PII Harvesting and Remote Service Abuse
Medium severity TLP:CLEAR Research by ESET Research Published 18 Nov 2026
Hypothesis
An intruder has redirected users to a copycat visa or identity portal to harvest passport scans and selfies, then used the stolen identities to authenticate to external remote services from unusual locations.
Brief
Why this hunt
ESET Research, "Is it safe to upload my passport or ID online?", explores how attackers trick users into submitting sensitive identification. This hunt addresses the risk where attackers use copycat portals to harvest passport scans and selfies. We focus on the sequence where a user interacts with a fake portal and then experiences unauthorized access to corporate resources.
How the Hunt Flows
The first phase identifies leads through DNS activity. The lead query finds rare resolutions to domains that mimic legitimate government or travel portals. While we provide a list of identity-themed domains as a baseline, the hunt specifically highlights lookups that are infrequent within the environment. This rarity helps filter out common traffic and isolates potential victims. After an analyst or agent evaluates the legitimacy of these domains, the hunt proceeds to a scouting phase. This phase runs two queries in parallel to gather evidence of both data submission and subsequent abuse. The first query monitors outbound HTTP POST requests. It looks for body sizes exceeding 100KB, which is a proxy for the transmission of image files or scanned documents. Since passport scans are relatively large, this threshold eliminates smaller, routine web form submissions. The second parallel query examines authentication logs for the hosts identified in the DNS phase. It searches for successful sign-ins to remote services that originate from unfamiliar countries or use unexpected protocols. This step identifies the transition from identity theft to active exploitation of the stolen credentials. We prioritize remote interactive and network logons that align with the timing of the initial DNS lead. In the final triage phase, an analyst correlates these signals. A confirmed malicious chain shows a user visiting a suspicious domain, followed by a significant data upload, and ending with anomalous remote access. This progression provides the context necessary to distinguish a targeted attack from routine web browsing. The correlation minimizes the false positives inherent in looking at authentication anomalies or large uploads in isolation.
Blind Spots
This hunt has two primary limitations. If an adversary uses DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) or a non-enrolled resolver, the initial DNS lead remains invisible. The hunt relies on endpoint or resolver logs to catch the redirection. Furthermore, without TLS inspection on the HTTP traffic, we cannot inspect the contents of the POST requests. We rely on the request body size as a proxy for biometric or document uploads, which may produce false positives from other encrypted data transfers.
Steps
-
Query, baseline
DNS lookups to identity copycat domains
Identify hosts that visited domains mimicking legitimate visa or identity portals.
sql, reads hb_dns_activitySELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS lookup_count, MIN(time) AS first_seenFROM hb_dns_activityWHERE instr(',' || '{{identity_themed_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostnameORDER BY lookup_count ASCWhat a hit looks like. A small number of hosts visiting a domain that is visually or semantically similar to a government portal. Silence suggests no interaction with these specific copycats.
-
Agent triage
Evaluate domain legitimacy
Determine if any domains visited in the lead query appear to be illegitimate harvesting portals.
-
Decision
Gate: Proceed with expensive scouting?
Stop the hunt early if no suspicious portal interaction is confirmed.
-
Query, enrichment
Potential PII uploads via HTTP POST
Find large outbound POST requests that may represent passport scans or biometric uploads.
sql, reads hb_http_activitySELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, request_body_len, timeFROM hb_http_activityWHERE http_method = 'POST' AND request_body_len > {{upload_min_bytes}} AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. POST requests over 100KB to suspicious or rare domains following the DNS lead hit. Silence suggests no large data was transmitted to the suspected portals.
-
Query, detection candidate
Anomalous remote service sign-ins
Identify unauthorized access to gateways using credentials likely stolen via the harvesting site.
sql, reads hb_auth_signinSELECT device_hostname, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_location_country, logon_type, status, timeFROM hb_auth_signinWHERE (logon_type IN ('Remote Interactive', 'Network') OR activity_id = 5) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')ORDER BY time DESCWhat a hit looks like. Sign-ins from unfamiliar locations or unusual protocols for the users identified in the scoping phase.
