Perimeter Exploitation and NTLM Redirection
High severity TLP:CLEAR Part 1 of 2 Research by Rapid7 Published 18 Nov 2026
Hypothesis
An attacker is exploiting vulnerabilities in perimeter applications (like Flowise or Citrix) to gain initial access or force NTLM authentication to a remote UNC path for credential theft.
Brief
Why now
Rapid7 recently published a Metasploit Wrapup detailing several new modules for perimeter and development devices. These updates include exploits for Flowise, Citrix NetScaler, and GitLab. Attackers frequently use these vulnerabilities to achieve remote code execution (RCE) or to force the appliance to authenticate to a remote UNC path. This redirection allows the adversary to capture NTLM hashes for credential theft and relay attacks.
How the Hunt Flows
The hunt begins by scoping the environment. The first query identifies every host running the software mentioned in the source report. It searches software inventory for packages including Flowise, GitLab, NetScaler, and specific WordPress plugins. This narrows the focus to potentially vulnerable surfaces.
Once scoped, the hunt executes two parallel queries to gather evidence. The first query scans HTTP logs for specific URI paths associated with the new Metasploit modules, such as password reset or API linting endpoints. The second query baselines outbound SMB traffic on port 445. It specifically looks for rare connections to external IP addresses that have occurred less than five times within the lookback period.
An analyst agent then evaluates the combined results. It looks for a temporal correlation between a hit on an exploit URI and a near-simultaneous outbound SMB connection. If both occur on the same host within a tight window, it indicates the server responded to an exploitation attempt by attempting to authenticate to an external resource. This correlation provides a high-confidence signal of successful exploitation.
What the Hunt Cannot See
This hunt has two primary blind spots. First, if the perimeter application uses TLS and the environment lacks traffic decryption or decrypted HTTP logs, URI-based patterns remain invisible. The hunt cannot inspect the encrypted payload to identify the exploit path. Second, if a firewall blocks outbound port 445 at the network edge, the connection attempt may not appear in the network connection logs. In this scenario, the exploit might have succeeded in triggering the request, but the secondary stage of credential theft failed and left no network record.
In this series
Steps
-
Query, scoping
Identify vulnerable perimeter software
Scope the hunt to hosts running software mentioned in the Metasploit wrap-up.
sql, reads hb_software_inventorySELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_versionFROM hb_software_inventoryWHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%flowise%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%gitlab%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%netscaler%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%secure%email%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%wordpress%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%openbullet%')What a hit looks like. A list of hosts running potentially vulnerable perimeter or development applications.
-
Query, detection candidate
Hunt for exploitation URI patterns
Find HTTP requests hitting specific endpoints associated with recent RCE modules.
sql, reads hb_http_activitySELECT device_hostname, url_path, http_method, src_endpoint_ip, timeFROM hb_http_activityWHERE (instr(',' || '{{target_uris}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(url_path) LIKE '%/wp-content/plugins/bug-library/%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)What a hit looks like. Requests to sensitive paths like /forgot-password in Flowise or CI lint in GitLab.
-
Query, baseline
Outbound SMB connection baseline
Identify anomalous outbound SMB connections that may indicate NTLM hash disclosure.
sql, reads hb_network_connectionSELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) AS connections, MIN(time) AS first_seenFROM hb_network_connectionWHERE dst_endpoint_port = 445 AND direction = 'outbound' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ipHAVING connections < 5What a hit looks like. Rare outbound port 445 connections from perimeter servers to external IPs.
-
Agent triage
Weigh perimeter evidence
Determine if the HTTP exploitation activity and SMB redirection are part of the same attack chain.
-
Decision
Decide on containment
Route the hunt based on the agent's confidence in the exploitation verdict.
-
Response action
Isolate affected host
Contain the breach and prevent credential relaying.
-
Analyst task
Analyst manual validation
Verify the automated findings and analyze the SMB destination.
