Unauthorized ScreenConnect Client Deployment
An intruder has abused ScreenConnect management consoles or extension vulnerabilities to silently deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and the SCKit loader toolkit to managed endpoints.
Based on research by Microsoft 2026-11-14 12 steps · 4 queries T1059 T1059.001 T1190
Brief
Why now
High-trust administrative tools like ScreenConnect are frequent targets for abuse. Microsoft recently published research on SCKit (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/), a toolkit attackers use to deploy unauthorized remote access clients. These deployments often bypass traditional identity perimeters by using existing management infrastructure.
How the hunt flows
The first phase scopes the estate by inventorying hosts that run ScreenConnect or ConnectWise software. This inventory identifies the potential attack surface and focuses the hunt on endpoints where the software is already present or recently installed. This scoping ensures the subsequent, more detailed queries target relevant hosts rather than the entire fleet.
The hunt then pivots to find leads involving silent MSI installations. It specifically searches for command lines containing sc.msi or session markers such as c=Exploited. These leads, often initiated via curl or msiexec, provide high-confidence indicators of unauthorized deployment activity rather than standard software updates. This phase acts as a filter to capture high-confidence signals of abuse.
An analyst evaluates these leads to determine if the command structure matches patterns seen in SCKit research. This manual gate is critical. It ensures that the hunt only proceeds to more resource-intensive queries when a lead appears suspicious. This prevents the noise of legitimate MSP maintenance from overwhelming the triage process.
If the lead passes the evaluation gate, the hunt gathers evidence in parallel. One query examines PowerShell script blocks for known SCKit loaders like stage0loader.ps1 or lateral movement scripts. Simultaneously, another query stacks MSI installation commands across the entire fleet to identify rare outliers. Legitimate management activity usually appears on dozens of hosts, while SCKit deployments typically target a specific subset of the estate.
The final phase correlates the behavioral lead with the script content and prevalence data. An analyst reviews the combined evidence to reach a final verdict. If the activity is confirmed as malicious, the hunt provides instructions for immediate host isolation and forensic capture. This structured approach moves from broad scoping to surgical response based on corroborated evidence.
What the hunt cannot see
This hunt relies on agent coverage. It cannot identify unauthorized clients installed on unmanaged endpoints, which could serve as blind beachheads. Furthermore, while the hunt detects the SCKit loader scripts, it requires PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) to see the actual commands executed after the scripts are decrypted in memory. Without this logging, the hunt confirms the presence of the toolkit but not the specific actions taken by the intruder.
In this series
Steps
-
Scope ScreenConnect installations
Query · scopingFind the hosts that currently have ScreenConnect or ConnectWise software to narrow the hunt scope.
reads hb_software_inventorysqlSELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%screenconnect%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%connectwise%')What a hit looks like. A list of hosts with ScreenConnect installed. Presence of the software is expected; silence means the software is not inventoried or is missing from the estate.
-
Lead: Silent MSI deployment with exploited markers
Query · detection candidateIdentify suspicious MSI installations involving sc.msi or session markers like c=Exploited initiated via curl or msiexec.
reads hb_process_activitysqlSELECT device_hostname, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%msiexec%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%curl%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. Command lines showing curl downloading sc.msi or msiexec installing it silently. The presence of session markers in the URL is a high-confidence lead.
-
Evaluate MSI installation lead
Agent triageDecide whether the observed lead represents a targeted intrusion attempt requiring further evidence collection.
-
Gate on lead verdict
DecisionTerminate the hunt if no suspicious installations are found, saving resources for the more expensive script analysis.
-
SCKit toolkit script execution
Query · enrichmentIdentify the execution of the PowerShell-based decoders and loaders that extract the SCKit toolkit.
reads hb_script_activitysqlSELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_content, time FROM hb_script_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sckit_scripts}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(script_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%panel-lateral%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')What a hit looks like. Script blocks matching the toolkit logic. Finding these on the same hosts as the MSI lead strongly corroborates a compromise.