-
Agent triage
Correlate harvesting and access anomalies
Verify if the DNS visit, HTTP upload, and auth anomalies form a single attack chain per host.
-
Decision
Route based on compromise
Initiate containment for confirmed malicious chains.
-
Response action
Isolate host and revoke session
Prevent further unauthorized access and stop potential data exfiltration.
-
Analyst task
Analyst manual review
Verify the correlated chain and assess if additional PII was leaked.
-
Analyst task
Close out
Document findings and update blocklists.
Coverage
3 of 3 stages covered
| Stage and ATT&CK technique | Covered | How, or why not |
|---|---|---|
| Redirection via Copycat Phishing and SEO T1566 |
Yes | dns-leads, evaluate-leads |
| PII and Biometric Harvesting T1566 |
Yes | pii-upload-check |
| Unauthorized Access via Stolen ID T1133 |
Yes | remote-access-check, final-triage |
Blind spots
- Needs hb_dns_activity from the endpoint or resolver. An attacker using DNS-over-HTTPS would bypass the lead query, making the harvesting interaction invisible. It would answer: whether the initial redirection to the portal occurred via DoH or a non-enrolled resolver
- Needs TLS inspection on hb_http_activity. Without TLS inspection, the query relies entirely on body length as a proxy for biometric upload, increasing false positives from legitimate encrypted traffic. It would answer: whether the POST request body actually contained an image or passport scan
Parameters and data
Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
identity_themed_domains | list[domain] | uk-visa-portal.com, visa-verify-status.online, identity-check-portal.net, passport-verification.io, travel-permit-gov.info | List of domains suspected of being copycat visa or identity portals. |
lookback_days | number | 14 | Days of history to examine for the lead and subsequent activities. |
scope_hosts | list[host] | none | Hostnames to narrow follow-on queries after the lead identifies potential victims. |
upload_min_bytes | number | 100000 | Minimum body size in bytes for an HTTP POST to be considered a document or biometric upload (100KB). |
Data sources
| Source | Category | Telemetry |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) | endpoint | endpoint |
| Identity / sign-in telemetry | identity | identity |
| Web server / proxy logs | siem | network |
Source
An open hunt.md file. It runs anywhere that reads the format.
---
analysis: A single rule on large uploads or rare DNS would be too noisy. This hunt
correlates the temporal relationship between visiting a suspicious domain, performing
a large upload, and the subsequent appearance of auth anomalies, providing the context
an analyst needs to confirm identity theft.
blind_spots:
- id: no-dns-telemetry
question: whether the initial redirection to the portal occurred via DoH or a non-enrolled
resolver
requires: hb_dns_activity from the endpoint or resolver
risk: An attacker using DNS-over-HTTPS would bypass the lead query, making the harvesting
interaction invisible.
stage: phishing-redirection-and-seo
- id: encrypted-traffic-blind-spot
question: whether the POST request body actually contained an image or passport
scan
requires: TLS inspection on hb_http_activity
risk: Without TLS inspection, the query relies entirely on body length as a proxy
for biometric upload, increasing false positives from legitimate encrypted traffic.
stage: pii-biometric-harvesting
coverage:
- stage: phishing-redirection-and-seo
status: covered
steps:
- dns-leads
- evaluate-leads
- stage: pii-biometric-harvesting
status: covered
steps:
- pii-upload-check
- stage: unauthorized-remote-access
status: covered
steps:
- remote-access-check
- final-triage
guardrails:
claims: no_unsupported
evidence: citation_required
missing_data: not_benign
telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
applicability: campaign-specific
handoff: promote-to-detection
justification: The harvesting of passport scans and biometrics is a critical precursor
to high-impact identity theft and initial access. Detecting these interactions
early allows for the revocation of identities before they are used to breach the
environment.