-
Analyst task
Close out hunt report
Document the outcome and update software inventory requirements.
Coverage
2 of 5 stages covered
| Stage and ATT&CK technique | Covered | How, or why not |
|---|---|---|
| Exploitation of Perimeter and Developer Tools T1190 |
Yes | vulnerable-host-inventory, perimeter-http-exploitation |
| NTLMv2 Hash Disclosure via UNC Path T1557.001 |
Yes | smb-redirection-attempts |
| Multi-Protocol Fetch Payload Execution T1105 T1059.003 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more' series. |
| Linux ELF Executable Payload Injection T1574 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more' series. |
| Docker Container Persistence and Host Access T1610 T1543.003 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much more' series. |
Blind spots
- Needs TLS inspection or decrypted HTTP logs. Attackers can hide exploit payloads in HTTPS traffic, making URI-based detection impossible without decryption. It would answer: What were the full URI and body of the request on encrypted channels?
- Needs Firewall logs with reject actions. If port 445 is blocked at the perimeter, the network connection surface may not show the attempt, leaving the successful exploit (initial access) undetected if it relies on SMB for the second stage. It would answer: Were there failed SMB connection attempts to external IPs?
Parameters and data
Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
lookback_days | number | 14 | Days of history to examine. |
scope_hosts | list[host] | none | Specific hosts to investigate; leave empty to hunt across the entire estate. |
target_uris | list[string] | /forgot-password, /api/v1/lint, /wp-content/plugins/bug-library/ | URI paths associated with the latest Metasploit module releases. |
Data sources
| Source | Category | Telemetry |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) | endpoint | endpoint |
| Network telemetry | network | network |
| Web server / proxy logs | siem | network |
Source
An open hunt.md file. It runs anywhere that reads the format.
---
analysis: A simple detection rule on the URI or the SMB port lacks context. This hunt
correlates the vulnerability state (vulnerable software present) with the behavior
(URI hit) and the specific outcome (uncommon outbound SMB connection) to settle
on a verdict.
blind_spots:
- id: tls-encryption-blind-spot
question: What were the full URI and body of the request on encrypted channels?
requires: TLS inspection or decrypted HTTP logs
risk: Attackers can hide exploit payloads in HTTPS traffic, making URI-based detection
impossible without decryption.
stage: initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities
- id: smb-egress-filtering
question: Were there failed SMB connection attempts to external IPs?
requires: Firewall logs with reject actions
risk: If port 445 is blocked at the perimeter, the network connection surface may
not show the attempt, leaving the successful exploit (initial access) undetected
if it relies on SMB for the second stage.
stage: credential-access-ntlm-disclosure
coverage:
- stage: initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities
status: covered
steps:
- vulnerable-host-inventory
- perimeter-http-exploitation
- stage: credential-access-ntlm-disclosure
status: covered
steps:
- smb-redirection-attempts
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules
in Network Perimeter Devices and much more'' series.'
stage: execution-fetch-payload-delivery
status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules
in Network Perimeter Devices and much more'' series.'
stage: persistence-linux-elf-injection
status: out_of_scope
- reason: 'Belongs to another part of the ''Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules
in Network Perimeter Devices and much more'' series.'
stage: persistence-privileged-container-mount
status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
claims: no_unsupported
evidence: citation_required
missing_data: not_benign
telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
applicability: campaign-specific
handoff: keep-as-periodic-hunt
justification: Exploitation of perimeter devices leads to immediate unauthenticated
network access or high-value credential theft; verifying the integrity of these
public-facing services is a critical security obligation.
methodology: model-assisted
trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An attacker is exploiting vulnerabilities in perimeter applications (like
Flowise or Citrix) to gain initial access or force NTLM authentication to a remote
UNC path for credential theft.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1557.001
- credential access
- execution
- initial access
- persistence
name: Perimeter Exploitation and NTLM Redirection
parameters:
lookback_days:
default: '14'
description: Days of history to examine.
