← All hunts high TLP:CLEAR Part 2 of 2

SCKit Persistence and RelayTrap Targeting

An intruder who has compromised a ScreenConnect client is maintaining access via script-based Registry persistence and is using the RelayTrap component to target connecting technician sessions.

Based on research by Microsoft 2026-11-14 10 steps · 4 queries T1053.005 T1059.001 T1071 T1190 T1547.001 T1562.001

Brief

Why now

Microsoft Security Blog published details on SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions. The research describes a sophisticated toolkit that exploits a specific ScreenConnect vulnerability to establish persistence and hijack active sessions. This hunt provides a systematic way to find the toolkit across your estate.

How the hunt flows

The hunt begins with a scoping phase using the hb_vulnerability_finding surface. It identifies unpatched hosts susceptible to CVE-2026-84869. While patching mitigates the initial vector, the hunt proceeds to check these and other hosts for existing infections that occurred before remediation.

The second phase executes a parallel fan-out across three surfaces to gather independent evidence. The hb_registry_activity query searches for rare batch or PowerShell scripts added to Run keys, focusing on entries that appear on three or fewer hosts. Simultaneously, the hb_process_activity query looks for the execution of known SCKit components like TrapWatch.ps1 or Lite-Alert.ps1. Finally, the hb_dns_activity query correlates host behavior with known malicious relay domains such as ns.mo7sen.dev and sc.payproofkit.com.

An agent then triages the collected evidence. It synthesizes the vulnerability status, persistence signals, and process artifacts to reach a verdict for each endpoint. This approach is necessary because individual signals, like Registry Run keys or PowerShell execution, often appear in legitimate IT support contexts. The hunt confirms an infection only when these signals converge, distinguishing the toolkit from standard maintenance.

What the hunt cannot see

The hunt relies on comprehensive EDR coverage. Any unmanaged hosts running ScreenConnect will not appear in the registry or process logs, which allows persistence to remain unobserved. Additionally, the RelayTrap component may execute and terminate quickly. If process telemetry is based on snapshot sampling rather than continuous event logging, the hunt might miss short-lived toolkit artifacts.

In this series

Steps

  1. Identify vulnerable ScreenConnect clients

    Query · scoping

    Find hosts susceptible to unauthorized file execution via ScreenConnect (CVE-2026-84869).

    reads hb_vulnerability_findingsql
    SELECT device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_at FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-84869' AND status != 'suppressed'

    What a hit looks like. Rows identify unpatched hosts. If none, the primary vector for SCKit deployment is mitigated, but the hunt continues for existing persistence.

  2. Rare script persistence in Run keys

    Query · baseline

    Identify hosts where SCKit launchers or cleanup scripts (Stop-LabTrap.bat) have been added to registry startup keys.

    reads hb_registry_activitysql
    SELECT LOWER(reg_value_data) AS script_data, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE (LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\currentversion\run%' OR LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\currentversion\runonce%') AND (LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.bat%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.ps1%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.cmd%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC

    What a hit looks like. Rare scripts (batch or PowerShell) persisting in Run keys. Malicious launchers like Run-Lateral-Full.bat will appear as unique entries.

  3. Execution of SCKit toolkit artifacts

    Query · detection candidate

    Detect the running components of the SCKit worm and RelayTrap payload.

    reads hb_process_activitysql
    SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%trapwatch.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%lite-alert.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%stop-labtrap.bat%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%toolboxrelayuploader.exe%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')

    What a hit looks like. Processes executing specific SCKit scripts or the RelayTrap uploader. This is a high-confidence indicator of active infection.

  4. DNS lookups to malicious relay infrastructure

    Query · enrichment

    Correlate host activity with the known domains used for toolkit retrieval and RelayTrap communication.

    reads hb_dns_activitysql
    SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')

    What a hit looks like. DNS queries for domains like ns.mo7sen.dev or sc.payproofkit.com. Any match indicates a host communicating with the threat actor's infrastructure.

  5. Triage SCKit evidence per host

    Agent triage

    Synthesize vulnerability status, registry persistence, and artifact execution to identify confirmed SCKit infections.

  6. Route based on infection verdict

    Decision

    Direct the hunt based on the severity of the findings.

  7. Isolate compromised host

    Response action

    Prevent further lateral movement and session hijacking by isolating the infected endpoint.

  8. Detailed analyst investigation

    Analyst task

    Verify the extent of the session hijacking and check for downstream impacts on managed endpoints.

  9. Close hunt and record coverage

    Analyst task

    Finalize the hunt and document the estate's exposure to SCKit.