-
Prevalence of MSI installation commands
Query · baselineStack-count the installation commands to separate legitimate fleet-wide management activity from unique, attacker-controlled outliers.
reads hb_process_activitysqlSELECT LOWER(process_cmd_line) AS cmd, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING hosts <= 3What a hit looks like. Command lines seen on only one or two hosts. Genuine MSP maintenance will typically have high host counts.
-
Triage deployment activity
Agent triageCorrelate the behavioral lead, PowerShell script content, and fleet-wide prevalence to reach a final verdict per host.
-
Route on triage verdict
DecisionRoute the host for immediate isolation or further manual review depending on the severity of the findings.
-
Isolate compromised host
Response actionPrevent further payload delivery and lateral movement from the unauthorized remote-access client.
-
Analyst remediation review
Analyst taskVerify the findings, identify the management server used to issue the commands, and audit for persistence.
-
Close out hunt
Analyst taskRecord findings and findings to improve standing detections.
Coverage
Scenario coverage
| Stage | Covered | How, or why not |
|---|---|---|
| ScreenConnect Management Abuse T1190 |
Yes | lead-unauthorized-msi-install, msi-cmd-prevalence |
| Malicious MSI Deployment T1059 |
Yes | lead-unauthorized-msi-install |
| SCKit Payload Extraction T1059.001 |
Yes | script-block-activity |
| Persistence via Tasks and Registry T1547.001 · T1053.005 · T1562.001 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series. |
| Command and Control Infrastructure T1071 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series. |
| Technician Session Hijacking T1059.001 |
Out of scope | Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions' series. |
Blind spots
- Needs comprehensive hb_software_inventory coverage. Intruders targeting hosts without an agent will leave no traces in this hunt, creating a blind beachhead. It would answer Are unauthorized clients installed on unmanaged endpoints?. Remediation: Audit agent coverage against network-discovered ScreenConnect clients.
- Needs hb_script_activity with full PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104). Without block-level logging, the hunt identifies the loader but not the actual commands SCKit ran after decryption. It would answer What did the decoded SCKit scripts execute in memory?. Remediation: Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging via GPO for all managed endpoints.
Parameters & data
Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
lookback_days | number | 14 | Days of history to examine. |
sckit_scripts | list[string] | stage0loader.ps1, panel-lateral.ps1, panel-lateral-free.ps1, labconfig.ps1, lite-alert.ps1, trapwatch.ps1, install.ps1 | Filenames of the SCKit loader scripts identified in threat research. |
scope_hosts | list[host] | — | Hostnames to focus the behavioral search on; leave empty for fleet-wide. |
Telemetry
| Source | Category | Telemetry |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces) | endpoint | endpoint |
Source
---
analysis: A simple detection rule might flag sc.msi, but this hunt uses a gated flow
to correlate behavioral markers (c=Exploited) with script block analysis and fleet-wide
prevalence. This context allows an analyst to distinguish targeted SCKit intrusions
from legitimate MSP software maintenance.
blind_spots:
- id: unmanaged-endpoints
owner: IT Operations
question: Are unauthorized clients installed on unmanaged endpoints?
remediation: Audit agent coverage against network-discovered ScreenConnect clients.
requires: comprehensive hb_software_inventory coverage
risk: Intruders targeting hosts without an agent will leave no traces in this hunt,
creating a blind beachhead.
stage: initial-access-screenconnect-abuse
- id: no-script-block-logging
owner: Security Engineering
question: What did the decoded SCKit scripts execute in memory?
remediation: Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging via GPO for all managed endpoints.
requires: hb_script_activity with full PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID
4104)
risk: Without block-level logging, the hunt identifies the loader but not the actual
commands SCKit ran after decryption.
stage: sckit-powershell-deployment
coverage:
- stage: initial-access-screenconnect-abuse
status: covered
steps:
- lead-unauthorized-msi-install
- msi-cmd-prevalence
- stage: unauthorized-client-installation
status: covered
steps:
- lead-unauthorized-msi-install
- stage: sckit-powershell-deployment
status: covered
steps:
- script-block-activity
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote
access and target technician sessions' series.
