Identity Pivot and Cloud Resource Access following Axis RCE
Critical severity TLP:CLEAR Part 2 of 2 Research by Rapid7 Published 18 Nov 2026
Hypothesis
An intruder has pivoted from a compromised application server to internal identity services for AS-REP roasting and accessed cloud data warehouses using stolen service account credentials.
Brief
Why this hunt
Rapid7 recently reported on the active exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central servers. This remote code execution vulnerability allows attackers to gain an initial foothold. However, the initial compromise is rarely the end goal. This hunt focuses on the subsequent movement from the compromised web application into the internal identity environment and eventually into cloud data stores.
How the Hunt Flows
The hunt begins with a scoping phase on the hb_vulnerability_finding surface. The first step identifies hosts where the vulnerability CVE-2026-90436 or the underlying Axis 1.x components are present. This query lists every host where a scanner has already confirmed the vulnerability, allowing the analyst to focus the search on the most likely entry points. Following scoping, the hunt executes two parallel detection paths. On the endpoint surface, hb_process_activity, the hunt searches for rare identity enumeration tools. It specifically looks for command-line evidence of Impacket scripts such as GetNPUsers.py, GetADUsers.py, and secretsdump.py. These tools are common in the reconnaissance phase of an identity pivot. The query groups these by host and command line to surface rare scripts running on the application servers. Simultaneously, the hunt monitors the hb_cloud_api_activity surface for suspicious data warehouse access. It filters for operations like SELECT, EXPORT, and GetObject targeting services like Snowflake, BigQuery, or Amazon S3. The query focuses on activity coming from known attacker IP addresses or service accounts that do not typically perform these actions from external locations. This identifies if credentials harvested from the endpoint are being used at the cloud control plane. An agent then triages the evidence. It correlates the appearance of enumeration tools on a vulnerable host with anomalous cloud access by service accounts linked to that host. This synthesis determines if the intruder successfully moved from the initial foothold to the exfiltration stage and provides a final verdict for the analyst.
What this Hunt Cannot See
This hunt has specific limitations. If an attacker renames their enumeration tools to match legitimate system scripts, the command-line pattern matching might not detect the activity. Additionally, while the hunt identifies cloud API operations, it may not reveal the specific records exfiltrated if the cloud provider does not include query payloads in their management logs.
In this series
Steps
-
Query, scoping
Identify vulnerable Confluence and N-central hosts
Identify hosts where the specific vulnerability CVE-2026-90436 has been detected to focus the investigation on the most likely targets.
sql, reads hb_vulnerability_findingSELECT device_uid, title, severity, first_seenFROM hb_vulnerability_findingWHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-90436' OR title LIKE '%Axis 1.x%'What a hit looks like. A list of hosts specifically flagged with CVE-2026-90436. Zero rows means no scanner has identified the vulnerability yet.
-
Query, baseline
Rare identity enumeration tools
Identify the use of Impacket or other identity enumeration tools; the actor uses these to find targets for lateral movement.
sql, reads hb_process_activitySELECT LOWER(process_name) AS proc, process_cmd_line, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seenFROM hb_process_activityWHERE (instr(',' || '{{impacket_strings}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_cmd_line) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%impacket%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%getnpusers%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')GROUP BY proc, process_cmd_lineHAVING hosts < 5ORDER BY hosts ASCWhat a hit looks like. Rare command lines containing Impacket script names, particularly when running under a Python interpreter on the application servers.
-
Query, enrichment
Suspicious cloud warehouse access
Filter for data-access and exfiltration-related calls to cloud warehouses originating from attacker infrastructure or service accounts.
sql, reads hb_cloud_api_activitySELECT time, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, api_operation, api_service_name, resource_nameFROM hb_cloud_api_activityWHERE (instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%integration%' OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%service%') AND (LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%select%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%export%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%getobject%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%copyobject%') AND (LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%snowflake%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%bigquery%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%s3%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')ORDER BY time DESCWhat a hit looks like. Data access operations targeting cloud warehouses from reported attacker IPs or integration accounts that do not typically use these operations from the internet.
-
Agent triage
Triage identity and cloud evidence
Synthesize the findings from endpoint processes and cloud API activity to determine if a multi-stage pivot and exfiltration event occurred.
-
Decision
Route on verdict
Route the investigation based on the agent's confidence and verdict.
-
Response action
Isolate host and revoke credentials
Neutralize the compromised beachhead and the stolen cloud account.