type: number
scope_hosts:
default: []
description: Specific hosts to investigate; leave empty to hunt across the entire
estate.
type: list[host]
target_uris:
default:
- /forgot-password
- /api/v1/lint
- /wp-content/plugins/bug-library/
description: URI paths associated with the latest Metasploit module releases.
type: list[string]
provenance:
authors:
- name: Huntbase hunt generation
org: huntbase.io
generated:
by: huntbase-hunt-generation
from: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more
gates:
- dry-run
- lint
- critic
model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Start by identifying all servers running Flowise, GitLab, Citrix, and Cisco
gateway software. Use the HTTP activity surface to look for URIs associated with
Metasploit modules, specifically focusing on unauthenticated endpoints.
references:
- name: "Rapid7 \u2014 Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter\
\ Devices"
url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more
related:
- hunt: smb-egress-to-non-rfc1918
reason: A broader hunt for any outbound SMB traffic regardless of perimeter application
exploitation.
relation: sibling
scenario:
stages:
- name: Exploitation of Perimeter and Developer Tools
observables:
- HTTP POST to /forgot-password in Flowise
- Unauthenticated CI lint API calls to GitLab
- PHP file uploads to /wp-content/plugins/bug-library/
- Command injection patterns in Citrix NetScaler login logs
- SQL injection patterns in Cisco Secure Email Gateway S/MIME handling
- CVE-2025-58434
- CVE-2026-88771
- CVE-2026-97229
- CVE-2026-76443
- CVE-2024-5450
slug: initial-access-perimeter-vulnerabilities
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1190
- name: NTLMv2 Hash Disclosure via UNC Path
observables:
- OpenBullet2 forced SMB authentication via UNC path proxy source
- Outbound SMB (port 445) connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure
- CVE-2026-39908
slug: credential-access-ntlm-disclosure
tactic: credential-access
techniques:
- T1557.001
- name: Multi-Protocol Fetch Payload Execution
observables:
- Fetch commands using FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, or TFTP to download LoongArch64 payloads
- Execution of chmod on downloaded files
- Reverse shell or bind shell activity (e.g., shell_reverse_tcp)
slug: execution-fetch-payload-delivery
tactic: execution
techniques:
- T1105
- T1059.003
- name: Linux ELF Executable Payload Injection
observables:
- Code cave and segment injection in Linux ELF files
- Architecture-specific trampolines for x86, x64, or AArch64
- Modified ELF binaries on disk
slug: persistence-linux-elf-injection
tactic: persistence
techniques:
- T1574
- name: Docker Container Persistence and Host Access
observables:
- Creation of privileged Docker containers
- 'Bind-mounting host filesystem (e.g., C: drive on Windows or root on Linux)
to a container'
- Docker Desktop creating persistent Alpine containers on Windows
- Portainer API activity to create containers with host access
slug: persistence-privileged-container-mount
tactic: persistence
techniques:
- T1610
- T1543.003
summary: This campaign involves the use of newly released Metasploit modules targeting
unauthenticated RCE and authentication bypass vulnerabilities in perimeter devices
and developer tools like Citrix NetScaler, Cisco Secure Email Gateway, Flowise,
and GitLab. After initial access, attackers leverage specialized Linux ELF injection
techniques and privileged Docker container creation for persistent access and
payload execution.
series:
index: 1
slug: metasploit-wrapup-unauth-rce-modules-in-network-perimeter-devices-and-much-more
title: 'Metasploit Wrapup: Unauth RCE modules in Network Perimeter Devices and much
more'
total: 2
severity: high
targets:
analyst:
name: Tier-2 analyst
role: analyst
endpoint:
category: endpoint
name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
telemetry:
- endpoint
hunter:
agent: true
name: Hunt agent
network:
category: network
name: Network telemetry
telemetry:
- network
web:
category: siem
name: Web server / proxy logs
telemetry:
- network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---
# Perimeter Exploitation and NTLM Redirection
This hunt targets recent Metasploit module releases for perimeter software. It first identifies hosts running vulnerable software, then concurrently examines HTTP logs for known exploitation paths and network logs for anomalous outbound SMB traffic (port 445). An agent evaluates whether these signals coincide, suggesting a successful exploit that redirected authentication to an attacker-controlled listener.