Coverage

Scenario coverage

StageCoveredHow, or why not
Persistence via Tasks and Registry
T1547.001 · T1053.005 · T1562.001
Yes rare-persistence-scripts, sckit-artifact-execution
Command and Control Infrastructure
T1071
Yes infrastructure-dns-lookups
Technician Session Hijacking
T1059.001
Yes vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts, sckit-artifact-execution, agent-triage
ScreenConnect Management Abuse
T1190
Out of scope Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.
Malicious MSI Deployment
T1059
Out of scope Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.
SCKit Payload Extraction
T1059.001
Out of scope Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series.

Blind spots

  • Needs EDR agent coverage across all MSP-managed endpoints. A host without an agent will not appear in registry or process logs, leaving persistence unobserved and session hijacking possible. It would answer Are there unmanaged hosts in the environment that SCKit has successfully compromised?.
  • Needs High-frequency process sampling or full process log retention. If using snapshot-based process activity (hb_process_activity) without historical logs, short-lived toolkit components may be missed. It would answer Did the RelayTrap component execute and terminate between sampling intervals?.

Parameters & data

Parameters

ParameterTypeDefaultWhat it is
c2_domainslist[domain]ns.mo7sen.dev, sc.payproofkit.com, relaytrap.cs, cdn007-digitaldownloads.com, suspscreenconnectdownload.ea, tikise.ea, relaypersist.fc, screlaytrap.ec, screenconnect.sc, screenconnect.dcC2 and relay domains identified in the research.
lookback_daysnumber14Days of activity to examine.
scope_hostslist[host]—Specific hostnames to focus on; leave empty to hunt the whole estate.

Telemetry

SourceCategoryTelemetry
Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)endpointendpoint

