows from both network and endpoint activities
across the lifecycle.
tools:
- endpoint
- network
```
## route-verdict
<!-- Route on final verdict -->
if~: "the lifecycle-agent verdict is malicious or suspicious for at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → isolate-host
indeterminate: → camouflage-investigation
unavailable: → camouflage-investigation (blind_spot: quic-visibility-gap)
else: → camouflage-investigation
## isolate-host
<!-- Isolate compromised host -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the host and initiate the TGR-STA-0049 incident response playbook.
```
→ camouflage-investigation
## camouflage-investigation
<!-- Investigate heuristic camouflage -->
```manual target=analyst
Review hb_registry_activity and hb_file_activity for high-volume, automated entries that appear benign but align with the compromise window. These are the likely heuristic camouflage artifacts used by KUKURAT to hide its actual functions.
```
→ hunt-close-out
## hunt-close-out
<!-- Hunt close out -->
```manual target=analyst
Summarize the findings, document any new C2 domains or behavioral patterns, and decide if the LSASS memory access pattern should be promoted to a permanent rule.
```
→ end
Run it
Take this hunt into your environment.
Open it in Huntbase to run every step against your own connections, with Scout weighing the evidence and your analysts in command. Or take the open hunt.md file anywhere that reads the format.
Machine-drafted by huntbase-hunt-generation using hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview, gated by dry-run, lint, then reviewed by a person.