stage: persistence-establishment
status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote
access and target technician sessions' series.
stage: c2-and-infrastructure-communication
status: out_of_scope
- reason: Belongs to another part of the 'SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote
access and target technician sessions' series.
stage: relay-trap-technician-targeting
status: out_of_scope
guardrails:
claims: no_unsupported
evidence: citation_required
missing_data: not_benign
telemetry: untrusted
hunt:
applicability: campaign-specific
handoff: promote-to-detection
justification: ScreenConnect is a high-trust administrative tool; unauthorized clients
provide persistent, unmonitored access that bypasses firewall and identity perimeters.
Verifying the integrity of the support infrastructure is critical for MSP-managed
estates.
methodology: model-assisted
trigger: intel-report
hypothesis: An intruder has abused ScreenConnect management consoles or extension
vulnerabilities to silently deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and the SCKit
loader toolkit to managed endpoints.
labels:
- hunt
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1059.001
- command and control
- execution
- initial access
- lateral movement
- persistence
name: Unauthorized ScreenConnect Client Deployment
parameters:
lookback_days:
default: '14'
description: Days of history to examine.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2026-11-13'
ref: hunt-standard
type: number
sckit_scripts:
default:
- stage0loader.ps1
- panel-lateral.ps1
- panel-lateral-free.ps1
- labconfig.ps1
- lite-alert.ps1
- trapwatch.ps1
- install.ps1
description: Filenames of the SCKit loader scripts identified in threat research.
from:
kind: article
observed: '2026-11-13'
ref: msrc-blog-sckit
type: list[string]
scope_hosts:
default: []
description: Hostnames to focus the behavioral search on; leave empty for fleet-wide.
from:
kind: manual
observed: '2026-11-13'
ref: analyst-input
type: list[host]
provenance:
authors:
- name: Huntbase hunt generation
org: huntbase.io
generated:
by: huntbase-hunt-generation
from: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/
gates:
- dry-run
- lint
- critic
model: hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview
rationale: Start with endpoints identified in the scoping query as having ScreenConnect
or ConnectWise software. Focus initial behavioral analysis on hosts showing curl
activity or silent msiexec parameters.
references:
- name: "MSRC Blog \u2014 SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target\
\ technician sessions"
url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/
related:
- hunt: sckit-persistence-mechanisms
reason: This hunt focuses on initial deployment; persistence via scheduled tasks
and run keys is handled by a sibling hunt in the series.
relation: out-of-scope-alternative
scenario:
stages:
- name: ScreenConnect Management Abuse
observables:
- Unauthorized commands issued via RMM+ extension APIs
- ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi requested with c=Exploited parameters
- Abuse of ConnectWise Automate/LabTech extensions
slug: initial-access-screenconnect-abuse
tactic: initial-access
techniques:
- T1190
- name: Malicious MSI Deployment
observables:
- curl.exe -o C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi
- msiexec.exe /i C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi /qn /norestart
- Silent installation of unauthorized ScreenConnect guest clients
slug: unauthorized-client-installation
tactic: execution
techniques:
- T1059
- name: SCKit Payload Extraction
observables:
- Stage0Loader.ps1
- Panel-Lateral.ps1
- Panel-Lateral-free.ps1
- LabConfig.ps1
- PowerShell decoder extracting toolkit using device-specific material
slug: sckit-powershell-deployment
tactic: execution
techniques:
- T1059.001
- name: Persistence via Tasks and Registry
observables:
- schtasks.exe creating malicious maintenance tasks
- Registry Run keys for SCKit launchers
- trapkit\install.ps1
- Stop-LabTrap.bat
slug: persistence-establishment
tactic: persistence
techniques:
- T1547.001
- T1053.005
- T1562.001
- name: Command and Control Infrastructure
observables:
- 185.99.255.28
- 155.94.150.39
- ns.mo7sen.dev
- sc.payproofkit.com
- cdn007-digitaldownloads.com
- relaytrap.cs
- newnewnew.gotdns.org
- soxnewwork.homedns.org
slug: c2-and-infrastructure-communication
tactic: command-and-control
techniques:
- T1071
- name: Technician Session Hijacking
observables:
- CVE-2026-84869
- RelayTrap component delivery to connecting technicians
- TrapWatch.ps1
- ToolboxRelayUploader.exe
- Lite-Alert.ps1
slug: relay-trap-technician-targeting
tactic: lateral-movement
techniques:
- T1059.001
summary: Threat actors abuse vulnerabilities in ScreenConnect server extensions
or hijacked management consoles to deploy unauthorized remote-access clients and
the SCKit malware toolkit. The campaign establishes long-term persistence on customer
endpoints to host RelayTrap, a component that targets IT technicians' workstations
with malicious payloads during support sessions.