## vulnerable-host-inventory
<!-- Identify vulnerable perimeter software -->
Scope the hunt to hosts running software mentioned in the Metasploit wrap-up.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping
~~~yaml
expected: A list of hosts running potentially vulnerable perimeter or development
applications.
reads:
- device_hostname
- package_name
- package_version
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_software_inventory
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%flowise%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%gitlab%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%netscaler%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%secure%email%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%wordpress%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%openbullet%')
```
## parallel-evidence-gathering
<!-- Parallel evidence gathering -->
parallel:
- → perimeter-http-exploitation
- → smb-redirection-attempts
join: → incident-triage
## perimeter-http-exploitation
<!-- Hunt for exploitation URI patterns -->
Find HTTP requests hitting specific endpoints associated with recent RCE modules.
```sqlite target=web role=detection-candidate params=(target_uris=target_uris, lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: Requests to sensitive paths like /forgot-password in Flowise or CI lint
in GitLab.
reads:
- device_hostname
- url_path
- http_method
- src_endpoint_ip
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_http_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, url_path, http_method, src_endpoint_ip, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{target_uris}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(url_path) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(url_path) LIKE '%/wp-content/plugins/bug-library/%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0)
```
## smb-redirection-attempts
<!-- Outbound SMB connection baseline -->
Identify anomalous outbound SMB connections that may indicate NTLM hash disclosure.
```sqlite target=network role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
baseline:
compare: first_seen
window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Rare outbound port 445 connections from perimeter servers to external IPs.
prevalence:
by: device_hostname
key:
- dst_endpoint_ip
rare_below: 5
reads:
- device_hostname
- dst_endpoint_ip
- dst_endpoint_port
- direction
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_network_connection
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip, COUNT(*) AS connections, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_network_connection WHERE dst_endpoint_port = 445 AND direction = 'outbound' AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) GROUP BY device_hostname, dst_endpoint_ip HAVING connections < 5
```
## incident-triage
<!-- Weigh perimeter evidence -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- vulnerable-host-inventory
- perimeter-http-exploitation
- smb-redirection-attempts
max_iterations: 4
objective: Determine if the perimeter server was successfully exploited based on URI
hits and subsequent outbound SMB activity.
success_criteria: A verdict of malicious if exploit URIs match outbound SMB redirections.
tools:
- endpoint
- network
- web
```
## remediation-decision
<!-- Decide on containment -->
if~: "the incident-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → isolate-target
indeterminate: → manual-validation
unavailable: → manual-validation (blind_spot: tls-encryption-blind-spot)
else: → close-out-report
## isolate-target
<!-- Isolate affected host -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the endpoint to stop outbound SMB NTLM relaying and further RCE execution.
```
→ manual-validation
## manual-validation
<!-- Analyst manual validation -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the HTTP paths and SMB destination IP. Check if the SMB traffic follows the HTTP POST request immediately. Determine if the destination IP has a reputation for hosting NTLM relay listeners.
```
→ close-out-report
## close-out-report
<!-- Close out hunt report -->
```manual target=analyst
Summarize the findings. If Benign, record the URI hits as false positives for tuning. If Malicious, escalate to Incident Response.
```
→ end
Run this hunt against your own data.
In Huntbase, Scout runs every step across the tools you already connect, checks back through your history and returns a verdict with the evidence. The hunt.md file is open, so you can also take it anywhere that reads the format.
Drafted by machine (huntbase-hunt-generation, hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview), checked by dry-run, lint, critic, then reviewed by a person.