-
Analyst task
Analyst manual review
Verify the agent's findings and assess the extent of the compromise.
-
Analyst task
Data impact assessment
Determine exactly what data was accessed in the cloud warehouse.
Coverage
2 of 5 stages covered
| Stage and ATT&CK technique | Covered | How, or why not |
|---|---|---|
| Identity service enumeration and AS-REP roasting T1087.002 T1558.004 |
Yes | rare-identity-enumeration-tools |
| Cloud data warehouse and M365 access T1537 T1078.004 |
Yes | suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access |
| Unauthenticated Axis SOAP RCE T1190 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series. |
| Automated shell execution and tunneling T1059.004 T1105 T1572 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series. |
| Confluence data and credential harvesting T1083 T1552.001 T1213 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series. |
Blind spots
- Needs Audit logging for specific data warehouse providers (Snowflake/BigQuery) integrated with hb_cloud_api_activity. While we see the API calls, the exact content of the queries or the rows returned might not be visible if the provider does not supply detailed payload logs to the management plane. It would answer: Which specific data records were exfiltrated from the warehouse? Remediation: Enable high-verbosity audit logging for all production data warehouses and stream to the central log repository.
- Needs hb_process_activity with on-disk binary verification. If the attacker renames 'GetNPUsers.py' to a legitimate script name, the baseline step relies solely on command-line pattern matching, which can be bypassed if the script is run through a custom interpreter. It would answer: Did the attacker rename the Impacket tools to bypass name-based detection? Remediation: Enable file hash auditing for all Python script executions on application servers.
Parameters and data
Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
attacker_ips | list[ip] | 192.238.253.176, 5.133.47.243, 163.182.68.109, 104.13.106.166, 157.20.241.16, 139.99.69.109, 79.76.51.56 | Observed attacker IP addresses associated with the intrusion. |
impacket_strings | list[string] | GetNPUsers.py, GetADUsers.py, secretsdump.py, psexec.py, GetUserSPNs.py | Impacket tool filenames used for identity enumeration. |
lookback_days | number | 14 | Days of history to examine. |
scope_hosts | list[host] | none | Optional: Specific hosts identified as vulnerable in the scoping step. |
Data sources
| Source | Category | Telemetry |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) | endpoint | endpoint |
Source
An open hunt.md file. It runs anywhere that reads the format.
---
analysis: A static detection rule might catch 'GetNPUsers.py', but this hunt uses
stack-counting to identify rare enumeration scripts on vulnerable servers and then
pivots into cloud API activity to correlate that activity with sensitive data access.
This context allows an analyst to distinguish between a developer testing a script
and an active intruder exfiltrating data.
blind_spots:
- id: cloud-api-visibility-gap
owner: Cloud Architecture Team
question: Which specific data records were exfiltrated from the warehouse?
remediation: Enable high-verbosity audit logging for all production data warehouses
and stream to the central log repository.
requires: Audit logging for specific data warehouse providers (Snowflake/BigQuery)
integrated with hb_cloud_api_activity
risk: While we see the API calls, the exact content of the queries or the rows returned
might not be visible if the provider does not supply detailed payload logs to
the management plane.
stage: exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access
- id: impacket-renaming
owner: Endpoint Security Admin
question: Did the attacker rename the Impacket tools to bypass name-based detection?
remediation: Enable file hash auditing for all Python script executions on application
servers.
requires: hb_process_activity with on-disk binary verification
risk: If the attacker renames 'GetNPUsers.py' to a legitimate script name, the baseline
step relies solely on command-line pattern matching, which can be bypassed if
the script is run through a custom interpreter.
stage: lateral-movement-identity-pivot
coverage:
- stage: lateral-movement-identity-pivot
status: covered
steps:
- rare-identity-enumeration-tools
- stage: exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access
status: covered
steps:
- suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436
against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.
stage: initial-access-axis-soap-rce
status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436
against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.
stage: execution-automated-shell-c2
status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436
against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited' series.
stage: discovery-credential-harvesting
status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
claims: no_unsupported
evidence: citation_required
missing_data: not_benign
telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
applicability: campaign-specific
handoff: keep-as-periodic-hunt
justification: The exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 provides an immediate foothold
that leads to identity theft and high-value data exfiltration. Because attackers
are known to pivot from application servers to cloud resources using service accounts,
a negative result across both endpoint and cloud surfaces is required to confirm
that the intrusion has not progressed to the data exfiltration stage.