series:
index: 1
slug: sckit-abuses-screenconnect-to-deploy-remote-access-and-target-technician-sessions
title: SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician
sessions
total: 2
severity: high
targets:
analyst:
name: Tier-2 analyst
role: analyst
endpoint:
category: endpoint
name: Endpoint telemetry (hb_ surfaces)
telemetry:
- endpoint
hunter:
agent: true
name: Hunt agent
tlp: clear
type: investigation
---
# Unauthorized ScreenConnect Client Deployment
This hunt identifies the initial entry and deployment phase of the SCKit campaign. It first scopes the estate for hosts with ScreenConnect software, then focuses on a lead query identifying silent installations (sc.msi) with session markers (c=Exploited) common in reported attacks. The hunt follows a gated flow: it only performs expensive PowerShell script analysis and fleet-wide command-line prevalence counting if the initial MSI lead is suspicious. This ensures high-fidelity triage of unauthorized support software without manual review of every legitimate installation.
## identify-screenconnect-hosts
<!-- Scope ScreenConnect installations -->
Find the hosts that currently have ScreenConnect or ConnectWise software to narrow the hunt scope.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=scoping
~~~yaml
expected: A list of hosts with ScreenConnect installed. Presence of the software is
expected; silence means the software is not inventoried or is missing from the estate.
reads:
- device_hostname
- package_name
- package_version
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_software_inventory
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, package_name, package_version FROM hb_software_inventory WHERE (LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%screenconnect%' OR LOWER(package_name) LIKE '%connectwise%')
```
## lead-unauthorized-msi-install
<!-- Lead: Silent MSI deployment with exploited markers -->
Identify suspicious MSI installations involving sc.msi or session markers like c=Exploited initiated via curl or msiexec.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=detection-candidate params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: Command lines showing curl downloading sc.msi or msiexec installing it silently.
The presence of session markers in the URL is a high-confidence lead.
reads:
- device_hostname
- process_cmd_line
- user_name
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_process_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, process_cmd_line, user_name, time FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%msiexec%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%curl%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## evaluate-lead
<!-- Evaluate MSI installation lead -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- lead-unauthorized-msi-install
max_iterations: 3
objective: Determine if the command lines in lead-unauthorized-msi-install match the
research for SCKit deployment, specifically focusing on unauthorized download sources
or c=Exploited markers.
success_criteria: A per-host verdict of suspicious or benign, citing specific command
strings.
tools:
- endpoint
```
## gate-on-lead
<!-- Gate on lead verdict -->
if~: "the evaluate-lead verdict is suspicious for at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → gather-sckit-evidence
indeterminate: → analyst-remediation-review
unavailable: → analyst-remediation-review (blind_spot: unmanaged-endpoints)
else: → close-out-hunt
## gather-sckit-evidence
<!-- Gather SCKit evidence -->
parallel:
- → script-block-activity
- → msi-cmd-prevalence
join: → triage-deployment
## script-block-activity
<!-- SCKit toolkit script execution -->
Identify the execution of the PowerShell-based decoders and loaders that extract the SCKit toolkit.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=enrichment params=(lookback_days=lookback_days, sckit_scripts=sckit_scripts, scope_hosts=scope_hosts)
~~~yaml
expected: Script blocks matching the toolkit logic. Finding these on the same hosts
as the MSI lead strongly corroborates a compromise.