methodology: model-assisted
trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An intruder has redirected users to a copycat visa or identity portal
to harvest passport scans and selfies, then used the stolen identities to authenticate
to external remote services from unusual locations.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1133
- initial access
name: PII Harvesting and Remote Service Abuse
parameters:
identity_themed_domains:
default:
- uk-visa-portal.com
- visa-verify-status.online
- identity-check-portal.net
- passport-verification.io
- travel-permit-gov.info
description: List of domains suspected of being copycat visa or identity portals.
from:
kind: article
observed: '2026-11-16'
ref: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/privacy/is-it-safe-upload-passport-id-online/
type: list[domain]
lookback_days:
default: '14'
description: Days of history to examine for the lead and subsequent activities.
type: number
scope_hosts:
default: []
description: Hostnames to narrow follow-on queries after the lead identifies potential
victims.
type: list[host]
upload_min_bytes:
default: '100000'
description: Minimum body size in bytes for an HTTP POST to be considered a document
or biometric upload (100KB).
type: number
provenance:
authors:
- name: Huntbase hunt generation
org: huntbase.io
generated:
by: huntbase-hunt-generation
from: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/privacy/is-it-safe-upload-passport-id-online/
gates:
- dry-run
- lint
- critic
model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Focus on users in departments that frequently handle international travel
or visa documentation. Prioritize hosts with rare DNS resolutions matching travel-themed
keywords.
references:
- name: "ESET Research \u2014 Is it safe to upload my passport or ID online?"
url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/privacy/is-it-safe-upload-passport-id-online/
related:
- hunt: unusual-geo-remote-signin
reason: This hunt specifically links the sign-in to the preceding PII harvesting
interaction; a general geo-anomaly hunt is a sibling but lacks the causative chain.
relation: out-of-scope-alternative
scenario:
stages:
- name: Redirection via Copycat Phishing and SEO
observables:
- Copycat visa portals
- Fake travel permit sites
- Malicious search ranking links
- Redirections to suspicious domains
slug: phishing-redirection-and-seo
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1566
- name: PII and Biometric Harvesting
observables:
- HTTP POST requests to unauthorized domains
- Upload of passport scans
- Upload of selfies or video-face scans
- Data submission to intermediary sites
slug: pii-biometric-harvesting
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1566
- name: Unauthorized Access via Stolen ID
observables:
- Logins to VPN or Citrix gateways using stolen credentials
- Remote service authentication from unfamiliar locations
- Password resets using harvested PII
- Account unlock attempts
slug: unauthorized-remote-access
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1133
summary: Adversaries use copycat phishing sites and SEO poisoning to lure users
into uploading sensitive identification documents, such as passports and biometrics,
to fake visa or travel portals. This harvested personally identifiable information
(PII) is subsequently used to bypass security measures, commit identity fraud,
or gain unauthorized access to accounts through external-facing remote services.
severity: medium
targets:
analyst:
name: Tier-2 analyst
role: analyst
endpoint:
category: endpoint
name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
telemetry:
- endpoint
hunter:
agent: true
name: Hunt agent
identity:
category: identity
name: Identity / sign-in telemetry
telemetry:
- identity
web:
category: siem
name: Web server / proxy logs
telemetry:
- network
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---
# PII Harvesting and Remote Service Abuse
This hunt identifies the progression from initial phishing redirection to credential abuse. It starts by finding rare DNS lookups to domains that mimic legitimate travel or identity portals. If an agent confirms these domains are suspicious, the hunt scopes to those hosts to find large HTTP POST requests (indicative of image uploads) and subsequent authentication anomalies on VPN or Citrix gateways. An analyst then weighs the complete chain to confirm a compromise.