methodology: model-assisted
trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An intruder has pivoted from a compromised application server to internal
identity services for AS-REP roasting and accessed cloud data warehouses using stolen
service account credentials.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1087.002
- attack.t1558.004
- attack.t1537
- attack.t1078.004
- discovery
- execution
- exfiltration
- initial access
- lateral movement
name: Identity Pivot and Cloud Resource Access following Axis RCE
parameters:
attacker_ips:
default:
- 192.238.253.176
- 5.133.47.243
- 163.182.68.109
- 104.13.106.166
- 157.20.241.16
- 139.99.69.109
- 79.76.51.56
description: Observed attacker IP addresses associated with the intrusion.
from:
kind: article
observed: '2026-11-17'
ref: Rapid7 CVE-2026-90436
type: list[ip]
impacket_strings:
default:
- GetNPUsers.py
- GetADUsers.py
- secretsdump.py
- psexec.py
- GetUserSPNs.py
description: Impacket tool filenames used for identity enumeration.
type: list[string]
lookback_days:
default: '14'
description: Days of history to examine.
type: number
scope_hosts:
default: []
description: 'Optional: Specific hosts identified as vulnerable in the scoping
step.'
type: list[host]
provenance:
authors:
- name: Huntbase hunt generation
org: huntbase.io
generated:
by: huntbase-hunt-generation
from: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited
gates:
- dry-run
- lint
model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Begin by identifying all hosts specifically detected as vulnerable to CVE-2026-90436.
Focus the hunt on these hosts and any service accounts they use for database or
cloud integration.
references:
- name: "Rapid7 \u2014 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence"
url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited
related:
- hunt: confluence-axis-rce-initial-execution
reason: This hunt focuses on the lateral movement and exfiltration that follows
the initial RCE on the application server.
relation: follows
- hunt: axis-rce-confluence-credential-harvesting
relation: follows
scenario:
stages:
- name: Unauthenticated Axis SOAP RCE
observables:
- POST /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2
- HTTP 500 Internal Server Error
- CVE-2026-90436
slug: initial-access-axis-soap-rce
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1190
- name: Automated shell execution and tunneling
observables:
- confluence service account
- Java process launching bash and curl
- hex-encoded shell commands
- trycloudflare.com
- free.pinggy.net
- webhook.site
- wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy.net
- sequential task IDs
- labeled delimiters in command output
slug: execution-automated-shell-c2
tactic: execution
techniques:
- T1059.004
- T1105
- T1572
- name: Confluence data and credential harvesting
observables:
- /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/attachments/v4/
- MySQL authentication using Confluence credentials
- parsing Office documents for credentials
- Luhn checks for payment card numbers
- searching for 'VPN', 'token', 'encryption keys'
slug: discovery-credential-harvesting
tactic: discovery
techniques:
- T1083
- T1552.001
- T1213
- name: Identity service enumeration and AS-REP roasting
observables:
- Atlassian Crowd API queries
- Impacket GetNPUsers.py against Domain Controller
- AS-REP roasting
slug: lateral-movement-identity-pivot
tactic: lateral-movement
techniques:
- T1087.002
- T1558.004
- name: Cloud data warehouse and M365 access
observables:
- Production cloud data warehouse queries
- M365 sign-in via legacy authentication
- IP 192.238.253.176
slug: exfiltration-cloud-warehouse-access
tactic: exfiltration
techniques:
- T1537
- T1078.004
summary: Attackers exploit a critical unauthenticated RCE in Apache Axis (CVE-2026-90436)
affecting Atlassian Confluence and N-able N-central to gain initial footprints.
Using AI-assisted automation, they harvest credentials from local databases and
file attachments before pivoting to internal identity services and production
cloud environments.
series:
index: 2
slug: rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n
title: Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence
Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited
total: 2
severity: critical
targets:
analyst:
name: Tier-2 analyst
role: analyst
endpoint:
category: endpoint
name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
telemetry:
- endpoint
hunter:
agent: true
name: Hunt agent
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---
# Identity Pivot and Cloud Resource Access following Axis RCE
After gaining an initial foothold on Atlassian Confluence or N-able N-central servers, attackers are known to perform identity service enumeration using Impacket and then access cloud data warehouses using acquired integration credentials. This hunt identifies these pivots by finding rare enumeration tools on vulnerable hosts and corroborating them with anomalous cloud API calls and sign-ins from known attacker infrastructure. An agent weighs the endpoint and cloud telemetry together to determine if an intrusion has progressed to the data exfiltration stage.