reads:
- device_hostname
- script_name
- script_content
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_script_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT device_hostname, script_name, script_content, time FROM hb_script_activity WHERE (instr(',' || '{{sckit_scripts}}' || ',', ',' || LOWER(script_name) || ',') > 0 OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%panel-lateral%' OR LOWER(script_content) LIKE '%relaytrap%') AND ('{{scope_hosts}}' = '' OR instr(',' || '{{scope_hosts}}' || ',', ',' || device_hostname || ',') > 0) AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days')
```
## msi-cmd-prevalence
<!-- Prevalence of MSI installation commands -->
Stack-count the installation commands to separate legitimate fleet-wide management activity from unique, attacker-controlled outliers.
```sqlite target=endpoint role=baseline params=(lookback_days=lookback_days)
~~~yaml
baseline:
compare: first_seen
window: '{{lookback_days}}d'
expected: Command lines seen on only one or two hosts. Genuine MSP maintenance will
typically have high host counts.
prevalence:
by: device_hostname
key:
- cmd
rare_below: 3
reads:
- process_cmd_line
- device_hostname
- time
silence: not_evidence_of_absence
source: hb_process_activity
verified: dry-run
verified_at: '2026-11-14'
~~~
SELECT LOWER(process_cmd_line) AS cmd, COUNT(DISTINCT device_hostname) AS hosts, MIN(time) AS first_seen FROM hb_process_activity WHERE (LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%sc.msi%' OR LOWER(process_cmd_line) LIKE '%c=exploited%') AND time >= datetime('now', '-{{lookback_days}} days') GROUP BY 1 HAVING hosts <= 3
```
## triage-deployment
<!-- Triage deployment activity -->
```agent target=hunter
cite: required
context:
- evaluate-lead
- script-block-activity
- msi-cmd-prevalence
max_iterations: 6
objective: Determine if the host was targeted by SCKit by weighing the rarity of its
MSI installation command line against the presence of known toolkit PowerShell script
blocks.
success_criteria: A per-host verdict citing specific rows from process and script
surfaces.
tools:
- endpoint
```
## route-on-triage
<!-- Route on triage verdict -->
if~: "the triage-deployment verdict is malicious for at least one host" (confidence: high, judge=hunter)
then: → contain-host
indeterminate: → analyst-remediation-review
unavailable: → analyst-remediation-review (blind_spot: unmanaged-endpoints)
else: → analyst-remediation-review
## contain-host
<!-- Isolate compromised host -->
```action target=endpoint
~~~yaml
approval: required
~~~
Isolate the host from the network immediately. Capture a forensic image and the unauthorized sc.msi installer for analysis.
```
→ analyst-remediation-review
## analyst-remediation-review
<!-- Analyst remediation review -->
```manual target=analyst
Review the triage evidence. Identify the origin of the management commands (e.g., vulnerable RMM+ extension). Audit the registry and scheduled tasks for follow-on SCKit persistence components.
```
→ close-out-hunt
## close-out-hunt
<!-- Close out hunt -->
```manual target=analyst
Log the number of affected hosts and the specific command line markers identified. If markers like c=Exploited are confirmed malicious, promote them to a standing detection rule.
```
→ end
Run it
Take this hunt into your environment.
Open it in Huntbase to run every step against your own connections, with Scout weighing the evidence and your analysts in command. Or take the open hunt.md file anywhere that reads the format.
Machine-drafted by huntbase-hunt-generation using hb_google/gemini-3-flash-preview, gated by dry-run, lint, critic, then reviewed by a person.