## dns-leads
<!-- DNS lookups to identity copycat domains -->
Identify hosts that visited domains mimicking legitimate visa or identity portals.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(identity_themed_domains=identity_themed_domains, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
baseline:
compare: first_seen
window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: A small number of hosts visiting a domain that is visually or semantically
similar to a government portal. Silence suggests no interaction with these specific
copycats.
prevalence:
by: device_hostname
key:
- query_hostname
rare_below: 5
reads:
- device_hostname
- query_hostname
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_dns_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, COUNT(*) AS lookup_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{identity_themed_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY device_hostname, query_hostname ORDER BY lookup_count ASC
```
## evaluate-leads
<!-- Evaluate domain legitimacy -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- dns-leads
max_iterations: 3
objective: Examine the DNS hits; identify if any queried hostnames are likely copycats
or fake portals based on the report parameters.
success_criteria: A list of suspicious domains and the hosts that visited them.
tools:
- endpoint
- identity
- web
```
## gate
<!-- Gate: Proceed with expensive scouting? -->
if~: "the evaluate-leads verdict classifies at least one domain as suspicious" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → parallel-scouting
indeterminate: → analyst-review
unavailable: → analyst-review (blind_spot: no-dns-telemetry)
else: → close-out
## parallel-scouting
<!-- Scout for uploads and abuse -->
parallel:
- → pii-upload-check
- → remote-access-check
join: → final-triage
## pii-upload-check
<!-- Potential PII uploads via HTTP POST -->
Find large outbound POST requests that may represent passport scans or biometric uploads.
```sqlite target=web role=enrichment params=(upload_min_bytes=upload_min_bytes, scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
expected: POST requests over 100KB to suspicious or rare domains following the DNS
lead hit. Silence suggests no large data was transmitted to the suspected portals.
reads:
- device_hostname
- url_hostname
- url_path
- request_body_len
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_http_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, url_hostname, url_path, request_body_len, time FROM hb_http_activity WHERE http_method = 'POST' AND request_body_len > {{upload_min_bytes}} AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## remote-access-check
<!-- Anomalous remote service sign-ins -->
Identify unauthorized access to gateways using credentials likely stolen via the harvesting site.
```sqlite target=identity role=detection-candidate params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
expected: Sign-ins from unfamiliar locations or unusual protocols for the users identified
in the scoping phase.
reads:
- device_hostname
- actor_user_name
- src_endpoint_ip
- src_location_country
- logon_type
- status
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_auth_signin
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-18'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, actor_user_name, src_endpoint_ip, src_location_country, logon_type, status, time FROM hb_auth_signin WHERE (logon_type IN ('Remote Interactive', 'Network') OR activity_id = 5) AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') ORDER BY time DESC
```
## final-triage
<!-- Correlate harvesting and access anomalies -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- evaluate-leads
- pii-upload-check
- remote-access-check
max_iterations: 6
objective: Determine if users who visited the suspicious portals also performed large
uploads and subsequently experienced anomalous remote authentication events.
success_criteria: A per-host verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign citing specific
DNS, HTTP, and Auth rows.
tools:
- endpoint
- identity
- web
```
## outcome-route
<!-- Route based on compromise -->
if~: "the final-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host and user" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → contain-and-reset
indeterminate: → analyst-review
unavailable: → analyst-review (blind_spot: encrypted-traffic-blind-spot)
else: → close-out
## contain-and-reset
<!-- Isolate host and revoke session -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the identified host and revoke all active cloud/VPN sessions for the affected user. Force a password reset.
```
→ analyst-review
## analyst-review
<!-- Analyst manual review -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the DNS query times against the HTTP POST request times. Confirm if the remote access originated from a known malicious IP or unusual geographic region.
```
→ end
## close-out
<!-- Close out -->
```manual target=analyst
Record the identified malicious domains for perimeter blocking and document the host/user combinations examined.
```
→ end
Run this hunt against your own data.
In Huntbase, Scout runs every step across the tools you already connect, checks back through your history and returns a verdict with the evidence. The hunt.md file is open, so you can also take it anywhere that reads the format.
Drafted by machine (huntbase-hunt-generation, hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview), checked by dry-run, lint, critic, then reviewed by a person.