## vulnerable-product-inventory
<!-- Identify vulnerable Confluence and N-central hosts -->
Identify hosts where the specific vulnerability CVE-2026-90436 has been detected to focus the investigation on the most likely targets.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping
~~~yaml
expected: A list of hosts specifically flagged with CVE-2026-90436. Zero rows means
no scanner has identified the vulnerability yet.
reads:
- device_uid
- title
- severity
- first_seen
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_vulnerability_finding
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_uid, title, severity, first_seen FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-90436' OR title LIKE '%Axis 1.x%'
```
## parallel-pivot-detection
<!-- Search for identity pivots and cloud exfiltration -->
parallel:
- → rare-identity-enumeration-tools
- → suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access
join: → agent-triage
## rare-identity-enumeration-tools
<!-- Rare identity enumeration tools -->
Identify the use of Impacket or other identity enumeration tools; the actor uses these to find targets for lateral movement.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, impacket_strings=impacket_strings, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
baseline:
compare: first_seen
window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Rare command lines containing Impacket script names, particularly when running
under a Python interpreter on the application servers.
prevalence:
by: device_hostname
key:
- process_cmd_line
rare_below: 5
reads:
- process_name
- process_cmd_line
- device_hostname
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_process_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT LOWER(process_name) AS proc, process_cmd_line, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{impacket_strings}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(process_cmd_line) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%impacket%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%getnpusers%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY proc, process_cmd_line HAVING hosts < 5 ORDER BY hosts ASC
```
## suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access
<!-- Suspicious cloud warehouse access -->
Filter for data-access and exfiltration-related calls to cloud warehouses originating from attacker infrastructure or service accounts.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=enrichment params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, attacker_ips=attacker_ips)
~~~yaml
expected: Data access operations targeting cloud warehouses from reported attacker
IPs or integration accounts that do not typically use these operations from the
internet.
reads:
- time
- actor_user_name
- src_endpoint_ip
- api_operation
- api_service_name
- resource_name
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_cloud_api_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT time, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, api_operation, api_service_name, resource_name FROM hb_cloud_api_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{attacker_ips}}' || ',', ',' || src_endpoint_ip || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%integration%' OR LOWER(actor_user_name) LIKE '%service%') AND (LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%select%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%export%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%getobject%' OR LOWER(api_operation) LIKE '%copyobject%') AND (LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%snowflake%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%bigquery%' OR LOWER(api_service_name) LIKE '%s3%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time DESC
```
## agent-triage
<!-- Triage identity and cloud evidence -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- vulnerable-product-inventory
- rare-identity-enumeration-tools
- suspicious-cloud-warehouse-access
max_iterations: 5
objective: Determine whether the rare processes on vulnerable hosts and the cloud
API calls from integration accounts or attacker IPs indicate a successful breach
and data exfiltration.
success_criteria: A per-host and per-user verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign,
citing specific rows for the pivot and the cloud access.
tools:
- endpoint
```
## route-on-verdict
<!-- Route on verdict -->
if~: "the agent-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host or service account" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → isolate-and-revoke
indeterminate: → analyst-manual-review
unavailable: → analyst-manual-review (blind_spot: cloud-api-visibility-gap)
else: → analyst-manual-review
## isolate-and-revoke
<!-- Isolate host and revoke credentials -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the compromised server, revoke all active sessions for the identified service account, and rotate its credentials immediately.
```
→ analyst-manual-review
## analyst-manual-review
<!-- Analyst manual review -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the cited rows from both endpoint and cloud surfaces. Verify if other service accounts used by the vulnerable server have also been compromised.
```
→ data-impact-assessment
## data-impact-assessment
<!-- Data impact assessment -->
```manual target=analyst
Coordinate with the data engineering team to review native audit logs for the impacted data warehouse (Snowflake/BigQuery) and identify the specific tables and rows accessed by the compromised credential.
```
→ end
Run this hunt against your own data.
In Huntbase, Scout runs every step across the tools you already connect, checks back through your history and returns a verdict with the evidence. The hunt.md file is open, so you can also take it anywhere that reads the format.
Drafted by machine (huntbase-hunt-generation, hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview), checked by dry-run, lint, then reviewed by a person.