Source

Download hunt.md Definition (JSON) An open hunt.md file; it runs anywhere that reads the format.
---
analysis: A single detection rule for Registry Run keys or DNS lookups would be prone
  to false positives from legitimate support activity. This hunt uses the agent to
  weigh multiple independent signals (vulnerability status, rare persistence scripts,
  and named artifact execution) to confirm a sophisticated toolkit installation.
blind_spots:
- id: incomplete-telemetry
  question: Are there unmanaged hosts in the environment that SCKit has successfully
    compromised?
  requires: EDR agent coverage across all MSP-managed endpoints
  risk: A host without an agent will not appear in registry or process logs, leaving
    persistence unobserved and session hijacking possible.
  stage: persistence-establishment
- id: ephemeral-processes
  question: Did the RelayTrap component execute and terminate between sampling intervals?
  requires: High-frequency process sampling or full process log retention
  risk: If using snapshot-based process activity (hb_process_activity) without historical
    logs, short-lived toolkit components may be missed.
  stage: relay-trap-technician-targeting
coverage:
- stage: persistence-establishment
  status: covered
  steps:
  - rare-persistence-scripts
  - sckit-artifact-execution
- stage: c2-and-infrastructure-communication
  status: covered
  steps:
  - infrastructure-dns-lookups
- stage: relay-trap-technician-targeting
  status: covered
  steps:
  - vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts
  - sckit-artifact-execution
  - agent-triage
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote
    access and target technician sessions' series.
  stage: initial-access-screenconnect-abuse
  status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote
    access and target technician sessions' series.
  stage: unauthorized-client-installation
  status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote
    access and target technician sessions' series.
  stage: sckit-powershell-deployment
  status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
  claims: no_unsupported
  evidence: citation_required
  missing_data: not_benign
  telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
  applicability: campaign-specific
  handoff: promote-to-detection
  justification: SCKit represents a direct threat to the trust relationship between
    MSPs and their customers. By abusing legitimate remote-access tools to hijack
    technician sessions, the threat actor can achieve broad lateral movement that
    bypasses standard perimeter controls.
  methodology: model-assisted
  trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An intruder who has compromised a ScreenConnect client is maintaining
  access via script-based Registry persistence and is using the RelayTrap component
  to target connecting technician sessions.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1071
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1562.001
- command and control
- execution
- initial access
- lateral movement
- persistence
name: SCKit Persistence and RelayTrap Targeting
parameters:
  c2_domains:
    default:
    - ns.mo7sen.dev
    - sc.payproofkit.com
    - relaytrap.cs
    - cdn007-digitaldownloads.com
    - suspscreenconnectdownload.ea
    - tikise.ea
    - relaypersist.fc
    - screlaytrap.ec
    - screenconnect.sc
    - screenconnect.dc
    description: C2 and relay domains identified in the research.
    from:
      kind: article
      observed: '2026-11-13'
      ref: msrc-blog-sckit-screenconnect
    type: list[domain]
  lookback_days:
    default: '14'
    description: Days of activity to examine.
    type: number
  scope_hosts:
    default: []
    description: Specific hostnames to focus on; leave empty to hunt the whole estate.
    type: list[host]
provenance:
  authors:
  - name: Huntbase hunt generation
    org: huntbase.io
  generated:
    by: huntbase-hunt-generation
    from: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/
    gates:
    - dry-run
    - lint
    model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: The scoping query targets the vulnerability used for initial access. The
  hunt also checks all hosts for persistence regardless of patch status to identify
  infections that occurred before patching.
references:
- name: "Microsoft Security Blog \u2014 SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote\
    \ access and target technician sessions"
  url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/
related:
- hunt: unauthorized-screenconnect-client-deployment
  reason: This hunt focuses on the persistent toolkit and technician targeting, whereas
    deployment focuses on the initial MSI installer activity.
  relation: out-of-scope-alternative
scenario:
  stages:
  - name: ScreenConnect Management Abuse
    observables:
    - Unauthorized commands issued via RMM+ extension APIs
    - ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi requested with c=Exploited parameters
    - Abuse of ConnectWise Automate/LabTech extensions
    slug: initial-access-screenconnect-abuse
    tactic: initial-access
    techniques:
    - T1190
  - name: Malicious MSI Deployment
    observables:
    - curl.exe -o C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi
    - msiexec.exe /i C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi /qn /norestart
    - Silent installation of unauthorized ScreenConnect guest clients
    slug: unauthorized-client-installation
    tactic: execution
    techniques:
    - T1059
  - name: SCKit Payload Extraction
    observables:
    - Stage0Loader.ps1
    - Panel-Lateral.ps1
    - Panel-Lateral-free.ps1
    - LabConfig.ps1
    - PowerShell decoder extracting toolkit using device-specific material
    slug: sckit-powershell-deployment
    tactic: execution
    techniques:
    - T1059.001
  - name: Persistence via Tasks and Registry
    observables:
    - schtasks.exe creating malicious maintenance tasks
    - Registry Run keys for SCKit launchers
    - trapkit\install.ps1
    - Stop-LabTrap.bat
    slug: persistence-establishment
    tactic: persistence
    techniques:
    - T1547.001
    - T1053.005
    - T1562.001
  - name: Command and Control Infrastructure
    observables:
    - 185.99.255.28
    - 155.94.150.39
    - ns.mo7sen.dev
    - sc.payproofkit.com
    - cdn007-digitaldownloads.com
    - relaytrap.cs
    - newnewnew.gotdns.org
    - soxnewwork.homedns.org
    slug: c2-and-infrastructure-communication
    tactic: command-and-control
    techniques:
    - T1071
  - name: Technician Session Hijacking
    observables:
    - CVE-2026-84869
    - RelayTrap component delivery to connecting technicians
    - TrapWatch.ps1
    - ToolboxRelayUploader.exe
    - Lite-Alert.ps1
    slug: relay-trap-technician-targeting
    tactic: lateral-movement
    techniques:
    - T1059.001
  summary: Threat actors abuse vulnerabilities in ScreenConnect server extensions
    or hijacked management consoles to deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and
    the SCKit malware toolkit. The campaign establishes long-term persistence on customer
    endpoints to host RelayTrap, a component that targets IT technicians' workstations
    with malicious payloads during support sessions.
series:
  index: 2
  slug: sckit-abuses-screenconnect-to-deploy-remote-access-and-target-technician-sessions
  title: SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician
    sessions
  total: 2
severity: high
targets:
  analyst:
    name: Tier-2 analyst
    role: analyst
  endpoint:
    category: endpoint
    name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
    telemetry:
    - endpoint
  hunter:
    agent: true
    name: Hunt agent
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---


# SCKit Persistence and RelayTrap Targeting

This hunt identifies long-term SCKit infections following the abuse of ScreenConnect clients. It begins by scoping the estate to endpoints running unpatched or vulnerable ScreenConnect clients (CVE-2026-84869). It then executes a fan-out to find independent evidence of the toolkit's presence: rare batch or PowerShell scripts persisting in Registry Run keys, the execution of named SCKit artifacts like TrapWatch or Lite-Alert, and network communication with known malicious relay infrastructure. An agent triages these signals to identify compromised customer endpoints that may be attempting to hijack technician sessions.

## vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts
<!-- Identify vulnerable ScreenConnect clients -->
Find hosts susceptible to unauthorized file execution via ScreenConnect (CVE-2026-84869).

```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping
~~~yaml
expected: Rows identify unpatched hosts. If none, the primary vector for SCKit deployment
  is mitigated, but the hunt continues for existing persistence.
reads:
- device_uid
- affected_package_version
- severity
- collected_at
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_vulnerability_finding
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT device_uid, affected_package_version, severity, collected_at FROM hb_vulnerability_finding WHERE cve_uid = 'CVE-2026-84869' AND status != 'suppressed'
```

## corroborate-evidence
<!-- Fan-out for persistence and C2 signals -->
parallel:
- → rare-persistence-scripts
- → sckit-artifact-execution
- → infrastructure-dns-lookups
join: → agent-triage

## rare-persistence-scripts
<!-- Rare script persistence in Run keys -->
Identify hosts where SCKit launchers or cleanup scripts (Stop-LabTrap.bat) have been added to registry startup keys.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
baseline:
  compare: first_seen
  window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Rare scripts (batch or PowerShell) persisting in Run keys. Malicious launchers
  like Run-Lateral-Full.bat will appear as unique entries.
prevalence:
  by: device_hostname
  key:
  - reg_value_data
  rare_below: 3
reads:
- device_hostname
- reg_target
- reg_value_data
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_registry_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT LOWER(reg_value_data) AS script_data, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS host_count, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_registry_activity WHERE (LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\currentversion\run%' OR LOWER(reg_target) LIKE '%\currentversion\runonce%') AND (LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.bat%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.ps1%' OR LOWER(reg_value_data) LIKE '%.cmd%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING host_count <= 3 ORDER BY host_count ASC
```

## sckit-artifact-execution
<!-- Execution of SCKit toolkit artifacts -->
Detect the running components of the SCKit worm and RelayTrap payload.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=detection-candidate params=(scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
expected: Processes executing specific SCKit scripts or the RelayTrap uploader. This
  is a high-confidence indicator of active infection.
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_name
- process_cmd_line
- user_name
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_process_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_name, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%trapwatch.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%lite-alert.ps1%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%stop-labtrap.bat%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%toolboxrelayuploader.exe%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```

## infrastructure-dns-lookups
<!-- DNS lookups to malicious relay infrastructure -->
Correlate host activity with the known domains used for toolkit retrieval and RelayTrap communication.

```sqlite target=endpoint role=enrichment params=(c2_domains=c2_domains, scope_hosts=scope_hosts, lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
expected: DNS queries for domains like ns.mo7sen.dev or sc.payproofkit.com. Any match
  indicates a host communicating with the threat actor's infrastructure.
reads:
- device_hostname
- query_hostname
- process_name
- time
silence: evidence_of_absence
source: hb_dns_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, query_hostname, process_name, time FROM hb_dns_activity WHERE instr(',' || '{{c2_domains}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(query_hostname) || ',') > 0 AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```

## agent-triage
<!-- Triage SCKit evidence per host -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- vulnerable-screenconnect-hosts
- rare-persistence-scripts
- sckit-artifact-execution
- infrastructure-dns-lookups
max_iterations: 6
objective: Determine which hosts are compromised by SCKit. A host is 'malicious' if
  it shows either artifact execution (TrapWatch/RelayTrap) or a combination of vulnerability
  (CVE-2026-84869) and rare script-based Run key persistence. Evaluate if the host
  process names suggest a technician workstation was the source of DNS lookups to
  the relays.
success_criteria: A verdict of malicious | suspicious | benign per host with citations.
tools:
- endpoint
```

## route-on-verdict
<!-- Route based on infection verdict -->
if~: "the agent-triage verdict is malicious for at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → isolate-host
indeterminate: → analyst-review
unavailable: → analyst-review (blind_spot: incomplete-telemetry)
else: → close-out

## isolate-host
<!-- Isolate compromised host -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the host from the network and revoke any active ScreenConnect sessions associated with the machine's client ID.
```
→ analyst-review

## analyst-review
<!-- Detailed analyst investigation -->
```manual target=analyst
Verify if the compromised host was used by a technician. Check for evidence of RelayTrap delivery (RelayTrap.cs or compiled variants) and audit any ScreenConnect commands issued during the infection window.
```
→ end

## close-out
<!-- Close hunt and record coverage -->
```manual target=analyst
Document the number of endpoints patched against CVE-2026-84869. If no malicious activity was found, record the negative results for persistence and C2 communication.
```
→ end

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Open it in Huntbase to run every step against your own connections, with Scout weighing the evidence and your analysts in command. Or take the open hunt.md file anywhere that reads the format.

Machine-drafted by huntbase-hunt-generation using hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview, gated by dry-run, lint, then reviewed by a person.

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